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"Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?"
From Choruses from the 'The Rock' by T. S. Eliot (1934)
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Abstract
The Ph.D. thesis looks extensively at the history and functions of trade marks and
attempts to outline a theory for trade mark protection established on their
communicative aspects. The second chapter is a historical note which looks at trade
marks as traces of history and sets the grounds for a functional analysis. The third
chapter deals with the proprietary aspects of trade marks, seeking to establish a
theoretical deontological argument for their legal protection. The functional analysis of
trade marks concentrates on their contemporary role as a fiat of information between
marketers, consumers and competitors. The economic analysis is developed around the
dualistic nature of trade marks, being on the one hand an essential prerequisite for
competition and on the other a potentially perpetual monopoly. The balance between the
two as depicted by their legal protection is being continuously re-established. The main
object of this thesis is to show that it is the nature of trade marks as a multidirectional
system of exchange of information that must form the basis for their protection.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Defining trade marks as communicators and assets
A trade mark is a sign which is used to distinguish the products of one enterprise from
those of other enterprises. Its utility in the marketplace seems straightforward: the sign
communicates to the consumer the idea that the trade marked product is linked with a
marketer using the trade mark. The product comes from "a" source, probably not easily
traceable but still "a" source.
For the trade mark to fulfil this function the consumer must trust the conveyed idea: s/he
must be reasonably confident that indeed all products marked in the same way derive
from the same source or at least that there is a bond between the actual manufacturer or
provider of the product and the "owner" of the trade mark that legitimises its use.
In order to protect the validity of the sign as a conveyor of this simple idea the law
conferred an exclusive right to the "owner" of the trade mark: whoever is recognised by
the law as lawful owner will be able to control the use of the trade mark in relation to
the trade marked products. The trade mark is protected as a communicator. The owner
may use it, allow others to use it, or exclude others from using it. In return the "owner"
must satisfy whatever requirements are set by the law.
But because of this protection trade marks provide, together with patents, copyright, and
design rights, ways of protecting elements of a product. The protected element may be
protected exclusively as a trade mark or it may enjoy overlapping protection if the
11
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requirements set by the law are satisfied. What distinguishes trade marks from the other
rights is first that trade mark rights are potentially indefinite in duration and second that
they are "... subject to conditions that are far from onerous".' Accordingly, marketers,
"... aware of the potency of these rights, have sought to exploit them through
brand-building, advertising, promotion and product development in order to
create a protectable "bond" the consumer. The benefits of such investment have
been enormous: customer loyalty, reliable cash flows and steady and growing
market share. And as a result, the trademark has become an asset of considerable
economic value".2
1.2. Some trade mark problems
Trade marks have been protected by the law traditionally as communicators of
information and gradually they have become valuable assets. Due to this partial
transformation and the interrelation with other rights protecting elements of a product
there are many possibilities for conflict.
Firstly, conflicts may arise between the often disparate claims by a large number of
interested parties: the entity that is recognised by the law as the owner of the trade mark;
the entity using the trade mark with or without the authorisation of the owner;
competing marketers who want to copy elements of the product that may or may not be
protected as trade marks; brand owners at a local or national level demanding protection
against brand owners at a wider or international level; consumers that demand absolute
assurance that the message conveyed by a trade mark is true; sophisticated consumers
that prefer choice over price; price sensitive consumers that do not care about choice;
governmental organisations recording and/or conferring trade mark rights; governments
attempting to balance the interests of their own national marketers with the pressures
exercised by the governments of foreign marketers.
T. BLACKETT, Trademarks (I-loundmills, Macmillan Press, 1998), at xiv.
2 Ibid; Blackett quotes John Stuart, Former Chairman of Quaker, stating: "[i]f this business were to be
split up, I would be glad to take the brands, trademarks and goodwill and you could have all the cash
and bricks and mortar - and I would fare better than you".
12
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Secondly, conflicts may arise as to the complementing or contradicting scope of rights
aiming to regulate the same subject matter. A product element may be protected as a
trade mark, under a patent, a design right, and/or copyright. The justification and the
resulting extent of protection may differ in each case. Each time we will have to answer
the question of which right will take precedence when there are contradictions.
1.3. The scope and objectives of this thesis
The list of potential conflicts can be endless; however they all relate to a very primary
question: how do we establish the basis of trade mark protection? This is the question
that this thesis attempts to describe by detecting some common threads in the various
trade mark "problems" described above. The scope of the thesis is not to provide a
definite answer on the basis of the trade mark protection but rather to underline a
characteristic of trade marks that dominates in all their functions, is enmeshed in the
interests of all involved parties, and also forms the hypothesis of this work. The
common threads will prove that trade marks consist predominantly of information
themselves but also function as conveyors of information. And if this is established then
it should also constitute the rationale of any chosen basis of protection.
1.4. The tools for evaluating the hypothesis
In evaluating the hypothesis of this thesis reference is made to trade mark jurisprudence
developed mainly in the United Kingdom and the United States with some references to
other jurisdictions that point to the universality of trade mark questions.
Legal literature and property theories are employed as a theoretical basis delineating the
deontological justification of a system of trade mark protection.
Basic economics and theories concentrating on consumption and industrial economics
are used as the tools for a consequentialist review and justification of the role of trade
marks in the marketplace.
13
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Finally, the empirical part of this study is based extensively on news items and press
cuttings providing a snapshot of trade mark problems and developments and a way for
comparing a more current situation with the overall trade mark history.
1.5. An outline of the parts
In order to uncover the common threads that will help us come close to a conclusion the
thesis is divided into four more or less self contained parts/chapters.
First, trade marks are viewed from a historical perspective. Their ancient historical
lineage will provide evidence of transformations in their functions but also of very deep
rooted trade mark "basics" that have survived almost unchanged. At the same time trade
marks are considered as part of history themselves giving us information on the
continuity of, and interplay between, civilisations.
Then, trade marks will be tested as objects of property using classical property theories.
The discussion will concentrate on whether trade marks can be considered as the subject
matter of property rights, the exclusionary nature of trade mark rights, and finally on
who should be considered the owner of trade marks.
Thirdly, an overview of trade mark functions will be attempted focusing equally on the
consumer's understanding of trade marks on the one hand and on a two way system of
communication between consumers and marketers on the other.
Fourthly, the economics of trade marks will be examined, stressing the contrasting
images of trade marks as the absolute prerequisite for competition on the one hand and a
powerful tool for the enforcement of monopolies on the other.
In the concluding chapter the hypothesis of this thesis will be reiterated by
recapitulating the main arguments of the preceding parts and summing up the relation
between the deontological and consequentialist analysis of trade marks.
14
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The bibliography incorporates full references to all the sources mentioned in the thesis,
including news items and newspaper articles.
15
A Synopsis of Trade Mark History
CHAPTER TWO'
A SYNOPSIS OF TRADE MARK HISTORY
2.1. Introduction
Today it is commonly accepted that the archetypes of intellectual property have deep
historical roots. Suchman argues that intellectual property rights existed in primitive
societies interrelated with magic rituals. 2 Gradually, from the Greeks and the Romans
onwards, property interests in intellectual creations were specifically founded first on
social conventions and religious doctrines, and later on laws. 3 Posner is more sceptical
and refers to the absence of secrecy in primitive societies, which negated the prospect of
concealment, and the lack either of formal rights to intellectual property or of a pattern
of public subsidy of innovation. But, he is doing so mainly to support the argument that
failure to remunerate innovators explains tardiness in the accretion of knowledge and
economic development in primitive societies. 4 Other writers, instead, stress that the link
A version of this chapter forms part of a wider essay on the history of trade marks, I. MADIEHA
AZMI, S. M. MANIATIS and B. SODIPO, "Distinctive Signs and Early Markets: Europe, Africa and
Islam", in A. FIRTH (ed.), Perspectives on Intellectual Property (Volume 1) - The Prehistory and
Development of Intellectual Property Systems (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), which provides a
more complete historical sketch and looks at trade marks and market regulation, from a wider socio-
cultural perspective, in Europe, pre-literate societies in Africa and Islamic jurisdictions, and
concludes that despite the, often, extreme, societal differences the gap between earlier and modem
functions of marks, or between functions in diverse societies, is probably narrower than we tend to
believe. In all cases trade marks are used to convey information. And in most cases the information
relates to the type, quality and characteristics, of a product or the reputation of a trader.
2 M.C. SUCHMAN,. "Invention and Ritual: Notes on the Interrelation of Magic and Intellectual Property
in Preliterate Societies", 89 Columbia Law Review 1264 (1989).
Copyright in particular; see H.C. STREIBICH, "The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual Property:
Part I - From the Beginning to the Age of Printing", 6 Memphis St. University Law Review 1(1975).
R.A. POSNER, "A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law", 23 Journal of Law
& Economics 1 (1980).
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of culture with rights may be comprehended only after considering the exchange
structure of primitive "gift" economies. So, the rights covered by the term "intellectual
property" can be identified as part of a creative activity, private in its expressive aspect
and commercial in its public exchange function. This duality sets the basis for
conceiving intellectual property rights as an evolution within the framework of natural
rights.5
However, despite anthropological and historical research, trade marks have suffered
from what has been described as
"... a touching absence of curiosity among English lawyers. Institutions which
are in the very heart of modem business life, the fountain heads of not ungrateful
streams of litigation, are accepted as though, like the image Ephesus, they fell
direct from heaven for the benefit of a deserving profession".6
F. I. Schechter adds that,
"... nowhere is the obscurity of the origins and at the same time the "touching
absence of curiosity" concerning these origins more apparent than in the field of
the law of trade-marks".7
Although this was written as early as 1925, unfortunately, it describes a wider attitude
of scholars and practitioners towards the history of trade marks. The work of Schechter
endures as the main comprehensive study of the origins of trade marks. The majority of
other commentaries on the historical roots of trade marks are fragmentary, often
obsolete, and based primarily on earlier publications.
Nevertheless, the ambition for a detailed and original research would require the
qualifications of an anthropologist rather than those of a lawyer. Accordingly, this
chapter does not pretend to be an in depth comparative analysis of the history of trade
J. BERG, "Moral Rights: A Legal, Historical and Anthropological Reappraisal", 6 (Canadian)
Intellectual Property Journal 341 (1991).
6 E. JENKS, Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, iii, at 51, as quoted by F.I.
SCHECHTER in The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks (1925), at 3.
SCHECTER (1925), at 4.
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marks. Its scope is to provide a short review of the relevant literature and a draft
historical and cultural sketch. In parallel it aims to highlight the progressive changes of
the notion and the functions of trade marks rather than provide a meticulous
chronological chart.
Since the development of trade marks' functions and historical chronology forms part of
a very intricate web, classifications are inevitably arbitrary. Diamond, divides his review
according to historical periods. 8 McClure,9 talks about the "early formative" period, the
"formalist", the "legal realist", and finally the "modern" periods. Some classify trade mark
functions under "proprietary" and "regulatory", or "merchant" and "production" marks,
others under diverse headings.
This synopsis is divided into three sections: the antiquity, the middle ages, and the
modem period. The middle ages are liberally extended from the disintegration of the
Roman Empire in western Europe up to the end of the eighteenth century. The third
period coincides with the industrial revolution and the ensuing demand for a more
inclusive and effective protection of industrial property.
2.2. Antiquity
Many authors dealing with the history of trade marks concur that the branding of
animals is the earliest form of marking.'° There are numerous indications of the practice
of branding animals ranging, geographically, from wall paintings in ancient Egypt, to
cave drawings in south-eastern Europe, 1 ' and evidence of ear-cut branding of cattle in
S.A. DIAMOND, "The Historical Development of Trademarks", 65 TMR 265 (1975).
D.M. McCLURE, "Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought", 69
TMR 305 (1979).
DIAMOND (1965), at 266, citing W. H. BROWNE, A Treatise on the Law of Trade-Marks and
Analogous Subjects (1898), submitting, at 5, that "brand" derives from the Anglo-Saxon verb
meaning "to bum".
G. RUSTON, "On the Origin of Trademarks", 45 TMR 127 (1955), at 128-129, claims that the
simple design-marks used for branding could be either an origin of the ancient alphabets or proof of
an existing system of "picture-writing".
18
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Madagascar,' 2 and chronologically, from the late Stone Age, to the contemporary
branding of cattle, timber and so on.
A second valuable source of knowledge is pottery. Pottery, as a craft, has developed
independently throughout the ancient world. There is evidence of mark affixing on
pottery from prehistoric settlements at Tordos in Transylvania,' 3 Corinth in mainland
Greece,' 4 on jars and tools buried in tombs of the First Dynasty at Abydos in Egypt, and
at the palaces of the Minoan period in Crete, where there are also specimens of seals and
similar devices used to indicate on the jars the sort of their contents, quantities, and
often the origin of the product.' 5 Similar examples are found in China, where the name
of the maker, or of the place of origin, of clay or porcelain pots was imprinted on the
surface of the pots together with the name of the ruling Emperor.'6
Inscriptions on bricks found in Egypt and Mesopotamia are another testimony. The
inscriptions give the names of the manufacturer/entrepreneur andlor the actual maker, of
the owner of the building where the bricks were used, and sometimes of the ruling king.
Often they are accompanied by signs evidencing and certifying the approval of the
competent official asserting that they were properly dried, over the necessary period of
two to five years, and therefore safe to use.'7
12 B. RUDOFSKY, Notes on Early Trademarks and Related Matters, in E. JACOBSON (ed.), Seven
Designers Look at Trademark Design (Chicago, P. Theobald, 1952) at 38; notching of this type is
practiced today not only by "primitive" societies but also by modem farmers in, for example, Scotland.
' RUSTON (1955), at 134.
14 SCHECHTER (1925), at 20, mentions the ruins revealed at Korakou.
15 RUSTON (1955), at 130-131. In Cyclades and Crete in the Aegean, and in Egypt important
civilisations have already been developed by 3500 B.C. Indications of origin on containers in the
Minoan palaces could be an indication of regional protectionism: they were used for enforcing tariffs on
imported products; see also M.H. WIENER, The Nature and Control of Minoan Foreign Trade (c. 1993,
Imprint).
16 A.S. GREENBERG, "The Ancient Lineage of Trade-Marks", 33 Journal of the Patent Office Society
876 (1951), at 878. The extensive use of stamps of family or house marks in China is a development
which deserves further research.
' B.G. PASTER, "Trademarks - Their Early History", 59 TMR 551 (1969), at 552-553. E. S.
ROGERS, "Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks", IX Michigan Law Review 28 (1910),
at 29-30. This seal of approval is an early example of the use of a mark as a certification mark.
19
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Similar illustrations of trade mark use are the archaeological findings of ruins of
masonry in, among other sites, Egypt, Olympia and other locations in Greece, and
Damascus in Syria. 18 They consistently provide the names of the manufacturer and/or
the actual maker, and often the names of the ruling king and the owner of the building
where the bricks were used. Most of these signs record the name of the stone-cutter
and/or of the individual worker, probably as evidence of labour in order to calculate
wages.'9
The use of trade marks escalates in the course of time coinciding with the expansion of
trade,2° and the development of civilisations in Greece and Rome.
2.2.1. The Greeks and the Romans
The Greeks marked most of their works of art with the name of the sculptor, or in the
case of pottery with the names of the maker and/or decorator. There is also evidence of
device marks such as figures of Hermes, bees, lions' heads, and so on. 2 ' Greeks also
marked products destined for exportation in order to indicate their origin. For example
jars containing the famous wine of Thasos were marked; the mark consists of the name
RUDOFSKY (1952), at 3-5.
BROWNE (1898) at 8, cited by DIAMOND (1965), at 270. See also PASTER (1969), at 553, stating
that during Solomon's reign Phoenician builders and mechanics painted signs of origin on the stone
blocks in vermillion paint to prove their claim to wages.
20 GREENBERG (1951), at 877, mentions that Hindus were consistently marking their goods when
trading developed between India and Asia Minor during 1300-1200 B.C.
21 ROGERS (1910), at 30, citing also KOHLER, Dan Rehgt des Markenshutzes (1884, Wurzburg).
Rogers also mentions an early instance of counterfeiting: Greek inscriptions found on Etruscan vases
could be either the result of widespread trade or of unauthorised copying of renowned marks. See also
W.H. BEWCHAMP, History of Ancient Pottery: Greek, Etruscan and Roman - Based on the Work of S.
BIRCH) (London, J. Murray, 1905) at 519-520. T.B.L. WEBSTER in Potter and Patron in Classical
Athens (London, Methuen, 1972), provides a historical index based on potters and painters, the depicted
subjects, and buyers, including patrons in Athens, ordinary purchasers in Athens, and traders who
purchased for the export trade. At 77 and 286, for example, he refers to a vane found in the Sicilian city
of Gela, which was probably commissioned, in about 510 B.C. by a Sicilian in Athens. The vase
represents the death of the tyrant Hipparchos and it is suggested that another Sicilian subsequently
bought the vase influenced by the depicted subject, having the local Sicilian tyrant in mind.
20
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of the island as a denomination of origin and a device indicating the wine maker and the
name of an official guaranteeing the quality of the wine.22
The Etruscans and Romans used marks in a similar manner. Famous cheeses and wines
were marked either with names or devices. 23 They also marked extensively many sorts
of pottery (bricks, jars, etc.) with the names of their makers, and/or of their workshops
as places of manufacture, or simply the names of the workers who actually made them.
These were accompanied by simple devices (such as moons, circles, squares and so on),
the names of their owners, dedications to deities, acciamations used in games or
references to historical events and other significant personal or public episodes.24
Among the range of products for which marks where used by the Romans there are
some which deserve particular mention. First is the case of Roman oil lamps, which
were traded throughout Europe. It appears that the mark of the most famous maker,
"Fortis", was counterfeited extensively in places such as France, Holland, Germany,
Spain and Britain.25 At the end it became a generic name for a variety of lamps.26
Another example confirming the diversity of branded goods, is the affixing of the name
of the doctor who formulated and produced an eye ointment and marked the packaging
of his preparation with his name. 27 Signs of shops and trade names, mostly carved on
stone, were commonly used by Greeks, Etruscans, and Romans.28
22 RUSTON (1955), at 132.
23 RUSTON ibid cites a writer stating that: "[t]he Etruscan cheese was marked with the sign of the
moon". Rogers states that the cheese of Luna was marked with the picture of the city, ROGERS
(1910) at 31; note that "luna" means "moon". Although Ruston's interpretation of Roger's passage is
vague most of the subsequent writers follow Ruston.
24 RUSTON (1955), at 132-133, where another occasion of counterfeiting is mentioned: imitations of
Roman potteries, in fact made in Belgium, were imported in Britain as if of true Roman origin. See
also ROGERS (1910), at 30-31 and DIAMOND (1965), at 270-271. Diamond, making a cross
reference to Ruston, reports the innovative Roman potter Lupus who used the design of a wolf's head
as a trade mark. The meaning of"Lupus" in Latin is "wolf'.
25 RIJDOFSKY (1952), at 5-6.
26 DIAMOND (1975), at 271; a good example of the degeneration of a famous trade mark to genericity.
27 GREENBERG (1951), at 879.
28 GREENBERG ibid, at 880. RUSTON (1955), at 133, maintains that amongst the signs found in
Pompeii and Herculaneum were that of a goat for a dairy and a man beating a boy for the services of a
school master. ROGERS (1910), at 31, gives the example of the Elephant Inn in Pompeii with the sign
21
A Synopsis of Trade Mark History
2.2.2. Legal provisions in antiquity
The plethora of trade mark usages is not, however, supported by an analogous
abundance of legal provisions. 29 It is probable that the administration, if any, of trade
mark application and use relied on customs of traders and self imposed rules that
governed each sector of commerce. Such has been the conventional practice regarding
other forms of intellectual property.3°
Under Roman lawfl there existed two kinds of action conceivably related to the marking
of goods. First, under the Lex Cornelia de injuriis, c. 81 B.C., there existed the potentiality
of public prosecution of anyone who took the name of another for profit; albeit there is no
evidence that the same applied to trade marks. And second, under the actio injuriarum
andlor the actio doli, a right was accorded to the purchaser of falsely marked goods to
bring an action based on injury or deceit and intent. But this right did not extend to the
rightful owner of the mark. Therefore apparently there is no traceable cause of action for a
trade mark proprietor.32
In any case our understanding of the actual Greek and Roman legal systems is far from
complete and the lack of evidence of a trade mark action as such is not conclusive.
of an elephant and an advertising message in Latin meaning "an inn with a dining room with three
comfortable couches".
29 RUSTON (1955), at 134, mentions that under the Jus Gentium - the Roman Commercial Law - there
were two kinds of action related to the marking of goods. The first was public prosecution against
anyone who took the name of another for profit, under the Lex Cornelia; however, there is no
traceable evidence to establish that the same applied to trade marks. The second was protection
available to the purchaser of falsely marked goods, under either the Actio In] uriarum or the Actio
Doll; but, again, there is no evidence that these actions were available to the rightful owner of the
mark.
° STREIBICH (1975), at 6, states that the enforcement of intellectual property rights was the exception
rather than the rule and refers, as an example, to a case where all the other entrants, apart from the
winner, to a literary competition in Athens, were disqualified because they copied the works of other
authors.
31 Note that under the lus Gentium (law of nations) and/or by the introduction of trading practices the
lus Civile (the law the Romans initially applied exclusively amongst themselves) became
progressively applicable to d yes (Roman citizens) and peregrini (foreigners) alike. See A.M.
PRICHARD, Leage's Roman Private Law (London, Macmillan, 1967), at 56-59.
32 B. POUILLET, Traite des Marques de Fabrique et de Ia Concurrence Déloyale en tous Genres (Paris,
Marcall & Godde, 1912) at 2, citing KOHLER (1889), at V t. 2, 805.See also RUSTON (1955), at 134.
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"That no trace of such an action is found in the commentaries of the Roman
jurists is not surprising considering the fragmentary condition of those
commentaries at present, especially as it is certain, from existing writings and
inscriptions, that there were many legal institutions of the Roman Empire,
concerning which we have no juristic commentaries. Jurists and schools of
jurists have their prejudices, and there are institutions which have been favoured
or neglected in juristic commentaries, from purely artificial reasons. A nation is
always richer in legal institutions than is indicated by its legal and judicial
writings, however full and complete they may be. It would not be the less
certain, that there existed manufacturers' marks and a system for their protection
in Rome, if we had the originals of the Roman jurists' writings before us, instead
of the compilers' extracts of them, and if we found nothing on the subject in
them."33
Finally, we must remark here that many Greek or Latin words function as modern trade
marks. Nike, for example, the ancient Greek personification of Victory is used for sports
equipment, Nivea, deriving from Latin niveus - meaning snow white - is used for
toiletries. Flora is used for margarine, Kouros, the typical male figure in Greek
sculpture, is used for men's toiletries. The whole pantheon of the Olympians is used for
almost every imaginable product. Finally, Mars is used for chocolate bars, only that this
time, and as if to underline the ongoing transformation of language, the name derives
from the Mars family rather than the god of war.34
2.3. The middle ages
The expanding trade mark use during the historical period up to the disintegration of the
Roman Empire is followed by a steep decline in western Europe which persisted almost
to the twelfth century. During the same period in Byzantium there is evidence of
continuity in respect of masons' and other craftsmen marks. 35 In western Europe the main
trace of marking was upon weaponry, sword blades in particular. These were initially
manufactured in the Rhineland by the Germans who, continuing a regional Roman
KOHLER (1889), at 41, cited by ROGERS (1910), at 32.
See for more such fascinating connections E. GREDLEY, "Is Your Trade Mark Classic", [1993] 30
Managing Intellectual Property 31.
DIAMOND (1975), at 270.
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tradition, marked the blades with makers' marks and then exported them all over
Europe. The remaining parts, in order to create a complete sword, were added by local
craftsmen. The same tactic of marking weaponry was followed in England by the
Saxons at the later part of the period.36
Diamond combines the decline in western Europe with the weakening of all forms of
learning, the lack of notable innovations and a stalemate of growth of trade which
stagnated in a "primitive", regional form. Illiterate and poor craftsmen and merchants
with a localised trade, and no reason or means for marking their products.37
During the period after the twelfth century knowledge, innovation, economy and trade
prospered and expanded. Trade marks responded with a parallel growth. Having more
room to grow the trade mark prototypes thrived. The first identifiable grouping is that of
personal, house or family marks. Such marks, originally distinguishing each one's
possessions, gradually evolved to means for identifying also the individuals possessing
the goods, their families and their houses. And for those who pursued a commercial
activity these marks consequently denoted their existence in that particular field,
individualising them from the rest of the other traders, innkeepers, yeomen and so on.
This process transformed the coats of arms, signets, and all similar signs to shop-signs
and trade marks.38
The same house marks, or other marks devised independently, continued to serve as
proprietary marks - designating the owner of the goods. The goods varied from animals,
tools, valuables and any object subjected to trade or transport to virtually everything
susceptible to marking, even humans in the case of prisoners and slaves. 39 For instance it
has been reported that, early in the fourteenth century, balls of wax salvaged after a
36 RUSTON (1955), at 135.
" DIAMOND (1975), at 272 and RUDOFSKY (1952), at 13. In this way the extent of use of trade
marks can be seen as an indicator of growth and social wealth.
RUSTON (1955), at 136-137; DIAMOND (1965), at 272.
DIAMOND, ibid, at 273.
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shipwreck were sorted between their owners according to the affixed marks, 4° or that the
Sheriff of Devon seized tuns of wine, looted by pirates but later recognised from their
affixed seals at a local inn, and returned them to their Spanish owner. 4 ' The picture of
the proprietary mark is completed with the British peculiarity of marks cut in the skin of
the swans' beaks. The Crown granted the swan marks to nobles, as evidence of
privilege, who could then claim ownership of the royal birds. 42 In general, the
proprietary function of the trade mark which qualified as prima facie and often
conclusive evidence of ownership all over Europe, in statute and case law alike,
remained predominant in the minds of the legal profession and, to some extent proved
prejudicial for the conceptualisation of trade marks and the understanding of their varied
functions.43
2.3.1. Appellations of origin
Here, we will look first at the appellation of origin marks which after the twelfth century
covered a wide range of products and geographical regions. Clothiers in England
adopted such marks which eventually were transformed to designate fabrics of superior
quality. 44 Manufacturers of tapestries in central Europe marked their products with
personal marks, indications of city - origin and later with seals guaranteeing quality.45
Wine, of course, continued to bear denominations of origin and the case of the
innkeeper who was hanged, by the Elector Palatine, because he passed off cheap wine as
° DIAMOND, ibid, at 273.
' SCHECHTER (1925), at 28, 1346 being the year of the incident. At 34 he refers to another case of
similar use: British merchants who had properly registered their marks in Florence and were able to
reclaim their goods when the buyer, an Italian trader in Florence, went bankrupt.
42 SCHECHTER, ibid, at 35-37.
SCHECHTER, ibid. at 34.
4° SCHECHTER, ibid, at 94-95.
4° DIAMOND (1975), at 273.
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Rudesheimer is an anecdotal account of criminal punishment depending on the erratic
stance of rulers and judges.46
Note too that modem rights to appellations of origin are established on deeply rooted
traditions. The name of Vinsanto, for example, is established in Greece, as the name of
the wine originating from the Greek island of Santorini (Santo-Erini). But the Italians in
Tuscany also produce a wine variety known as Vino Santo, produced under the same
process, using semi-dried grapes. In deciding who has the right to the name as an
appellation of origin the parties had to go back to the fifteenth century and establish that
the Vinsanto was already known then throughout the ports of Levante (south-eastern
Mediterranean) as a wine from Santorini. According to a Florentine tale the Tuscany
wine was known as Vin Pretto, until 1439, when the Greek Patriarch had lunch with the
Pope and tasting the divine wine said "... ma questo e vino di Xanto", referring to a
wine from another Greek region. The others thought that he claimed that this was a Vino
Santo (holy, in Italian) and so the wine was baptised.47
Registers of "origin" trade marks were common, especially in cities which were big
transport centres or where "guilds", manufacturers' and traders' unions, had developed,
like Dantzig, Antwerp, and Florence.
2.3.2. Marks of craftsmen and artists
Some trade marks were created independently from house marks. For example in the
thirteenth century bell founders started to mark their products. 48 Similarly, it became the
rule for carpenters, stone masons, tile manufacturers, potters and other artisans to mark
RUSTON (1955), at 140-141. The French had also adopted severe punishments against passing off of
wine in an attempt to protect the quality of French wines and the resulting goodwill.
See: The Vinsanto of Santorini (Athens, Boutari (Fani) Foundation, 1995); 0. TACHIS, II Libro del
Vin Santo (in Italian) (Firenze, 1988); and S. KOURAKOU., VinSanto Tales and History of a Wine
Variety (in Greek), Kathimerini, June 30, 1996.
DIAMOND (1975), at 274, illustrates this with the example of Swiss beilfounders; RUSTON (1955), at
138.
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their products with their names or initials and/or simple designs. 49
 Artists "reinvent" the
Greek and Roman habit of signing all their artistic creations with production marks
combining indications of origin and the pride of the artist.5°
The "absence of any notion of property in literary work", 5 ' at least property perceived
formally as a legally enforceable right, and the fact that the only way of preserving the
classics and the texts of the Church was by copying them, compelled the pioneers of
printing to adopt marks in order to distinguish their editions and protect their goodwill.
Petitions for printing privileges, mainly from the printers rather than authors soon
followed. 52 Monograms and devices such as a dolphin and an anchor or a printing
apparatus were used. The preface to the 1518 Aldus edition of Livy vividly depicts the
antagonism between trade mark owners and counterfeiters.
"Lastly, I must draw the attention of the student to the fact that some Florentine
printers, seeing that they could not equal our diligence in correcting and printing,
have resorted to their usual artifices. To Aldus's Institutiones Gramaticae,
printed in their offices, they have affixed our well known sign of the Dolphin
wound round the Anchor. But they have so managed that any person who is in
the least acquainted with the books of our production, cannot fail to observe that
this is an impudent fraud. For the head of the Dolphin is turned to the left,
whereas that of ours is well known to be turned to the right."53
In our days the heads of crocodiles and polo horses are known to suffer likewise.
RUSTON, ibid, at 13 8-139.
50 DIAMOND (1975), at 274. PASTER (1969), at 556-557 refers to G.H. PUTMAN, H - Books and Their
Makers During the Middle Ages (1897), at 409, who cites a German decree of 1512, concerning Durer,
the use and copying of his signature; "...a certain foreigner, who sells engravings..., has, among others,
certain ones bearing the signature of Albrecht Durer,...it is ordered that he shall obliterate all such
signatures, and keep no more such engravings in future, and if he shall neglect so to do, he shall be
brought before the Council for fraud". The work of Durer as an artistic creation was open to the copyist,
but Durer should retain for himself the right to put in the market genuine Durer printings and exploit his
fame.
' ROGERS (1910) at 35. CORNISH W.R., in Intellectual Property (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996),
at 297-299, provides a short but comprehensive review.
52 In 1534 printers started to obtain protection from the Crown in Britain; similar privileges were
introduced sooner or later all over Europe. Statutory protection was introduced for the first time in 1710
in Britain. For a review see R.L. PAITERSON, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville,
Vanderbilt University Press, 1968).
" Cited by ROGERS (1910), at 35-36.
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2.3.3. Trade marks and guilds
We now move on to the monopolistic use of exclusive marks by members of guilds, the
localised and specialist unions of craftsmen. 54 Forming such unions was a common
method of organising and regulating industry and trade. Guilds were capable, because of
the initially limited and territorial development of trade in the Middle Ages, of
exercising a rigid monopoly against importation of products similar to the products of
their own members, erecting barriers against newcomers in the craft, and fixing
monopolistic prices. 55 The efficacy and ethics of the guild system have been often
contested.
"Under a careful scrutiny of contemporary evidence of gild life and activity, the
charming picture of the gilds [sic] as "organised to maintain the Just Price"
exalted though highly theoretical canons of "fair trade" soon fades out."56
The obvious means to distinguish members of such organisations and to police the
exertion of the monopoly was to formulate a mark for each guild and oblige the
members to affix it upon their products. Initially they preferred to use exclusively a
single guild mark, a practice stressing the power of the guild and the insignificance of
the individual manufacturer/trader who was able to trade only under the rules set by the
guild. 57 Later they conceded to the combined affixation of the guild mark together with a
A.P. EVANS provides a lucid description of the "guild system" in "The Problem of Control in Medieval
Industry", XXXVI Political Science Quarterly 610 (1921).
G.F. RENARD in Guilds in the Middle Ages (edited by G.D.H. COLE originally in 1918; reprinted:
New York, A.M. Kelley, 1968) provides a classic work on the matter. W. STUBBS, in the
Constitutional History of England, vol. 3, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1903) terms the self-regulatory law
that the guilds had developed as "guild jurisprudence".
56 F.I. SCHECHTER, "Trade Morals and Regulation: The American Scene", 6 Fordham Law Review 190
(1937), at 193, fn. 11. SCI{ECHTER (1925) also states, at 164, that policing marks, apart from
fortifying the guilds' monopolies, also enforced "measures" and some minimum quality standards for
food and drink products and ensured the stability of the coinage (goldsmiths' marks). As to the
monopoly enforcement aspect, Schechter bases his criticism on, amongst others, C. GROSS, The Gild
Merchant. A Contribution to British Municipal History (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1890). For an
opposing view see A.J. PENTY, A Guildsman's Interpretation of History (1923), who at 102 comments
on a socialist leader of his time and talks about, "... the conspiracy against things medieval". On how the
reminiscence of "the good old times" influenced the formation of a labour movement in England see, N.
CARPENTER Guild Socialism (New York, Appleton, 1922), at 39-50.
CARPENTER ibid. at 91, quotes Penty declaring, in 1906, as the true principle of the Gild System that,
"... the individual craftsman should in all matters relating to his craft be subject to the control of the craft
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personal production mark. This would enable the guild or the state authorities to trace
the origin of defective goods, punish their producers, enforce territorial restrictions,
police price fixing, and penalise daring competitors.58
The regulatory trade mark developed progressively in two offshoots. First to trade
marks used in wider state schemes of regulating industry at the national level, as in the
cases of the cloth or the cutlery trade in the UK. And second, to the closest ancestor of
the modem trade mark:59 the mark that incorporates the notion of goodwill and is
gradually liberated from the guild system to become again an active asset rather than an
obligation.60
As a telling example of the transformation we can refer to a case of licensing. In the first
years of the nineteenth century a successful grocer in Cheapside found that his
signboard "mark" - a grasshopper - was being extensively copied and that it was
difficult to stop the counterfeiters; so he channelled his exasperation to a positive
economic reaction and licensed the use of his mark to a number of other aspiring
grocers who purchased for themselves a part of his good name in the market.6'
to which he belongs". Reference must be made here to a celebrated passage from, Adam Smith's, The
Wealth of Nations. "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for a merriment or derision,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices":
cited by P. PRESCOTT, in "The Origins of Copyright: A Debunking View", [1990] EIPR 453.
58 SCHECFITER (1925), at 47 and generally at 3 8-62. At 39 he cites the authorities of M. de GAILHARD-
BANCEL, Les Anciennes Corporations de Métiers et Ia Lutte Contre Ia Fraude dans le Commerce et la
Petite Industrie, talking about "marques defabrique obligatoires" in France and D.R. PELLA, Marcas
de Fabrica y de Comercio en Espana, describing the guild marks of Barcelona. These are two of
numerous other similar references and instances of ordinances, statutes, cases, etc. exhaustively
presented by Schechter.
"[n addition to ... "gild jurisprudence", we have seen germs of modem trade mark law in statute law and
also in the conciliar law, i.e. the law developed by the King's Council and the Star Chamber. All three of
these sources of modem trade mark law, and especially "gild jurisprudence", had by the seventeenth
century, made contributions to trade mark law of much greater significance than that of common law
itself': SCHECHTER (1925), at 125.
60 SCHECHTER ibid, at 95-96 discussing the contribution of the cloth trade: "... still leaves us far from the
notion of property in trade-marks ... as a legal possession, which may be bought and sold and
transmitted". But at any rate it brings us to the point where trade marks are used not only as the means
for identifying defective products but also the good qualities of the source of production. "In this light
trademarks are already being regarded by administrative courts ... as assets of value that are worthy of
protection."
61 SCHECHTER ibid. at 134-135, citing J. LARWOOD & J.C. H01TEN., History of Signboards (1908)
(see English Inn Signs - A Revised and Modernized Version of History of Signboards, New York, Arco
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2.3.4. Legal provisions during the middle ages
In the Middle Ages period there is an abundance of formal regulation. The resentment
of Kohler about the inadequacies of the United States trade mark law - in the first
quarter of our century - when compared to a statute of Parma of 1282, is sufficient
indication of the wealth of legal provisions. 62 Since similar provisions existed all over
Europe,63 it is worth citing here the representative, inasmuch as innovative and
inclusive, general provision of Parma,
"... that no persons in the trade or guild shall use the mark of any other person in
such trade or guild, nor place such mark, or a similar one, upon knives or
swords, and if any person in such guild has continuously used a mark upon
knives, swords, or other steel or iron articles for ten years, and any other person
is found to have used, within one or two years, the same mark or an imitation
thereof, whether stamped or formed in any other way, the latter shall not in
future be allowed to use such mark upon knives, swords, or other steel or iron
articles, under penalty of ten pounds of Parma for each and every offence, and
that regardless of any compromise or award of arbitrators which may have been
made".
However, the enforceability of such statutes is a different story; copying others' marks
and counterfeiting was routine activity, despite the institution of court and other
proceedings as a result of the establishment of guilds' monopolies. 64 The gap, following
Pub., 1985) quoting at 3 1-32 from C.A. GOEDE, Memorials of Nature and Art Collected on a Journey
in Great Britain during the Years 1802-1803 (1808). The distinction between the initial post-counterfeit
advertisement of the grocer stating that "... the genuine Grasshopper is only to be found before his
warehouse" and the post-licensing shop signs of the licensees advertising that "... they are genuine
descendants of the renowned and matchless Grasshopper" is remarkably apt to demonstrate the
transfonnation of a trade mark once it is licensed.
62 KOl-ILER (1889), at 46, cited in ROGERS (1910), at 36-37, and PASTER (1969), at 560 and fns 48-49
and in most of the other authors. For the modem self regulation of Parma prosciuto producers see
Consorzio del Prosciuto di Parma v Marks & Spencer Plc [1990] FSR 530, and N. DAWSON, "The
Parma Ham Case: Trade Descriptions and Passing Off - Shortcomings of English Law?", [1991] EIPR
487.
63 SCHECHTER (1925), at 105-106.
SCI-IECHTER ibid. at 105, specially fn. 2.
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the dissolution of the guild system, was covered by a transitional period of state-granted
monopolies leading to the rise of the "modem" trade mark.65
2.4. The modern times
Industrial revolution brought with it a huge increase in trade, but this time in a massive
international level, and with a corresponding boom in the retail trade. Transportation
of goods between trading nations far apart was now feasible, advertising flourished and
initiated the creation of a global market in which international players-marketers pressed
for national and international protection of their investment, enhancement of their
prominence and fortification of the new establishment. In the power struggle for a post
in the market place,
"... trade marks and trade names have become nothing more nor less than the
fundament of most marketplace competition".67
2.4.1. United Kingdom
Considering the history of the common law approach to trade marks in the United
Kingdom there are two things that we must keep in mind. First, we must note that,
historically, courts of equity could award injunctions but not damages; the award of
damages was in the competence of common law courts. Thus trade mark owners, who
primarily desire injunctions against further infringing use rather than compensation, turned
65 P.11. BEHRENDT, "Trademarks and Monopolies - Historical and Conceptual Foundations", 51 TMR
853 (1961), at 855-856 where, stressing the monopolistic function of the Middle Ages trade mark, he
concludes that: "[a] 11 these medieval and early modem marks ... had two things in common. First, there
was a preexisting monopoly and the trademark was only its adjunct, and designed to permit its
enforcement. Secondly, and with some qualification for the later monopolies by grant, adoption and use
of the mark were not within the free choice of the individual trader but were imposed, enforced and
supervised by a higher authority, such as the guild or, in the subsequent period, the revenue receiver or
collector".
P. A. SAMUELSON & W. D. NORDHAUS, in Economics (New York, McGraw Hill, 1989), at 640-
641, 852-853 provide a brief historical description.
67 CORNISH (1996) at 517. See 5 15-527 for the complete historical sketch.
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first to equity courts. 68 Second, we must underline the distrust of the judiciary towards
business, coupled, uncomfortably, with its reluctance to intervene in the marketplace,
unless there is a statutory obligation. 69 As with unfair competition, general principles,
such as unjust enrichment, or abstract intangible rights, like personality right or the right to
privacy, rarely, if ever, form the cornerstones of decisions, in sharp contrast with the
sanctity of "laissez faire" and contractual agreement. Denigrating unfair competition as
an "idiosyncratic notion" most succinctly encapsulates this attitude.7°
The first cases under English law were based on deceit on behalf of the consuming
public; fraudulent intent was one of the elements of the action. Despite earlier "passing
off' cases, the first recorded straightforward trade mark infringement case was brought
in 1742 before an equity court, where the request of injunctive relief was denied, since
the essential fraudulent intent of the defendant to draw the customers of the plaintiff was
not established. The defendant used the plaintiffs mark on the same type of goods,
namely playing cards but the court was, adversely for the plaintiff, influenced by the
68 See SCHECHTER (1925), at 137-145 and CORNISH ibid, at 517.
69 "... to draw a line between fair and unfair competition, between what is reasonable and not, passes the
power of the Courts": per Fry L.J., in Mogul Steamship Co. v McGregor (1889) 23 QBD 598, at 625-
626. In that way we face a vicious circle, dispensing all too easily the flexibility of common law as a
legal device for the creation and, "common sense", adjustment of rights in order to correspond with ever
changing social needs and realities. More recently in Er p. Island Records, [1978] 3 All ER 824, L.
Denning M.R. hinted at an indirect adoption of unfair competition reasoning; in that case a performer
injured by a breach of the Dramatic and Musical Performers' Protection Act 1958 could not claim
damages but could restrain a repetition of the breach. This opening of the door to unfair competition was
partially blocked by L. Diplock in Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 456; see P.
ELLIAS & A. TETfENBORN, Case Comment, 40 Cambridge Law Journal 230 (1981), at 231: "... a
speciously simple private law question. A commits a crime, knowing that he is thus causing loss to B.
Can B sue A? Orthodoxly [sic] no, unless the crime is a tort against B or the statute creating it gives a
private right of action. But what if B does not frame his action as one for breach of statutory duty,
invoking instead the tort of causing loss by unlawful means?". The answer in Lonrho would be
emphatically negative. Later, in Rickiess & others v UnitedArtists Corpn. & others, [1987] FSR 362, the
Court of Appeal held that the 1958 Act conferred a civil right of action on performers. For the classic
deliberation on unfair competition in the UK see G. DWORK[N, "Unfair Competition: Is the Common
Law Developing a New Tort", [1979] EIPR 241, and for a more recent analysis see A. ROBERTSON &
A. HORTON, "Does the United Kingdom or the European Community Need an Unfair Competition
Law", [1995] EIPR 568.
70 Per Deane J., at 88 of Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd and Anor (1984) 59 ALJR 77.
DWORK[N (1979) asserts, at 242, "[u]nder English law there is no law of tort in the sense of a general
theory of liability - but rather a law of torts. The facts of any grievance must be fitted into an existing
nominate tort or torts if they are to stand much chance of success in the courts. It is also appreciated that,
even so, existing torts are gradually widened and developed and occasionally new torts are created. The
torts concerning unfair competition have complied with this pattern ...".
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extent of the monopoly granted under a royal chart. 7 ' Up to 1824 there is a series of
similar cases, 72 until the first persuasive authority at common law, of Sykes v. Sykes.73
There it is established that the action for deceit could be based on the injury of the
competitor. Some years later in Millington v. Fox,74 it is re-affirmed that equity courts
were more flexible on the requirement to establish fraud: it was sufficient to prove
deception of the public75 even by a defendant who was acting in innocence. Finally it is
necessary to mention Hall v. Barrows,76 where Lord Westbury stated that the name of
the manufacturer might in time become a mere trade mark or sign of quality, and cease
to denote that any particular person is the maker77 and defined trade mark as
a brand which has reputation and currency in the market as a well-known
sign of quality; and that, as such, the trade mark is a valuable property ... and
may be properly sold with the works".78
Due to political reluctance to intervene actively in the market it was only in 1862 that
wider protection was introduced by statute. 79 The Merchandise Marks Act endowed the
consumer and the administration with the apparatus of criminal law but still there was
no civil, economic ground for the competitors to initiate proceedings. This created more
pressure from marketers, resulting in the 1875 Trade Mark Registration Act establishing
a registration system for marks for goods, which would coexist with the common law
" Blanchard v Hill (1742) 2 Atk. 485. SCHECHTER (1925), at 136-137 discounting the importance of
the case.
72 See CORNISH (1996), at 517.
(1824)3B&C541.
(1838)3 My. & Cr. 338.
1 In equity, fraud was used in a very wide sense based on a the circular defmition that equity would
characterise as fraudulent any conduct which it was prepared to restrain: C. WADLOW The Law of
Passing Off (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), at 9-13.
76 (1863)4DeGJ&S150,12WR322.
Ibid. at 155.
78 Ibid, at 157-158.
The Merchandise Marks Act 1862. The Report of the Trade Marks Bill Select Committee, PP 1862
(212) XII shows that the pressure on parliamentarians was exerted by industrialists and traders who
wanted a set of secure and known to all rules in the jurisdiction and also access to international
protection which would only be offered by foreign states under the condition that their nationals were
granted analogous protection in Britain; there was also popular outcry against the widespread
adulteration of precious metals and other products.
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and equity protection of goodwill. 80 This rapprochement survived the successive Acts
broadening the scope of protection Acts of 1876, 1877, 1883,81 1888, 1905 ,82 1919,83
and finally the 1938 Act; much later, in 1984, the registered trade mark regime
expanded to cover marks for services, following in part the recommendations of the
1974 Mathys Departmental Commitee.M Registered trade mark protection still co-exists
with passing off,85 after the introduction of the 1994 Act which harmonised trade mark
laws throughout the European Union. Finally under the 1968 Trade Descriptions Act it
is an offence to apply a false trade description to goods or services. This, however, does
not attribute a direct right to the consumer who can only inform the relevant authority,
who must then act.
2.4.2. United States
In the United States the approach towards trade marks was initially with that adopted in
the UK, but later diverged on the issues of unfair competition and the effect of
registration. Trade marks form a perfected and important part of a general tort of unfair
80 CORNISH (1996), at 517-518, states that the goodwill earned from actual trading was a stronger right
than the right resulting from registration. Methods of protection were cumulative.
The Patents Designs and Trade Marks Act. To tie the Act with the courts approach James L. J., in
Massam v Thorley 's (1880)14 Ch.D. 748, described the object of a trade mark as indicating a warranty
that the marked product has come from the particular manufacturer of the goods with which the
customer has been hitherto pleased.
82 Including the first comprehensive defmition of a trade mark, introducing the prerequisite of actual use,
and not recognising trade mark licensing of a mark, because then the supposed connection in trade
would not be accurate: see A. FIRTH, Trade Marks - The New Law (Bristol, Jordan, 1995), at 26-38.
83 The 1919 Act divided the registry into Parts A and B. Registration in Part B allowed protection for
marks which existed in the market but could not overcome the rigorous qualifications for registration in
Part A nevertheless successfully existed in the market.
84 The 1938 Act provided for the defensive registration of well known marks and established the right of
Part A owners to refuse the use of their marks in comparative advertising. The first provision was
watered down by the lack of the court's enthusiasm to enforce it - see W.R. CORNISH Intellectual
Property (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1989), at 458-459 and the references therein - and the real
difference between Parts A and B was relaxed by the subsisting possibility to use the passing off action.
It also provided for a system of "registered users", adopting a different approach from the 1905 Act and
the case law of Bowden Wire v Bowden Brake [1914] RPC 385.
85 In Lee Kar Choo v Lee Lian Choon [1967] 1 AC 602 (J.C.) the plaintiff relied on passing off since trade
mark infringement could not be established despite the fact that a significant part of his mark has been
copied. For a historical survey of passing off and its relation with trade mark protection see the review
of Diplock L. in the defining case of Erven Warning B. V. v I Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1980] RPC
31 (H.L.).
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competition which supplements the protection accorded to the fruits of one's labour
which do not fall under patents, copyrights or trade marks.
In 1791, after a series of fraudulent incidents in the sail cloth trade, Thomas Jefferson,
then a Secretary of State, reported on the petition of the sail cloth manufacturers, that
protection could be provided by
"... permitting the owner of every manufactory to enter in the records of the
court of the district wherein his manufactory is, the name with which he chooses
to mark or designate his wares, and rendering it penal in others to put the same
mark to any other wares".87
The first US Federal Act of 1870 and consecutive statutes, until 1905, attempted to
establish a balance on the question of constitutionality. The Constitution conferred
directly on the Congress the power to legislate on patents and copyrights but not on
trade marks. In order to intervene, Congress chose to attenuate the constitutional
provision that enabled it to legislate on commerce with foreign nations and federal trade
between the constituent US states.88 The first comprehensive act, the 1905 Act, catered
for the "technical common law marks" used in interstate commerce but left much to be
86 This additional quasi-property right was recognised in International News Service v Associated Press
248 US 215, 2 ALR 293 (1918). On the existing link see, for example, P. NIMS, "Developments in the
Law - Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition", 68 Harvard Law Review 814, (1955). J. Duer delineates
this in Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v Spear & Ripley 4 New York Superior Court (2 Sandf.) 599 (1849), a 1849
case, at 605: "[h]e who affixes to his own goods an imitation of an original trade-mark, ... endeavors, by
a false representation, to effect a dishonest purpose; he commits a fraud upon the public and upon the
true owner of the trade-mark". And J. Pitney declares that "... the common law of trade marks is but a
part of the broader law of unfair competition". Hanover Star Milling Co. v Metcalf 240 US 403 (1916).
See also, BEHRENDT (1961), and Mc CLURE (1979).
87 T. JEFFERSON, Complete Works (1854), vii, at 563, as quoted by ROGERS (1910), at 41. See also
SCHECHTER (1925), at 130-134 for a detailed picture.
On the "commerce power" delegated under Art.I, Sec. 8, cI. 3 see J. Mc. CARTHY, The Law of Trade
Marks and Unfair Competition (Rochester, Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co., 1984) at 135-137. On
the history of Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8, the "patent clause", see the two first parts of the serialised survey of
P.J. FEDERICO, "Origin and Early History of Patents", (Parts I&II) 11 Journal of the Patent Office
Society 292 and 358 respectively, (1929), where it is stressed that the international character of
industrial property and the need for protection of US nationals in other countries that, in a quid pro quo
approach, demanded similar protection for their nationals in the US, were decisive factors for its
adoption.
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regulated by existing common law rules. 89 It is worth citing here a classic definition by
Judge Learned Hand stating that a merchant's
"... mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it
carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner's
reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury,
even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a
reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can
use it only as a mask. And so it has come to be recognised that, unless the
borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure against any identification
of the two, it is unlawful".9°
The 1946 Trade Mark Act ended the debate on the extent of protection. 9 ' The Act
simplified registration and broadened the scope of protection but much of the old case
law remained valid. 92 Finally it is tempting to mention some early decisions which view
trade marks as guarantees of quality and strip their owners of their monopoly, because
of their "unclean hands", under the assumption that
"... those who come into a court of equity, seeking equity, must come with pure
hands and a pure conscience".93
R. CALLMANN., The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies (Deerfield, Callaghan
&Company, 1984) ch. 25, 4.This was coupled with the slow reaction of the law to intervene and
regulate an already existing economic reality despite the demand of traders and consumers.
9° In Yale Electric Corp. v Robertson 26 F2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
' E.S. ROGERS in his first hand chronicle, "The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trademarks", 14
Law and Contemporary Problems 173 (1949), at 180, characterised the Act as the creation of: "... the bar
association committees and business generally".
92 For the co-existence of common law rights, with state registers and statutes and a federal registration
system and the complications arising, see McCARThY (1984), ch. 1. It is uncertain whether the
"philosophy" of protecting only trade-marks in actual use and protectable under common law was ever
followed in reality because of the liberal interpretation of the requisites from the courts. See M.H.
DAVIS, "Death of a Salesman's Doctrine: A Critical Look at Trademark Use", 19 Georgetown Law
Review 233 (1985), at 234, where it is argued that the price that the marketer has to pay for the
monopoly on his trade mark is "... determined by the common law doctrine of trademark use, which
requires that the potential trademark owner take the risk of developing the trademark with no assurance
of ownership of the mark. The owner thus must first demonstrate the competitive worth of the goods or
services to which the mark is attached without any prior exclusive claim to the mark". With the
relaxation of the rule this duty was not discharged. The 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act introduced
an "intent to use" provision, complying with market realities.
Fetridge v Wells, 13 How Pr 385, cited in Worden v California Fig Syrup Co. 187 US 516 (1903), at
531. hi the latter case the plaintiff company was so grossly misrepresenting the ingredients of his
product - senna instead of figs - that it lost its right to a remedy. For a comment on the doctrine of
unclean hands, and its arbitrary character, see I.P. COOPER, '"'Unclean Hands" and "Unlawful Use in
Commerce": Trademarks Adrift on the Regulatory Tide", 71 TMR 38, (1981).
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In Independent Baking Powder for example,94 the owner of the trade mark who had
secretly substituted one of the ingredients of the marked product was denied relief when
a competitor took on the same mark.95
2.4.3. France
In France, an example of a civil law jurisdiction, a dual system of protection has been
formulated following the introduction in the 1832 Civil Code of the notion of unfair
competition.97 The decrees of 1803 and 1809 against "contrefa con" provided for civil
remedies and criminal penalties if the infringed mark had been deposited and the action
"en concurrence déloyale" provided for the remaining cases. The paired system
survived the 1857 Act which protected a notion of a mark distinguishing a corporation,
an individual, or both. 98 As to the question of strength of rights, the first user had a
stronger right than that based on registration. But contrary to the underlying ethical
reasoning of trade mark rights based on unfair competition, French trade mark law
moved rapidly towards the antithesis of a model of formal registration under the
Independent Baking Powder Co. v Boorman, 175 F 448 (C.C.N.J. 1910).
A similar result was reached in Mulhens & Kropff Inc. v F. Muelhens, Inc. 38 F2d 287 (S.D.N.Y.
1929); in the similar facts of Reuter (KJ.) Co. Ltd v Muhlens [1954] RPC 102, in England, the opposite
result was reached. Despite the fact that the courts later avoided such solutions fearing that the result
would be even more confusion for the consumers - Ames Publishing Co. v Walker Davis Publications
Inc. 372 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.Pa. 1974) and US Jaycees v Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F2d 134, 209 USPQ
457 (3d Cir. 1981)- the approach was reaffirmed in Menendez v Faber, Coe & Gregg lnc. 345 F Supp.
527, 174 USPQ 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) and Urecal Corp. v Masters 413 F. Supp. 873 (N.D.Ill.1976), cases
where the misrepresentation was blatant.
F.K. BEIER, "Basic Features of Anglo-American, French and German Trademark Law", 6 IIC 285
(1975).
For a summary of the emergence of unfair competition in France, see G. SCHRICKER, "Unfair
Competition and Consumer Protection in Western Europe", 1 IIC 414 (1972), at 414-417; unfair
competition rules initially aimed to establish the "sporting" rules that competitors had to respect in their
hunting expeditions for customers.
"D' ordinaire, ii y avait deux marques: I' une qui était celle de Ia corporation, et qui par cela même,
était collective; I' autre qui était celle du maitre, et qui, naturellement était individuelle. Il/a choisissait
a son entrée dans ía maItrise, et elle était en même temps le symbole de Ia condition sociale qu' il
acquérait et comme son anneau de marriage." E. POUILLET, Traite des Marques de Fabrique Ct de la
Concurrence Deloyale en bus Genres (Paris, Marchal & Godde, 1912), at 6, see also 6-10.
Although when an unused registered mark was subsequently used by another this was not considered as
first use. The priority of first use was thus transformed to a priority of first occupation. See the decision
of the Cour de Bordeaux, 15 April 1924, 1924 Revue Internationale pour la Propriété Industrielle et
Artistique 49, and BEIER (1975), at 296.
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auspices of a trade mark administration which was very liberal on deciding what is
capable of registration. The acknowledgement that the liberal registration system has
become an irrelevancy and a burden to the market because of the huge accumulation of
registrations, led to the 1964 Act,'°° which introduced use requirements and sanctions
against non use, but re-established registration as a prerequisite for protection. 10 ' Finally,
after some minor reforms and updates, we arrive at the 1991 and then the 1994 Acts
conforming to the requirements set by the European Union.'°2
2.5. Conclusion
By now, it must have become clear that trade marks have been evolving steadily since
the early stages of civilisation corresponding to social and economic needs at one
historical point or another. Its has been shown that the concept of a trade mark has a
multitude of roles to fulfil. However, the gap between earlier and modern functions of
marks, or between functions in diverse societies, is probably narrower than we tend to
believe. In all cases trade marks are used to convey information. And in most cases the
information relates to the type, quality and characteristics, of a product or the reputation
of a trader.
We have seen that proprietary interests in trade marks have been recognised and
gradually have become enforceable and that trade marks have been regulated to a
greater or lesser degree. So, now we have to turn to the concept of property in relation to
trade marks.
'°° See P. MATI-IELY, "La Nouvelle Lois Francaise sur les Marques", Annales 1965.11 50.
101 See P.J. STENGER, "Loss of Trade Mark Rights Through Lack of Use", [1976] Industrial Property Law
214. On the acquisition of the right under the law of 1857 and the law of 1964, see J. SCHMIDT
SZALEWSKI, Droit de la Propriété Industrielle (Paris, Dalloz, 1984), at 105-110.
102 M.D. POISSON SCHODERMEIER, "Changes in French Trade Mark Law: The 1991 Act", [1992]
EIPR 104. On the conflict of priority see A. PEROT MOREL, "L' Opposabilité des Anténorités en
Matière de Marque de Fabrique de Commerce ou de Service", [1971] Revue Trimestrielle du Droit
Commerciale 246, who at 253 states that: "... ii est. ... . nécessaire et sufflsant que Ia protection ne soit
accordée que dons le cadre de la concurrence".
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CHAPTER THREE
TRADE MARKS AND THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY
3.1. Preface
"Intellectual property" is a term used to describe a wider field of law which includes
trade marks as well as patents and copyright. In general, intellectual property
"protects applications of ideas and information that are of commercial value".1
A common characteristic shared by all types of intellectual property is that the rights
conferred are "essentially negative". 2 They are excluding others from certain activities, a
characteristic of any other property right as it will be shown below.
In respect of trade marks the UK Trade Marks Act 1994 explicitly provides that a
"... registered trade mark is a property right . . .
Passing off, the alternative way of protecting trade marks as distinguishing features
encapsulating and depicting goodwill protected against deception by an action in
passing off,4 also evolves around property. Passing off can be explained
W.R. CORNISH, Intellectual Property (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), at 5.
2	 Ibid.
Section 2(2). See also section 5(1) of the trade mark harmonisation Directive 89/104/EEC.
In passing off "[t]he principle of law may be very plainly stated, that nobody has any right to
represent his goods as the goods of somebody else", per Halsbury L.C. in Reddaway v. Banham
[1896] A.C. 199, at 204.
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"... in terms of protection of a property right, the right being the property the
plaintiff had in the goodwill of his business".5
So, in order to establish a theoretical framework for this thesis, inevitably we have to
look at the concept of "property" that is an inherent part of the concept of "intellectual
property". The aftractiveness is obvious: the concept of property is broad and based on a
plenitude of justifications; accordingly it may provide concrete, but structurally flexible,
foundations for a comprehensive trade marks theory. And interestingly, the writers who
dismiss the application of property theories in intellectual property often bypass trade
marks.6
Property can be anything, ranging from robbery 7 to the guardian of every other right. 8 It
is like an iceberg: more complicated than it looks and with much of its significance
submerged. 9 So the boundaries between the most down to earth and commercial of
intellectual and industrial property rights - therefore the most tangible fraction of the
C. WADLOW, The Law of Passing Off (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), at 27 referring to the
importance of Spa/ding v. Gamage [1915] RPC 273 (H.L.). The property aspect was strengthened in
cases like Lego Systems A/S v. Lego M Lemeistrich Ltd [1983] FSR 155, Mirage Studios v. Counter
Feat Clothing [1991] FSR 145 and Taittinger v. Albev [1993] FSR 641.
6 M. BARETT, for example, in "The "Law of Ideas" Reconsidered", 71 JPTOS (1989) 691, at 736,
submits that "... notwithstanding numerous cases and secondary references to a property theory for
idea recovery, there is very little evidence that such a theory in fact is applied by the [US] courts ".
However, most of Barett's arguments originate from patent or copyright cases. Similarly, E.C.
HETTINGER, in "Justifying Intellectual Property", 18 Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 (1989),
acknowledges that property institutions shape a society, and sets out to detennine what sort of
ownership we ought to allow for "... noncorporeal intellectual objects, such as writings inventions,
and secret business information". Trade marks fall outside this defmition of intellectual property. P.
DRAHOS, in A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996) includes trade
marks in his overview but does not make a discussion specific to trade marks.
P.J. PROUDHON (trans. B.R.TIJCKER), in What is Property? An Enquiry into The Principle of
Right and Government (New York, H. Fertig, 1966) at 10-11 where the contention that property is
theft is analysed.
8 See J.W. ELY Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992),
for a contrast to Proudhon's line of inquiry.
K. MINOGUE, "The Concept of Property and its Contemporary Significance", in J.R. PENNOCK &
J.W. CHAPMAN (eds), Property - Nomos XXII (New York, New York University Press, 1980) at
10.
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"most boring subject known to man"° - on the one hand and the philosophical
justifications of property on the other remain scarcely defined.
3.2. Introduction
The endeavour to employ property theories for the legitimisation of trade mark rights
will include, at a first stage, the "setting" of trade marks within classical property
theories. This will be followed by the choice - or the framing, for the more ambitious -
of a theory which has to fulfil a threefold objective, it must: constitute, in principle, a
satisfactory theoretical basis of property rights; form the link between property and
intellectual property in general; and, finally, incorporate trade marks in its
Here, as well as in chapter five dealing with the economics of trade marks, two types of
arguments are utilised. One is premised on "natural" rights or ethical principles, and is
part of what we call deontological argument. The other comprises consequentialist
arguments which look expost at the societal effects of property.
An example of how an intellectual property right can be viewed and characterised under
this dual system is copyright, as an author's right in the first case, considered as
"... the legal vindication of a person's moral right to property in the fruits of her
labor",'2
and as an economic right in the second, considered as a right that
'° Attributed to J. McCLELLAND by D. VAVER in "Some Agnostic Observations on Intellectual
Property", 6 hitellectual Property Journal 125 (1991), at 126.
" See L. BECKER, Property Rights - Philosophical Foundations (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1977), at 23 where the "general" justification is for property in general, "specific" is the justification
of a specific sort of property rights and the "particular" justification links a particular right, on a
particular thing, with a particular person.
12 A.C. YEN, "The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory", 10 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment.
Law Journal 423 (1992), at 425-426.
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"... exists solely to provide necessary economic incentives for the production of
creative work".'3
In the case of trade marks we will develop more extensively in this chapter the
deontological aspect, leaving a more detailed consequentialist analysis for the chapters
on functions and economics of trade marks.'4
Any choice of a property theory will be, partially, arbitrary, because it will be the result
of a right based argument, a moral point of view
"... showing that an individual interest considered in itself is sufficiently
important to justify holding people to be under a duty to promote it".'5
This definition constitutes a twofold answer to those' 6 who would argue as to the need
to link property and trade marks at a theoretical level since trade mark rights are
13 Thid, at 425. U. Suthersanen pointed out to me that the 1956 UK Copyright Act succinctly depicts the
dichotomy. Part A is for copyright protection of authorship based creative works linked directly with
the author's personality, and in continental terms her/his individuality. Part B is for entrepreneurial
effort protecting investment rather than creation; in other words granting rights to the producer, the
subject matter of the right cannot be easily attributed to an author's personality.
14 In a similar vein of argument, modern supporters of capitalism define morality as a matter partly of
motivation and partly of outcomes, liberally mixing deontological and functional justification. See
for example the view of Lord LAWSON as expressed in a review of one of his speeches, "A Paean of
Praise to Capitalism", Financial Times, September 4, 1993. The result may be the same but the moral
argument will be strong and autonomous only if the two are examined separately.
' J. WALDRON, The Right to Private Property (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988) at 3. For a defmition
of basic rights as "... those moral constraints that impose minimal demands on the forbearance of
others such that individuals can pursue projects amidst a world of similar beings, each with his own
life to lead, and each owing the same measure of respect to others that they owe to him"; see L.
LOMASKY, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (New York, Oxford University Press,
1987), at 83.
16 See for example J. LAHORE, "The Herschel Smith Lecture 1992: Intellectual Property Rights and
Unfair Copying: Old Concepts, New Ideas", [1992] EIPR 428, concluding at 433 that he prefers a
general law of unfair copying than "... an ever increasing range of property rights within or
analogous to intellectual property". See also A. KAMPERMAN SANDERS, Badges of Trade: The
Protection of Trade Marks and Related Intangibles in Unfair Competition Law (PhD thesis, Queen
Mary and Westfield College, 1995) at 4-5 and 57-82. At 64-65 it is mentioned that "... the economic
value of the sales device as a matter of law can only depend on the protection that is awarded to it,
whereas the recognition of assts of commercial value as property depends upon commercial and
economic value. This is not only legal reasoning in a vicious circle, but it also makes it impossible to
create certainty in the law. The boundaries to be drawn in order to determine whether or not a
business asset is economically valuable enough to be worthy of protection as a property right can not
be defined as a legal rule because the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta are based upon recognition of
legal notions of economic value translated into the pre-existent entity: "property". Finally F. COHEN
in "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach", 35 Columbia Law Review 809 (1935),
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irreversibly recognised as property rights. First, property theories offer invaluable
deontological arguments even when what we seek are pragmatic solutions.' 7 Second,
defining the property owner and delineating the property right could alter the respective
positions of state, consumers, and marketers, as players in the trade mark field.'8
The fact that our era has been heralded as post-industrialist, 19 meaning that the
production, use and flow of information will precede, in economic importance, the
production of physical goods does not detract from the importance of property theories
since property in, and control of, information and channels of conmiunication will be
pivotal and trade marks, as will be shown in chapter four, are tools for communicating
information.
A right over some object means that the right holder can determine the object's destiny,
therefore rights endow the right holder with power, yet rights themselves do not stem
dismisses the "supernatural" character of property found on trade names and symbols and, at 816,
states that "[t]he effect of this theory, in the law of unfair competition as elsewhere, is to dull lay
understanding and criticism of what courts do in fact. What the courts are doing, of course, in unfair
competition cases, is to create and distribute a new source of economic wealth or power".
' See D. SCHMIDTZ, The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument (Boulder,
Westview, 1991), at 28-29.
18 R.A. POSNER in The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990) at
353-354, having assumed all people to be rational maximisers goes on to look at businessmen and
consumers as the usual economic actors and legislators as maximisers of their own satisfaction rather
than of the public interest as such; they want to be re-elected, they need money to sustain their
campaigns, thus they seek the support of organised groups rather than unorganised individuals.
' See for example chapter 1 of J. NAISBITT's, Megatrends (New York, Warner Books, 1982) and J.
REIDENBERG, "Information Property: Some Intellectual Property Aspects of the Global
Information Economy", 10 Information Age 3 (1988). For a more realistic and recent evaluation see
K. ROBINS (ed.), Understanding Information (London, Belhaven, 1992) and especially the
contributions of I. MILES & K. ROBINS, "Making Sense of Information", and I. MILES & M.
MATTHEWS, "Information Technology and Information Economy", concluding at 111 that "... it
becomes inappropriate to consider manufacturing and services as contrasting sectors: they are
becoming more alike and they are becoming more integrated". See also F. KNIGHT, Risk,
Opportunity and Profit (New York, Augustus Kelly, 1964) at 261, who in 1921 - the original date of
publication - argued that the "... ubiquitous presence of uncertainty permeating every relation of life
has brought it about that information is one of the principal commodities that the economic
organization is engaged in supplying". In the US there is evidence that they lean towards such a
view. In the field of telecommunications the administration was willing to provide a simpler and
relaxed regulatory environment in return for guaranteeing "non - discriminatory access" to their
networks, a step closer to the "information superhighway": see G. GRAHAM & L. KEHOE, "US
Backs Open Competition Among Multimedia Groups", Financial Times, January 12, 1994.
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from that power. 2° Rights are the result of ethical, rational and legal reasoning. A
consequentialist justification of trade marks could have been easily achieved through a
functional analysis and a few references to trade theories. 2 ' It would, perhaps, suffice to
refer to a quote of Takhashi Korekiyo, the founder of the Japanese industrial property
system, who proclaimed at the turn of the century,
"... [w]e have looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so that we can
be like them. We said "What is it that makes the United States such a great
nation?" and we investigated and found that it was patents, and we will have
patents".22
Our moral points of view will differ according, amongst others, to our political beliefs.23
One is, thus, tempted to choose from the very start a convenient theory and try simply to
fit trade marks in it, by, indiscriminately, picking, from a grabbag full of abstract
arguments and principles, anything that is suitable in order to justif' trade marks as
20 See D. LEVINE, Needs, Rights and the Market (Boulder, Lynne Riener, 1988), at 29-30.
21 See D.N. McCLOSKEY, The Applied Theory of Price (New York, Macmillan, 1982) at 359, where
he underlines the partial failure of economics to fully legitimise property rights and states that
economics as a science "... enlists the theory of self - interest to define the very object of self -
interested desire". Property lawyers often concentrate on the "monopolistic" nature of intellectual
property rights in order to exclude them from a purified property context; see, for example, J.E.
PENNER, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), at 118-119.
22 US Department of Commerce Patent Office, The Story of the United States Patent Office
(Washington, 1972), at 20, as quoted by G. RAHN, "Industrial Property as an Element of National
Industrial Strategy", in 1988 Hong Kong - Symposium on Industrial Property and Economic and
Technological Development (Geneva, WIPO, 1988), at 30. Section 8, paragraph 8 of the US
Constitution legitimises patent and copyright rights on the basis that they "... promote the progress of
science and the useful arts".
23 
"For each fonn of life carries with it its own picture of human nature. The choice of a form of life
and the choice of a view of human nature go together ... Each will try by their choice of examples to
redefine their opponent's case away ... [this] is a reinforcement for the view that this philosophical
controversy is an expression of our social and moral situation that it should have occurred in quite a
different context in the arguments that have proceeded in France between Catholic moralists,
Stalinists, Marxists and Sartrian existentialists." A. MacINTYRE, A Short History of Ethics (London,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), at 268-269.
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obviously valuable and usefttl.24 Alas, this would fail miserably the Aristotelian
definition of the rational political animal.25
We have come a long way far from the Aristotelian or Platonian "polis"; the citizens
stopped "being" the state - since nowadays we are neither all equally informed nor do
we have direct experience of the events we decide about - and the nature and the rules of
the political game changed radically, but the debate on good, just, freedom, well being
and the terms of social co-operation is very much alive. And, to an extent, the
ideological confrontations on terms-rules and supporting principles, the attempt to
preserve fragile balances between principles that contradict each other, and finally the
need to adapt rights in accordance with radical scientific, economic, and social changes,
are agents for legislative evolution.26
24 J.P. DOBEL, The Ends of Ethics - The Beginnings of Politics in JR. PENNOCK & J.W.
CHAPMAN (eds), Justification - Nomos XXVIII (New York, New York University Press, 1986),
especially at 328-33 1. He distinguishes three families of reasons: ethical, political and prudential.
25 ARISTOTLE, E. BARKER (ed.), Politics (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1947), at 15: "[men] live
together on terms; and they discuss those terms over and over again". See also C. DOUZINAS,
Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law of Text in the Texts of Law (London, Routledge, 1991); chapter
I offers a fascinating narration of the transition from the classical polis to the postmodern megapolis.
F. Jameson in a critique of post-modernism adds to the formulations and tactics of Stuart Hall's
"discourse analysis" a historical qualifier: "... the fundamental level on which political struggle is
waged is that of the legitimacy of concepts like planning or the market - at least right now and in our
current situation"; he goes on defining market as an ideologeme for which we have to talk about in
respect of "realities" and "concepts". He warns that by skirting the vast continent of political
philosophy as such "itself a kind of ideological "market" in its own right, in which, as in some
gigantic combinational system, all possible variants and combinations of political "values", options,
and "solutions" are available, on condition you think you are free to choose among them". However
a theory of ideology excludes this optionality of political theories, "... not merely because "values" as
such have deeper class and unconscious sources than those of the conscious mind but also because
theory is itself a kind of form determined by social content, and it reflects social reality in more
complicated ways than a solution "reflects" its problem": F. JAMESON, Postmodernism, or the
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London, Verso, 1991), at 264-265. From a different perspective
POSNER (1990), at 359, submits that "[i]t may be objected that in assigning ideology as a cause of
judicial behavior, the economist strays outside the boundaries of his discipline; but he need not rest
on ideology. The economic analysis of legislation implies that fields of law left to the judges to
elaborate, such as the common law fields, must be the ones in which interest-group pressures are too
weak to deflect the legislature from pursuing goals that are in the general interest. Prosperity is one of
those goals, and one that judges are especially well equipped to promote. The rules of the common
law that they promulgate attach prices to socially undesirable conduct, whether free riding or
imposing social costs without corresponding benefits."
26 R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard, Cambridge University Press, 1977), at 22-2 8 for
the distinctions between principles and rules. The core of the difference lies on their respective
weighing systems. Rules are clear-cut and when they are in conflict, then, only one can be applied.
On the contrary it is necessary to combine and balance principles that contradict but apply to the
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Rights, themselves, possess a dynamic edge, since
"... the existence of a right often leads another to have a duty because of the
existence of particular facts peculiar to the parties or general to the society in
which they live. A change of circumstances may lead to the creation of new
duties based on the old right •
This dynamism enables rights to develop, mature, and fulfil their historical role and
undermines the concept of property rights as a theoretical device with a sole purpose to
conserve the social status quo,28 since property is both a legal and social institution.
same situation. F. HAYEK, in Law, Legislation and Liberty (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1982), at 78-81 follows the distinction to descriptive and normative rules: descriptive are the rules
which "... assert the regular recurrence of certain sequences of events" and normative are the rules
which state that "such sequences "ought" to take place". See also B. GERT, "Rationality, Human
Nature, and Lists", 100 Ethics 279 (1990), at 283-286 on the relation of reason and human behaviour
where it is shown that rules should comply to reason; K. GREENAWALT, in Conflicts of Law and
Morality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989) concludes, at 372, that "[s]ome of the ways in
which the impact of the law can be moderated are plainly within the law, others involve official
defiance of law, and still others enjoy a twilight status, receiving no explicit authorization but some
degree of acceptance from the legal system". So following a parallel argument trade mark rules
without an ideology may become the subject matter of a conflict between rules and ideology and/or
reason and/or morality. R. BRANDT, however, in Morality, Utilitarianism and Rights (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1992), a collection of essays, distinguishes, at 179, between a moral
right and a legal right. "One might think that to have a moral right is just for it to be true that morally
one ought to have a legal right. This is not the case. We speak of a moral right when it is not thought
that there should be a legal right, for instance, when we speak of the moral right of a child to equal
treatment in a family." Accordingly he relies to moral psychology rather than theory to describe
morality. Finally see J. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1993), at 199-200, who explains that the vocabulary and grammar of rights is derived from the
language of lawyers and jurists, "... and is strongly influenced by its origins ... [h]uman or natural
rights are the fundamental and general moral rights; particular or concrete more rights ... can be
spoken of as "human" or "natural", but it is more usual to speak of them as "moral" rights, derived,
of course, from the general forms of moral, i.e. human rights: the distinction thus drawn by usage is
not, however, very firm or clear".
27 J• RAZ, "On the Nature of Rights", 1984 Mind 93, at 199-200. The evolution, or not, of passing off
to a tort of unfair competition is a good example.
28 C. GORE, in Property-Its Duties and Rights, Essays by Various Writers (London, Macmillan, 1913)
urges for a clear principle as a response to the question of property regulation with a corporate mind
and conscience, and describes, at viii, all of us - property owners and property-less alike - as
paralysed by a system of which we inevitably form a part. See also R.H. TAWNEY, The Sickness of
An Acquisitive Society, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1920), where, in chapter five, it is
submitted that it is comprehensible that the instrument should be confused with the end, and that any
proposal to modify it should create dismay. C. DOUZINAS & R. WARRINGTON in Justice
Miscarried (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), at 249 answer to the rhetorical question of why
some property rules, strange wonders of a previous age, still have meaning for us? "Property law still
governs [society's] organising formal notions via feudal concepts of estates and tenures. In this field
such basic notions as rights of way depend on fictitious grants that everyone knows were never made,
and yet which are treated by modern judges as though they were made and which oblige the judges to
give instructions to juries (which are no longer used in this type of case anyway) to treat the non-
existent as though it did exist". See also L.H. JONSTON, "Drifting Towards Trademark Rights in
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Perhaps it is not property rights themselves but the biases of property systems and the
resulting allocation of wealth that are of social significance and in a way "property" is
used as a banner in a battle of conflicting interests without, necessarily, being the cause
of the conflict, but because it can portray it in a lucid style. 29 In the field of trade marks,
for example, the clash between consumers' and traders' interests in the market is
pictured by a
"... tension between describing trade marks as property or badges of recognition
[which] lies in the emphasis implicit in the former on the paramount interests of
the registered proprietor while the latter raises the ascendancy of functional
qualifications to the proprietor's rights".30
Therefore, for a theory forming property's justificatory base, it has to be shown that it
can overcome this association and accommodate the conflicting interests, although the
adjudication between conflicting rights on the one hand and contradictory rights and
goals on the other is one of the most "formidable problems in rights theory".3'
Turning again to morality one way of reaching a compromise is to put the chosen theory
under a test of "morality in the narrow sense",
"... a system of a particular sort of constraints on conduct - ones whose central
task is to protect the interests of persons rather than the agent and which present
Gross", 85 TlvfR 19 (1995), arguing that throughout the twentieth century, the scope and degree of
trade mark protection has expanded markedly, but not uniformly, in response to the pressures of a
changing commercial environment.
29 See R. ABEL, "Rise of Capitalism and the Transformation of Disputing: From Confrontation over
Honour to Competition for Property", 27 UCLA LR 233-255 (1979). C.M. ROSE in Property as
Wealth, Property as Propriety, in J.W. CHAPMAN (ed.) Compensatory Justice - Nomos XX)(III
(New York, New York University Press, 1991) makes, at 232, the fine distinction of property as a
vehicle for preference satisfaction on the one hand and property as propriety on the other, the
purpose of which is "... to accord to each person or entity what is "proper" or "appropriate" to him or
her"; in turn "proper" is "... that which is needed to keep good order in the commonwealth or body
politic".
° M.D. PENDLETON, "Excising Consumer Protection - The Key to Reforming Trade mark Law", 3
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 110 (1992), at 111. See also references to dilution in chapter
four on the functions of trade marks that exemplif' this conflict, in particular fh. 158.
31 D.T. MEYERS, A Sketch of a Rights Taxonomy in K. KIPNIS & D.T. MEYERS (eds), Economic
Justice - Private Rights and Public Responsibilities (Totowa, Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), at 87.
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themselves to an agent as checks on his natural inclinations or spontaneous
tendencies to act".32
In a world of limited resources, 33 morality should be supplemented by a combined
principle of "utility" and "efficiency", since an allocation of rights that would maximise
utility and/or efficiency in the use and enjoyment of the objects protected by property
rights is imperative. When utility and efficiency are in conflict then reference must be
made to the concept of equal moral worth34 and to a principle of justice that property
rights will not undermine the minimum required for a human existence 35 in a humane
way. 36 This would help resolve the conflict and at the same time reconcile deontological
and consequentialist justification by making ethos a catalyst on efficiency and
maximisation of economic growth.
32 J• MACKIE, Ethics (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977), at 106. See also G. CALABRESI & D.
MELAMED, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral", 85
Harvard Law Review 1089 (1972), stressing that "[t]he first issue which must be faced by any legal
system is one we call the problem of "entitlement". Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting
interests of two more people, or two or more groups of people, it must decide which side to favor.
Absent such a decision, access to goods, services and life itself will be decided on the basis of "might
makes right" - whoever is stronger or shrewder will win.
Meaning that there are worthy fruits from the imposition of property rights. See J. RAZ, The
Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), chapter eleven.
The same approach is followed by S. MUNZER in A Theory of Property (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1990), at 4. In intellectual property the limitations of efficiency and utility on
property rights can be apprehended as a "utilitarian functionality" that comprises of "utility", "user
efficiency", and "maker efficiency" and delineates the scope and extent of most intellectual property
rights. For the formation of the notion of utilitarian functionality in relation to trade marks see A.S.
ODDI, "Consumer Motivation in Trade mark and Unfair Competition Law: On the Importance of
Source", 31 Villanova Law Review 1(1986), at 9-25.
In essence a Rawlsian thesis, albeit purposely diminished in scope so as to become broadly accepted
in a non "ideal" world. See J. RAWLS, A theory of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1971), at 178. "In fact, when society is conceived as a system of co-operation designed to advance
the good of its members, it seems quite incredible that some citizens should be expected, on the basis
of political principles, to accept lower prospects of life for the sake of others"; he has already
mentioned at 104 that "[t]he assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to
make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in large part
upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit". Indeed in his most
recent work on political liberalism, Rawls attempts to separate, up to a point, ethics from politics and
re-launch his liberal theory ofjustice as a political theory where pluralism ensures that some minimal
ethical standards are followed. Therefore it is pluralism rather than any particular theory that makes
liberal justice ethical for all; see P.K. SOURLAS, "Liberalism Without Twists" (in Greek), To Vima,
December 5, 1993.
36 Therefore not "minimal" and "bare" survival but an "acceptable" and "average" living: T.
AIRAKSINEN, Hegel on Poverty and Violence, in KIPNIS & MEYERS (1985), at 42-45.
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Before starting the brief examination of property theories, some clarifications must be
made. Trade marks are understood as,
"... essentially symbols or badges indicating source or origin of the goods
bearing such. The word origin denotes at least that the goods are issued as
vendible goods under the aegis of the proprietor of the trade mark who thus
assumes responsibility for them".37
And goodwill is
"... a thing very easy to describe, very difficult to define. It is the benefit and
advantage of the good name, reputation and connection of the business. It is the
attractive force which brings in custom".
A conclusive definition of property is, for the moment, evaded. The term has no definite
and unique connotation, in common, legal and economic usage, referring either to the
object of the legal rights or, "with far greater discrimination and accuracy", to the legal
rights themselves. 39 However, it is possible to single out some of its characteristics.
Therefore, it will be always used as denoting a right, in the sense of an enforceable
claim to some use or benefit of something, 4° and primarily as a traditional right in rem, a
right in a thing, and the resulting relations of the right owner with the world. This is also
described as a general right, meaning a right that does not arise out of any special
relationship or transaction between humans. It is not peculiar to those who have it but a
right which all men capable of choice may have in the absence of special conditions
S.P. LADAS, "Trade mark Licensing and the Antitrust Law", 63 TMR 245 (1973), at 248. See the
similar reasoning of the ECJ in CNL-Sucal v. Hag [1990]! ECR 3711 (Hag H), that property rights
are given to trade mark owners so that consumers can distinguish the source responsible for the
product: W. ROTHNIE, "HAG II: Putting the Common Origin Doctrine to Sleep", [1991] EIPR 24,
at 28.
38 Lord MacNaughton in Commissionerrs of Inland Revenue v. Muller & Co's Margarine Ltd [1901]
AC 217, at 223.
W.N. HOHFELD, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning (New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1919). See also the discussion of A. REEVE, in Property (London,
Macmillan, 1986), at 13-23 and 29-3 8. References to "ownership" will be avoided because of the
term's indeterminacy. See, however, F. SNARE, "The Concept of Property", 9 American
Philosophical Quarterly 200 (1972), at 202-204, where it is convincingly argued that usually
ownership and property can be used interchangeably without confusion.
40 C.B. MACPHERSON, The Meaning of Property in C.B. MACPHERSON (ed.), Property (Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1978), at 3.I
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giving rise to special rights. Finally the general property right imposes correlative
obligations on everyone not to interfere. 4 ' This, necessarily,42 extrovert nature of
property can be grasped, in the real world, as a right to prohibit - by force of law - or to
permit the activities of others on the object of the right. Exclusivity, thus, became for
many the main characteristic of property and according to F. Cohen, we could attach to
property the label:
"To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private citizen
Endorsed: The state".43
Other elements of property, in an ordinary language analysis, are its transferability and
the imposition of liability rules on the proprietor when liability arises from the object of
the property right."'
Finally it is stressed that the difference between tangibles and intangibles as objects of
property will be considered as immaterial for two reasons. First, it was shown that rights
are notions distinct from their objects. When we refer to a car as our property we refer to
our right to drive, sell, protect, and so on, the car in the same way that we can affix or
41 H. HART, Are There Any Natural Rights?, in J. WALDRON (ed.), Theories of Rights, (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1984), at 88. At 84 he describes special rights as those arising out of special
transactions or relationships between individuals and confer rights/obligations to the individuals
concerned.
Property is a public fact, or it is no fact at all, see J.F. TAYLOR, The Masks of Society (New York,
Appleton, 1976).
F. COHEN, "Dialogue on Private Property", 9 Rutgers Law Review 357 (1954). He is using the
power to exclude as the main characteristic of property rights. W. KINGSTON in The Political
Economy of Innovation (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), at 5, goes a bit further bringing
markets into the picture by stating that "... it is not the transfer of goods which makes a market, but
the uncoerced exchange of titles to these goods, guaranteed by a political authority". CORNISH
(1996) at 5, stresses that "... one characteristic shared by all types of intellectual property to date is
that the rights granted are essentially negative: they are rights to stop others doing certain things".
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transfer our trade mark or enjoin others from using it without our permission.45
Therefore, the limitation of property theories to tangibles would only facilitate the actual
portrayal of the object of property but achieve nothing else;
"... we would identify by way of metonymy the right with the material thing
which is the object".46
The de-physicalisation of property during the nineteenth century was one of the ways to
modernise the concept. Until then property was considered as possession of things and,
when the object of the right was not physical, it was fictionalised as physical. 47 It can be
argued that in the case of registered trade marks, at least, the portrayal of the object - the
actual res - of the right is feasible, without having to resort to abstract ideas; what can be
more tangible, than a trade mark, as registered, or the combination of the mark and a
product. 48 Even in the case where intangibles cannot be easily apprehended and
compared to chattels - copyrights, patents or goodwill in unregistered trade marks for
example - some physical manifestation of the object of the right can be grasped in the
forms of drawings, hard copies, some visible elements of the place of business or of the
As described by SNARE (1972).
R. DIAS in Jurisprudence (London, Butterworth, 1985) succinctly states, at 296-297, that the term
"incorporeal ownership" is only applied to some types of claims etc. in so far as these are "things",
but it does not apply to others because they are not "things"; "... "ownership" is coterminous with
that of "things", which is narrower than that of rights". At 295-298 he shows that "things" of
incorporeal property are not necessarily physical objects.
J. SALMOND, Jurisprudence (7th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1924), at 278-279. At 276 he
defmes ownership as "... a bundle of claims, liberties, powers and immunities".
K. VANDEVELDE, "The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern
Concept of Property", 29 Buffalo Law Review 325 (1980), at 328-330 and 333.
"Any system of registration of rights which can be asserted against others can only function if it is
possible to ascertain the scope of the rights in question. Thus legal certainty requires the trade mark
to be fixed in some way, so that both the owner, the registry and anyone interested can find out what
the trade mark is." D. KITCHIN & J. MELLOR, Trade Marks Act 1994 (London, Sweet and
Maxwell, 1995), at 13. This is the opposite side of the same argument. Fixation is required if
registration is to serve as a signpost of a property right. Equally in passing off reputation and
goodwill must reside in what is often called a "badge of trade", something that can be apprehended.
See A. FIRTH, Trade Marks - The New Law (Bristol, Jordans, 1995), at 30-3 1 and CORNISH
(1996), at 536-538. In passing off problems arise when there is reputation in the UK but it cannot be
associated with a "signpost" - a business - existing in the UK. See for example Anheuser - Busch v.
Budejovicky Budvar [1984] FSR 413 where the lack of presence in the UK negated the possibility of
damage.
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trade dress and so on.49 The justification of any proprietary right remains the same.5°
Second, and most importantly, a successful justificatory modern theory of property
would never rely upon the discrimination between tangibles and intangibles which in an
integrated world appears irrational.5'
Nevertheless, the unwillingness of commentators to deal expressly with property in
intangibles must be admitted 52 and contrasted with a more liberal judicial approach
which, in its extreme, declares that,
"... one man has property in land, another in goods, another in a business,
another in a skill, another in reputation .. "
Many argue that an expansive definition embodying in property everything of value
would transform all remedies in tort to infringement of property rights and perhaps
It is telling that property rights in trade marks are questioned when it is difficult to describe the trade
mark as such, or when description becomes so technical that is meaningless to the common
consumer. Sensory marks are such an example: Chanel applied in the UK for registration of a mark
described as "the scent of aldehyde-floral fragrance product, with an aldehydic top note from
aldehydes, bergamot, lemon, and neroli; an elegant floral middle note, from jasmine, rose, lily of the
valley, orris and ylang ylang; and a sensual feminine base note from sandal, cedar, vanilla, amber
civet and musk. The scent also being known as Chanel No 5"; registrastion was denied partly because
this was not considered sufficient description - according to the graphical representation requirement
- of the sign. Sumitomo, however, applied successfully, also in the UK, to register a mark described
as "the smell of roses when applied to tyres". In a US case, Celia Clarke 17 USPQ 2d 1238 (T.T.A.B.
1990), "registration was obtained for a "high-impact, fresh, floral fragrance reminiscent of plumeria
blossom". The problem with such trade marks is that even when they obtain registration the extent of
protection is uncertain because the object of the property right is defined in very uncertain terms. On
this question see S.M. MANIATIS, Scents as Trade Marks: Propertisation of Scents and Olfactory
Poverty, in L BENTLY & L. FLYNN (eds), Law and the Senses - Sensational Jurisprudence
(London, Pluto, 1996) and the references therein. See also the discussion on functionality in fn. 255
of chapter four.
50 D.F. LIBBING in "The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles", 94 Law Quarterly Review 103
(1978), argues that regulation of intellectual property weakened the common law recognition of
property in intangibles.
51 A.M. HONORE in "Social Justice", 8 Mc Gill Law Journal 62 (1962). See also F.H.
EASTERBROOK, "Intellectual Property Is Still Property", 13 Harvard Journal of Law and Public
Policy 110 (1990). Of course the doubts expressed above, MANIATIS (1996), remain valid but are
relevant to tangibles and intangibles alike.
52 WALDRON (1988), at 33, for example, argues that the proliferation of different kinds of incorporeal
property caused despair to the jurists attempting precise defmitions.
Per MaIms V.C. in Dixon v. Holden (1869) LR 7 Eq. 488, at 492.
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deprive the word of any useful meaning. 54 This may be true, but abstract property
theories can form an ethical justification also for remedies in tort enabling us to
transcend artificial legal barriers. Inevitably the exact nature and extent of property
rights will be under continuous periodical evaluation resulting in re-definitions.55
Finally it must be stressed that although most of the argumentation will be for or against
private property, this does not mean that property and private property fall under the
same definitions and line of arguments. The different notions will be dealt separately
wherever necessary; in particular in chapter five where the monopolistic character of
trade marks will be examined. There are two reasons, though, that much of the
discussion will be on private property. First the logical priority that the creation of any
notion of common property has to follow the existence of private property. 56 Then
comes the fact that the controversy surrounding the institution of private property, that
started with Plato advocating, in The Republic, the abstention of the state rulers from
any form of private property, which after all caused only trouble and disharmony, and
As argued by G. DWORKIN in Property; Land Law; Industrial and Intellectual Property: Are There
any Common Characteristics?, in 1978 Ford Foundation Workshop on Property Law (London, IALS,
1978), at 2.
S.D. WARREN & L.D. BRANDEIS, "The Right to Privacy", 4 Harv.L.R. 193 (1890), at 193. See
also the dissenting opinions in Boardman v. Phipps [1966] 3 All.E.R. 721. At 759 Lord Upjohn states
that "... information is not property at all; it is normally open to all who have eyes to read and ears to
hear", whilst Lord Hodson dissents and states that "... we are aware that what is called know how in
the commercial sense is property which may be very valuable as an asset ... [thus] confidential
information ... can be properly regarded as property". The two approaches can be compared with
International News Service v. Associated Press 248 US 215 (1918), where the quasi-property status
of information - in this case news - was recognised, leading to the recognition of a sui generis tort of
unfair competition. For the current "common sense" approach of common law reference must be
made to Jacob J.'s comment in Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd v. Ward Mobility Ltd [1995] FSR 169, at
174-175 that in common law "[t]here is not tort of copying. There is not tort of taking a man's
market or customers. Neither the market nor the customers are the plaintiff's to own. There is no tort
of making use of another's goodwill as such. There is no tort of competition". Some may argue that
anything worth copying is worth protecting but "[a]t the heart of passing off lies deception or its
likelihood, deception of the ultimate consumer in particular"; for a comment on the last case see A.
FIRTh, "Cushions and Confusion" [1994] EIPR 494.
56 See J. HARRIS, "Private Property: What is the Difference?", unpublished paper presented at W.G.
HART Legal Workshop, 1993, especially at 5-6.
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Aristotle responding, in Politics, that private property is the means for well being,
dominate the discourse on property and have produced the huge bulk of arguments.57
3.3 The justification based on labour
3.3.1. Locke's property theory and the leap to private property
It must be emphasised from the outset that Locke himself avoided expressly defming
property. By stating that
"Lives, Liberties and Estates, ... I call by the general name, property
he indicated that he used property as referring to a whole bunch of rights loosely
connected and defined.59
Locke perceived property as the result of intuitive human behaviour. He used both
"natural Reason" and "Revelation" to prove that humans, once born, have a right to
survive and, in order to do so, must appropriate what "Nature" has to offer for their
subsistence,6° the means for their survival. The act of appropriation is the beginning of
transfonnation of the fruits of nature to the consumables, necessary for human
preservation and to the goods which will also "increase the common stock of
mankind",6 ' since the exchange economy has taken, by then, a step beyond the state of
For Plato common property was the fiat and proof of a well run state whilst Aristotle felt that
prosperity of individual households would mean increased production and wealth for the whole state;
see E. BARKER, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York, Dover, 1959). This
dominated the political theory of the west; for some what is "... lurking in much of the "political"
debate over property is an implicit theory of history": A. RYAN, Property (Milton Keynes, Open
University Press, 1987), at 92.
58 J LOCKE, P. LASLETT (ed.), Two Treatises of Government, (London, Cambridge University Press,
1967), at 368, II. 123. All references to Locke's Treatises are to this edition. Numbers indicate page,
treatise, paragraph.
A.J. SIMMONS, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), at
226-227, indicates that Locke's "definitions" refer to characteristics and components of property.
60 LOCKE (1967), at 303-304, 11.25.
61	 Ibid, at 312, 11.37.
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nature, where the goods are granted from God to the people in common and primitive
humans live isolated satisfying only their immediate needs.62
The same exchange economy which, according to Rousseau, 63 finished off equality for
good, for Locke, launched humanity to progress and, as we will see below, made
possible the compliance with the limitations on property.64
Human labour must be exerted for the appropriation and the combination of that labour
with Nature's offerings and, accordingly, the value added - or more succinctly an
inherent value acknowledged and manifested only through labour - is the dominant
moral underlining of the institution of property.65
The leap from appropriation and possession to the justification of private property and
the two qualifications imposed: the "enough" and "as good" condition and the "non-
waste" requirement, provoked a lot of interpretations.
62 Ibid, at 303-304, 11.25. See also ARISTOTLE (E. BARKER ed.) (1967), at 6, who states that "... who
is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is already
self-sufficient - is no part of the polis, and must be either a beast or a god".
63 The "little piece of yellow Metal" (ibid at 312, 11.37) for Locke served as a means to quantify
property without the danger of wasting or decay. Rousseau, on the other hand, in his second
discourse on The Origin of Inequality attributes most of the evils inflicted to society to the fact that
due to the exchange system it was useful for a single person to have provisions for two. See J.
ROUSSEAU (R. MASTERS & E. KELLY, eds), volume three, of the The Collected Writings of
Rousseau (Hanover, University Press, 1992). It is worth referring here to Becker's description of the
transformation towards a "market" based on the household as a consumption and production unit.
"The household production function framework emphasizes the parallel services performed by firms
and households as organizational units. Similar to the typical firm analyzed in standard production
theory, the household invests in capital assets (savings), capital equipment (durable goods), and
capital embodied in its "labor force" (human capital of family members). As an organizational entity,
the household, like the firm, engages in production using this labor and capital. Each is viewed as
maximizing its objective function subject to resource and technological constraints. The production
model not only emphasizes that the household is the appropriate basic unit of analysis in
consumption theory, it also brings out the interdependence of several household decisions: decisions
about family labor supply and time and goods expenditures in a single time-period analysis, and
decisions about marriage, family size, labor force attachment, and expenditures on goods and human
capital investments in a life cycle analysis." See G. BECKER, An Economic Approach to Human
Behavior (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976), at 141.
As for A. Smith's acceptance of Locke's property theories see chapter three of R. BOYDEN SMITH,
Property Markets and the State in Adam Smith's System (New York, Garland Publishing, 1987).
65 LOCKE (1967), at 304-308, 11.26-28.
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The mixing of the can of tomato juice, that I own, with the ocean, that I do not own, and
the ambivalent result of my action - do I own the ocean or have I wasted my tomato
juice - is the most popular of the arguments striving to undermine Locke's theory.
Aristotle, who obviously gave food for thought both to Locke and Hegel with his
definitions of natural products as contrasted to makings, may be providing an answer to
Nozick's provocative question.
"[I]t is impossible that anything should be produced if there were nothing
existing before. Obviously then some part of the result will pre-exist of
necessity; for the matter is a part; for this is present in the process and it is this
that becomes something. But is the matter an element even in the formula? We
certainly describe in both ways what brazen circles are; we describe both the
matter by saying it is brass, and the form by saying that it is such and such a
figure; and figure is the proximate genus in which it is placed. The brazen circle,
then, has its matter in its formula."
He goes on questioning whether
"... is there, then, a sphere apart from the individual spheres or a house apart
from the bricks? Rather we may say that no "this" would ever have coming to
be, if this had been so, but the "form" means the "such", and is not a "this" - a
definite thing; but the artist makes or the father begets, a "such" out of a "this";
and when it is begotten, it is a "this such".67
The clarity of the importance of the "formula", as described by Aristotle, is the
cornerstone of a functional justification of intellectual property.
R. NOZICK, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, Basic Books, 1974), at 174. Of course, at 174-
175, he qualifies his didactic example by stating that labouring refers to the value added by the
improvement but then "why should one's entitlement extend to the whole object rather than just the
added value one's labour has produced". In the same line see: WALDRON (1988), at 184-191,
arguing that there is a conceptual mistake in mixing two different things, labour and objects or J.
PLAMENATZ in Man and Society (London, Longman, 1992), volume one, at 246-247, wondering
what will happen to the second labour applied to the object where a first labour has been already
applied. For an inclusive overview of critiques on Locke see SIMMONS (1992), at 264-278.
67 See ARJSTOTLE (W.D. ROSS ed.), Metaphysics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1928), at 791-
795.
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Despite the fact that the tomato juice example has been constructed so as to adapt the
labour theory to a theory of historical entitlement, limiting the government's power -
always ephemeral - to intervene in the sphere designated by the individuals' rights -
which will last for ever68 - it is true that the leap of Locke towards private property is
difficult to understand.69
One interpretation is that the general right argument, based on subsistence, is for any
property regime. The argument for private property, based on the idea that the labour
input to an object, is an argument for a special right, independent of its background. So,
arguably, it is at this point, that Locke fails to offer a general theory of private
property.7°
Others go far enough to read labour theory as a theory for property that is originally
social or collective7 ' or that the
"... fundamental and undifferentiated form of property is the natural right and
duty to make use of the world to achieve God's purpose of preserving all his
workmanship ...",
and that the public good - a notion expanding that of preservation - allows re-
arrangements of private property rights in order to satisfy the public good.72
Other commentators discover in Locke an early advocate of capitalism and
consequently of the distribution of property along the class dividing lines: property, of
unlimited amounts, is not just a limitation of governments but on the contrary limited
68 
"Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them": NOZICK (1974),
at ix; unless these rights are violated.
69 Although he genuinely attempted it. He wanted to show how it became possible for every man to
possess a "private dominion", LOCKE (1967), at 304, 11.26.
70 WALDRON (1988), at 139-140.
" R.P. WOLFF for example in Robert Nozick's Derivation of the Minimal State, in J. PAUL (ed.),
Reading Nozick, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981), at 101-102.
72 J TULLY, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1980) concluding at 175.
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governments were created by societies that wished first to protect their individual
members' properties. 73 For them Locke was an advocate of private property as an end in
itself and not as the means of well being. His "astonishing achievement" was that he
based property rights on natural law and then removed all natural law limits. 74 Labour
adds value to things but since value to humans is individualistic enjoyment or advantage
then value, for Locke, is necessarily private.75
All the contradictory interpretations of Locke's property theory are reinforced by
contradictions in his writings which are conñising, at least for us, ordinary readers. 76 It is
indeed intriguing that Locke has been read as "the father of modern socialism" until
1928, then he became a liberal, then an illiberal and recently a pragmatist who preferred
to leave to government the definition of property.77
It is Locke who has written that,
"God gave the World to Men in Common; but since he gave it them for their
benefit, and the greatest Conveniences of Life they were capable to Draw from
it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncul-
tivated. He gave it to the use of the Industrious and Rational, (and Labour was to
be his Title to it;) .	 78
73 PLAMENATZ for example based his criticism on the contradictory Lockeian defmitions of
"consent" of individuals who are initially out of society but decide to become members, on their own
"free" will and in order to protect their property. Therefore, "... if Hobbes was wrong in treating
morality as obedience to positive law, human or divine, Locke was no less wrong when he said that
men are moral merely as men and not as members of society"; see PLAMENATZ (1992) volume
one, at 346.
C.B. MACKPHERSON, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1962), at 199; see chapter 5 in general. But see also A. RYAN, "Locke and the
Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie", 13 Political Studies 219 (1966), at 226 where he cautions the reader
about the misleading notion of absolute property and argues that: "... no sort of absolute ownership is
involved in either life, liberty or goods, on all of which there can be claims".
H.C. MANSFIELD Jr., On the Political Character of Property in Locke, in A. KONTOS (ed.)
Powers, Possessions and Freedom, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1979), at 23.
76 MACKPHERSON (1962) asserts, at 247-248, that Locke is himself confused.
J. TULLY, An Approach to Political Philosophy - Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1993), at 96-97.
78 LOCKE (1967), at 309, 11.34.
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and the same philosopher who stated that,
"... by this grant God gave him not Private Dominion over the Inferior Creatures,
but right in common with all mankind; so neither was he Monarch, upon the
account of the Property here given him . . . "
and that the industrious and rational, when their subsistence was not in danger, ought to
"preserve the rest of mankind", 80 but then went on, again, that property is "for the
benefit and sole Advantage of the Proprietor", 8 ' failing to develop our guardianship
responsibilities.
It is submitted however that it is obvious that Locke without being the founder of
modem capitalism82 could not also have been the strongest advocate of common
property systems; perhaps it is so obvious that it is often overlooked. One can contrast
Locke with Rousseau, for example, who started from the same starting point of a human
right to preservation but concluded that the unlimited right to property for some negated
the right to subsistence for many of the rest.
"Such was ... the origin of society and laws, which gave new fetters to the weak
and new forces to the rich, destroyed natural freedom for all time, established
forever the law of property and inequality, changed a clever usurpation into an
irrevocable right, and for the profit of a few ambitious men henceforth subjected
the whole human race to work, servitude, and misery".83
So, placing Locke in his historical context is the first step in understanding him. He was
first a politically involved citizen and only then a reluctant philosopher. He was strongly
Ibid, at 175, 1.24.
° Ibid, at 289, 11.6.
81 Ibid, at 227, 1.92.
82 It seems that RYAN (1966) is right to an extent at 247 where he refutes Macpherson for attributing to
Locke the fatherhood of absolute property upon class lines; there are no strict class lines in Locke.
WALDRON (1988) may be rightly sceptical on Tully's interpretation, but absurdly self-confident
when he characterises some of the arguments as silly, at 158. See TULLY's response (1993), at 122-
125.
83 J•J ROUSSEAU, (R.D. MASTERS ed.), The First and Second Discourses (New York, St. Martins
Press, 1964), at 160.
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opposed to the legitimisation of the absolute monarchy regimes of his time, 84 where the
monarch was the proprietor of all property in the kingdom, and property rights of
individuals existed only as an act of grace of his part. 85 In a way, property constituted
the means for the citizen to confine the monarch's absolute power but this view was
heavily influenced by philosophy, church - we must not ignore the theological influence
which converts Locke's theory in a way that is difficult to conceive today - and the
political realities of the English ruling system. 86 The claim that the Lockeian concept of
private property was different from the modern concept, which is mutually exclusive
with common property, and that his linguistic analysis is possible only in the context of
the normative theological vocabulary that was available to him, may provide the only
valid way to interpret Locke.87
Another characteristic of Locke was that in his main works he was dealing with his
ideological opponents Filmer and Hobbes who have laid the foundations of the
seventeenth century monarchy. Although Filmer was the one directly attacked by
Locke,88 Hobbes was by far more significant and the intellectual vigour of Locke's
second treatise might have targeted his writings on the covenant between the individual
and Leviathan, the mortal God, which was Hobbe's solution to the state of nature, in
reality always a state of war. 89 Property's legitimacy was rising from the power of the
sovereign, and not from an individual right of the citizen.9°
LASLETT (1967) is offering a short and excellent reconstruction of Locke's life and personality, at
16-45.
85 R. ASHCRAFT, Locke's Two Treatises of Government (London, Allen & Unwin, 1987), in chapter
four.
LASLETT (1967), at 92, asserts that for Locke men are God's property and this is a most central
common sense proposition. See also LOCKE (1967), at 288-289, 11.6.
See chapter three of TULLY (1993), especially at 115-118 where the problem of "individuation or
distribution" of property in Locke is being analysed. See also S. BUCKLE, Natural Law and the
Theory of Property (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991), at 149. He underlines the supremacy of "self-
interested self-preserving behaviour" in the Two Treatises and contrasts it with the different "self-
sacrifice" behaviour commended by Locke in the Essays on the Law of Nature.
88 See R. FILMER (P. LASLETT ed.), Patriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1949), at 1-48.
89 L. STEPHEN in Hobbes (London, Macmillan, 1904) is offering a vivid representation of Hobbes's
political philosophy, especially in chapter 4 where he is dealing with the notion of the state and the
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All the above hint that Locke's standing was somewhere in the middle of the loci
chosen for him by his posteriors, though not in the sense that he was a "half way"
political theorist of his time.9 ' His thoughts were original and distinct92 and the unifying
theme, for property, was that society should for practical reasons - a consequentialist
and historical approach93 - reward labour with property, but more importantly ought to
do so for ethical necessity - a normative justification. 94 The history of property is a
different thing from the reason for its existence, but Locke appraised his preceding
generations for the then existing private property system and then used history as a
justification for the development of property as a concept and justificatory property
theories.95
The examination of Locke's two qualifying conditions and finally of the notion of
labour will enable us to follow his theory better.
covenant between the monarch and the citizen. LASLETF (1967) in the introduction of his edition of
the Two Treatises, especially at 72-75, is arguing that Hobbes was indeed the reason for the Second
Treatise.
9° T. HOBBES, Leviathan (London, Fontana, 1962), at 231-232.
91 See H. CAIRNS, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1949),
submitting, at 335, that Locke's dominant impulse lied more on the constitutional affairs than
philosophy. He became a philosopher of the middle area, dealing with the familiar and avoiding to
venture beyond it "... in either of the two directions in which speculative inquiry moves".
92 However, Plamenatz's harshest comment on Locke was that he confined himself to ordinary
problems and reached, by employing easy methods, solutions that were attractive to the majority of
his contemporaries; see PLAMENATZ (1992), at 336.
ASHCRAFT (1987), at 125 is making the interesting point that: "Locke believes that his historical
account of the development of unequal property ownership [(LOCKE (1967) at 35 1-362, 11.100-112]
is compatible with his natural law justification for the right to own property, and that he incorporates
both these aspects of his theory of property into his explanation for the origins of political society".
See J. HUGHES, "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property", 77 Georgetown Law Journal 251 (1988),
at 296.
SIMMONS (1992), at 247, claims that by asking "... by general conformity to what rules will
mankind be best preserved" we can grasp the rule-consequentialist reasoning for natural law for
Locke. But see H. STEINER, Slavery, Socialism, and Private Property, in PENNOCK & CHAPMAN
(1980), arguing that Locke's theory is valid only for each current generation and thus incoherent.
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3.3.2. Two qualifications: "No Waste" and the "Enough" and "as Good"
condition
"God has given us all things richly ... But how far has he given it us? To enjoy.
As much as any one can make use of to any advantage in life before it spoils; so
much may he by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this is more
than his share, and belongs to others."96
Locke limited our entitlement to property, positing, not only that we do not have the
right to abuse it, 97 which for some is a manifestation of dominating property, but
imposing a positive right to use it, otherwise it returns to the commons and is left to the
others to exploit it. One can argue that use is very widely defined and contains any
advantage that the property can give, but this is a logical consequence in Locke's
outright acceptance of the exchange economy, and is further qualified by the right of
those in dire need to appropriate the objects that can satisfy that need. 98 Some of the
critics point that it would be rare to find people in dire need in a thriving Lockeian
private economy.99 But what would happen if, for some reason, the economy was not
thriving? Would then Locke's argument be valid? If we insist on using hindsight or
hypotheses then why not relocate Locke to modern times and substitute his theological
morality with radical social conscience; the effect could be quite extreme indeed. It is
apparent that if we are willing to treat history and philosophy in such a way we can
prove anything we like from them.'°°
Perhaps the way Smith regards labour and property is the most valid guide for
advancing Locke's property theory. Smith at one stage is
LOCKE (1967), at 308, 11.31. As far as trade marks are concerned the picture of inexhaustibility can
be more easily conceived. C. THOMPSON, in "Tips From the Top", Financial Times, October 18,
1993, is telling us that "... it is amazing how much difference type faces and letter styles can make".
But it is also amazing how many different type faces and letter styles exist. The crucial question is
how many of the different types are attractive.
We could destroy it only by using it. LOCKE (1967), at 185, 1.39.
'	 Ibid, at 188, 1.42.
WALDRON (1988), at 161.
'°° LASLETF (1967), at 105.
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"... concerned that no outside agency - government or labour or employer
organisation - should interfere with the free right of someone to sell their labour
[makes] the independent labourer, and his freedom to change jobs, the
centrepiece of his story",'°'
but recognises that
"... in every part of Europe, twenty workmen serve under one master for one that
is independent ... [and that] ... the workmen desire to get as much, the master to
give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise,
the latter in order to lower the wages of labour".'°2
"For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but
he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough
and as good left in common for others."103
The "sufficiency"°4 requirement should, if all else fails, protect Locke's theory from
being labelled immoral as tolerating, if not advocating, inequalities. The enough and as
good condition can be seen as a provision for equal opportunities leading to an
allocation of goods that is "desert-based" but "non-competitive" and a person can get as
much as he is willing to work for.'°5 It is suggested that this interpretation can be
accepted, keeping always in mind that Locke's property and political theory is dealing
with a notion of property that in economic terms is either in its initial primitive stage or
in its infantile period of early capitalism. His belief, for example, that
"... No Man's Labour could subdue, or appropriate all: nor could his Enjoyment
consume more than a small part",'°6
T. BURKE, A. GENN-BASH & B. HAINES, Competition in Theory and Practice (London,
Routlegde, 1991), at 29.
102 A. SMITH (R.H. CAMPBELL & A.S. SKINNER eds), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976), at I.viii.1 1, 83-84.
103 LOCKE (1967), at 306, 11.27.
'° As named by MACPHERSON (1962), at 211.
105 HUGHES (1988), at 298.
106 LOCKE(1967), at 310, 11.36.
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today in the age of the "post-perfect world",' 07 that has witnessed the fall of
communism, has felt the disillusionment about limitless "laissez faire" and has run into
an ideological vacuum,' 08 seems naive. 109 The nucleus of the argument for the
"sufficiency" proviso is existent and valid although it needs further development in
order to satisfy our basic morality test.
3.3.3. The Lockeian labour
It is easier, and appropriate, to start building the association between trade marks and a
labour property theory by showing that trade marks - as any other idea - require some
form of labour."° But what kind of labour is required for the Lockeian justification?
Idea-producing for example may not be the hard form of labouring that deserves
property reward." But it is submitted that the classification of labouring activities, to
more or less pleasurable, is important only when we examine property in its
consequentialist or instrumental reasoning. Thus, if society wishes to induce some
necessary to the public good, but still disagreeable, activities, then it may offer as
107 Termed by J. ROGALY, "Post-Perfect World", Financial Times, June 15, 1993. The right to labour is
now supplementing the property right to the fruits of labour: see C.B. MACPHERSON, "Liberal-
Democracy and Property", in MACPHERSON (1978), at 205-206.
'° See also R. GILPIN, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1987), at 64, arguing that, due to the economic changes brought by the international
division of labour and the global distribution of economic activities, "... the inherent stability of the
international market or capitalist system is highly problematic; it is the nature of the dynamics of this
system that it erodes the political foundations upon which it must ultimately rest and thereby raises
the crucial question of finding a new political leadership to ensure the survival of a liberal
international economic order".
109 
"Today, the only things where there is enough and as good left for others have no market value": A.
CARTER, The Philosophical Foundations of Property Rights (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1989), at 19. But, surely, this is not an argument against the Lockean provision itself. WALDRON
(1988), at 209-2 18, dismisses the significance of the sufficiency provision but to do that he is re-
using his general arguments against the Lockean property theory in general and especially against
Tully's interpretation.
This is a mirror argument of that, that ideas are legitimate objects of property rights being the fruits
of intellectual labour. D. BAIRD, "Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of I.N.S v.
A.P.", 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 411(1983), at 412-413.
1I From the outset we have to say that the meaning of labour was often confused with the resulting
work. In France, for example, it was during the middle ages that people started looking for "travail"
instead of "oeuvre". Interestingly "travail" derives from the latin "tripalium", meaning a kind of rake
that was used in torturing: G. MILLER, interviewing Le GOFF, in "Labour, the Original Sin" (in
Greek), To Vima, Sunday, 26 August, 1993.
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reward bigger slices of the bundle of property rights that can be exercised on the object
of the activity."2 A common justificatory basis does not mean that property law will
regulate all objects or that all should be regulated in the same way. The debate on the
genetically engineered onco-mouse and its cousin developed for hair growth is such an
example from the field of intellectual property."3
The deontological justification, though, should be separate" 4 from the consequentialist.
In practice this seems a technicality. For example it has been argued that the exclusive
entitlement to use a trade mark requires attributing artificial scarcity to it, which in turn
simply reflects a public policy." 5 The analysis may be correct but it is one sided, what if
exclusivity is deserved irrespectively from any value created or the other way round?
Similar questions arise in other areas of intellectual property; for example should
copyright be accorded exclusively to works of a minimum artistic merit, or is the
exclusion of discoveries from patentability justified?
112 HUGHES (1988), at 302-305 makes a lengthier analysis before dismissing the avoidance view of
labour. Here the discussion in relation to the property element of trade marks will be completed in the
following chapters dealing with the functions and the economics of trade marks. On the same subject
see also: D. ELLERMAN, "Property and the Theory of Value", 16 Philosophical Forum 293 (1985),
at 293-295 where he argues that even Locke himself was confusingly using concurringly a labour
theory of property with a labour theory of value.
"3 See for example B. SHERMAN & L. BENTLY, The Question of Patenting Life, in L. BENTLY &
S.M. MANIATIS (eds), Perspectives on Intellectual Property (Volume 4) - Intellectual Property and
Ethics (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998),.
114 Though not independent. The social and legal connotations of property are so much inextricably
linked that it is almost impossible for legal scientists to, credibly, claim that they distanced
themselves from the values they describe. The requirements of H. KELSEN (M. KNIGHT trans.), in
Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967) at 68 and 101-102 are very
difficult to satisf'. It may be correct that "... the judicial error of discussing abstract questions is
slight compared to the error of interpreting legislative enactments on the basis of a courts
preconceived views on "morals" and "ethics", per J. Black in The Mercoid Corp. v. Mid - Continent
Investment Co. eta!. 60 USPQ 21(1944), at 28, but it applies only to those legal scientists who have
to apply enacted legislation - and then only in the process of interpreting the legislation. It does not
apply to those who create or propose new legislation. See also G. TEUBNER, Law as an Autopoietic
System (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1992) who, at 79, describes law and the economy as two
autonomous, hermetically sealed, communication systems that nevertheless intereact on the basis of
the image that each one has created for the other.
h15 W.P. KRATZKE for example in "Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law", 21 Memphis
State University Law. Review 199 (1991), at 203-204. Trade mark law "... should accord a user an
exclusive entitlement only when exclusivity creates more value than would be created by not
according a user an exclusive interest".
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Ideally deontological and consequentialist justification will coincide, but when there is
conflict both must be weighed with caution if we want public policy to be both effective
and legitimate. This is a necessary stage in a "rights argument" also because people
should be rewarded if they add value to other people's lives, regardless of "whether they
are motivated by such rewards";' 16 in many cases materialistic reward is not the
exclusive incentive.
Another way to differentiate between types of labour is according to the amount of the
activity that has to be exercised in order to obtain a property right. It can be argued that
property rights are recognised, in the sphere of ideas, only when a certain amount of
labour has been exercised. In the case of patents, for example, a test of novelty and
inventiveness is applied in order to obtain a patent and delineate the object and the
limits of the property right. These tests may have more to do with the necessity to
depict, with clarity, the object of the right than set a minimum amount of labour that has
to be exercised;" 7 contradictory property claims are not welcomed in any system of
order.
Even when we shift the argument and claim that property rights are recognised on the
particular invention etc. not as a reward for its required amount of labour but rather as a
credit to the whole system of intellectual and industrial property," 8 this conforms only
to the historical Lockeian justification of property and becomes the main line of
argumentation in the attempt to justify property rights "economically".'19
116 HUGHES (1988), at 306.
" See for example W.R. CORNISH, Intellectual Property (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) where the
test of novelty is said to be elusive, at 83, and then he assesses, at 126, that the inventive step has
been adopted by many patent systems in order to find a solution in the cases that the invention "... is
not greatly different from what is known already" and also to shield the system from fence-post
claims.
Here we have to repeat a classic distinct,on between trade marks and the other forms of intellectual
property. Trade mark exclusive rights, to a great extent and at least in theory, find their justification
in the complementary objectives of fair trade and consumer protection. See for example D.
SHANAHAN, Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off (Sydney, Law Book Company,
1990), at 1.
" An often referred to anecdote illustrates what happens when self motivation for an activity is lacking
and we view ourselves as working to get a reward; then we will no longer fmd that activity worth
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So what kind of labour did Locke require for a property right to be recognised. The
criteria are not strict: gathering, hunting, cultivating and reaping are considered to be
"labouring" activities. He went far enough to use the terms "actions" and "labour" as
suggesting the same thing) 2° Nevertheless the connection of all forms of labour is not
that they result in "physical exertion" but that themselves are the results of free and
intentional human choice;' 21 the only juxtaposition he makes is between labour and play,
an activity that despite being free and intentional does not fall under labour. 122 Still,
there must be some decisiveness enshrined in the action, serving as a manifestation of
our will to create and protect our property rights by dominating the object of the right. 123
Therefore the "internal" labour of organising a plan, reflecting on an invention etc.
needs some external action which will be the apprehensible productive part of the whole
process124 and at the same time the medium of enriching the common pooi of goods,
ideas and so on. Pointing to a fruit does not create property rights, picking up does.
Concluding, it is submitted that although the Lockeian justification of property had
strenuously taken the step towards private property, at least in its modern
conceptualisation, and anyway not in the form of an "uncaring individualism",' 25 it has
to offer the moral criterion of labour and has developed the utilitarian need of society to
doing in its own right. An old man, harassed by the taunts of neighbourhood children, devised a
scheme. He offered to pay each child a dollar if they would all return Tuesday and yell their insults
again. They did so eagerly and received the money, but he told them he could only pay 25 cents on
Wednesday. When they returned, insulted him again and collected their quarters, he informed them
that Thursday's rate would be just a cent. Forget it, they said, and never taunted him again. Quoted
by A. KOHN, "Creativity and Intrinsic Interest Diminish if Task is Done for Gain", Boston Globe, 19
January 1987.
120 LOCKE (1967), at 316-317, 11.44
121 SIMMONS (1992) at 271 is connecting this with the thought that it is our intellectual nature that
makes us "capable of dominion": LOCKE, ibid, at 180, I. 30.
122 11JLLY (1980), at 109.
123 SIMMONS (1992), at 272-273 analyses this idea. We bring things within our purposive activities by
using them in productive ways. Occupying the land does not suffice if some labour is not exercised.
See K. OLIVERCRONA, "Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of Property",
35 Journal of the History of Ideas 211 (1974), at 225. On the same question see also BECKER
(1977), at 33-34.
124 See SIMMONS, ibid, especially at 273.
125 As described by BUCKLE (1991), at 149.
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remunerate labour. By establishing the labour rationale and linking it with limitations on
appropriation, Locke's theory offers a strong argument in favour of property, if not a
fuliy developed theory of private property.
Having briefly drafted a sketch of the Lockeian justification we can now turn to its
relation with trade marks. In respect of Lockeian property it is submitted that trade
marks require labour, they come from a "common", and they seem to satisfy the
"enough and as good" and "no waste" conditions.
3.3.4. Trade marks as Lockeian "labour"
The first logical step in our attempt to link trade marks and Lockeian property theory is
to establish if any Lockeian labour is exercised in creating a trade mark, since labour is
the cornerstone of the theory. So initially we have to examine if any labour, at all, is
spent in the creation of a trade mark.
There are three aspects from which we can apprehend the trade mark labour. First it is
the esoteric stage of planning the creation of a trade mark. Then comes the stage of
applying the trade mark and putting it in the market; it is then when the action of
appropriating publicly something previously not owned takes place. 126 Finally - although
not in a chronological order - labour can be looked at from the angle of labour invested
in building the goodwill that the trade mark symbolises.
The first stage may indeed necessitate a massive amount of labour and investment.
Trade mark proprietors employ agencies, specialists, advertisers, designers - almost
anyone and anything conceivable - in their attempt to create a trade mark that is
meaningful and can capture the imagination and the spending power of the public' 27 and
126 In the case of trade marks what is appropriated is letters, numerals, sounds, shapes, symbols etc. in a
specific distinctive connotation; the appropriation relates to the distinctive connotation rather the sign
as such.
127 A word trade mark, for example, has to be at least euphonious, easy to remember, evocative and
meaningful in its communicative objective, Y. PLASSERAUD, "Selection and Protection of Marks",
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at the same time satisfy the existing legal tests. Often the result of such campaigns is
commercially questionable,' 28 but surely, according to the Lockeian labouring standards,
the effort invested to the mark-creation would be a sufficient cause to recognise property
rights in the object of labour, the trade mark.
Things get more complicated when we deal with other intellectual property rights. In the
world of science, for example, the investment and the competition of business on
research is tremendous. The days of the lone scientist - inventor are, almost entirely,
gone, and patents are awarded to businesses that can afford the speculative investing
risks on inevitable inventions.' 29 Nevertheless, this is a discussion on balances within a
property system rather on a general labour justification of property.
What the trade mark creator is achieving with labour is simpler: s\he either isolates from
the existing visual, acoustic, or any other sensory perceptible common wealth
appropriate words, sounds, designs etc. or composes, according to, again common to all,
phonetic, artistic, acoustic, or other sensory methods a new sign which serves as a
mark.'30
28 Industrial Property 70 (1989), at 72. Put another way the criteria for selection are based on the
following factors: a proposed mark should be easy to learn and remember, suggest the product class,
support a symbol or slogan, suggest desired associations, avoid undesired associations, be distinctive
and finally be available and legally protectable, D.A. AAKER, Managing Brand Equity - Capitalizing
on the Value of a Brand Name (New York, The Free Press, 1991), at 196.
128 British Telecom for example have paid almost fifty million UK pounds for their new logo and its
implementation. At the other extreme some companies "... spent little more than the cost of reprinting
their stationery"; see L. KELLA WAY, "What's in a Name?", Financial Times, October 28, 1993, and
S. BAYLEY, "Top Marques", The Times Magazine, February 19, 1994, for more examples. It is
worth referring here to T.D. DRESCHER, "The Transformation and Evolution of Trade marks -
From Signals to Symbols to Myth", 82 TMR 301 (1992) asserting at 303 that "... trade marks,
especially in the form of brand names, can become extremely valuable corporate assets". Indeed,
according to the director-general of the Institute of Directors, defending their decision to spend sixty
thousand UK pounds on redesigning their logo, "... we do our radical policy papers no favour by
producing them in banal papers": L. KELLAWAY, "loD Urges End to "Enterprise Deficit",
Financial Times, February 24, 1994.
129 A. KAHN, an early but powerful critic, in "Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law",
30 American Economic Review 475 (1940), at 481.
130 j PRANISKAS in Trade Name Creation: Processes and Patterns, a 1968 linguistic study of 2,000
brand names, quoted by W.M. LANDES & R.A. POSNER, in "Trade mark Law: An Economic
Perspective", 30 Journal of Law & Economics 265 (1987), at 271 (111.1 1), established that they were
formed on the same linguistic principles as other words.
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But what is the kind of embodied labour when the trade mark consists simpiy of the
name of the marketer? In chapter three below, dealing with the functions of trade marks,
it is shown that a trade mark in an exchange economy is a necessary tool for the
manufacturer or trader of non monopolistic products. Now, the link of the producer with
her\his tools is something that can be easily apprehended, although not necessarily
sanctioned.'3'
Locke, himself, stated that
"...every man has a Property in his own person ... The Labour of his Body, and
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his",'32
and a human is the
master of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and the Actions or
Labour of it".'33
So first of all, one may combine the use of a name, as part of one's own person, with the
action of one's own labour and the result will be a persuasive Lockeian argument for
granting a property right to the name of the labourer not only as an extension of her\his
person but also as a necessary personification of her\his labour.
We can, furthermore, argue that using a name is one of the sequence of
.different degrees of Industry ... apt to give Men Possessions in different
Proportions",'34
leads to the similar conclusion that a mark - be it invented, a name or any other device -
is an ingenious process in the legitimate quest for more property and thus it becomes a
131 It is tempting to quote here Marx who remarked that in a craft system "... the worker and his means
of production remained closely united, like the snail with its shell" in K. MARX (B. FOWKES,
trans.), volume 1, Capital, (New York, Vintage, 1977).
132 LOCKE (1968), at 305-306, 11.27.
133 Ibid, at 316, 11.44.
134 Ibid, at 319, 11.48.
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"natural", in the Lockeian sense, object of property rights. The weakness of this
argument lies in its circularity: we use property to justify what creates it, and that may
be a successful but strenuous, for the legitimisation of property, exercise. The use of
trade marks as a marketing novelty, nevertheless, enables us to move on to the third
evidence of labour in trade marks, leaving the second for the end.
Business goodwill has been long recognised as a valuable asset and in the early
nineteenth century it has been associated with the actual place of business, being simply,
"... nothing more that the old customers will resort to the old place . . .
reading it almost as a real property right. The argument is that, since someone has built,
spending labour, amongst other factors, a reputation, it is ethical for her\him to expect
that a property will be awarded to safeguard this reputation. 136 The general argument of
Locke could lead us to the same conclusion: the core of the Lockeian argument is that
labour creates a right to property and it does not take a too big leap to move from
property on a trade name to property on a reputation.' 37 It is better though to avoid
interpreting Locke too liberally. It suffices here to say that what is worth stealing may
be worth protecting but what is worth protecting is not always property.
We have now reached the crucial point of making the claim to a mark, by now the result
of labour or an extension of one's person in connection with one's labour, public. There
are two ways of achieving this, depending on the formal requirements and custom. The
first is by actually putting the mark in the market. This can only be done by relating it to
some particular product, because otherwise the property claim would be too feeble and
Per Lord Eldon in Cruttwell v. Lye (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 129, at 133. See also the unequivocal
statement of Lord Lindley in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Muller and Co 's Margarine Ltd
[1901] AC 217 (H.L), at 223, that "...it is very difficult ... to say that goodwill is not property ... [it] is
bought and sold ... [it] may be acquired ... in any of the different ways in which property is usually
acquired ... [its proprietor] may vindicate his exclusive right to it ... by process of law". For
comments on this case and further references see VANDEVELDE (1980), at 335.
136 So reputation is protected against deception under the tort of passing off or more directly under a
trade mark registration system.
137 In passing off names such as Harrods - Harrods Ltdv. Harrod (R) Ltd [1924] RPC 74- or Annabel's
- Annabel s (Berkeley Square) v. Schock [1972] FSR 261, obtained protection.
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lacking the decisiveness we described earlier. It would be similar to the argument that
watching a rabbit gives a right to its meat. The other way would be by some form of
registration but this should also be followed by actual use because otherwise the "no
waste" condition would be breached as we will see below.
What has happened in the whole process is that the trade mark creator has appropriated
and then, in a way, returned the mark to the commons, making them a richer place,
because either a brand new addition has been made or a new connotation has been
attributed to an existing part of the commons; at the same time a property right in the
new addition or connotation has been recognised. This sequence of actions will be easier
understood if we turn to the commons and examine them before and after the
appropriation.
3.3.5. The "Commons" for trade marks
"Wealthy traders are habitually eager to enclose part of the great common of the
English language and to exclude the general public of the present day and of the
future from access to the enclosure."38
It is true that it is a troublesome exercise to compare the Lockeian world of Nature
containing the "Meat and Drink, and such other things", 139 with the commons of words
and ideas. What must be established is that the world of ideas falls within the Lockeian
perception of "commons".
Ideas are capable of universal possession, their vital characteristics are non exclusivity
in use, probably absolute non scarcity,' 4° and minimal costs of transfer and replication;
138 Sir H. Cozens-Hardy MR. in Crosfield & Son's Appn (Perfection) [1909] RPC 837, at 854. For a
more current representation of a similar sceptic approach see British Sugar Plc. v. J. Robertson &
Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281.
139 LOCKE (1967), at 303, 11.25.
° Although there is congestion around some of the most valued words such as "gold". We have seen
Nescafe Gold Blend, American Express Gold Card, Selfridges Gold Card, St. Ivel Gold, Capital Gold
and now Andrex Gold: D. SUMMERS, "Golden Touch on Brands", Financial Times, October 28,
1993. See AD2000 [1997] RPC 168.
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all the above are in evident contrast with physical objects.' 4 ' Things get more
complicated when we add to the above the fact that the societal value of an idea or
information is multiplied in direct analogy to the occurrences of its use. This,
unfortunately, does not happen to other consumables, unless it constitutes a miracle. I
can read a book and leave it in perfect order for my fellow human but I cannot do the
same with the food and drink that I consume, and, as a result, if I want to feed myself I
have to prevent others from depleting my provisions, whilst I do not have to do the same
for an idea for a medicine. Consumption is not fatal for ideas and information and
therefore rationing is not necessary. We can safely assume that the stock of ideas and
information represent a primary resource for societies and that the value of the stock
depends on its spreading among the members of society rather than in its safeguarding.
The matter of exchange value is of course a different question. In the case of physical
goods the answer may be traced in the demand - rational or not it does not matter -
combined with their scarcity. For objects of intellectual property rights - trade marks
apart - the answer lies in the substitution of the notion of inherent scarcity with that of
fictional scarcity as a generator of value. Fictional scarcity is created by secrecy; an idea
that is kept secret might worth millions, and become worthless, albeit only for its
"proprietor", once it is published.' 42 In antithesis, it is a trade mark kept secret that is
worthless, since the expectation of its creator is to make it notorious. So what attributes
value to a trade mark is the exclusivity of its linking either with a particular product or
line of products or with a specific origin, defined in the widest possible sense, of a
product, the associations conveyed to the consumer, and the information carried,
141 T. Jefferson, in one of his letters to Madison, likened ideas to fife; they were expansible over all
space and to air and incapable of confmement or exclusive appropriation: as mentioned at 67 and fn.
13 in Jefferson and Property Rights by J. YARBROUGH in E. FRANKEL PAUL & H. DICKMAN
(eds), Liberty, Property, and the Foundations of the American Constitution (Albany, State University
of New York Press, 1989).
142 Although the question will be fully developed in part three below some repetitions could not be
avoided. See R.J. ROBERTS, "Is Information Property?", 3 Intellectual Property Journal 209 (1988),
at 210-211.
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through it, in both directions - marketer to consumer and vice versa.' 43 In essence use in
trade is what attributes value to a trade mark."'
Exchange value, though, was convenient but irrelevant to a Lockeian property theory as
we have seen above. Not least because he believed that "God has given all things
richly".' 45 Now, this natural wealth is much more easily reconciled with the abundance
of res that are capable of becoming trade marks than the prosperity, as envisaged by
Locke, of the commons of physical objects. The commons of ideas, language, etc.
conform better with these descriptions and may satisfy, much more than physical
objects, the notion of "inexhaustibility" 46 that validates morally his property theory.
Still, it can be argued that ideas for trade marks are limited. Combinations of existing
words or coinage of new ones, for example, may not be infinite since only a small
number of linked phonemes - sound groups - enter the spoken language,' 47 and linguistic
change is neither a quick nor an easy process.' 48 Yet, in comparison with anything else
that is valuable and scarce, the supply of ideas will always remain enormous and
143 See chapter three above on the functions of trade marks.
144 
"Trade mark rights, not surprisingly, are generally confined to the commercial arena.": FIRTH
(1995) at 38. For example in passing off a political party could not gain protection for their name
under passing off, Kean v. McGivan [1982] FSR 119; on the other hand a professional organisation is
deemed to be involved in some sort of trade activities, BMA v. Marsh [1931] RPC 565. The question
of whether infringing use must be in the course of trade is important because if any use could
constitute infringement then the scope of the property right would be extended substantially. See
Mothercare v. Penguin Boo/cs [1988] RPC 113, for a straightforward negative answer under the 1938
Act. Bravado Merchandising v. Mainstream Publishing [1996] FSR 205 seems to widen the scope of
protection under the 1994 Act whilst British Sugar v. James Robertson [1996] RPC 281, is a
successful acrobatic exercise in limiting the scope of protection without disagreeing with Bravado;
see also FIRTH (1995), at 40-4 1 and E. GREDLEY & S.M. MANIATIS, '"'People you know yet you
can't quite name ..." Fair or Foul in the "Wet Wet Wet" Case?", [1996] Entertainment Law Review
99.
'	 I Tim. vi. 17, in LOCKE (1967), at 308, 11.31.
146 HUGHES (1988), at 315.
R. HALL, Introductory Linguistics (Philadelphia, Chilton Books, 1964), at 235. See also R.C.
DREYFUSS in "Expressive Genericity: Trade marks as Language in the Pepsi Generation", 65 Notre
Dame Law Review 397 (1990), at 412-423 and LANDES & POSNER (1987), at 272-273 and the
references therein, arguing, at 273, that the "... universe from which trade marks are picked is very
large". See the discussion of Laddie J. in Profitmaker 1994 RPC 613.
See the general presentation, at 57-88 for the phonetic, and 133-154 for the semantic changes, of R.
ANTI1LA in Historical and Comparative Linguistics (Amsterdam, J. Benjamins, 1989).
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continuous.' 49 Trade marks are an important but minuscule, in terms of size, sector of
the ideas world. Therefore we may conclude that the commons of language and ideas
are a perfectly sized Lockeian state of nature providing the essentials for the creation of
trade marks.
Finally we have to ensure that these commons, in their state of nature are not owned,
otherwise their components cannot become legitimate objects of property. We have seen
above that the order of this initial stock is very similar to Locke's state of Nature for
other consumables, and initially is held in common. The initial stock is free for all to
use, but what happens with property rights? It is submitted that appropriation is possible
only for new ideas built on the basis of the common stock, because only they
incorporate the labour that has to be exerted. The "idea", if we are strict in our
interpretation, would cover only coined and arbitrary marks; if our criteria are relaxed it
could also cover suggestive marks. But, in any case, the "idea" covers the linking of a
sign with a particular product rather than the sign as such. Therefore property rights in
them can be accepted since they will not affect the initial "commons".15°
' Of course some of the signs which could constitute a trade mark are limited; solid colours not
spatially confmed are one example; it has been widely argued in the US that according to a "colour
depletion theory" colours will, soon, not be available as signs for trade mark use, if rights to solid
colours are recognised. However this does not create a problem if what is covered by the property
right in a colour as a sign is the link of a particular product with the solid colour rather than the solid
colour as such. For the UK initial cautious approach on colours under the 1938 Act see Unilever
Plc's TM [1984] RPC 155 and Smith Kline & French's Application [1976] RPC 511. For the
American liberalised approach see Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. 774 F2d 1116, 227 USPQ 417
(C.A.F.C. 1985) and Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc. 34 USPQ2d 1161(1995); see also
M.S. SOMMERS, "Owning your Own Colour", Trademark World, May 1995, 18. Confirming that
appealing symbols for particular products are limited T. PAVIA & J. COSTA, in Gender Dimensions
of the Alphabetic Characters With Implications for Branding, in J. COSTA (ed.), Gender and
Consumer Behavior (Thousand Oaks, Sage, 1994) examine the phonetic symbolism of letters find
that products named C, L, and Y are strongly associated with women. In reality KL, MCM, and Y are
actual trade marks for fragrances for women. MCM was an innovative combination of the aggressive
letter M with the feminine C aiming at professional women. So a property right in Y for women's
fragrances would deplete the commons of attractive letters for products targeting women.
° Of course the extent of protection and the concise definition of the object of property are significant
in establishing the effect of the exercise of the right on the commons. In passing off, for example,
property on the shape of a product, in particular if the shape is functional, would devastate the
"commons" for the particular product; see for example Edge v. Niccolls [1911] RPC 582, and Reckitt
& Colman v. Borden [1990] RPC 340. Jacob J., on the other hand, delineates the limits of the
property right under the 1994 Act commenting on section 10 and setting that it "...requires the court
to assume the mark of the plaintiff is used in a normal and fair manner in relation to goods for which
it is registered and then to assess a likelihood of confusion in relation to the way the defendant uses
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The question of the type of property right recognised cannot be answered definitively
because of the difficulty to interpret the Lockeian theory in accordance with our
understanding of private property. But since the creation of new ideas satisfies the
criterion of labour and it is possible to define the commons, from where trade marks
derive, there is no reason why trade marks cannot be objects of the elusive Lockeian
private property right if they can fulfil the two provisions set by Locke.
3.3.6. The "Commons" after the appropriation and the two conditions
Ideas' 5 ' are not destroyed by consumption, therefore property rights in them do not need
to be, and cannot be, absolutely exclusive. It would be impossible, if anything else, to
police the exclusivity.' 52 Ideas are also easy to divide, transform, and adapt. These
characteristics allow us, in essence, to notionally carve of them distinguishable
segments and attribute accordingly separate property rights without destroying the total.
The action of carving may be shown in copyright by referring to the rules requiring that
a substantial part of the work must be copied to constitute infringement, therefore
copyright on a novel relates only to one distinct expression of an idea for a novel not to
the core idea itself.' 53 In patents, there is a general rule that only the inventions that have
been embodied into technical applications are patentable, thus, and to the extent that the
patent relates to the conception as such, discoveries, scientific theories and
mathematical methods are not patentable.' 54 In trade marks, property rights are confined
to marks which are capable to create an association in the mind of the customer between
its mark, discounting added matter or circumstances", in Origins Natural Resources Inc. v. Origin
Clothing Ltd [1995] FSR 280, at 284.
151 J must be obvious by now that the terms of ideas, words, information are used as denoting similar
notions. The truth is that words and ideas are the content of information which, in turn, is the act of
delivering a message: F. MACHLUP, Semantic Quirks in the Study of Information, in F. MACHLUP
& U. MANSFIELD (eds), The Study of Information: Interdisciplinary Messages (New York, Wiley,
1983), at 642. It is submitted that for our purposes the successiveness of the terms is not conceptually
confusing.
152 Ladbroke v. Hill (1964) 1 WLR 273, at 291: "The law has not found it possible to give full protection
to the intangibles."
153 To prove infringement it must be shown that the plot and not a simple starting idea has been copied.
CORNISH (1996), at 177.
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the mark and specific products, but they do not confer property on the signs constituting
the marks.'55
If the idea - expression distinction was more authoritatively developed by the courts,'56
it would serve as an excellent tool to envisage the commons before and after the
appropriation. The idea remains in the common pool of knowledge, property rights are
attributed to each expression and the expressions that incorporate new ideas are split,
permitting the return of the idea-section to the conmions whilst leaving the individual
expression to the property sphere of the creator.' 57 Apparently the carving of ideas -
expressions facilitates the creation of new ideas, since the commons is always
augmented either directly after the expiration of intellectual property rights' 58 - though
not in the case of trade marks which can be protected indefinitely' 59 - or indirectly.
The reader should note here that what is suggested, at this point, is not that granting of
property status to patents, copyrights and - we must add trade marks - inevitably leads to
the "... encouragement of individual effort by personal gain";' 60 such a leap would also
require a functional analysis of each intellectual property right separately. It is submitted
' Rules on distinctiveness, generic and descriptive marks etc. and requirements for actual use, common
in many trade mark systems, are telling examples. R. BROWN in "Advertising and the Public
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols", 57 Yale L. J. 1165 (1948), is stating, at 1206 that: "In
an acquisitive society, the drive for monopoly advantage is a very powerful pressure. Unchecked, it
would no doubt patent the wheel, copyright the alphabet, and register the sun and moon as exclusive
trade-marks". It is submitted that the checks also represent the inability of humans to patent the wheel
etc.
156 CORNISH (1989), at 289.
157 HUGHES (1988), at 3 10-314. Although his examples are strained - he is looking at historical cases
of copyright as if current law would lead to the same results - he, too, reaches the same conclusions.
Section 48 of the UK 1977 Patents Act serves also as an example: section 48(3) provides that a patent
cannot be used in order to hinder development of new ideas deriving from the first patent.
' Property rights in patents and copyrights are in that sense like long leases. Trade secrets can last
indefinitely but according to our interpretation they lack property status since they have not been
made public.
So trade marks rights should be limited only to the extent that are used in the course of trade. In
principle use not in a trade mark sense should not fall within the property exclusion zone and equally
protection should temporally coincide with the actual use of the trade mark by the proprietor.
160 Mazer v. Stein 347 US 201, 100 USPQ 325 (1954).
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though that if we accept the Lockeian criterion of labour' 6 ' then the granting of property
rights will not necessarily drain the world of ideas but to the contrary will enrich it to
the extent that the "enough and as good condition" is satisfied.
The non-waste condition is more delicate and controversial. We have seen that the
object of property must not be wastefully destroyed and although it is difficult to follow
what Locke exactly meant, and even more so to adapt it so as to fit a contemporary
property theory, the requirement must be present if we want the theory to be rightful. An
idea that is not used will never spoil like food but deterioration can be perceived if seen
against a "social backdrop".' 62 It is the backdrop that suffers - being excluded from the
idea - in the same way that the spoilage of food is preventing other potential consumers
from appropriating it and thus has to be returned to the commons before it becomes
unusable for personal consumption or exchange in the money-economy.
Similarly patents have to be used, trade marks to be applied in the market and so on, not
only because society will suffer' 63 but also - according to Locke's reasoning - because
other individuals are not able to seize what should be in the commons but instead is
becoming unusable. 164
When we look at the more developed economies it seems that, although defensive
patents and trade mark registrations exist, market competition and legal rules tend to
satisfy the principle. Time limitations of intellectual property rights are one of the more
Put otherwise: if we accept that "... sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards"; ibid.
162 HTJGI-IES (1988), at 328.
NOZICK (1974), at 181, argues that a scientist who discovers and appropriates a new substance does
not deprive anyone else. It would not be possible since the new substance was not there in the first
place. This suits the "enough and as good" provision but fails the spoilage provision which for
Nozick is superfluous, at 176. In respect of registered trade marks non use will render registration
liable to revocation; in passing off assignment of a mark in gross without the goodwill - breaking the
link with use - would be considered abandonment of the mark, which returns to the commons: Star
Industrial v. Yap Kwee Kor [1976] FSR 256.
' NOZICK, ibid, expands the new substance example in order to justify limitations on the inheritance
of physical goods because "... as time passes, the likelihood increases that others would have come
across the substance".
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direct means to reset the equilibrium in the commons.' 65 Giving or - more often -
threatening to give compulsory licences for patents have a similar effect.' Especially
for trade marks where the right can be infinite and the imposition of compulsory
licensing would only create confusion in the market, the use-requirements are a
powerful incentive to actually apply the mark.'67
But if we bring into consideration the less developed economies and the pressures' 68 and
conflicts between the two when questions of trade, trade agreements,' 69 and technology
165 See HUGHES (1988), further expanding Nozick's substance example.
' CORNISH (1989), at 205 supports that in industrialised countries it is the threat of invoking
compulsory licences that works as an incentive for the patentee to use his patent.
167 Section 26 of the UK 1938 Trade Mark Act. See also Imperial Group v. Philip Morris [1982] FSR 72
setting that the use must be real. Test marketing was not enough. Similar provisions exist in several
states. See for France, A. CHAVANNE & J. BURST, Droit de la Propriété Industrielle (Paris, Dalloz,
1990), at 658-674 and as an indication see Gluckslee Milchgesellschafi v. Besnier, 1982 Ann. Prop.
md. 147, where an international mark for milk and milk products was expunged since it was applied
only on cheese. For a review of the general situation in Europe prior to harmonisation see Use to
Maintain Rights in EC Countries (London, ECTA, 1987).
168 See, for example, the authoritative study on patents of F. MACHLUP, An Economic Review of the
Patent System, Study No. 15 of the Sub-Committee on Patents, Trade marks and Copyright of the US
Senate, 1958, at 42-43.
169 See A. P. BRAGGA, "The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GAiT: A View from
the South", 22 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 243 (1989), at 258-261 briefly presenting the
pros and the cons and, at 264, concluding that "... unilateral actions designed to force LDCs to
reform their intellectual property systems may backfire ...", for a contrary view see R. McQUISTON,
"Developing Countries are Undermining Corporate America's Capacity to Market its Creativity, a
Call for a Reasoned Solution by the United States Government in Light of the Continuing
Deterioration of the International Trade Mark System", 14 Syracuses Journal of International &
Commercial Law. 237, (1987). For an "historical" overview see A. OXLEY, The Challenge of Free
Trade (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), in particular at 100-111, where the incentives for
and the results of a closer collaboration between developed and developing are being presented.
Finally see C.J. ARUP, "The Prospective GATF Agreement for Intellectual Property Protection", 4
AIPJ 181(1993), arguing, at 182, that the new methods of dispute resolution in IP which will make
protection a matter of public as well as private international law will mean that" ... international
standards and processes will reach far into the domestic law formation of the contracting parties",
referring to a more general theory expressed by Y. DEZALAY, in "The Big Bang and the Law: The
Internationalization and Restructuration of the Legal Field", 7 Theory, Culture and Society 279
(1990). Inevitably, at an initial stage the balance of inconvenience will be against developing
countries, based on the usual arguments about incentive rewards and so on, but it remains to be seen
what will be the reaction of developed economies when the rest will start invoking public
international measures for the protection of their own intellectual property. Kingston in W.
KiNGSTON (ed.), Direct Protection of Innovation (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), argues, at
23-24, that Model Laws proposed to the third world countries are based on the, now, confounded
assumptions that protection of inventions would reduce the time needed by poor countries to reach
the technology levels of rich ones and also that such laws would advance the inward flow of
investment; in reality there was a basic incompatibility between indirect protection of innovation and
the realities faced by such economies. For a similar argument see J. HILLS, Economics as Ideology,
The World Bank and Privatisation (unpublished paper, 1995) arguing that the anglo-american model
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transfer arise,' 70 it seems that the intellectual property system is either deficient or not
ethically valid. The cry of those in defence of poorer regimes - in terms of economic
indicators and strength of intellectual property protection - that intellectual property
rights should be granted only when their proprietor is actually using them seems
valid.' 7 ' Contradictory claims on property could be avoided under a system of
compulsory licensing of those intellectual property rights that are not put into
production' 72 or the setting of quality standards when internationally known marks are
used for dumping purposes.' 73 In intellectual property the days of the empire seem to
have gone by and owners of international trade marks should take advantage of the
newly introduced legal regimes and support them by obtaining registrations rather than
"... to sit back and await unauthorised imports, which can be attacked with the
big stick of the ITC. At present the level of US and European registration of
trade marks in developing countries is very low. If these registrations are not
forthcoming, it may take more than threats, promises and diplomacy to get those
countries to raise their IP standards higher in the future".''
It is this kind of conflict that was described above, which has to be resolved through
public policy, which in turn can be drawn only after a thorough unbiased
consequentialist analysis combined with a review of all deonto logical arguments.
of capitalism exported to less developed countries is putting the state further in debt since it has to
take over the debts of public utilities to make them more attractive for privatisation.
170 See, for example, J. PHILIPS, "Some Thoughts on the Transfer of Technology", Vol. 22, Nos 4-5,
The Inventor.
H. JEWRY, Criticism of the International and National Intellectual Property Systems in Zimbabwe
and Developing Countries, a mimeo of the University of Zimbabwe (14 March 1988), as quoted by
U. KUMAR, in "Benefits of the Industrial Property System and the African Developing Countries",
16 (3) World Competition 71(1993), at 71 (fli.7). For the contrary view see R. RAPP & R. ROZEK,
"Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries", 24 Journal of
World Trade 75 (1990), where it is argued that the benefits by far overcome the costs.
172 Since "... by far the most important reason for taking out patents in developing countries is to import
to these countries and be protected from imitator's imports": H.E. GRUNDMANN, "Foreign Patent
Monopolies in Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis", 12 Journal of Development Studies
186 (1976), at 186. See also the complete discussion of KUMAR, ibid.
'' Colgate Palmolive v. Markwell [1988] RPC 283 is a good example.
J. PHILIPS, "Trade Marks 1992", in Trade Marks Creation, Protection and Valuation (published
together with April/May edition of Managing Intellectual Property), at 2.
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Locke overlooked such problems but has nevertheless written that only God could be,
"... Proprietor of the whole World, [and] may deny all the rest of Mankind Food,
and so at his pleasure starve them, if they will not acknowledge his Soveraignty,
and Obey his Will".'75
Advocates of private property using a Lockeian justification should keep this quote in
mind.
3.3.7. Concluding remarks
Concluding it is submitted that it is difficult to satisfy all of Locke's requirements, albeit
this has more to do with disparities that Locke failed to examine, than with the original
labour rationale which has become part of most property theories. The two
qualifications also form a powerful basis that has to be developed further in order to
satisfy our basic moral criteria. It has been shown that trade marks fulfil the labour
requirements and potentially can satisfy the two provisions.
3.4. The justification based on personality
3.4.1. Hegel's Properly Theory
Hegel offers a classic, complementary, alternative to Locke's property theory.' 76 It is
complementary for two reasons: first, because for Hegel it is work that brings out
humans' "creative and intelligent capacities" rather than consumption,' 77 and second
175 LOCKE (1967), at 187, 1.41.
176 Locke's theory has been contradictory but easy to understand. Hegel's "... intricacy of ... thought is
the theme of the commentator and the experience of the student", as perceived by CAIRNS (1949), at
503. Therefore a schematic approach cannot be avoided.
See A. RYAN, Property and Political Theory (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984), at 120, interpreting
Hegel's alarm on the division between property owners and property-less - who cannot fulfil their
citizenship role - developed in Janaer Realphilosophie - excerpts in R. PLANT, Hegel (London,
Allen & Unwin, 1973). Ryan's ideas are developed further in A. RYAN, Hegel on Work, Ownership
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because an interpretation of Locke's theory that points to a logical sequence of property
rights that people have initially in their bodies and labour and only then to the object of
the labour is bringing Locke closer both to the property theory based on "deserts" 78 and
the Hegelian starting point.
Hegel was clearer on the kind of right we have in ourselves, departing from Locke's
individualism.' 79 We possess our bodies in a natural way,' 8° but they are not our
property; if they were, then their alienation or destruction would mean the collapse of
the two notions - object of property and proprietor - and their simultaneous tearing
down. Setting that our capacity for rights, together with our ethical life and religious
feelings are inalienable Hegel lays minimum moral standards and at the same time
avoids some jflcOflsisteflcies.'8'
His scope was to enable us to gradually' 82 grasp mentally the truth about "Right, Ethics
and the state", which we recognise and enact in our everyday life through the "law of
and Citizenship, in Z.A. PELCZYNSKI (ed.), The State and Civil Society (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1984).
178 A line of argument that probably started with J.S. MILL (W. ASHLEY ed.) in Principles of Political
Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy, (London, Longman's Green, 1909);
Mill went a step further from Locke and influenced many of the future commentators, including
Becker.
See C.J. BERRY, Property and Possession; Two replies to Locke - Hume and Hegel, in PENNOCK
& CHAPMAN (1980), at 90-91.
180 A body should be "... the willing organ and soul-endowed instrument of mind": G.W.F. HEGEL (1.
KNOX, ed.) Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1952), at 43, par. 48. All
references to Hegel will be to this work, unless stated otherwise.
181 HEGEL (1952), at 53, par. 66. But could it be possible to establish property rights in parts of
ourselves, could we for example sell one arm and keep the rest, which can still function? Flegel set, at
43, par. 47, that our bodily organisms are "... universal in content and undivided". See the discussion
of A.T. SMITH, "Stealing the Body and its Parts", [1976] Criminal Law Review 622, P.
MATTHEWS, "Whose Body? People as Property", 36 Current Legal Problems 193 (1983) -
concluding that instead of applying property rules it is public policy that has to regulate the market of
human spare parts - and finally the unpublished paper of S.R. MUNZER, An Uneasy Case Against
Property Rights in Body Parts, presented at W.G. HART Legal Workshop, 1993, IALS; Munzer
following a Kantian analysis of dignity rejects the legitimacy of the, yet undefined, market for human
parts.
182 A telling, for the pedagogic character of his theory, detail of his life is the fact that, in 1808, he
accepted happily a place as a teacher at the high school in Nuremberg. It provided him with a stable
income and a link with science. F. WIEDMAN (F. PREVEDOUROU trans.), Hegel (in Greek)
(Plethron, Athens, 1985), at 47.
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the land", "in the morality of everyday life, and in religion".' 83 The nucleus of the theory
lies in the existence of "personality", that provides the means to start the journey out
from oneself - only when that is completed can a person claim to know her\himself "as
united in its innermost being with the truth lM - and is identified as the force
"... which struggles to lift itself above this restriction [of subjectivity] and to give
itself reality, or in other words to claim that external world as its own",'85
enabling the individual to realise itself and thus
"... translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as an Idea".'86
Human spirit can attain self consciousness only after the separation from "... nature,
society, God and fate" and the realisation of the human will. At the end, those
dichotomies do nothing more than create mirror images - since the truth is unique' 87 -
and personality returns to society, the only place where the new-found freedom can be
relished.' 88 In this long venture between creation, alienation, and re-appropriation of
' HEGEL (1952), at 3. The Preface is further evidence of the pedagogy of his work. But see K.
MARX, (B. LYCOUDIS trans.), A Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of State and Justice (in
Greek) (Papazisis, Athens, 1978), at 139. He characterises as an anomaly the theorem that the highest
synthesis of the political State lies in property of land and the life of family.
HEGEL, ibid. RYAN in PELCZYNSKI (1984), is describing the process of creation, alienation and
reappropriation of the world as follows: "Geist or Spirit creates a world which is initially blankly
alien or other, object not subject; this world, though it is the creation of Geist, is not seen to be such
until it is wholly understood, until Geist has so to speak recapitulated in understanding its creative
achievement and comes to see the world not as object but subject." See G.W.F. HEGEL (A.V.
MILLER trans.), The Phenomenology of Spirit, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977), at 10-12.
185 HEGEL (1952), at 38, par.39.
186 Ibid, at 40, par.41.
187 TAYLOR (1979), at 15. Taylor's discussion in 14-31 can help us understand Hegel's principle of
embodiment.
' For the fundamental link between individual and society see RYAN, in PELCZYNSKJ (1984), at 133
and K.H. ILTING, Hegel's Concept of the State and Marx's Early Critique, in PELCZYNSKI
(1984), at 100 onwards.
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reality and history, 189 human personality must be objectively witnessed in the real world
otherwise, in its subjectivity, it will be "a contradiction and a nullity".'°
Societal acknowledgement is made possible by the actualisation of human personality,
which has many facets and sources.' 9 ' Nevertheless the action of appropriating has a
twofold particular significance. As an absolute right because a person is giving to
external things an end, destiny and soul, all deriving from human will. They are thus
made worthy not as "ends-in-themselves" but as the steps towards self realisation.192
And second as a private property right because, it becomes "the personality" of a
"unitary will". Property is
"... the means whereby I give my will an embodiment, [and] must also have the
character of being "this" or "mine". This is the important doctrine of the
necessity of private property".'93
So property, initially or at a certain stage, in Hegel's theory, has to be private. But by
enacting this in his more general philosophy he is a more exhaustive advocate of private
property than Locke.' 94 Apart from that Hegel makes clear in his didactic preface, that,
as a philosopher, he is dealing with "... what is", because "... what is, is reason", so
private property being an, arguably, universal institution is part of reason and has to be
189 See RYAN in PELCZYNKI (1984), at 118-119 and his reference to K. MARX, Early Writings
(Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975), at 3 85-386.
190 HEGEL (1952), at 38, par.39.
191 And some of them may collide with property: See HUGHES (1988), at 336.
192 HEGEL (1952), at 41, par.44. At 236, par.44A it is added that: "... the thing as externality, has no end
in itself; it is not infinite self relation but something external to itself'. See also D. KNOWLES,
"Hegel on Property and Personality", 33 Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1983), at 48-49 and
WALDRON (1988), at 356. This can also be seen as a further argument against slavery in
furtherance of Hegel's views on slavery, at 48, par.57.
193 HEGEL, ibid, at 236, par.46A.
Some, like CARTER (1989), at 96, argue that this is a kind of gloss that enables Hegel to put the cart
before the horse.
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dealt with.' 95 Even if we disagree with his conclusions on private property, his reasoning
may be valid for a wider justification of property.'96
Both the absolute and the private right are parts of the Abstract right, meaning the body
of abstract principles, such as the right to life, to property and personal liberties;
concepts that underline all positive and rational legal systems.'97
Appropriation for 1-legel starts with the necessities of life but he goes a step beyond
Locke by side-tracking from the Lockeian natural and historical justification. 198 There is
something more in property rights than instinctive human behaviour and this can be
found neither in use nor in exchange-generated wealth.' The significance of property
lies in its being one of the ways to develop and understand our personality, the
expression of our will to occupy, the means of setting the boundaries between proprietor
and the rest of society20° and finally a way for society to express respect for the
individual's personality through the recognition and respect of property rights. 20 ' It is
195 HEGEL(1952),at 11.
196 See WALDRON (1988), at 373-375.
'° As defined by Z. PELCZYNSKI, The Hegelian Conception of Right, in Z. PELCZYNSKI (ed.),
Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1971), at 8.
198 For Hegel the "animal" desire for the bare necessities for life would be a necessary - but not
sufficient - condition for self consciousness. D. KOJEVE, Introduction a Ia Lecture de Hegel (Paris,
Gallimard, 1944), at 11, as quoted by BERRY in PENNOCK & CHAPMAN (1980), at 95 and fn.13.
Hegel wants to establish that there is "... a deeper ethical significance in [the human] in ... ownership
of property", see WALDRON (1988), at 352.
HEGEL (1952), at 49, par.59.
200 Although Hegel was strongly opposed to Enlightenment's view of the man "... as the subject of
egoistic desires, for which nature and society provided merely the means for fulfilment", C.
TAYLOR, Hegel and Modem Society, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), at 1.
201 S. AVINERI, in Hegel's Theory of the Modem State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1972), at 136, states: "[t]hrough property man's existence is recognised by others, since the respect
others show to his property by not trespassing on it, reflects their acceptance of it as a person". Now
we may or we may not agree with such a showing of respect for the individual, but we must not
overlook the fact that it is only one - though essential - mechanism by which individuals recognise
each other. RYAN (1984), at 131, asserts himself that "[p]roperty is only one way in which modem
man finds himself at home in the modem world". WALDRON (1988), at 348, fli.9, is dismissive of
this approach, but he overlooks property's complementary character. However, he does visualise the
Hegelian property as "... a stage in a process of individual and social development".
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perhaps telling to note here the progress on the recognition of women rights in general,
their rights on property and the parallel expansion of property rights.202
Here it must be emphasised that, for Hegel, there are no defined particular property
rights that are essential for the development of personality, but rights in general
certainly are. 203 People are free - and rational - to choose the kind of property to obtain
and the social role they attempt to fulfil.204
202 The reference here is to a pattern of parallel - but not necessarily coinciding chronologically -
development. The question of women and property is controversial, as any dealing with inequalities,
but can offer a valuable insight to the notion of property and accordingly to the understanding of
intellectual property. See first the moderate view of C.M. ROSE, who in "Women and Property:
Gaining and Losing Ground", 78 Virginia Law Review 421 (1992), adheres to the view that
allocation of property is only an aspect of our society, sets from the outset, at 423, that she is "... not
arguing that women would be better off in a world without property or entitlement generally", and, at
431-433, offers a description of a non-market "economy" of domestic relations, an alternative that
coexists with the market economy. Her views can be contrasted with the more radical feminist
approach of S. COONTZ & P. HENDERSON, in Property Forms, Political Power and Female
Labour in the Origins of Class and State Societies, in S. COONTZ & P. HENDERSON (eds),
Women's Work, Men's Property (London, Verso, 1986), suggesting, at 111-112, that "... the roots of
female subordination lie 1) in the growth of an incentive for property - owning kin corporations to
privatize both female productive and reproductive capacities and 2) in the greater expansionary
potential of kin corporations where women were the movable partners at marriage". Historically the
evolution of women's status as property holders in the English society is described by S. STAVES,
Married Women's Separate Property in England, 1660-1883 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
1990), concluding, at 229, that, looking from the middle ages to the present, "... the same struggles
appear to be repeated over and over again with only minor variations of vocabulary, depending on
what particular forms of property were important at different historical moments". Is it, then, a telling
detail that the large majority of inventors, trade mark owners are men? See for example F. MOUSSA,
Women Inventors (Geneva, WIPO, 1991) for a number of exceptional - in both its meanings -
women inventors. It is worth looking at two more historical notes that do not establish any of the two
theories but emphasise the trends described by Staves: M. SALIOU, in The Processes of Women's
Subordination in Primitive and Archaic Greece, in COONTZ & HENDERSON (1986) and the
conclusions of M. SALMON, in Women and the Law of Property in Early America (Chapel Hill,
University of North Carolina Press, 1986), at 185-193, where the regional differences in the US are
described as almost anarchic and the close more general link between economic and ideological
forces in promoting legal change is being demonstrated. Finally for a contemporary problem see the
paper delivered at W.G. HART Legal Workshop 1993 by A. LAWSON, Acquiring a Beneficial
Interest in the Family Home: The Detrimental Reliance Test: would the next step forward for
common law be a whole heartedly adoption of "unjust enrichment" on the question of women's
contribution to the family fortune? And if unjust enrichment is accepted in one field then would it be
too much to expect that "unjust enrichment" could become the principle on the basis of which a
general tort of "unfair competition" is adopted. Substitution of "deception" by "unjust enrichment" as
the basis of passing off is proposed by KAMPERMAN SANDERS (1995), at 83-122.
203 RYAN in PELCZYNSKI (1984), at 124.
204 See HEGEL (1952), at 35-36, par.33, for the interrelation of the individual and the truth that can be
found in the "... universal ... characterised as something inward, the good, and also as something
outward, a world presented to the will; both ... are mediated only by each other".
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3.4.2. Some qualifications on Property
Hegel, dealing with poverty and its relation to property, expanded the subject matter of
property. Summarising his argument we can say that in the reality of the exchange
economy what we own is the value of the object and not the object itself. 205 The value
can be quantified as monetaly value. But our skills, labour etc. can be contracted 206 and
their value can be represented in the same way, and generate income, therefore they,
too, can be seen as property assets. 207 In that way property requirements are more easily
satisfied and there is a chance for all of us to develop our personalities.208
Of course we cannot alienate the whole of our labour because then we would be made
slaves, because we would
"... be making into another's property the substance of [our] being, [our]
universal activity and actuality, [our] personality".209
Nevertheless, in modern societies, there are people in the fringes of property, when
property is seen as wealth: the very rich and the very poor, who do not or cannot
work. 21 ° There is also a class of absolutely propertyless "rabble" for which property
benefits are irrelevant. 21 ' Hegel had no obvious answer on that. It is not even clear if he
perceived the existence of the propertyless as another threat to civil society or as a class
205 See HEGEL's discussion of Exchange, ibid, at 62-63, par.80.
206 Ibid, at 57, in par.7l, titled "Transition from Property to Contract", is holding that property may
express not only the subjective will of the owner but may be part of a collective will, as in the case of
contractual relationships.
207 Commodification is a valid notion in the case of "facts" as the content of information. The argument
is that facts once put in the market are commodified and thus ex-post propertised.
208 The sketch is crude, but for a better analysis see RYAN in PELCZYNSKI (1984), at 134-136, and
AIRAKSINEN in KIPNIS & MEYERS (1985). See also WALDRON (1988), at 384-385, and finally
HEGEL (1952), at 237, par.49A, "... men are equal, but only qua persons, that is with respect only to
the source from which possession springs". Now, this could mean that opportunity to property would
suffice, but Waldron successfully argues that then the whole ethical necessity of property would not
be valid. Some actual form of property is demanded.
209 HEGEL (1952), at 54, par.67.
210 HEGEL (1952), at 123-124, par.185.
211 Ibid, at 149-150, pars.243-245.
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to which the chance to develop their personality is refused, because of the lack of
property. But he blamed the rules of the economy rather than property rights themselves
and although he was prepared to impose constraints on the institution of property he did
not talk extensively about inequality and distribution of property.212
If we place property in the wider context of Hegelian philosophy then it may seem
unfair to accuse Hegel of indifference, on the problem of the propertyless. At the
projected stage of Hegelian human completion, property, having completed its
pedagogic role, will be one of the many aspects of life in a society where
"... to have no interest except in one's formal right may be pure obstinacy, often
a fitting accompaniment of a cold heart and restricted sympathies. It is
uncultured people who insist most on their rights, while noble minds look on
other aspects of the thing. Thus abstract right is nothing but a bare possibility
and, at least in contrast with the whole range of the situation, something
formal".213
Projected, so as to satisfy the criteria set at the beginning, the Hegelian property theory
is allowing us to set two basic rules. First of all property may stem from but is not a
prerequisite of personhood. It is, at least intuitively, evident to all of us that property
objects, such as wedding rings, houses, etc., that are
"... closely bound up with personhood because they are part of the way we
constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world",214
212 For the analysis on the comparison between Hegel's influential and Marx's more radical approach on
the question see for example: P.G. STILLMAN, Property, Freedom, and Individuality in Hegel's and
Marx's Political Thought, in PENNOCK & CHAPMAN (1980), at 130, RYAN in PELCZYNSKI
(1984), at 138-139, and R.N. BERKI, Perspectives in the Marxian critique of Hegel's Political
Philosophy, in PELCZYNSKI (1971), at 199; at 202 it is stated that according to the Marxian critique
of Hegel his flaws lie in "... his being an idealist philosopher in the first place, in his making
everything in his philosophy revolve around reason, or the "Idea".
213 HEGEL (1952), at 235, par.37A
214 See M.J. RADIN, "Property and Personhood", 34 Stanford Law Review 957 (1982), at 959. Radin
provides a more systematic analysis of the relation between property and personhood, and concludes
that some property rights, according to our deeper social convictions, can be ascertained as personal;
these rights ought to have stronger protection against governmental invasion and attacks from
conflicting "fungible" property claims of others. Personhood, in that way, is only strengthening some
property rights.
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are not self luminous but are always determined by human personalities and actions.
And second, property rights cannot be used as "trumps", to block other human rights.
Hegel also provides that "the specific characteristics" of private property may have to be
subordinated to the higher interests of society.215
Recently, probably in the apparent need to rediscover political ideologies and resist the
onslaught of law and economics, some are putting forward the claim that Hegel has
given us a thoroughly social theory of property.216 Indeed, Hegel's "social conception of
property rights" can be contrasted with the more individualistic and materialistic
approach of Locke;217 an example are his views on alienation, and the expansion of
Locke's provisions on the right to subsistence. 218 But Hegel's expressed concern on
poverty and the boundaries of property was limited, especially when we compare it with
his elaborate property theory. So property's social character can be determined today,
only within the entirety of Hegel's philosophy and, to an extent, with the hindsight of
Marxist critique and politics.
Nevertheless the limits of property, until that moment of completion, can be drawn by
examining the ways of creating and exercising property rights. Their respective
assessment elucidates Hegel's qualifications on property better than the expressed
limitations.
215 HEGEL (1952), at 42, par.46. So if society was at war with poverty then property rights could be
subordinated? His views on Plato's ideology, the fundamentality of property and the statement that
the exceptions cannot be grounded in chance, private caprice or advantage seem to deny this. Most of
the commentators use the "trumps" metaphor of Dworkin.
216 M.G. SALTER, in the unpublished paper Property Law as Public Law? Hegel's Social Theory of the
Rationale for, and Limit of Property, presented in W.G. HART Legal Workshop 1993 strongly
advocates that. A telling comparison can be found, at fn.29 of the paper, between COHEN's (1954)
definition of property and Hegel's statement, at 121 of System of Ethical Life, H. HARRIS & T.
KNOX (eds) (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1979) that "... property enters reality
through the plurality of persons involved in exchange and mutually recognising one another. Value
enters in the reality of things and applies to each of them as surplus".
217 H. BROD, in Hegel's Philosophy of Politics (Oxford, Westview, 1992), at 68.
218 HEGEL (1952), at 277, par.240A.
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3.4.3. Some Hegelian ways of exercising property rights
In a way similar to Locke, Hegel demands that a physical relation between the person
and the object must exist, like taking possession or use. 219 This is a consequence of the
belief that personality must be externalised. He asserts that,
"... the inner act of will which consists in saying that something is mine must
also become recognisable by others".22°
Starting with possession,22 ' there are three ways that it can be manifested: direct
physical grasping, formation of the object and merely marking it as ours.
Physical grasping can only be temporary, since it coexists with the actual grasping. So
an abandoned apple is anybody's apple in contrast to the fruit that is in our physical
possession and which is ours.222
Possession by formation will last longer, since our will that is incorporated to our work
will give the object an "independent externality". We give to the object a further facet
which relates closely to our will.223 The hut that our labour built is ours because the
action of building represented our will and was witnessed as such by society. The hut
will be respected even for a reasonable period of absence. 224 Marking has a similar
effect, being a "representative" and "indeterminate" mode of expressing our will, 225 and
219 Ibid, at 45-46, pars.5 1-52, and 237, par.5 1A. See also WALDRON (1988), at 363-365.
220 FIEGEL ibid.
221 HEGEL is dealing with possession, at 46-49, pars 54-58, ibid.
222 thid, at 46-47, par.55.
223 Ibid, at 47, par.56. R. PLANT in Economic and Social Integration in Hegel's Philosophy, in D.P.
VERENE (ed.), Hegel's Social and Political Thought: The Philosophy of the Objective Spirit
(Sussex, Harvester Press, 1980), at 62-63, traces a direct Lockeian influence.
224 In the case of registered trade marks non use for a certain period of time would jeopardise
registration almost in all jurisdictions throughout the world. In respect of passing off absence from
the market for a considerable period of time would negate protection; see for example Norman Kark
v. Odhams [1962] RPC 163, which sets the general principle that use at one period does not lead to
indefmite protection; and Berkeley Hotel v. Berkeley International [1972] RPC 673, where protection
was granted despite temporary closure of the business for relocation, and Ad-Lib Club v. Granville
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"... the notion of a mark, ... is that the thing does not count as the thing which it
is but as what it is supposed to signify".226
Therefore the marking of our animals with a personal sign will express our will to
dominate the animals even when they are mixed with the animals of the neighbours.
Use of the object draws it further away from the total of independent objects and
converts it to a status of subordinance to our will, because
"... the use of the thing is [our] need being externally realised through the
change, destruction and consumption of the thing".227
So humans are once more using nature to satisfy their needs only this time in a more
systematic way, than in the Lockeian norm. Hegel, too, emphasises the importance of
non-wasteful use, which from the ethical aspect is the "most important thing about an
individual's ownership". 228 Hegel himself forcefully states that:
"[t]he relation of use to property is the same as that of substance to accident,
inner to outer, force to manifestation. Just as force exists only in manifesting
itself, so arabic land, is arabic land only in bearing crops".229
This statement has two supplementing interpretations: the obvious one that the owner of
the land is also the owner of the right to cultivate and reap the land, and a second, that
the owner of the arabic land can claim, or at least ethically justify, property rights only if
the land is cultivated. In the legal sense this may seem nebulous, but in philosophical
terms it is a strong and clear argument; function-less property is itself an enemy of
[1971] FSR 1, where notoriety and willingness to get back in business assisted the goodwill to
survive a five year period of not trading.
225 HEGEL (1952), at 49, par.58.
226 Ibid, at 239, par.58A. This "definition" of marking serves as an excellent link of the Hegelian
property theory with trade marks.
227 Ibid, at 49, par.59.
228 WALDRON, (1988) at 366.
229 HEGEL (1952), at 239-240, par.62A.
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property. 23° This is very similar to the idea that a private enterprise will create
substantial income for its shareholders only when a large part of its profits are
reinvested to the enterprise.23'
Let us turn now to the relation of property with intellectual property and trade marks.
3.4.4. A clearer view of "Intellectual Property"
Fortunately Hegel has a much more direct approach to intellectual property. He
indicates that
"... mental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, even things ecclesiastical
inventions, and so forth, become subjects of a contract, brought on to a parity,
through being bought and sold, with things recognised as things".232
He questions the reasoning of calling "such abilities" "things", because although they
are part of business dealings there is also
"... something inward and mental about [them], and for this reason the
Understanding may be in perplexity about how to describe such possession in
legal terms, because its field of vision is as limited to the dilemma that this is
"either a thing or not a thing" as to the dilemma either "finite or infinite".233
So the problem is easy to solve and its nature is legalistic rather than ethical. Hegel simply
describes here the need of the courts to physicalise the object of property.
He also examines the more complex issue of ideas as something internal to the free mind.
The question then posed is how they are going to be separated from it and where our will
is going to be embodied. Otherwise the entire of the free mind will have to be alienated
230 TAWNEY (1920).
231 See J. FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980). At 172, he
is arguing that the private owner of a capital good has a duty to put it in productive use.
232 HEGEL (1952), at 40-41, par.43.
233 Ibid.
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and the personality will be enslaved. He thus dichotomises between ideas and their
expression. Expressions can be embodied into something external, which in turn can be
alienated. So ideas are not from the beginning the object of property rights but are turned
into such after
"... the mediation of mind which reduces its inner possessions to immediacy and
externality".234
Therefore the embodiment does not only facilitate the physicalised grasping of the
expression but essentially satisfies the Hegelian need for objective witnessing and
materialisation of personality.
He also touches the process of human mediation for intellectual objects of property. In the
case of works of art he brings out the peculiar case of regarding the work of a copyist as
his own property, and distinguishes works of art from literary works and inventions. There
the mechanistic tool of the language on the one hand and the mechanical content of the
inventions on the other are contrasted with the "en bloc" nature of art copies, making
easier the understanding of the notion of a copy.235
He goes even further in commenting on the transitional stages between all the extremes of
mind creations. So the labour which the copyist put into his creation has a more
personalised character, that is lacking from the labour that uses the mechanistic and
universal tool of language. Therefore it contributes to the building of personality and may
attract property rights. 236 A comparison can be drawn with the common law rule that in
234 Ibid. HUGHES (1988) at 337, submits that for Hegel intellectual property does not need a
justification by analogy to physical property. Nevertheless the justification remains the same in
substance. An example of a border line case would be confidential information, defming it, linking it
with intellectual property, and delineating the related rights.
235 For a surprising parallel see L.A. GREENBERG, "The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and
Post-Modernism", 11 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 1 (1992), arguing that pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works, because of their unique status as material entities, require a different
copyright analysis from that applied to other copyrightable subject matter, in the light of artists
following radical appropriation strategies.
236 HEGEL (1952), at 54-55, par.69.
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copyright infringement the decision on whether the part taken is substantial has more to do
with the quality than the quantity of the part taken.237
The essence of the rights lies in the provision that when the creator alienates a copy of his
work he is not conferring at the same time the right to reproduce copies of the work. This
would mean alienation of the "... universal ways and means of expression". 238 Thus the
new owner of the copy shares the intellectual creation and the creator and owner of the
original withholds his integrity and wealth generating "capital assets".239
Hegel's brief discussion could be an excellent addition to the armoury of the supporters of
intellectual property monopolies, because he introduces the functional, but disputed,
argument that the protection of intellectual property is
"... the purely negative, though the primary, means of advancing the sciences
and arts",
as a natural consequence of his philosophical arguments.24°
Finally 1-legel recognised that formal legal protection is often limited and that the
treasuring of intellectual property is then left to honour. His final caustic remarks are
reserved for the scholars' ability to avoid plagiarism and abide by honour.24'
237 As set in University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch. 601, at 610.
238 HEGEL (1952), at 54-55, par.69. HUGHES (1988) makes a shorter description at 338. In this sense
copyright laws providing for the protection of moral rights are closer to the Hegelian ideal than the
laws that identif' copyright with economic rights only.
239 HEGEL, ibid, at 55-56, par.69. This is how he describes the intellectual creations as benefits of
learning.
240 thid, at 55, par.69. For that approach see also A.S. WEINRIB, "information and Property", 23
University of Toronto Law Journal 121(1988) arguing that the assignment of property rights is the
result of the expectation that they will achieve a more desirable result, and that "... the law of
property is thus purposive ... [serving] as an incentive to encourage conduct we consider desirable by
regulating the actions of others in relation to that protected interest".
241 HEGEL, ibid, at 56, par.69. He, ironically, submitted that either plagiarism has ceased to be
dishonourable or any trivial idea could be held original.
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We have seen that the Hegelian justification of intellectual property rights in general
does not require the uneasy expansions of Locke's theory. Things get more difficult
when we turn to trade marks.
3.4.5. A more complicated view of trade marks
It is the problem of how much and what kind of labour is needed, that resurfaces in the
case of trade marks. Only that now it is expressed as not only whether but also how
much specific property rights contribute to the building of personality and how
personality is manifested on each object of property.
Arguably, the contribution of trade mark creation to the intellect is not that significant
so as to deserve the status of property object. This, though, is not supported by an
analysis of the functions of trade marks and Hegel's understanding of the notion of the
mark as a symbol that signifies the owner of the object and attributes property rights.
Furthermore the criteria that may be set for the originality of intellectual works are often
irrelevant.242
Starting with the historical prime functions of trade marks it is well established that
amongst them is the indication of ownership. 243 So, in the same way, the marking of a
thing changes its character, the use of a word, sign, etc. as a mark is transforming it into
a symbol, by attributing to it a further function.
Now if that is agreed, how can I signify something as my property if I do not own the
symbol used as the signifier, to the extent, at least, that it serves as signifier? In passing
off cases, for example, the property protected is that in goodwill rather than that in the
242 Whicher, as quoted at 11 of J. FROW's article on the changing faces of originality, "Repetition and
Limitation: Computer Software and Copyright Law", 29 Screen 4 (1988), states that, "... when the
creative process is re-examined by the wisdom of judicial hindsight, it is, like a conjuror's trick that
has been explained to children, almost always a disappointment. There is, we discover, no magic to it
after all. It's only work".
243 See chapter two on the history of trade marks.
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name or the marked 2 protection requires that whatever depicts the goodwill to
the customer is protected, so property in the mark or other goodwill depicting and
distinctive indicia is established, at least in judicial practice. 245 The defendant, will
always have to show that despite her/his use of the plaintiff's distinctive indicia s/he
effectively distinguishes her/his goods or business from the goods or business of the
plaintiff. This is often impossible,246 and even when it is possible then the defendant will
have to face other non-proprietary common law rules such us injurious falsehood or
rules on comparative advertising etc.
Slightly adjusting the discussion on what is appropriated and what is left in the
commons, we can say that it is the capability of the symbol to denote a particular propri-
etor that becomes the subject matter of property in the trade mark. This is the point
where personality is realised as required in the Hegelian property theory, and where we
dichotomise between idea - the sign as such - and expression - the sign used as a mark.
It is a logical sequence that human will is first embodied into the mark and then into the
marked object, even if, in the case of passing off, the goodwill already exists in some
form. Because, in a more developed economy one of the trade marks' roles is to mark
and express the ownership of a source of products and not necessarily ownership of the
products themselves. In the retail stage, ownership of the goods may lie either with the
retailer or with the manufacturer. Nevertheless as it was put in an early, unreported but
quoted, case, a clothier was claiming that
"... whereas he had gained great reputation for his making of his cloth, and by
reason whereof he had great utterance to his great benefit and profit, and that he
used to set his mark to the cloth, whereby it should be known to be his cloth,
244 As we are asked to do by Lord Diplock in Erven Warning B. V. v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd
[1980] R.P.C. 31 (H.L.), at 93.
245 J. Pitney in Prestonettes Inc. v. Coty 264 US 359 (1924), at 368, is making a similar point stating that
trade marks are classed among property rights as an "instrumentality" to the "... man's right to the
continued enjoyment of his ... goodwill".
246 See WADLOW, The Law of Passing Off (London, Sweet & Maxwell,1990), at 145-146; see also
Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co. [1897] RPC 721 (H.L.).
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and another clothier perceiving it, used the same mark to his ill made cloth on
purpose to deceive him... ,,247
The emphasised words are an example of the sequence presented above.
The exact characterisation either by courts or by statutes of the exclusive right in a mark
is not particularly clear. "Fuliginous obscurity"248 is a well known expression, apt to
describe several aspects of common and statutory law on the protection of trade marks
especially when we add to that the European aspect and the two way influence between
common and civil law, but it does not invalidate Hegel's property theory as long as the
exclusivity is recognised in some form. This is even more so because we have seen
above that Hegel accepted the limitations of law, believing that some questions cannot
be finally settled either in principle or by positive legislation.
Now, the choice of the marking symbol must not be irrational. This means first that it
must not contradict with prior established property rights, otherwise the property system
would fall apart. Rights in trade marks would be without power and value if we were
allowed to claim the marks already used by others. Rules on conflicts between
applications for registration with already established rights in marks which exist in all
trade mark laws are a good example.249
Second it must be capable to convey the link of the mark with the personality;
limitations on descriptive and generic marks are meant to satisfy this. Obviously the
claiming of the mark "Orange" for the trading of oranges falls within the same category
with the expectation that my claim that "I want people to identify me with the World
247 As quoted by Lord Haisbury in Magnolia Metal Co. v. Tandem Smelting Syndicate Ltd [1900] RPC
477 (H.L.).
248 Per Mackinnon L.J. in Bismag v. Amblins [1940] RPC 209, at 237, commenting on section 4 of the
1938 Trade Marks Act.
249 For trade marks in particular this will be shown in chapter five below on the economics of trade
marks.
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Trade Center" will confer to me property rights in the Center, whereas I do not have
any.25°
Finally, it must have an internal link with the proprietor, making her/his will
recognisable. The link can be creation, use, etc., but an arbitrary claim will not suffice.
Trade mark rules requiring use as a pre-requisite for, or a condition, of registration and
the wider protection available to signs that have no other meaning apart from that of the
mark help us illustrate the existence of that internal link. 25 ' Common law protection
exemplifies the link created by grasping; as long as the mark is used then the will of the
proprietor is recognised and the property right respected, abandoning the mark will
bring it, in the majority of cases back to the conimons. 252 Registered trade marks, on the
other hand possess an independent externality, given to them by registration and similar
to that acquired by working on or marking the object of property. Therefore the property
right recognised in respect of registered trade marks is more concrete.253
A property theory based on personality is also fertile ground for evolving goodwill as
the creative reason for property rights in trade marks. An individual who leaves a mark
on the world has built a public image, part of which is her/his reputation and history.254
For a trader the public image is what we call the goodwill, and this is captured in the
250 The World Trade Center example is used by HUGHES (1988) at 343. Don't forget though that
Windsor Castle and the World Trade Center are among the properties that have been actually "sold"
by people that claimed their ownership.
251 Reference is made here to decisiveness test set by Locke.
252 A nice comparison can be drawn with Hegel's view that when a public memorial loses its character
as a symbol then it is open to appropriation. See also the statement of Eve J. in Pink v. Sharwood
(J.A.) & Co. Ltd [1913] 30 RPC 725, at 725 that "... if, hereafter, the plaintiff should recover and
resume business, he will resume with the benefit of his former reputation, but the goodwill which he
will then assume will be a goodwill he will then start to create, and not the goodwill of the old
business revived and resuscitated". Cases where goodwill survives the cessation of the business are
an example of the strength that creation, extensive use, etc. of the property objects gives to the rights
on them, and are making the Hegelian property theory even stronger.
253 Registration takes here the role of creation or marking. We can say that we add to, or create for, the
mark a new dimension or that we mark the mark as ours in its new dimension.
254 HUGHES (1988) at 339-341, interestingly starts his whole conversation on the varying degrees of
personality in intellectual property, by building the concept of "persona." He suggests that literary
works and works that involve the building of an individual's public image are particularly receptacle
for a personality justification of property. It is submitted that although this is only one - and not very
clear - aspect of intellectual property, it is of particular significance for the case of trade marks.
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adopted trade mark. Thus the trade mark is one of the intellectual property capital assets
but it is more the result of a process of learning and developing the personality through
good and fair trading rather than literal learning. The weak point of this approach is that
in the cases where trade marks are so closely linked with the goodwill they represent
that they became inseparable. Something that is difficult to reconcile with the possibility
of assignment or devolution of trade marks, irrespective of goodwill.255
3.4.6. The role of the consumer and some concluding remarks
We have seen by now that trade marks can fit in more than one ways into the Hegelian
property theory. And that even if, for some commentators, trade marks lack the
"nobility" of other intellectual property rights they encapsulate in return the core
reasoning of Hegel's property theory.
We have also to emphasise here his idea that property objects and rights can also be
defmed through contractual relationships, because this can form the link between trade
mark owners256 on the one hand and other trade mark owners, marketers, and consumers
on the other. Hegel claims that property is also
"... an existent as an embodiment of the will, and from this point of view the
"other" for which it exists can only be the will of another person. This relation of
will to will is the true and proper ground in which freedom is existent".257
This means that reason will make everybody realise that human needs can only be
satisfied through multilateral agreements advancing the interests of all the parties to the
agreements. 258 So the fair trader will not take the mark of another because he realises
255 See for example section 22 of the 1938 UK Trade Marks Act.
256 See for example the cases on infringing a trade mark by importing a reference and the real need to
refer to the competitor's product.
257 HEGEL (1952), at 57, par.7l.
25B This is similar to A. Smith's approach that a producer gains by contracting with the consumer; it is
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from
their regard to their own interest.
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that this will put in danger his claim of ownership of his own goods, marks or goodwill.
Therefore, traders in general will have to recognise "... each other as persons and
property owners",259 and respect the marks adopted by each one of them.26°
But today a parallel main function of trade marks is to convey information. This has no
effect on their status as property objects - because all the ethical discussion remains
valid - but brings into the picture the consumer.
We have seen above that it is the consumer's understanding that gives meaning to trade
marks.26 ' If the consumer does not respect262 the conveyed message, then trade marks
will lose their ability to distinguish between different traders as sources of a product.
Their role will diminish to signifiers of physical property, and their owners will lose the
mark's most valuable asset. In that way the relationship between the trader and the
consumer acts as a catalyst that triggers a series of reactions. This in turn, gives the
consumer the ability to codetermine the kind and extent of property rights in trade
marks. As it will be shown in the following chapters that will examine the market
functions of trade marks markets already understand this.263
3.5. Some comments on the justification of property
We have briefly examined, with a rights argumentation method, two mainstream
property theories. It was established that under both theories intellectual property and
trade marks are justifiable objects of property rights. Nevertheless both theories could
259 HIEGEL (1952), at 57, par.71.
260 F. LAWSON & B. RIJDDEN in the Law of Property (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982) are
stating, at 33, that property of goodwill is of an odd kind because only the person who has transferred
can be placed under a duty to respect it. This is true only if we view goodwill in isolation from trade
marks and passing off, as their analysis shows.
261 See chapter four on the functions of trade marks.
262 And the respect of a rational consumer will lie at the same place with her/his trust. See the discussion
of Akerlof's seminal article of in fn. 127 in chapter four below.
263 But the markets may be unable or unwilling to regulate this co-determination; see M. COHEN,
"Property and Sovereignty", 13 Cornell LQ 8 (1927), claiming that controlling and moderating our
consumptive demands cannot be left to those whose dominant interest is to stimulate such demands.
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not predict the development of society and economy and inevitably to an extent fail to
fulfil the morality standards that were set at the beginning of this chapter; so, often we
had to take hypothetical steps forward.
The labour theory has been developed further by many writers, albeit in contradicting
directions but the criterion of labour became the starting point for most property theories
based on deserts and it contains too much substantial truth to be brushed aside. 264 The
two qualifications on property, even as incomplete discussions on the limitations of
property, posed challenging questions on the restraints that should be imposed on trade
marks rights that cannot be ignored.
Hegel's justification, based on the expansion of personality to external objects, has
similar weaknesses. It is only in the general philosophical system of Hegel, that
provides the most complete and ethically developed view of property.
The arguments of both theories are independently sound. A general property theory has
to include them and co-ordinate them. 265 But the co-ordination of the "ingredients" 266 of
a right of property must not fail to comprise three essential standpoints.
First that after the establishment of minimum morality standards, public policy
intervenes and determines the balancing of property rights, social needs and goals.
Inequalities - the existence of which is the main anti-property argument - cannot be
ignored. However, inequality, for Flegel and Locke, would exclude or trump property
rights only when they deny the essentials for the development of human personality or
the physical necessities for survival. So, the conditions provided by them would satisfy
264 Ibid. Although he believes that the essential truth is that property induces labour, and labour induces
productivity.
265 It can be argued that the Lockeian justification becomes inactive when the more fundamental
Hegelian is valid. Even then they supplement rather than exclude each other. See R.S KING, The
"Moral Rights" of Creators of Intellectual Property, 9 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Review
267 (1991) at 287-290.
266 Meaning the analogies between labour, development of personality, strength of individualistic and
social will, morality, utility and efficiency, that have all to be present in a property theory.
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with difficulty the minimum test of morality that was set at the beginning of the chapter.
Accordingly, after that initial stage, each property right has to be examined separately.
So having looked at property theories and trade marks, we must turn to an economic
analysis. 267 Inequalities will be presented as assymetries of information and conflicting
interests on rights of access to information at the following chapter. Although the
hierarchy, between the rights, is a question that has to be answered according to the
prevailing social and economic policy,268 thirty years ago it was put forward that,
"... the public interest state ... represents in one sense the triumph of society over
private property".26'
Despite current debate on the extent of the public interest state it has to be reminded that
it is, still, the extent and not its existence that is re-examined. 270 The tools that the state
has for the regulation of property, such as the imposition of taxes on income derived
from property or on property as wealth, are not being questioned, 27 ' despite the fact that
"... big government is out of favour. Economies and financial markets are being
deregulated. Taxes are being cut. The need for equality is denigrated... [but]
[w] ill financial instability, high unemployment, trade friction and international
debt crises eventually discredit the new "hands off" philosophy, as they did in
the 1930s, and lead to re-regulation and aggressive public sector interven-
tion"?272
267 L. BECKER in The Moral Rights of Property Rights, in PENNOCK & CHAPMAN (1980), at 196,
summarises a similar approach:" ... a much richer set of considerations is needed .... in order to apply
the utility argument - and the anti-property argument - to questions of specific and particular
justification".
268 As to the difficulties arising from the relation of law and political philosophy on the matter of
property see L. BECKER, "Too Much Property", 21 Philosophy and Public Affairs 206 (1992).
269 C.A. REICH, "The New Property", 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964), at (771-787).
270 The term "public interest" is wider than "welfare". See the critique of R. HARRIS, in Beyond the
Welfare State (London, I.E.A., 1988), at 22-26.
271 MUNZER (1990) makes an interesting discussion on the moral problems and the justifications of
takings, especially at 436-44 1.
272 M. PROWSE, in The Wheel's Full Turn, Financial Times, February 15, 1988, an apprehensible
review of economic theories on intervention.
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The existence and the extent of the tort of unfair competition is one of trade marks'
regulatory tools, which determine the degree of responsibility imposed on the trade
mark proprietor to use trade marks within the rules of the property system. The
regulation of anti-trust is the other complementary regulatory tool.
The second point is that today, as a result of new global technologies, we have a better
conception of a world that is fragmented and diverse. In that diversity, property, on its
own, may be devoid of any meaning if it is not seen in a particular context. The two
property theories described above are part of a western method of thinking, which may
be expanding but is in no way unique or dominant. In the discussion of Hegel's theory
for example it was hinted that for him the concepts of reason can be concrete only when
"... they contain features derived from the knowledge of actual conduct or
institution".273
Leaving aside that there are other fundamentally different understandings of reason it
must be stressed that even "concrete reason" will vary for each segment of society, if
not for each individual. Accepting this diversity and acknowledging the possibility of
alternatives, will make easier for the mind to
"... [take] a long, attentive and sober look at itself, at its condition and its past
works, not fully liking what it sees and [sense] the urge to change".274
273 T.M. KNOX, Hegel's Political Writings (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964), at 114.
274 z BAUMAN, Postmodemity, or Living with Ambivalence (Oxford, Polity Press, 1990), at 272. It is
one of the contribution of postmodernism to western thinking that apart from proclaiming diversity it
has re-emphasised the need to examine things constantly. My attention to this defmition has been
drawn by the draft of a fascinating paper of K. GREEN, S.70 (1) (g) in the "Masculine" Economy:
Enrichment or Impoverishment?, a paper presented at the W.G. HART Legal Workshop, I.A.L.S.
1993. The paper shows that the alternative worlds meet and influence each other; the story of
Draupadhi, in, G.C. SPIVAK In Other Worlds : Essays in Cultural Politics (New York, Methuen,
1987), on the power of the unarmed, imprisoned, impoverished and violated woman who confronted
her interrogators with the last remaining thing that she owned: her will, enshrined in a naked body.
The alternative incomprehensible - for the armed guard - world of the woman leaves him in a state of
confusion. Well, the Hegelian personality in its perfection does not require any actual property to
express itself and certainly a personality does not need property to develop itself.
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We have also seen that Hegel and Locke avoided to define property, in their ethical
discourses, in a formalistic manner. They preferred to look at the ways of creating and
exercising property rights. Even exclusivity, which seems a common denominator, is
challenged by claims that the notion of property needs expansion to become an
individual right not to be excluded by others from the use or benefit of something,
instead of a right to exclude.275
When we turn to the real world we also see that even legally defined property276
functions in diverse ways for different people. The contrast between aftachment to
property and the behaviour of the small farmer on the one hand and the land speculator
on the other can be realised in trade mark terms as the divergence between the family
firm, for which the trading name is integrated within human personality, and the private
enterprise that deals with trade marks as with any other capital asset. Today, legal
regulation of property shows that there is a trend towards a more commercialised
concept, an example could be the lowering of the limitations on the licensing of
intellectual property rights but at the same time there are developments to the other
direction, as is the debate on whether copyright should expand to cover more moral
rights.
So, pluralism must not be disregarded and, as the analysis of the functions of trade
marks will show, although the general context of trade mark theorisation has become
275 MACKPHERSON (1978) at 201. This would expand property significantly, since "... lending the
support of the state to the assertion of control over access to ... benefits, the courts have it in their
power to create property"; see K. GRAY, "Property in Thin Air", 50 Cambridge L.J. 252 (1991).
This can be illustrated in intellectual property terms by the question of compatibility of intellectual
property creations, then "... is there a right to make one's product compatible with another's"? See
the analysis, on the costs and benefits of compatibility, of J. FARRELL, in "Standardization and
Intellectual Property", 30 Jurimetrics 35 (1989), at 36-39.
276 Even legal "defmitions" of property vary. See the analysis, on the different meanings of property in
tax and company law, of G. TEUBNER, Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1992) at 113-115.
104
Trade Marks and the Concept of Property
part of the western mainstream, there are references to alternatives, even when the
alternatives seem utopic.277
The fmal point has to do with the definition of property that was avoided at the
beginning of this chapter. It is submitted that property rights are a bundle of rights and
interests. According to the subject matter, a specific combination of the applicable rights
are attributed each time. The subject matter must from the outset fulfil some
deontological criteria - in our case the criteria set by Locke and Hegel. Therefore the
only meaningful definition of property is for property rights in each specific subject-
matter. In the case of trade marks property will mean the right to use exclusively a
name, symbol etc. to denote a relation between a good or a product and an identifiable
person.
The relation can vary from denoting ownership to implying a guarantee of quality,
depending on the market values and the legal provisions. In most cases the property
right will not cover the sign as such but only the sign in relation to specific
communicative aspects; in essence it will take the form of a qualified monopoly, which
expresses the power conferred by the property right. Public good and the rights and
relationships of other persons with the trade mark proprietor will define the extent of the
property right and the resulting monopoly, because although,
"... in a qualified sense the mark is property, protected and alienable, ... as with
other property its outline is shown only by the law of torts, of which the right is
a prophetic summary"278
But then even the adversaries of property theories for trade marks are admitting that
"... the word "property" has been sometimes applied to what has been termed a
trade mark at common law. I doubt myself whether it is accurate to speak of
277 Not least because branding, arguably, stimulates the creation of universal classes defying pluralism of
expression. "People in places as diverse as Paris and Hong Kong, Khartoum and Tokyo, New York
and Brasilia wear, drive and drink the same brands"; J. McDERMOTT, Corporate Society (Boulder,
Westview Press, 1991), at 141.
278 Per J. HOLMES, in Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co. 273 US 629 (1927).
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there being property in such a trade mark, though no doubt some of the rights
which are incident to property may attach to it".279
But we have said enough on the, according to property, moral justification of trade
marks and keeping in mind that
"... perhaps we should dispense with the search for a deep justification for
property rights (from metaphysics, moral psychology, natural rights ... or
whatever) and focus on the behavioral surface: the observed, persistent, robust
behavioral connections between various property arrangements and human well-
being broadly conceived".280
279 Per Lord Herschel! in Reddaway v. Banham [1896] RPC 218, at 228.
280 BECKER (1992), at 206; chapters four and five will attempt to do so.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE FUNCTIONS OF TRADE MARKS
4.1. Introduction
4.1.1. Defining the consumer
"The consumer has become a god-like figure, before whom markets and
politicians alike bow. Everywhere it seems, the consumer is triumphant.
Consumers are said to dictate production; to fuel innovation; to be creating new
service sectors in advanced economies; to be driving modern politics; to have it
in their power to save the environment and protect the future of the planet.
Consumers embody a simple modern logic, the right to choose. Choice, the
consumer's friend, the inefficient producer's foe, can be applied to things as
diverse as soap-powder, holidays, healthcare or politicians. And yet the
consumer is also seen as a weak and malleable creature, easily manipulated,
dependent, passive and foolish. Immersed in illusions, addicted to joyless
pursuits of ever-increasing living standards, the consumer, far from being god, is
a pawn, in games played in invisible boardrooms."
Y. GABRIEL & T. LANG, The Unmanageable Consumer (London, Sage Publications, 1995), at 1.
Chapter 1 on the emergence of contemporary consumerism provides a good account of the
transformation in the West of "consumption" - a notion distinct from "custom" - from "destruction",
"exhaustion", and so on, to its recent meaning of "living life to the full". They alternatively identify
consumerism as "a moral doctrine in developed countries", the "ideology of conspicuous
consumption", "an economic ideology for global development", "a political ideology", "a social
movement seeking to promote and protect the rights of consumers". Since all these notions often
coexist consumerism can be understood as a phenomenon which describes social reality but also
shapes our perceptions of social reality. Consumerism is the outcome of a complex interplay of
forces comprising political ideology, production, class relations, international trade, economic theory,
cultural and moral values. The judicial defmitions of "a" - each time average in relation to a
particular product - consumer portray this diversity. See also D. MILLER, Consumption as the
Vanguard of History, in D. MILLER (ed.) Acknowledging Consumption (London, Routledge, 1995)
at 12 onwards for a polemic against the economists perception of the consumer. Miller acknowledges
that consumption as a topic cannot be usefully defmed. It must be followed as a dialectic between, on
the one hand, the specificity of regions, groups and particular commodity forms and, on the other
hand, the generality of global shifts in the political economy and contradictions of culture. For a
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"But the class of goods which are sold and the circumstances in which they are
sold have to be taken into consideration. The goods in question are made up in
penny packets, and are chiefly purchased over the counter by washerwomen,
cottagers, and other persons in a humble station of life."2
"[E}xperts and many educated persons, and most persons engaged in the trade,
and no doubt wine waiters and the like, know what Champagne should be..
"There is ... in my view, a considerable body of evidence that persons whose
life or education has not taught them much about the nature and production of
wine, but who from time to time want to purchase Champagne, as the wine with
the great reputation, are likely to be misled by the description "Spanish
Champagne"."4
"I am satisfied that ... inspection of the labels on the bottle would dispel any
initial belief that the bottle contained "Champagne" as that word is generally
understood. However that may be, I speak of the average member of the public,
whether educated or uneducated in the matter of wine. But there is another
section of the public. There is the simple unwordly man who has in mind a
family celebration and knows that champagne is drunk for celebrations. ... Since
the simple man I have in mind will know little of champagne prices, he is likely
to suppose that he has found champagne at a price of2.45."5
"Now all the healthcare professionals I heard struck me particularly as not only
caring but also careful people."6
"[Pleople are rational maximizers of their satisfactions - all people (with the
exception of small children and the profoundly retarded) in all of their activities
(except when under the influence of psychosis or similarly deranged through
drug or alcohol abuse) that involve choice."7
review of studies in the field see R.W. BELK, Studies in the New Consumer Behaviour, in MILLER
(1995) at 74-95.
2 Edge& Sons Ltd v. Niccolls& Sons Ltd[191l]RPC 582, at 593.
Bollinger (J.) S.A. v. The Costa Brava Wine Co. Ltd [1961] RPC 116, at 126.
Ibidat 127.
Taittinger S.A. v. Allbev Ltd [1993] FSR 641, at 654.
6 Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd v. Wards Mobility Ltd [1995] FSR 169, at 180.
' R.A. POSNER, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990), at 354.
At 355 he underlines first that "rational" denotes capable of suiting means to ends, rather than
mulling things over, and second that much of our knowledge is tacit.
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"[C]onsumers seemed homogenous and passive in the face of the onslaughts of
the culture industry. There seemed to be little role for resistance to the powers of
production. Consumption was a seductive form of captivity."8
4.1.2. An example of a world without trade marks
How would the world be without trade marks? Imagine you are a passenger at Victoria
wanting to travel to Gatwick; you know that there are three alternative services, that
compete on price, time and comfort, but the trains in the station have no markings. The
value of being able to choose between alternatives suddenly diminishes, until the time
that "Gatwick Express", "Thameslink" and "Network South-East" appear on the
platform. But even that is not enough because if you are in a hurry what you need is co-
ordinated information as to which train departs first, which train arrives to Gatwick first,
and at what price each service is provided. So trade marks, as distinguishing indicia,
make choice of alternatives possible, but to function effectively trade marks require
additional reliable and co-ordinated information; otherwise the efforts put into creating
and offering the alternatives are spent in vain.9
4.1.3. Trade marks as conveyors of information
In the second chapter of this thesis we have looked at the early historical aspects and
functions of trade marks. From the three facets of trade marks, as objects of property,
conveyors of information and tools of monopoly, here we will concentrate to their
communicative nature. It is submitted that trade marks, being a medium of
communication, can be defined only by reference to all the communicating entities and
after taking into account the communicative environment.' 0 Furthermore the
I. RAMSAY, "Advertising, Taste Construction, and the Search for Enlightened Policy: A Critique",
29 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 573 (1991) at 594, commenting on individuals seen as consumers
rather than workers.
The train example was adapted from J. KELLY, "But Which One Goes First?", Financial Times,
January 24, 1994.
10 L. WITTGENSTEThT, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Blackwell, 1958), asserts, at 20, that the
meaning of a word can only be found in its use within language. Therefore trade marks either as
property or means of communication require both trade mark owners and consumers in order to
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communicative character of trade marks supplements and validates their status as
objects of property, since an object can only be conceived in its discourse, otherwise it
is simply irrelevant." In other words if the justification of trade marks as property
provides the established background of "morality" for trade mark protection then trade
marks' functions, and predominantly their communicative nature, provides
"... the causality between morality and discourse [which] is neither contingent
nor temporal, but co-instantaneous",'2
and the
"... features of discourse [that] insure the public acknowledgement of a
purportedly inward-based discourse as socially and ideologically
authoritative".
It is from this viewpoint that trade marks' contemporary functions are examined. It is
also submitted that trade marks are moving away from their stage of adolescence. Apart
from the identification of a product, its characterisation as satisfactory or not and,
resultingly, the stimulation of further sales, 14 trade marks also dominate innovative
marketing and their market functions and value are expanding to cover some of the
ground traditionally occupied by other intellectual property rights.' 5 In practice this
expansion could make the controversy over origin and quality almost irrelevant.
function and to be defmed. In the first case because it is their social and legal recognition as objects
of property rights that matters in real terms and in the second because, by defmition, it takes at least
two to communicate.
For challenging views on this see E. LACLAU, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time
(London, New Verso, 1990), especially at 100-101.
12 T. PFAU, "The Pragmatics of Genre: Moral Theory and Lyric Authorship in Hegel and
Wordsworth", 10 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment. Law Journal 397 (1992), at 398.
Ibid.
' F.I. SCHECHTER, "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection", 40 Harvard Law Review 813
(1929) at 818.
' We have moved away from the opinion of the Advocate General in Sirena v. Eda [1971] C.M.L.R.
260, who submitted, at 264, that "... the interests which patent legislation is intended to protect are
economically and humanely more respectable than those protected by trademarks".
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Trade marks' growth is twofold. First, the sheer extent of their marketing power,
combined with their potential for perpetual protection, make them the most potent
intellectual property weapon in the competition for obtaining and then securing a place
in the market.' 6 Second, in a cultural industry, increasingly characterised by simulation,
trade marks now occupy a new place in the intellectual property establishment next to
traditional copyright, as a legal right which may be equally suitable to govern the
emerging modern form of authorship.'7
The review of trade marks' functions in modern society and economy will be completed
with the economic analysis in chapter five. There we will move from the consumers
perception of trade marks to the paradox of a monopoly that exists for the benefit of
competition.
Here, the description of trade marks' functions will follow four stages. First trade marks
will be examined as communicators of information and indicators of origin,
incorporating the signification of actual ownership of a product. Then they will be
viewed, in more detail, as indicators of consistent product characteristics and quality. It
will be argued that this supplements the indicator of origin aspect and in addition makes
trade marks agents for product diversification. This, in turn, will lead us to an
advertising and marketing function that can be independent from the product itself, and
incorporates a surplus social value.' 8 In reality, the categorisation is purely artificial,
because their three facets may be of differing value, for each of the market participants,
at different times, in different lines of business, and for different products, but they are
"...somewhat correlative",' 9 since, not only, they stem from the same source but, also,
16 W.R. CORNISH, in Intellectual Property, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), affirms at 521 to 531
the fundamental role of trade marks in market competition. For the perpetuity aspect see S.A.
DIAMOND, "Properly Used Trademarks are Forever", 68 American Bar Association Journal 1575
(1982).
17 C. LURY, Cultural Rights, Technology, Legality and Personality (London, Routledge, 1993), at 92.
In the same way that marketing itself adds social surplus values to labour; see D. SCHILLER, How
to Think About Information, in V. MOSCO & J. WASKO (eds), The Political Economy of
Information (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), where he argues that marketing
integrates to the marketed commodities part of our social experiences.
19 R. CALLMANN (L. ALTMAN, ed.) The Law of Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies
(Wilmette, Callaghan, 1981) at 17.01, p.2. For example credit cards, which not long ago could not
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they are all directed to the inter-dependences of consumers and marketers. Finally, the
transcendental character of trade marks, within the general context of intellectual
property rights, will be introduced.20
4.2. Trade marks: communicators and indicators of origin
4.2.1. Codes of communication
Since we will keep on coming back to the communicative character of trade marks, we
have to stress from the outset that the starting point of a trade mark theory is that people
do not convey ideas. Instead they convey signs, sounds, and symbols which represent
ideas. These are organised in common codes, which are part of the humans system of
communication. 2 ' The form of these codes depends on human capabilities to perceive
and interpret them; for instance, they range from the use of language to the employment
of skills in emitting, perceiving and identifying odours by chemical means.22 The odours
get trade mark protection, being the means for providing a banking service and thus unregistrable,
see Bank of America [1976] FSR 582. Today credit cards are used for associating credit businesses
with the provision of other products or services, such as telecommunications, cars and so on, and
generate new sales for both. Ford, for example associated with Barclays and created Ford - Visa -
Barclaycard, whilst General Motors builds a new image for the Vauxhall subsidiary by putting in the
market GM - Visa. The incentive for both is the common desire to understand more about their
clients (through the credit card application), reward brand loyalty (through a system of rebates), and
recruit new customers (through rebates and extra advertising): namely the three marketing "r" of the
nineties, "retention" of existing customers, "recruitment" of new ones and "relationship" building
with all: see S. WORTHINGTON, "Car Groups Gamble on Playing the Right Card", Financial
Times, January 13, 1994.
20 Some of the discussion which follows has been repeated in A. KAMPERMAN-SANDERS & S.M.
MANIATIS, "A Consumer Trade mark: Protection Based on Origin and Quality", [1993] EIPR 406
that dealt with a "consumer's trade mark". It was submitted then that a liberal understanding of trade
marks should provide for direct recognition of the interests of all the market participants. th this
chapter trade marks' functions are developed in more detail.
21 C.E. CLEVELAND, Semiotics: Determining What the Advertising Means to the Audience, in J.
OLSON & K. SENTIS (eds), Advertising and Consumer Psychology (New York, Praeger Publishers,
1986) at 227, discussing J. DEELY, Introducing Semiotics: Its History and Doctrine (Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1982).
22 See the analysis of U. ECO, How Culture Conditions the Colours we See, in M. BLONSKY (ed.), On
Signs: A Semiotics Reader (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985) at 161-165.
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example is chosen because it is topical and depicts the variety of communicative codes
that trade marks can employ.23
Two in particular associations of trade marks and communication codes will be of
relevance to our description of trade marks' functions after adopting the widest
definition of a sign - one of the defining elements of a trade mark - as,
"... something which stands to somebody for something else, in some respect or
capacity".24
The first has to do with the social character of signs and trade marks. The meaning of
the sign is confined to its place in the communication code, and the same is true for
trade marks. Their meaning and value are owed to their actual use in the markets as
communicators. The value of property in a trade mark that is not put in actual use is
insignificant and property rights as such are theoretically difficult to establish since their
exercise becomes undesirable. Equally it is problematic to enforce their monopoly
power when use that should establish the monopoly in the market place is not exercised
in the first place.
But we will also try to show that a trade mark is an index, meaning a sign that points to
something else "... by virtue of a causal relationship". 25 The existence of trade marks, for
example, is an index of existence of the product and, at a different communicative level,
23 The UK Registration No. 2000234 of "the strong smell of bitter beer" in respect of dart flights is a
good example and exemplifies the hyperbole in the change of the Registry's attitude on issues of
registrability. See S.M. MANIATIS, Scents as Trade Marks: Propertisation of Scents and Olfactory
Poverty, in L. BENTLY and L. FLYNN (eds), Law and the Senses: Sensational Jurisprudence
(Chicago, Pluto Press, 1996) and the references therein and L.B. BURGUNDER, "Trademark
Protection of Smells: Sense or Nonsense", 29 American Business Law Journal 459 (1991). An
example of using smell as a trade sign is that of Ralph Lauren; they use their "Summerhouse"
fragrance not only to soothe their customers but also as a trade sign, since the smell signifies to
customers a Ralph Lauren shop: see J. BARTLETT, "Purchase Tacks", Time Out, October 13, 1993,
34, where it is supported that music and lighting have similar relaxing and distinguishing effects.
24 C. PEIRCE, Collected Papers 193 1-1958 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1931), as cited by
G. COOK, The Discourse of Advertising (London, Routledge, 1992), at 69; Cook at 60-93 provides a
short but very clear and accessible presentation of the works of Saussure and Peirce and the
dimensions of the sign in language and paralanguage. Another important definition is that of a sign
which comprises of a word as a signifier and a concept as the signified.
25 COOK (1992), at 61.
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becomes an index of wealth, power, and so on in respect in some occasions of the
consumer and in others of the marketer.
A brand is something more than a name. As a colunmist succinctly described it:
"You are reading an article by John Kay. But John Kay makes the transition
from name on the masthead to brand only when attaching it to the contents
persuades you to read the article, or pay attention to it - and if you would ignore
the same piece if it appeared under someone else's name. Once that happens -
but only when it happens - I have a brand with a value."26
For a representative of the drinks industry, brands
"... are our most important assets. Through them we communicate the quality of
our products to consumers. They represent a huge investment of time, effort and
money, that can be diluted, weakened, even destroyed by those who copy
them".27
For a beer consumer a brand may mean taste for the cognoscenti, cost for the price
cautious, allegiance to a group of drinkers for the Newcastle United fan, a fashion
statement for the trendy club goer, or simply a generic indication of alcoholic strength
for the hardened drinker.28
26 J KAY, "What's in a Name", Financial Times, December 6, 1996.
27 The view of M. Leathes, legal director of International Distillers and Vintners, reported by P.
RAUSTORNE, "Pirates Who Walk the Plank", Financial Times, October 14, 1993.
28 Some gin drinkers in the UK swiftly realised that the majority of market leaders dropped the strength
of their gins from 40% to 37.5% alcohol per volume, in order to improve their profit margins;
accordingly they switched, despite a price premium, to Beefeaters who stuck with the 40%.
Beefeaters sales volume increased by 25%. Still it would be interesting to establish exactly how many
gin drinkers apprehended the change, since Beefeaters has a small overall share of 6.6% of the gin
market; see P. TAYLOR, "UK's Gin Drinkers Prefer the Hard Stuff", Financial Times, May 18,
1994. Drinkers "sophistication" is also portrayed in the attitude of Sauza and Jose Cuervo, the biggest
tequila producers in Mexico, towards low quality un-branded tequila; they believe, in contrast to the
fears of the Tequila Chamber of Commerce for the future of Tequila as a denomination of origin, that
branded and unbranded products can live side by side, one for high quality neat products and the
other for mixers: D. FRASER, "Tequila Refines Its Image", Financial Times, May 19, 1994.
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4.2.2. Use of a mark as proof of ownership
Today, when we talk about the purpose of trade marks as indicators of origin, we have
to distinguish this origin function from the application of a mark with the scope to
denote actual ownership of a product before it reaches the consumer. The marking of
cattle, timber and other goods kept or transported in bulk are examples of inter-temporal
trade mark use that enables us in the course of trade to single out the proprietor of a
product. 29 A contemporary example is the recording of the marks of merchandise to be
transported by sea, often referred vaguely in the bill of lading as "general merchandise".
In such cases, usually tally clerks issue a mate's receipt,
"... a record or tally of their date of loading, identification marks, individual
package, numbers, their weight and/or measurement, and any defect or comment
about the condition in which the goods are received".30
Usually the mate's receipt is prima facie evidence of ownership of the product.31 When
the marked commodity is put in commerce the same ownership mark may facilitate the
allocation of incoming payments.
A contemporary and innovative, albeit inhumane, use of signs for marking people in
order to communicate membership and the influence, if not ownership, that some
organisations exercise over their members, is the practice of Yakuza, the Japanese
version of Mafia - both well known marks on their own - to mark its members with
tattoos, a benign sign of membership and/or ownership, and lopped off fingers, a sign of
punishment. Since such marks are very costly to get rid off they acquired a premium
value as well protected enduring symbols, until the law enforcement authorities, taking
29 See also chapter 2 above on the history of a mark's ability to signif ' the proprietor.
30 Harris & Son Ltd v. China Mutual Steam Navigation Co. Ltd [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 500, at 501.
31 See C.M. SCHMITTHOFF, The Law and Practice of International Trade (London, Stevens, 1986), at
464, and the cases cited therein.
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advantage of medical developments, offered plastic surgery to turn Yakuza members to
state witnesses.32
4.2.3. Consumption and consumerism
"I don't like coffee without caffeine, nor, I may add, trade marks without origin.
So much for Kaffee Hag..
This statement, of a staunch advocate of the predominance of the origin function, on the
character and origin of coffee is evidence that a market economy caters for the
satisfaction of all tastes, although origin may not be for trade marks what caffeine is for
coffee. If all consumers had identical tastes then, assuming that richer consumers would
be willing to pay more for higher quality products, markets would be partitioned
according to a straightforward rule: the top quality product offered in the market is
bought by all consumers above a critical income level, the second highest quality
product appeals to a band stretching below this critical level and above the new critical
level set for this product and so on. A category of niarginal consumers would lie on the
boundary between these two, or any other two consecutive, bands and would be
indifferent between buying the higher quality product at its - higher - equilibrium price,
or buying the second highest, or any following, quality instead. 34 But tastes vary and one
of the markets' functions is to satisf' the consuming needs of all participants.
32 See D. GAMBETTA, Symbols and Property Rights, a paper presented at the 1993 W.G. HART
Legal Workshop, at 13, and the references therein to D. KAPLAN & A. DUBRO, Yakuza. The
Explosive Account of Japan's Criminal Underworld (New York, MacMillan, 1986), at 14 and 26. As
to the criminals' understanding of the role of branding in marketing reference is made to Luciano's
biography who presented the need for naming his new organisation, the "Sidiliana union"; he argued
that, unless the organisation is given a name, the whole set-up will disappear; a guy don't walk into a
car show room and say "I' 11 take the car over there, the one without a name"; see M.A. GOSH & R.
HAMMER, The Last Testament of Lucky Luciano (London, MacMillan, 1975), at 146.
F.K. BEIER, "Basic Features of Anglo-American, French and German Trademark Law", 3 TIC 285
(1975), at 285-286.
See A. SHAKED & J. SUTTON, Natural Oligopolies and International Trade, in H.
KIERZKOWSKI (ed.), Monopolistic Competition and International Trade (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1984), at 3 7-43, for the description of such markets and a market with an "infinite" property where
"... competition between "high quality" products drives their prices down to a level at which not even
the poorest consumer would prefer to buy certain lower - quality products at any price sufficient to
cover unit variable cost".
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Consumption has become a strong pillar of economic growth; it is a dominant
component of gross national product in developed countries, where it is calculated that a
1% change in consumption is five times the size of a 1% change in investment. A
structural link between consumption and gross national product is a feature of
traditional economic theories, although causality within their relation and the positive
economic effects of consumption are disputed.35
The dominance of consumption labelled the western world as a consumerist society, and
attributed to consumerism two main meanings. That of a social movement, seeking to
strengthen the rights and power36 of buyers in relation to sellers, 37 and second of a
society whose highest priorities are the acquisition and consumption of material goods
and services, 38 and where, as in a theatre of consumption, 39 goods are acting not only as
satisfiers but also as communicators.
For a survey of theories on consumer's behaviour independent influence on macro-economic
fluctuations see R.E. HALL, The Role of Consumption in Economic Fluctuations, in R.J. GORDEN
(ed.), The American Business Cycle: Continuity and Change (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1986). At 255 he concludes that "... in the compromise economy (which does not have a theory to go
with it), random shifts in consumption are an important source of overall fluctuations". For the
economical results of over-consumption see K. RASLER & W. R. THOMPSON, "Relative Decline
and the Overconsumption - Underinvestment Hypothesis", 35 International Studies Quarterly 273
(1991), who argue that over-consumption is a result rather than the underlying cause for our relative
economical decline, and present, at 273-283, a review of consumption theories. For a tangible
example see G. GRAHAM, "Consumers and Industry Set to Spur US Growth", Financial Times,
December 29, 1993, one only of the plethora of similar pieces of news that dominate the media. Here
it is tempting to quote a view that is valid for the entirety of references to economics: "... it is easy to
be fervent in advancing simplistic theories of economic behaviour. It is much more difficult to work
up passion over the view, ... that the industrial world is quite diverse and complex, requiring complex
theories if it is to be understood": F. SCHERER & D. ROSS, Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance (Boston, Houghton Muffin Company, 1990), at 571.
36 The juxtaposition between rights and power is made because often what the consumer really misses
is the enforceability of existing legal provisions. P.G. SCHRAG, in Counsel for the Deceived (New
York, Pantheon, 1972) presents a series of such cases. Setting the ground for his references he states,
at 3, that in the late sixties although "... the rights of consumers were being rapidly expanded,
enforcement of those rights was almost non-existent".
P. KOTLER defining consumerism in, "What Consumerism Means for Marketeers", 50 Harvard
Business Review 49 (1972).
T.H. QUALTER, Advertising and Democracy in the Mass Age (Houndmills, MacMillan, 1991), at
39. For an alternative view see S. LEBERGO1T, Pursuing Happiness: American Consumer in the
20th Century (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), the message according to the book
review of A. St GEORGE, "We Are What We Consume", Financial Times, September 28, 1993, is
that: "... to make yourself rich, you must not increase your money but decrease your greed.
Consumption, not income, is the key to your wealth"; in the US, and at 1982 prices, one hour's work
earned SOc of personal consumption; in 1929, $2.75; in 1960, $6.50; and in 1990, $9.75.
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In most commercial activities, both definitions of consumerism are experienced in two
ways. In a qualitative way, the capacity to determine the form, nature, and quality, of the
products put in the market to satisfy the needs of the consumer, 4° is gradually moving
from the producer towards the consumer. 4 ' From a quantitative aspect consumers are
gaining power because, from the eighteenth century onwards, they are matching their
desire to consume with a more widely dispersed ability to do so. 42 The demise of
barriers within a consumer's society required and caused changes in attitude, ideology
and economic thought, prosperity, standards of living, commercial techniques,
promotional skills and finally legislative approaches, 43 and involved, in these changes,
the state, marketers and consumers, alike. It must be further underlined that
The metaphor is taken from W. LEISS, S. KLINE & S. JHALLY, Social Communications in
Advertising (London, Routledge, 1990), at 197.
40 The sovereignty of consumer in her/his trading relations with marketers is encapsulated in Smith's
celebrated quotation that "... it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest": A. SMITH, The Wealth of
Nations (London, Methuen, 1950), vol. I, at 18.
'' N. ABERCROMBIE, in The Privilege of the Producer, in R. KEAT & N. ABERCROMBIE (eds),
Enterprise Culture (London, Routledge, 1991), developed a model of the publishing industry that
may be valid in general, outside the field of cultural industries. At 172-173 it is submitted that the
loss of authority is wider than a re-balancing exercise between consumers and producers. From a
sociological point of view it is argued that regimes of production are associated with the forces of
rationalisation whilst consumption with undisciplined play and disorder. As it is shown below often
consumer's behaviour is determined by intrinsic criteria that make it unpredictable. The fact that
leather feels nice to some consumers, is not easy to predict or rationalise. Social conventions enable
us to inject some predictability into human behaviour; the want of cleanliness may be the result of
personal intrinsic choice, of belief to medical advice, or of adherence to the social norm.
42 But see T.W ADORNO & M. HORKHEIMER. in the abridged version of The Culture Industry:
Enlightenment as Mass Deception, in J. CURRAN, M. GUREVITCH & J. WOOLLACOTF et al.
(eds), Mass Communication and Society (London, E. Arnold, 1977), arguing, at 350, that the result
of the standardisation and the illusory consumer's power is, "... the circle of manipulation and
retroactive need in which the unity of the system grows ever stronger". Real power stays with those
whose economic hold over society is already strong. For a Marxist perspective see S. EWEN,
Captains of Consciousness (New York, McGraw Hill, 1976). Finally see J.K. GALBRAITH who,
with The Affluent Society (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974), became notorious as an economist
criticising the squirrel wheel of artificially generated needs and consumption.
n See N. McKENDRICK, J. BREWER & J.H. PLUMB, The Birth of a Consumer Society (London,
Hutchinson, 1982), at 1-9, although their subject is eighteenth - century England, their introduction
offers a good general discussion, and M. AGLIETTA, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (London,
NLB, 1979), at 151-169 for the formation and evolution of a norm of social consumption. At 158 it is
emphasised that for the first time in history we have been able to conceive "... a norm of working-
class consumption in which individual ownership of commodities governed the concrete practices of
consumption". For the traditional sociological view see C. PRESVELOU, Sociologie de Ia
Consommation Familiale (Bruxelles, Les Editions Vie Ouvriére, 1968), concluding at 211-212 that the
continuous amelioration of life standards, changes in family relationships, and the explosion of service
industries call for research in the family at the social level.
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consumerism, both as an ideology and a state of the economy, changes continuously,
conforming with the changing faces of capitalism and society;45 economic and social
issues, crises and resulting political trends. The relations of competitive partnership
between consumers and the industry in the market place are continuously being re-
established.46
Finally, from an historical perspective the value of goods as communicators of the past
serves as a further example of the theatre of consumption. We are able to reconstruct
history from findings of consumption goods because we, as consumers of a later age, are
able to attribute to them their true importance and characteristics. Renmants of
consumption products become witnesses of our past.47
For a general appraisal see B. PRETNAR, Industrial Property and Related Trade Policy in Less
Developed Countries: Economic Appraisal of Legal Concepts, 20 IIC 782 (1990) and, for developed
economies, M. WILKINS, "The Neglected Intangible Aspect: The Influence of the Trade Mark on
the Rise of the Modern Corporation", 34 Business History 66 (1992).
See R. MAYER, "Gone Yesterday, Here Today: Consumer Issues in the Agenda-Setting Process", 47
Journal of Social Issues 21(1991), stating at 21, that "... the most common view is that scandals and
tragedies ignite a process by which consumer problems receive media coverage, become public
concerns, and finally receive the attention of government policy-makers". For the view of a
marketing expert on the "need" for change in attitudes, in days where employees in larger companies
spend 80% of their time on routine administrative chores and only 20% working on product
innovation, see G. de JONQUIERES, quoting Prof. J. Quelch, in "A Rose by Any Other Name",
Financial Times, October 6, 1993, stating that "... consumer products manufacturers tend to think
they are the fount of all marketing wisdom. But in reality many have become excruciatingly myopic
and arrogant". He goes on urging consumer brand managers to spend more than the average 3% of
their time in direct contacts with consumers and to rely less on numerical market research data.
For two contrasting views on the antagonism between marketers and consumers see first S.J. LEVY
& G. ZALTMAN in Marketing, Society and Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1975), who,
at 14, highlights the antagonistic nature, referring negatively to consumerism as a movement of
consumer unrest and dissatisfaction pushed purposely forward by professional agitators, but at 25,
refers to marketing as a social system - thus autonomous - and define it as a set of interrelated groups,
engaged in reaching a shared goal and having patterned relationships with one another. A. ETZIONI,
in The Moral Dimension (New York, The Free Press, 1988), at 199, is conceiving the market -
existentially and functionally - as a subsystem dependent upon "... the contextual factors, the societal
"capsule", within which competition takes place.
See M. SAHLINS, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976), at
210-215 on the life of goods and I.M. AZMI, S.M. MANIATIS & B. SODIPO, Distinctive Signs and
Early Markets: Europe, Africa and Islam, in A. FIRTH (ed.), Perspectives on Intellectual Property
(Volume 1) - The Prehistory and Development of Intellectual Property Systems (London, Sweet &
Maxwell, 1997) for some interesting historical examples from different jurisdictions.
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4.2.4. Trade marks as codes of communication
A fundamental consumer right48 and, by definition, the essence of competition49 is the
individual's right to choose. But a trip to the supermarket proves that, in the abundance
of competing consumer products, product characteristics and prices, it would be
impossible even to articulate our choices without the use of symbols.5°
Now, assume an economy in a nascent stage where each marketer is putting only one
product in the market, and a society that employs verbal symbols, such as language, but
not signs that can be averbal, 5 ' such as trade marks, and imagine the task confronting the
customer who wants to buy coffee with caffeine, with a particular taste, suitable for the
cafetiere, percolator or filter coffee-maker, and, finally, of a particular origin. 52 In the
absence of signs the customer must either describe in detail the sought product or
mentally process the analytical information that should be available with each product.
Multiply the spent effort with the number of purchases we make in a lifetime, keeping
in mind that some are quite complicated and consume disproportionate energy, as is the
In 1962, J.F. Kennedy pre-empted the media and other opinion makers when in the first, at least for
the US, presidential consumer message he set the rights of consumers: the rights to safety,
information, choice, and representation: MAYER (1991), at 31-32.
Perfect competition is "... a market situation in which (1) the number of sellers and buyers is very
large and (2) the products offered by sellers are homogeneous (or indistinguishable). Under such
conditions, no firm can affect the market price, and each firm faces a horizontal (or perfectly elastic)
demand curve": P.A. SAMUELSON & W.D NORDHAUS, Economics, (New York, McGraw-Hill,
1989), at 968.
° For a similar description of the world without trade marks from an American perspective see E.S.
ROGERS, "Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks", 14 Law and Contemporary
Problems 173 (1949).
' A symbol is a "... sign without either similarity or contiguity, but only with a conventional link
between its signifier and its denotata, and with an intensional class for its designator": T.A.
SEBEOK, Pandora's Box, in BLONSKY (ed.) (1985) at 466. Out of its context this assumption may
seem an-historic since humans have been using signs before language, but is nevertheless didactic:
see SEBEOK at 452-45 5.
52 From the outset there are two choices: one is to go to a shop that sells only coffee, a specialist's shop
with a better assortment of coffees, and the other to go to a shop dealing in more commodities, a
grocery shop or a super-market; see J. SAY, A Treatise on Political Economy (New York, Augustus
Kelly, 1971), originally published in 1821, at 95. J. O'SAUGHNESSY, in Why People Buy (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1987) at 46-47, is using a shoes example. The consumer's want can be
expressed in terms of her/his reasons, which in turn can be transformed into corresponding rules, but
the number and the intricacy of rules and reasons is indeed extraordinary.
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case of drugs, electronics, cars, etc., and the need to employ an efficient way of
communicating our desires is obvious.
Thus humans learned through social interaction to utilise together with verbal symbols,
other signs as mechanisms for communication. 53 In this series of communicative
actions, trade marks enable the consumer to conceptualise in a caption the notion of a
product, by individualising the connection of the product with the affixed trade mark
and, from that moment onwards, identify the product in a fraction of time and with a
fraction of effort from what would be needed if s/he had to use more analytical ways of
communication. The whole process can be described - in semiotic and economic terms -
as,
"... the formulation and encoding of messages by sources, the transmission of
these messages through channels, the decoding and interpretation of these
messages by destinations, and their signification. The entire transaction, or
semiosis, takes place within a context to which the system is highly sensitive and
which the system, in turn, affects".54
The analogy is so attractive that it can become overwhelming. If communication is seen
as the organising principle of every human whole and the methods of communication as
determinative of the kind of society we have,55 then the strength of the communicative
character of trade marks will lead us to believe that they can determine the nature of the
markets. But, the analysis should also concentrate on the contrasting assertion that the
For the social character of communication see the quotation from Aristotle's On Interpretation by T.
TODOROV, in Theories of the Symbol (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1977), at 16, "... spoken words are
the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of the spoken words. Just as all
men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental
experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which
our experiences are the images". It is in the system of signification exclusively that symbols acquire a
meaning. See R. COWARD & J. ELLIS, Language and Materialism (London, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1977), at 12-14; at 12 they present Saussure's position that "... language is revealed to be a
system whose only reality is its realisations". Thus trade marks are not abstract symbols, their
message is their reality.
SEBEOK, in BLONSKY (ed.) (1985), at 451-452. The article of D.H. BOGGART, "Feedback,
Feedword and Feedwithin: Strategic Information in Systems", 25 Behavioral Science 237 (1980),
expands on the sensitivity of the system. Trade marks, in that context, can be perceived as the signs,
in a system that communicates quality information; they influence and are affected by the
environment of the system: the market for consumer goods.
L. TFIAYER, "Editor's Introduction", 1 Communication 1 (1974).
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modes of communication are determined by the structure of socio-economic relations.56
After all trade marks cannot escape economic and class factors. For example the top ten
of the canned foods chart, for Britain in the nineties, looks very much like a shopping
list of the 1950's. Marketing people attribute the exceptional brands longevity to the fact
that canned foods remain a working class staple and consumers at the poorer end of the
market cannot afford to make mistakes by trying new lines. 57 Now, contrast this with the
worry that affluent consumers may react negatively to the emerging homogeneity of
European brands. A shopping list in any country of Europe is almost identical to that of
her neighbours, this might have created a feeling of reassurance when travelling to
foreign European destinations was a novelty, but today is causing boredom and aversion
to the consumers "leading edge".58
4.2.5. Trade marks as indicators of origin
Our imaginary consumer, now, knows that the green distinctive packet on the shelves
marked with the Hag trade mark is "a" coffee that s/he desires although the
characteristics that make the product desirable may be unobservable in the market place;
s/he cannot smell, taste etc. the product that is packed in vacuum.
"This information is not provided to the consumer in an analytic form, such as
an indication of size or a listing of ingredients, but rather in summary form,
through a symbol which the consumer identifies with a specific combination of
features. Information in analytic form is a complement to, rather than a
substitute for, trademarks."59
Analytic information is needed when the product is unknown. When for example coffee
shop chains wanted to introduce gourmet coffee in the American market they had first to
56 G. MURDOCK & P. GOLDING, Capitalism, Communication and Class Relations, in CURRAN et
a!. (eds), (1977), at 13, responding to the above mentioned quotation.
" C. Sanbrook of Marketing, as quoted by R. GREEN SLADE, "Putting Your Brand on to the British",
Life & Times, The Times, June 29, 1992.
58 See the results of Nielsen - Checkout Top 100, as presented and commented upon by A.
MITCHELL, in "One Europe One Taste?", The Times, November 10, 1993.
See N.S. ECONOMIDES, "The Economics of Trademarks", 78 TMR 523 (1988), at 526-527.
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educate the consumer and create a desire for good coffee. This was achieved by
extensive advertising, free tastings, lectures, and use of every possibility for publicity.
These are costs that traders can avoid once their initial customer base is created.
Now, a significant element of products' characteristics is their origin, as denoted, for
example, by the Hag trade mark, which we define as concrete and/or abstract. Concrete
origin means that the trade mark refers to the actual producer or trader of the product.
Sometimes this is considered material enough to influence the consumer's choice. The
trade mark may refer to the physical producer of the product or to a number of affiliated
producers - as in the case of champagne names 6° and other wine marks6' - or may
contain some other traceable information about the producer or marketer like location -
British beef is an example - or opening hours. On the other hand a trade mark may
incorporate references to origin or function which, in truth, are irrelevant. Responding to
potential investors the managing director of British Aluminium admits that there
"is nothing quite like it, and no other organisation that analysts can compare it
with ... British Aluminium is a wonderful name ... but it does suggest a
producer of the commodity: actually it does not make one gram".62
Abstract origin, relocates trade marks from the one product - one producer parallel
coexisting markets to the real economy. Abstract origin has more to do with the function
of trade marks as indicators of quality and it means that the product obviously exists
because someone produced it, however, the identification of the actual producer is
immaterial for the consumer. 63 It is either the existence alone of a brand or the
60 See "Labels that Tell a Story", Financial Times, August 14, 1993. By de-codifying two letter
combinations appearing on champagne labels, the cognoscenti can identify the status of a given
champagne producer: NM refers to one of 250 champagne houses, CM to one of 42 co-operatives
and MA to one of thousand BOB (buyer's own brand) brands.
61 Although some times the law reaches its limits, as in the case of the American wine producer who put
in the market a made in the USA Chateau La Feet for $5 and faced the opposition of the French
Chateau Lafite, worth $100, unfortunately the case did not go to court, because the threat of
protracted court proceedings made the Americans think again: D. REEVES, "French Stamp on Grape
Impostor", The Independent, November 29, 1993.
62 K. GOODING, "When There's More to a Name", Financial Times, December 10, 1996.
63 The signification of blurred origin in international markets can be achieved by two methods. First by
using the same mark but different labelling or getup, an approach followed by Brannigans to market
crisps in Spain, when they switched the picture of the male baker, printed on the package of the
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signification of consistency that may influence the choice of the consumer. It is at this
stage of deciding before buying that marketing comes into play and influences the
adoption of goals by consumers by helping them visualise what it would be like - "what
it really would be like"64 - to achieve the state of affairs as described by their goals or
by dramatising the consequences of neglecting a particular goal.65
The examination of the mechanisms for indicating either concrete or abstract origin will
contribute to a better understanding of the interrelation of trade marks and consumption.
Here we turn first to concrete origin.
4.2.6. Why concrete origin is important
It is often supported that consumers in general
"... in very few instances ... really know what they want",
but our imaginary consumer is the "mythical",67 ordinary, reasonable and rational person
who having already set some goals, 68 trusts her/his own past experiences with the same
crisps, with that of a female one. The second method is by using established national marks but
adopting a harmonised approach to packaging, by using similar visual devices, typography and
colours, as for example does Unilever with All, Omo, Persil, Presto, Skip and Via: see N. BUKLEY,
"More Than Just a Pretty Picture", at the Exporter section of Financial Times, October 13, 1993.
See O'SAUHGNESSY (1987) at 4-5. According to him goals and wants are interacting with beliefs
in order to create consumer's disposition to buy. This disposition is to be followed by three
alternatives: wanting without buying (because the want is latent and/or passive or there are some
exclusionary reasons), buying without deciding (according to habit and/or intrinsic preference or by
picking indiscriminately), and deciding before buying (in this case the nature of the choice criteria
may be intrinsic, technical, legalistic, integrative, adaptive, and economic). His research is impressive
because his theory on brand choice is the result of over a thousand "protocols" of consumers choice
of particular products.
65 Ibid
V. PACKARD, in The Hidden Persuaders (London, Longmans, 1957), at 13, casting doubt on the
evidence of market research for two reasons. First consumers cannot be trusted to act rationally and
predictably and second they are not very keen to admit that they may act irrationally. But to deny any
rationality it would mean that all decisions are based on a game theory. Given the diverging results of
various research projects on consumer behaviour one cannot avoid contemplating that the consumer
is, to some extent, an anarchist telling one thing to market researchers and enforcing another in his
purchasing behaviour.
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products, shares the experiences with friends and experts, and benefits by analysing the
information on competing products, acquired from her/his visits to retail outlets,
advertising material, consumers' guides etc.69
S/he then decides as to the particular product s/he wants to obtain and ventures to
purchase it. At that point, trade marks fulfil two separate functions.
First they enable the consumer to link all the information with the relevant individual
product. Being able to trace a common origin, 70 signifies, in the model developed by the
consumer, that the marked product will have the same characteristics with the
previously examined identical product that was identically marked. Since they share the
same source, a particular Sony television set will be identical to the one with the same
mark that was checked in the electronics shop, Hag coffee in the green coloured packet
will have the same taste with Hag coffee in the same packet that was purchased in the
past. The relevance of origin in this case is limited to the satisfaction of consumers'
67 W. PROSSER, Handbook of the Law of Torts (St. Paul, West, 1971), at 150. It is a "noperson" and
"everyperson", see M.G. JOHNSON, Language and Cognition in Products Liability, in J.N. LEVI &
A.G. WALKER, Language in the Judicial Process (New York, Plenum Press, 1990), at 300-303.
68 The goals set are in accordance either with need or desire. Needs, as a notion, correspond with the
classical school of economic thought and desires with the neoclassical one. D. LEVINE, in Needs,
Rights and the Market (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1988), at 9, points out that "... the subtle distinction
between need and desire marks a watershed in the development of economics. Each concept
expresses a basic idea about human motivation that provides the organizing principle for a whole
conception. Both ideas are fundamental, yet neither seems wholly satisfying. One - need - eliminates
any meaningful idea of a market economy, while the other - desire - looks on market outcomes as
functions of whim and choice rather than necessity". O'SAUHGNESSY (1987), at 9-10, presents
these goals as a number of actions satisfying alternatives: we rather be healthy rather than ill, loved
rather than hated, insiders rather than outsiders etc. What is unique is the importance each one of us
attributes to satisfying each particular choice in correlation with the others, "the multiple life goals",
and their ordering and subordination: the author's obvious example we all want to be healthy but
some of us often drink and smoke wanting to become insiders to a particular group, and after doing
that some of us prefer to become outsiders again because of the prevailing damage to our health. In
this continuous reordering Marlboro may mean acceptance, appeal etc. at the one moment and lung
cancer at the other, as it does in a US campaign that used ex-models of tobacco adverts that are now
lung cancer sufferers and turned to anti-smoking campaigners.
69 P. SMITH & D. SWANN, Protecting the Consumer - An Economic and Legal Analysis (Oxford, M.
Robertson, 1979); at 132-149 they present the various sources of information; especially at 141-144
they talk about what is expected from the rational consumer.
° In real economy the tracing of actual origin may be difficult because a trade mark "... may be affixed
to goods by a manufacturer thousands of miles away from the consumer, or by an importer or jobber
who has not manufactured but merely selected the goods and put them on the local market, or by a
commission merchant who has not even selected the goods or rendered any service relating to them
except to sell such as may have been sent to him by the owner": SCHECHTER (1929) at 815-816.
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expectations in respect of products' characteristics; quality is one of the relevant
characteristics. In the next stage trade marks assist the articulation of the consumer's
choice to the trader.71
After the purchase of products the reference to their concrete origin is important, for the
consumer, in the case of servicing, possible redress for defective goods and so on. In
such occasions further reference must be made to the small-print of the label or the
documentation accompanying the product, but still the existence of the trade mark
serves as a signpost for the direction that the consumer has to turn to. This is even more
true in cases of sales by post or tele-sales where it is more difficult for the consumer to
trace the origin of the product and ask for guarantees and after sales service.72
For the trader the trade mark works as a constant reminder of existence, a powerful, and
relatively cheap, way of advertising if the mark has an eye catching appeal, generates
income from further services related to the product and enables the manufacturer or
marketer of a product to fulfil guarantees and other similar obligations.73
" Support for this empirical description may be drawn from G. KELLY, The Psychology of Personal
Constructs (New York, W.W. NORTON, 1955), quoted by D. EDWARDS & S. JOHNSON, The
Meanings of Products in Consumers' Lives: The Grid Approach, in OLSON & SENTIS (eds) (1986)
at 259: "Grid Research proposes that consumers are trying to understand their experiences with
products by building models of the experiences". They then use their models to make the decisions
that they believe will allow them to maximise their opportunities to fulfil their "needs and desires".
72 Computerised shopping, in particular, is expected to revolutionise the retail business in the near
future, see A. FISHER, "Tapping into Convenience", Financial Times, November 11, 1993, where J.
louis, of Andersen Consulting, states that the retail sector in the UK is about to experience a
tremendous shakeup. Changes will effect products' prices as well as the life-style, habits, etc. of the
consumers; this of course would include trade marks, however it is submitted that trade marks as
such will not suffer, the only difference being that they will be used in an alternative or additional
service provided to the consumer. Obviously things are more complicated when sales by post are
crossing national boarders. Part of the European Commission's efforts for the creation of a single
market is to ensure that the consumer enjoys the same protection, terms and service throughout the
Union irrespective of the place of business of the marketing entity.
Here are two examples of the importance of the trade mark for the marketer. First in Sony KK v.
Saray Electronics (London) Ltd [1983] FSR 302, the unauthorised grey-importers of Sony products
were passing off their services as being part of the Sony guarantee. The court held that they had to
mark all Sony merchandise with labels making clear that they were not guaranteed by Sony. In D.
MOMBERG, "The "Entrapped Trademark", [1998] EIPR 65, a new function is described: drugs
may be prescribed through "Managed Health Care Systems", trade marks will be relevant in
determining whether the right drug is administered (all the parties involved have an interest in
ensuring that the "System" works effectively); problems for marketers of pharmaceutical products
arise from the extent of the ability of the "System" to incorporate and prescribe alternative branded
drugs.
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In a cyclical way, after the consumption of the product the trade mark will be a constant
signifier of satisfaction or disappointment with the particular product and accordingly
influence future purchase decisions.
Direct indication of origin is also important for certification marks, denominations of
origin and trade marks that refer to a whole group of producers. In the case of
certification marks the consumer is influenced by the authority of the certification body
that awards the mark and guarantees particular product properties. Usually certification
marks are distinct from the manufacturers' or traders' marks affixed on the product. In a
way certification marks are a very good model of a mark that is independent of direct
product origin and may become a conmiodity in itself. 74 For a European example we can
refer to the eco-flower, a mark comprising of a flower with first twelve, and now fifteen,
stars as petals, attributed by each member state's competent authority; the mark is valid
through-out the Union as a certification of the ecological characteristics of each product.
Interestingly, the eco-flower has caused a wave effect to the regulation of advertising
since only products bearing the mark will be allowed to be advertised as eco-friendly.75
It has to be stressed here though that the proliferation of eco-labelling schemes is in turn
becoming a barrier to market entry, particularly for products originating from
developing economies.76
Collective marks and denominations of origin are significant when the consumer desires
a product with specific characteristics attributed either by geographical location or
The various national standards or certification marks and the EEC blue flags indicating clean beaches
are good examples of such marks. Their value and "commodisation" can be seen in allegations that
resorts in the UK which did not fulfil minimum standards switched to blue flags of a lighter shade
awarded by a UK private organisation with lower standards for sea water and that in continental
Europe several local authorities misled the awarding body in order to obtain the certification: August
93 Which Holiday?, and the BBC2 Nature television program of July 27 1993. For a pre-1994
discussion of certification marks in the UK see N. DAWSON, Certification Trade Marks - Law and
Practice (London, Intellectual Property Publishing Limited, 1988).
The program started with dish and clothes washing machines and has expanded to almost everything
else. Hoover was the first to apply the mark on three of its models.
76 More on the subject of hidden barriers to entry will follow in the next chapter; the worries and the
priorities of the World Trade Organisation on eco-labelling were reported by F. WILLIAMS, "Eco-
labelling Tops Agenda for New Group", Financial Times, July 13, 1994.
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common practices of groups of producers. 77 To differentiate between a trade mark and a
generic name can be difficult. Churnton - the name of a new British cheese - was
invented in order to conjure up homely images of traditional cheese making. Albeit, the
cheese is currently produced by a single company and is targeting the "own label"
segment of the market. The situation is different in France where branded regional
cheeses abound and the retailing sector is more fragmented. 78 At a different
communicative level, but still related to the concrete origin of a marked product,
Emperor Akihito had to consent to eat in public foreign rice in order to ease the
suspicions of the public over the quality and purity of imported rice, following a
disastrous Japanese crop. For general sale the government required the blending of
foreign and domestic rice, so consumers could not be in a position to discriminate
against imported crops.79
Indeed, the importance of geographical origin offers a very good example of the
conflicting interests enmeshed into a trade name. Producers on the one hand want to
compete in a fair environment that allows them to profit from their reputation for high
quality, either by charging higher prices or by capturing a larger sector of the market; at
the same time they also demand to be allowed to compete in the production and trading
of more products. The consumer on the other hand demands more choice but also
trustworthy information. And society as a whole may have an additional agenda, for
example to preserve small farms for environmental, political or economic reasons. The
' The champagne cases are good examples of a collective mark that is at the same time a denomination
of origin. See in general L. BENDEKGEY & C.H. MEAD, "International Protection of Appellations
of Origin and Other Geographic Indications", 82 TMR 765 (1992), and M. KOLIA, "Monopolising
Names: EEC Proposals on the Protection of Trade Descriptions of Foodstuffs", [1992] EIPR 233. It
is particularly interesting to compare different approaches on champagne: see B. BROWN, "Generic
Term or Appellation of Origin - Champagne in New Zealand", [1992] EIPR 176. See also M.
LEHMANN, "Unfair Use of and Damage to the Reputation of Well-Known Marks, Names and
Indications of Source in Germany. Some aspects of Law and Economics", 17 lIC 746 (1986), at 755
and B. DUTOIT, "Unfair Use of and Damage to the Reputation of Well-Known Trademarks, Names
and Indications of Origin in Switzerland and France", 17 IIC 733 (1986), at 735-737. Examples of
hybrids between a certification and a collective mark are the wool-mark and the seal of quality
awarded by the Amsterdam Operators of Relax Business to those of its members that satisfy
independently set and controlled health and hygiene criteria, see "Netherlands", Trademark World,
October 1992, at 10-11.
See A. MAITLAND, "Hard Sell for a New British Cheese", Financial Times, March 10, 1994.
E. TERAZONO, "Japan's Consumers Spurn Rice Fit for an Emperor", Financial Times, March 10,
1994.
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law, then, has to balance all these, often contradictory, interests and reach a
compromise.8°
Origin is also directly influencing consumer's choice in the case of promotional goods
where the consumer acts more on an emotional than a cognitive level. S/he wants to
make her/his allegiance to a sports team, a social or political organisation and so on
known to the public. For that reason s/he uses all sorts of garments and gadgets
portraying the favoured insignia. The valuable part of the product, the comrnodifled
idea, is the mark itself; indication of origin relates to the origin of the insignia as such
and not to the origin of the marked product. It is debatable if the sophisticated consumer
who knows about the modern practice of licensing, 81 would buy a promotional product
if s/he knew that there was no connection with the proprietor of the insignia and that the
proprietor would not benefit in any material way, 82 even when the genuine item carries a
80 We all want to trust the information conveyed by the words "Parma Ham". For the general public the
words signify a particular type of ham. For the purists and the local Italian producers, however,
Parma ham is the ham produced in the Parma region of Italy, according to the local tradition, and,
according to tradition, sold from the bone. The trader and the non - purist consumer want to narrow
the defmition and expand its scope: traditional Parma ham is genuine even when sold in pre-cut
slices. The UK courts preferred the second approach, in particular after hearing evidence that Parma
producers wanted themselves to control pre-sliced ham in the market. See Consorzio del Prosciutto
di Parma v. Marks & Spencer Plc, [1991] RPC 351, and N. DAWSON, "The Parma Ham Case:
Trade Descriptions and Passing Off - Shortcomings of English Law?", [1991] EIPR 487, concluding
at 490 that "... judgments in the case suggest that far from English law being defective in this area,
on the contrary Italian law is over-protective of geographical denominations in regulating how
products may be sold to the consumer". Parma Ham producers failed again more recently when they
tried to rely on Council Regulation 208 1/93 and Commission Regulation 1107/96: see A.
COLLINSON & I. DAVIES, "European Community Law Can Save Your Bacon", Trademark
World, March 1998, 20. See also SWISS MISS Trade Mark [1997] RPC 219 and Chocosuisse Union
de Fabricants Suisses de Chocolat v. Cadbury Ltd [1998] RPC 117.
' For such a lucidly expressed doubt, see Tavener Rutledge Ltd v. Trexapalm Ltd, [1977] R.P.C. 275,
at 280.
82 For a clear statement see a US case, Boston Professional Hockey Ass 'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg
510 F2d 1011(5th Cir. 1975), at 1012-1013 the court of appeal notes that "... the argument that
confusion must be as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem is unpersuasive, where the
trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the emblem ... Where
the consuming public had the certain knowledge that the source and origin of the trademark symbol
was in the Toronto team, the reproduction of that symbol by the defendant constituted a violation".
See also the discussion of P.E. MIMS, "Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An
Economic Model of Trademarks", 63 Texas Law Review 639 (1984), and P.D. SUPNIK,
"Designations of Source - Are they Necessary to Support Entertainment Industry Merchandising
Rights?", 5 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Review 363 (1986), at 391-400, for an exhaustive
enumeration of US cases.
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disproportionate price premium. 83
 It is estimated that "spectator wear" alone, meaning
pure leisure products, like bomber jackets, casual sweaters and sports bags, bearing
insignia, constitute up to 50% of big football strip manufacturers. Character
merchandising cases are equally good indications of trade marks transcendental
character; there issues are more complicated with trade mark law having to deal with
questions on personality and publicity rights.85
From all the above both the consumer and the marketer appear to benefit from the
existence of trade marks and their reference to concrete origin. The consumer cuts
research costs, 86 avoids confusion, and communicates her/his desire to the marketer; in
turn the marketer has a method of learning what the consumer wants and a system to
distinguish her/his product from those of the competitors and put it in the market with a
chance to address a "non confused public". 87 For further practical evidence as to the
value of channels of direct communication between marketers and consumers one can
refer to the nineties practice of creating "care-lines" that allow the consumer to
communicate with the manufacturer at the latter's expense; the lines assist the effective
communication of complaints, build brand loyalty, provide a route for early warnings in
cases of problems with product quality, and allow the parties to trace customer
satisfaction.88
83 See for example the complaints and exploitation accusations about the high prices and the frequent
design changes of the football outfits replicas, in G. MEAD, "Football Clubs Accused of Exploiting
Young Fans", Financial Times, August 26, 1993.
84 C. GARDNER, "Styles of Play", Design, January 1993, at 18, for the case of Umbro.
A famous American case that illustrates the link between personality rights and promotionality is
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd 604 F2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979), where a porn
movie was exploiting the insignia and the "public image" of the plaintiffs organisation. The court
enjoined such exploitation. See: E.P. WINNER, "Rights of Identity: Right of Publicity and Protection
for a Trademark's Persona", 71 TMR 193 (1981); see also E. GREDLEY & S.M. MANIATIS,
"Parody: A Fatal Attraction?", Part 1 [1997] EIPR 339 and Part 2 [1997] EIPR 412.
86 See also chapter 5 on economics.
87 James Burrough Ltd v. Sign of Beefeater Inc. 540 F2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976). For the very close link of
the trade mark, its owner, and the product and the rationality of the accorded protection see also
Bowden Wire Ltd v. Bowden Break Co Ltd [1914] RPC 385, at 392: "The object of the law is to
preserve for a trader the reputation he has made for himself, not to help him in disposing of [it] ... as
a marketable commodity".
88 Flora, the margarine manufacturer, was lucky to have already established such a care-line and thus be
able to respond quickly and directly to the public on the false rumours that her product contained pig
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Next, we will test the validity of this conclusion in more complicated market conditions,
because until now our description involved a consumer that had to deal with choices and
experiences of individual products stemming from identifiable producers. But what
happens when, for example, the consumer is faced with a choice of Virgin Cola
(exclusively distributed by Tesco), Safeway Cola, and Sainsbury Cola, incidentally all
made by Cott, a Canadian soft drinks company, which also puts in the market its own
brand of Cola.89
4.3. Trade marks: indicators of quality
4.3.1. Product differentiation
If products were homogeneous they would also be perfect substitutes of each other in
the minds of the consumers, and there would be no need to identify them with the use of
trade marks. Any purchase would satisfy their needs. Allocation of payments could be
made via a quota system linked to each producer's output. But in the real market the
consumer differentiates between - and the producer competes in - similar products
according to price, product characteristics and conditions surrounding their sale.9°
fat. Such attitudes help ensure the consumer that the manufacturer really cares about the product
quality and the satisfaction of the consumer, and inspire her/him with trust and confidence about the
brand. See D. SUMMERS, "Show the Customers You Care", Financial Times, January 13, 1994. To
underline the importance of help-lines it has been reported that, responding to an advertising spoof of
Britvic, thirty thousand people have called in the first day of advertising to report stockists who were
stocking the "unauthorised" Tango. Ironically the product had to be recalled a week after due to cases
of fermentation: D. SUMMERS, "Britvic Censured Over TV Advert", Financial Times, July 7, 1994.
N. BUCKLEY, "Cola War Hots Up as Safeway Launches Own Label Drink", Financial Times,
October 31, 1994. Indeed Cott chose to fight a world-wide guerilla cola war against the Coca and
Pepsi Giants: they provide the product for in house brands for ninety major retailers in Canada, the
US, the UK, France, Spain, and Japan; in addition in Canada, their home market, they also market
their own brand of Royal Crown Cola. In Canada a 750m1 bottle of President's Choice (the retailers'
Loblaws generic brand supplied by Cott) sells for 49 cents compared with 79 cents for Coke or Pepsi,
whereas Cotts' sales in the first quarter of 1994 where 67% higher: B. SIMON, "Upstart Cott Shakes
Up Cola Kings", Financial Times, June 15, 1994.
9° For markets were homogeneity prevails see SCHERER & ROSS (1990), at 17-18. At a given price
"... products are differentiated when, owing to differences in physical attributes, ancillary service,
geographic location, information, and/or subjective image, one firm's products are clearly preferred
by at least some buyers"; this is a condensed defmition for product differentiation. The economist
originally behind the characteristics approach is K. LANCASTER, in "A New Approach to
Consumer Theory", 74 Journal of Political Economy 132 (1966).
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In the category of product characteristics we include exclusive patented features, trade
marks, trade names, peculiarities of the package or container, and finally singularity in
quality and/or get up including design, colour or style. Conditions surrounding their sale
incorporate the convenience of the seller's location, 9' the general tone or character of
her/his establishment, the way of doing business, the reputation for fair dealing,
courtesy, efficiency, and all the personal links which attach the customers either to the
seller or those employed by her/him. 92 Advertising should also be added to the
conditions surrounding the sale of a product.
All these elements of differentiation can be conceptualised by a brand which is
"... the product or service of a particular supplier which is differentiated by its
name and presentation".93
So branding - a concept that is more specific than marking - distinguishes the branded
product not only from other similar products but also from products which may come
under the same mark94 or house mark.95
91 N.J. IRELAND, in Product Differentiation and Non-Price Competition (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1987), at 21, says that in order to describe product differentiation fully it is necessary to limit the
number of characteristics considered. He thus developed two models, one of horizontal product
differentiation based on location criteria and another of vertical product differentiation based on
quality variations.
92 E.H. CHAMBERLIN in The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Harvard, Harvard University
Press, 1969) offers this analytical review. Such links often are indirect but effective; Kenwood's
1994 advertising campaign for example concentrated on transforming its staff to image ambassadors,
"... Kenwood recognised that building a brand for electronic products is not easy. Shared technology
means there is little difference between the products. Successful advertising must convince people
that the brand is suited to their personality". B. Griffiths, Kenwood UK sales and marketing director
is reported saying "... we are trying to develop a personality for our products. We are not just a
consumer electronics company, we are more like a family": see L. KELLAWAY, "The Personnel
Touch", Financial Times, January 6, 1994.
J.M. MURPHY, The Brand Strategy (Cambridge, Director Books, 1990), at 1. A good example is the
case of Coke as brand which consists of "... taste, refreshment, [and especially] a complex of other,
less tangible benefits including consistent quality, sophistication, pleasure and relaxation".
Different terms used in respect of trade marks often cause conceptual confusion. In the US context
the trouble spots are somewhat different, concentrating on the terminology of: trade name, secondary
meaning, generic terms, and related company; see S.A. DIAMOND, "Untangling the Confusion in
Trademark Terminology", 65 American Bar Association Journal 1523 (1979), at 1523-1524. In real
markets some trade marks are so successful that they loose their product differentiating ability and
become generic. One example is the case of Sana, Unilever's original sunflower oil brand for Turkey,
which became the Turkish word for margarine. Unilever paid a, small, price for its success: see J.M.
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A further way of dividing products according to their characteristics is to talk about
search, experience, and credence products. Search products can be subjected to physical
inspection - food items are a good example. The qualities of experience products can be
apprehended only after previous use and cannot usually be observed before purchase -
electronics are such an example. Finally, drugs or cosmetics are examples of credence
products; usually examining their characteristics and effects, is either impossible before
purchase and use or too expensive and complicated. 96 The importance of brands is
apparent in the market for drugs where the balances are very delicate. On the one hand
generic drugs are a cheaper alternative promoted even in comparatively rich societies,
and on the other the market is so quality sensitive that the occurrence of even one
counterfeit product will create a "drug alert".97
A further mode of differentiation is according to quality and variety features, between
which consumers usually discriminate. For example, the speed with which a computer
accomplishes a task is a feature of quality and all consumers desire higher speeds
although their willingness to pay for the same increase in quality may differ. Colour is
an example of a variety feature and, since some consumers prefer white over red and
some have the opposite preference, all consumers, by definition, do not prefer more of a
variety feature.98 Brands again are relevant: some are designed to confer the impression
BROWN, "Foreigners Move In", Turkish Finance and Industry, Financial Times, November 25,
1993.
House marks meaning marks "... that are used on all products the company produces, in connection
with all services it provides and as shorthand for identifying the company generally": see M.
ABELL, "House Marks - The Sphinx of Intellectual Property", Trademark World, September 1993,
17, at 17-18, and 23 where Id and IBM are presented as notorious examples of house marks. Abel!
in presenting the position under UK law is stretching the defmitional limits of house marks. For the
US case on whether the addition of a house mark to a trade mark is enough to eliminate any
possibility of confusion between similar marks see M.J. BERAN, "Likelihood of Confusion: Will
That "House Mark" Get You "Home-Free", 83 TMR 336 (1993). It seems that the notion of a house
mark and its effects are still unclear in both jurisdictions.
M. DARBY & E. KARNI in "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud", 16 Journal of
Law and Economics 67 (1973), devised this categorisation. CORNISH (1996) and other
commentators follow similar routes.
See P. JOHN & D. GREEN, "Glaxo Hit by Counterfeit Drugs", Financial Times, February 18, 1994,
for the case of counterfeited "Zantac".
ECONOMIDES, (1988), at 525, is supplying this aspect of differentiation: see also 530-53 1 for a
clear description of the features of different goods. Colour of course ceases to be a variety feature if it
adopts the role of a trade mark. The colour pink for insulation material had, in the US, the dual role
of functioning as a trade mark and a being a variety feature: see Re Owens - Corning Fibreglass
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of reliability and quality, but limited choice; at the same time the proliferation of brands
allows marketers to offer the same product under a variety of guises.
4.3.2. Consumer motivation
Keeping in mind all the possibilities of product differentiation, we can describe
consumer motivation as,
"... a state of need arousal - a condition exerting "push" on the individual to
engage in those activities which he anticipates will have the highest probability
of bringing him gratification of a particular need pattern".99
The process that we described above can be defined as purely cognitive, because it
provides the answers to the questions of what rational issues are associated with the
experience, what are the product attributes, what are the product benefits, what are the
descriptions of events, products, and product experiences.'00
In this rational process we can include in the pre-purchase issues, first, questions on
budget allocation which lead to a decision on the purchase or not of a particular type of,
but still generic, product. Considerations on brand and style choice and store patronage
will follow resulting to the decision on the purchase of a specific marked product.'°1
Corp., 774 F2d 1116, 227 USPQ 417 (C.A.F.C. 1985). In the UK under the 1994 Act the colour
purple has been registered for cleaning fluids (Reg. No. 2009633) and the colour pink, again, for
insulation material (Reg. No. 2004215); under the 1938 Act, in John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd's Trade Mark
[1988] RPC 233, colours were used to indicate dosages rather than a branded pharmaceutical, thus
they were not used as trade marks and registration was refused.
J. BATON, Motivation, Cognition, Learning - Basic Factors in Consumer Behavior, in J. McNEAL
(ed.), Dimensions of Consumer Behavior (New York, Appleton Century Crofts, 1965), at 24.
°° This is part of the Grid Research, results, as described by EDWARDS & JOHNSON in OLSON &
SENTIS (eds) (1986) at 259. Note here that often we use the word belief wanting to signify that we
have some doubt about the truth of our opinion. "... when truths are necessary truths (e.g., parallel
lines never meet), they are not prefaced by the word "belief". See O'SAUGHNESSY (1987) at 19,
and the reference therein to J.M. ADLER, Ten Philosophical Mistakes (New York, Macmillan,
1985).
'° See W.L. WILKIE, Consumer Behaviour (New York, Wiley, 1990), at 563-564.
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Without going into a detailed description of the behaviour and the strategies available to
the consumer'°2 we can say that they are formulated according not only to our cognitive
behaviour but also according to affective, responsive, social and cultural, spiritual and
symbolic, and finally electrochemical influences.' 03 In short, although we can in theory
distinguish between cognitive behaviour and behaviour that responds to affective and/or
symbolic appeal,'°4 the two are always combined in creating our individual need pattern,
despite the overemphasis on cognitivism that has dominated research during the last
decades.'°5 Therefore each consumer has developed a need pattern, that consists of
various balancing factors and is under constant change.'° 6 Still, general assertions will
be valid up to a point, because, once the need pattern has been created, then we can
expect more rationality in our hypothetical consumer's strive to satisfy it. So the
economist's assertion that a very wide variety of consumer behaviour - addiction
included - is consistent with utility maximisation and thus rational, is not an act of
economic jugglery but an attempt for the creation of a neutral - towards the need pattern
- paradigm of satisfaction of need patterns that may or may not be themselves rational,
ethical, beneficial, and so on.'°7
102 For the classical description of which see WILKIE, ibid, at 591-612.
103 See in general EDWARDS & JOHNSON in OLSON & SENTIS (eds) (1986).
104 See P. WOODS Psychological Dimensions of Consumer Decisions in McNEAL (ed.) (1965) at 33.
A.S. ODDI in "Consumer Motivation in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law: On the Importance
of Source", 31 Villanova Law Review 1 (1986), at 1-9 and especially fn.2 offers a review of the
literature on the psychology of the consumer.
105 See the conclusions of R.G. FOXALL in Consumer Psychology in Behavioral Perspective (London,
Routledge, 1990), at 168-173. He rejects any unitary theory and attempts to link the marketer and
consumer aspects of marketing, in the light of a "relativistic consumer research".
106 Huge national divergences on the criteria that influence the behaviour of consumers in Europe are
strong evidence of retaining a national consumer's identity. In 1993 the EU average for the
effectiveness of celebrity endorsement is 11%, the French level is at 22%, and the UK at 1%.
Similarly eye-catching packaging is influencing only 4% of Dutch consumers, but 21% of French
shoppers, advertising is a key-factor for more than 50% of Italians and French but for only 31% of
Spaniards. Results of a Mintel research on European Lifestyles, as presented by G. MEAD, in
"Hunting the Euro-Consumer", Financial Times, June 28, 1993.
107 G.S. BECKER & K.M. MURPHY, "A Theory of Rational Addiction", 96 Journal of Political
Economy 675 (1988). E.J. DOCKNER & G. FEICHTINGER, in "Cyclical Consumption Patterns and
Rational Addiction", 83 American Economic Review 256 (1993), after discussing happiness of
addicts they conclude, at 262, that consumption behaviour may end up in persistent oscillations
(limited cycles). It is very intriguing that economists started to incorporate into their paradigms terms
such as happiness etc. This constitutes a shift from the assertion that every chosen behaviour is
rational. See for example G. BECKER, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (Chicago,
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Therefore demand for quality features will be stronger for experience and credence
goods and products that are not purchased frequently, than for those that can be
examined before purchase and are to be consumed immediately; different quality
criteria, and accordingly trade mark messages, are involved in the purchases of oranges,
cars, and drugs,'°8 but quality criteria as such exist in all cases, and it is almost self-
evident that,
"... if ... [the consumer] is interested in origin, it is normally because origin
imports an expectation about some quality".'09
This view is supported by the observations of consumers' associations and international
organisations - such as WIPO - agreeing on the value of information on product
characteristics and quality conveyed by trade marks."°
University of Chicago Press, 1976). O'SAUGHNESSY (1987), is giving flesh to that shift first by
distinguishing, at 25 between latent, passive wants and exclusionary reasons for not buying: latent is
a want that is dormant, passive is a want that is inhibited by an objective assessment of benefits and
costs and ethical or legal reasons or incapacities may form an exclusionary reason, so an addiction
theory has to accommodate the legal deterrents, etc. At 83 he sets a four steps test that determines the
extent to which consumers decide wisely as well as correctly and depends on: "1. The rationality of
the want itself, since it could be argued that not all wants are rational. 2. Whether the products or
brands being considered include the best buy for the consumer. 3. Whether the consumer correctly
perceives the relevant facts about options. 4. The degree to which the consumer rationally processes
information".
108 The case of drugs exemplifies in particular the value of information conveyed by trade marks, since
they are a product for which a consumer with a minimal aversion to risk will be prepared to pay more
for a product about "... whose quality he is confident than a cheaper product about which he knows
little or nothing and judges the cost of finding out more to be too great". CORNISH (1989) at 49. See
also M.A. HURVITZ, R.E. CAVES, "Persuasion or Information? Promotion and the Shares of Brand
Names and Generic Pharmaceuticals", 31 Journal of Law and Economics 299 (1988).
'° W.R. CORNISH & J. PHILIPS, The Economic Function of Trade Marks: An Analysis with Special
Reference to Developing Countries, 13 IIC 41(1982), at 43.
° See International Trade and the Consumer (National Consumer Council, 1991) a working paper
supporting, at 19, that trade marks convey information, assure that the goods are what they say they
are, guarantee a measure of quality and safety and differentiate the product from others. In The Role
of Industrial Property in the Protection of Consumers (Geneva, WIPO, 1983), at 9, all the above are
repeated and in addition it is stressed that the law of unfair competition "... prohibits, among other
things, ... untrue allegations or insinuations; thus, it helps the consumer to be correctly informed
rather than misled". In the US there have been five types of consumer rights: the right to be
informed, the right to choose, the right to safety, the right to be heard, and the right to recourse and
redress, see M. FRIEDMAN, "Research on Consumer Protection Issues: The Perspective of the
"Human Sciences", 47 Journal of Social Issues 1 (1991), at 3. Trade marks are directly related as
communicators with all five of them and in particular with the rights to be informed, choose, and
seek redress.
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After purchase, it is use and consumption that make the consumer confront the issues of
maintenance, repair and usage costs, including accident risks, and lead, ultimately, to
the disposition of the product, evaluation of satisfaction, and further decisions" on re-
consumption or not, customer loyalty or switching in terms of products, brands or
suppliers etc. In the post-purchase period we utilise our learning abilities and adapt our
behaviour accordingly. The whole stage turns around the axis of satjsfaction,"2 but it
would be impossible to initiate communication or learning without the landmarks set by
trade marks that provide a solid point of reference.
Take, for example, the case of dissatisfaction outcomes." 3 Voice is the response that
communicates verbally dissatisfaction to the seller; trade marks make identification of
the dissatisfaction's cause possible and enable the seller to respond. Exit means ceasing
of the use and continued purchase of the product; in the absence of trade marks the
consumer would not be able to consciously stop buying the product unless s/he stopped
using the generic product, and, on the other hand, the marketer would not have the
opportunity to correct the defect." 4 Finally the reaction may be retaliatory meaning the
making of the dissatisfaction public and/or the intentional exclusion from pre-purchase
consideration of any product that comes under the same mark or the boycott of the store
as a whole; lacking trade marks the consumer would not be able to do any of the above,
except the boycott of a store, that has physical location as a point of reference, unless
s/he was ready to devote large amounts of time and effort in identifying the product's
trade route.
Apart from all these characteristics' and products' divisions and the attempts to typify
consumer behaviour we also have to consider the fact that trade mark proprietors
' See WILKIE (1990), at 6 14-619.
112 Defined by H.K. HUNT, in "Consumer Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction, and Complaining Behaviour",
47 Journal of Social Issues 107 (1991), at 110, as the realisation of what is realistically expected from
a product.
113 As set by HUNT ibid, at 114-115. For the first two see A.O. HIRSHMAN, Exit, Voice and Loyalty:
Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1970).
" Trade marks are double edged: they can bring in but also send away custom; see S.A. DIAMOND,
Trademark Problems and How to Avoid Them (Chicago, Cram Books, 1973), at 240.
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usually put in the markets numerous varieties of series of products under the same mark.
The rational consumer has to adapt accordingly her/his behaviour and integrate in it
trade marks as indicators of abstract origin and quality. This is strengthening further the
eminence of trade marks, giving them the potential to affect consumers behaviour both
at the cognitive and the psychological level. And because trade marks are symbols they
are capable of persuasion and/or deception, as they are independent of the objective,
natural properties of the entities towards which they point.' 15 Messages conveyed by
trade marks may be manipulated so as to evoke associations, which are then "...
perceived as attributes" of the independent product."6
The clothing industry serves as a good example. If producers and consumers had the
same consciousness, clothing would be bought and produced only at the very slow rate
of its dilapidation; it is fashion and advertising that accelerates the rate of
consumption." 7 Accordingly the possibilities for distinction and further differentiation
are inexhaustible, since the possible number of fields of preferences equals the number
115 BLONSKY (1985) at vii. Semiologists come to the rescue of trade mark lawyers who argue that
Juliet was definitely wrong, at least for trade marks, when "... she mused "What's in a name? That
which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet": D.L. SKOLER, in "Trademark
Identification - Much Ado about something?", 76 TMR 224 (1986), at 224, fii.2, is presenting some
definitional and identification problems with "roses".
116 T.D. DRESCHER, "The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks - From Signals to Symbols to
Myth", 82 TMR 301 (1992), at 305. The feud as to the secret recipe of Coca Cola and its press
coverage is evidence of the myth surrounding the brand. To symbolise the strength of the mark
David Sainsbury has been quoted saying for his own cola drink that now "[for the first time a cola
has been found that is as good as Coca Cola. That is a new situation for Coke"; as reported by M.
THOMPSON NOEL, "Of Fish Heads, Baked Beans and Cola", Financial Times, October 31, 1994.
Adapting Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola advertising themes what is even more important than "just the
taste" of the product is to persuade the consumer that s/he is part of the marked product's
"generation". Opposing views on colas and private labelling are represented in an exchange of letters
in the Financial Times. J. MURPHY, chairman of Interbrand, is stating that "[o]wn-label products
represent fair competition. Look-alikes that deliberately assume the characteristics of market-leading
brands are parasites and represent unfair competition". A. JACK responds, suggesting changes to
Sainsbury cola which would indeed ensure non confusion: dyeing the liquid a different colour,
serving it flat, or substituting cola with "artificially flavoured sugar water". See the exchange in
"Own Brand Look-Alikes Are Parasites", Financial Times, May 12, 1994, and "Green Light to Avoid
Confusion", Financial Times, May 13, 1994.
" R. BARTHES, The Fashion System (London, Jonathan Cape, 1985), at xi. The consumer acts
"irrationally" because "... calculating industrial society is obliged to form consumers who don't
calculate". The balance of power between producers and consumers is depicted once more under a
different light.
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of fields of stylistic possibles." 8 We do not claim here that physical - as opposed to
price - differentiation is something detrimental to society and economy. Asserting that
consumers would be better off if they had a smaller choice of goods, but at lower prices,
would be an "unadmitted bluenoseism",' 19 since even for the most rational consumer
there are products that tempt her/him to abandon the "basic" model. As a mild critic of
irrational advertising put it:
"[t]he economist, whose dour lexicon defines as irrational any market behavior
not dictated by a logical pecuniary calculus, may think it irrational to buy
illusions; but there is a degree of that kind of irrationality even in economic man;
and consuming man is full of it".'2°
Admittedly buying a television set in the box at a warehouse is a different experience
from that of buying it in a showroom where one can examine it, test the colour, sound,
etc.; buying cheap is not necessarily efficient.' 2 ' After all product diversification
according to trade marks, get up design, and advertising may serve to express and
I P. BOURDIEU, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (London, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1984), at 226. See also the review of theories of consumer culture in M.
FEATHERSTONE, Consumer Culture & Postmodemism (London, Sage, 1991), at 13-28.
' R.H. BORK, in The Antitrust Paradox (New York, Basic Books, 1978), at 313. BORK is right to
claim that the step from the assertion that consumers "really" do not want feature differentiation to
the authoritarian conclusion that the law should keep them away from having what they are willing to
pay for but "really" do not want. But see J.K. GALBRAITH, The Affluent Society (Boston,
Houghton Muffin, 1958), at 140: "[c]onsumer wants can have bizarre, frivolous, or even immoral
origins, and an admirable case can be made for a society that seeks to satisfy them. But the case
cannot stand if it is the process of satisfying wants that creates the wants". For a practical test see, D.
SUMMERS, "Smoke Gets in Europe's Eyes", Financial Times, December 13, 1993 on the
controversy over the proposed advertising ban of tobacco products in the European Union. One of
the arguments of the opponents of such a ban is the fear that it might set a worrying precedent, "...
tomorrow it could be fast cars, children's toys, pharmaceuticals or Black Forest gateaux". For the
formation of the relationship between the Commission and the advertising lobby see A.
MATTELART & M. PALMER, "Advertising in Europe: Promises, and Pitfalls", 13 Media, Culture
and Society 535 (1991); advertising agencies were the fust to react and organise against the
"regulatory threat" from Europe. They point to the fact that decisions are taken seemingly as a result
of an international debate; however the validity of the debate is undermined by the fact that the data
used in the debate are usually provided by advertising agencies. The unorthodoxy of regulation
based, exclusively, on data provided by the regulated is obvious. See also A. KAMPERMAN
SANDERS & S.M. MANIATIS, "A Quixotic Raid Against the Tobacco Mill" [1997] EIPR 237.
120 See BROWN, "Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols" 57 Yale Law
Journal 1165 (1948), at 1181.
121 An example used by C.F. RULE & D.L. MEYER in "An Antitrust Enforcement Policy to Maximize
the Economic Wealth of All Consumers", 82 Antitrust Bulletin 677 (1988), at 679, urging against a
"counterrevolution" against the, then, current US antitrust stance and the return to older stricter
principles.
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reinforce divergences that already exist in society, such as according to sex, age, and
class, but it may also satisfy the evolution of new needs' 22 and enrich ways of
expression.'23
But we can all agree on two things. First that,
"... a product is something that is made in a factory; a brand is something bought
by a customer. A product can be copied by a competitor; a brand is unique. A
product can be quickly outdated; a successful brand is timeless".'24
And second that, if trade marks, next to their utilitarian communicative value, have a
further symbolic communicative value, then they can cause symbolic actions; these are
often,
"... expressive actions, [and] another view of them would be this: the symbolic
connection of an action to a situation enables the action to be expressive of some
attitude, belief, value, emotion, or whatever. Expressiveness, not utility is what
flows back. What flows back along the symbolic connection to the action is (the
possibility of) expressing some particular attitude, belief, value, emotion and so
on. Expressing this has high utility for the person, and so he performs the
symbolic action".'25
122 Unilever, for example, is exploiting, in Thailand, the international goodwill accrued in Wall's brand
by putting in the market an ice cream with a lower fat content than the formulation used in colder
climates, and, catering for the local taste, by introducing a red bean ice cream flavour; Unilever
simply adapts to a new market and creates a new product which is dressed with the old goodwill: V.
MALLET, "Asian Delight" Tempts Thai Palates", Financial Times, May 12, 1994.
123 For a parallel development of design according to historical, social and artistic changes see A.
FORTY, Objects of Desire - Design and Society 1750-1980 (London, Cameron Books, 1986), at 62-
94. At 9 1-93 he stresses the common failure of historians to deal with product diversification, partly
because we take diversification for granted, describes the limits set to designers by manufacturers and
consumers and concludes that "... to know the range of different designs was to know an image of
society". Simply by browsing old issues of The Trademarks Journal one can get a historical
"feeling".
124 Per S. KING, of WPP Group, as quoted by D.A. AAKER, in Managing Brand Equity - Capitalising
on the Value of a Brand Name (New York, Free Press, 1991). Put another way a "... marketing mix
consists of the product, the packaging, the trade mark, the promotion, the advertising and the overall
presentation. The trade mark is the essence of all this. It is the shorthand that permits the
manufacturer to inform consumers that this product is available and stimulates them to buy it": L.M.
GIBSON, The Role of Trademarks in Marketing, in 1988 Hong Kong Symposium on Industrial
Property and Economic and Technological Development (Geneva, WIPO, 1988), at 64.
125 R. NOZICK, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), at 28,
expresses this view in a more general context.
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4.3.3. Abstract origin and brand loyalty
Now that our rational consumer has to deal with series of marked similar products a
choice strategy becomes ever more intricate. Bombarded by information that cannot be
processed, due to quantity and specialisation, s/he faces the task of creating "meaning
out of chaos",' 26 and, utilising learning, relies more on messages conveyed by trade
marks, which function almost exclusively as symbols.' 27 Once more trade marks, in the
mind of the consumer, denote the origin of the symbol rather than the origin of the
marked product. Certain Rover car models, for example, may have originated from a
Honda design and, often, a Honda factory that produced identical cars under Rover or
Honda badges, despite the fact that 80% of Rover is currently owned by BMW.' 28 The
actual relations are often unknown to the consumer, although s/he may realise that the
differences between Honda and Rover are minor. It may seem absurd, but some people
bought Rover cars because they came from Rover, others because they came from
Honda, and now people buy Rover cars, produced under the control of BMW, according
126 As put by G. DUCKWORTH, Brands and the Role of Advertising, in D. COWLEY (ed.),
Understanding Brands (London, Kogan Page, 1991), at 60-61, where it is argued that it is our ability
to associate that allows us to create meaning out of chaos. See also J.C. DRIVER & G.R. FOXALL,
Advertising Policy and Practice (London, Holt, Rinehart & Wilson, 1984), at 85-93. LEISS, KLINE
& JHALLY (1990) are making, at 39, the point that this book is co-published by the Advertising
Association of Great Britain. Accordingly their description of consumer behaviour is such so as to fit
their conclusion, at 93, that advertising has "... no power beyond engendering passing interest and,
perhaps, cursory comparative evaluation; it is certainly, of itself, incapable of building preference or
conviction".
127 What will happen when the information conveyed cannot be trusted was developed by G.A.
AKERLOF in "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", 84
Quarterly Journal of Economics 488 (1970), who built an economic paradigm based on second hand
car markets. If prospective buyers do not trust the information on quality they are willing to pay a
price that is lower from that of the cars offered. Car dealers will then offer the quality that
corresponds with the price offered, this will trigger once more the buyers unwillingness to pay and
the vicious circle ends at the lowest possible price and quality although there is a buyers market for
better cars and a sellers market for better prices. In the case of trade marks, the rational consumer will
refuse to pay the premium on the information carried by the trade mark, the honest marketer will
withdraw from the market mark because he will not afford to remain in the market without charging
a premium; gradually, the value of trade marks will degenerate since they will not be able to indicate
anything.
128 See K. GOODING, "Rich British Ancestry Fails to Provide Independent Future", Financial Times,
February 1, 1994, for a review of Starley & Sutton history which started in 1877, became Rover in
1904, had a parallel life with Land Rover from 1948, became the Rover Group - merging with MG
and Land Rover - to be sold to British Aerospace in 1989, and then sold again to BMW, in 1994. It
was a marriage based on British style and Japanese innovation that made Rover's luck change and
attracted BMW: P. WILLIAMS, "Rover's Return", Design, April 1993, at 16.
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to Honda technology. Name associations however can be a mixed blessing: Jaguar's
image for example suffered under British Leyland. Having learned a lesson, and after
regaining its older glory and becoming an integral part of Ford, it now benefits from the
sheer power and extensive network of Ford; however there is not even a hint of an
attempt to associate the marks Ford and Jaguar. Skoda on the other hand is trying to
leave in the past its cult image as a "joke" by adopting a strategy based on the
acquisition of the company by Volkswagen.' 29 Similarly South Korean companies in an
attempt to overcome the association with low end electronics are buying out foreign
trade marks or companies in order to use brands with other connotations. Samsung, for
example spent in February 1995, US $378 million for a 40% stake in AST Research
Inc., a California personal computer maker.'3°
Tracing actual origin is difficult indeed and, albeit, futile.'3'
Accordingly the consumer develops biases' 32 towards commercial products, meaning
that s/he starts to "... have consistent preferences" and develop what has become known
as "brand loyalty".' 33 Based on their loyalty, consumers identify their preferred beer
even when the actual bottled beer does not correspond with the one bearing the favoured
brand label,' 34 they establish their purchase of a new car on the mark of their previous
car, and are prone to accept claims which are objectively debatable because they are
129 The advertising slogan was: "Volkswagen were so impressed, they bought the company"; see D.
SUMMERS, "Skoda's Sales Drives is No Joke", Financial Times May 12, 1994.
130 Zenith, AST Research, and Luxman, have all now become brands or company names for Korean
products: see S. BRULL, "Resolving a Korean Identity Crisis", International Herald Tribune,
September 19, 1995.
131 In respect of registered marks it must be stressed again that increasingly the majority of laws
worldwide are satisfied by the existence of an ability to distinguish rather than an ability to trace
origin as a registrability requirement.
132 For a complete presentation of the sources of bias see R.M. HOGARTH & S. MAKRIDAKIS,
"Forecasting and Planning: An Evaluation", 27 Management Science 115 (1981).
G.E. MONACO & D. KAISER, Effects of Prior Preference, Inferences, and Believability in
Consumer Advertising, in R. HARRIS (ed.), Information Processing Research in Advertising
(Hillsdale, Lawrence Erlbaum Ass., 1983) 263, at 267, where they describe the consumer's world
view.
' A whole series of such tests is described by D.F. GREER, in Industrial Organisation and Public
Policy (New York, MacMillan, 1980), at 87-91.
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positively partial towards their "own" car maker, although because of the expenditure
involved they should be more aware of existing real differences.'35
Levels of brand loyalty differ according to the strength of the trade mark and the type of
the product. We have already seen that quality expectations are the predominant
consideration in the case of experience goods such as drugs. Due to their importance
and an, inherent to the product, risk aversion, brand loyalty is also stronger in the case
of drugs than other products. A study of the markets for drugs whose patents have
expired has shown that trade mark holders preserve their market shares against generic
entrants for a considerable period of time. 136 On the other hand, search goods like food
products, may create a lesser sense of loyalty. The cost and risk of switching brands are
much more trivial and this results partly to the phenomenon of supermarkets' own
brands that are encroaching the markets of branded groceries. 137 The role of trade marks,
in probably the "biggest postwar crisis" that brand owners faced in Europe,' 38 is not
diminished, because even then the trade name and the packaging of the retailer simply
substitutes the marketers brand name. The consumer, aware of commercial practices,'39
MONACO & KAISER in HARRIS (ed.) (1983), at 283-285, and R.J. HARRIS, "Comprehension of
Pragmatic Implications in Advertising", 62 Journal of Applied Psychology 603 (1977).
136 HURWITZ & CAVES (1988), at 317-318. Courts recognise that; for example in a UK case it has
been accepted that the colour combination used in relation to a tranquilliser should not be used by a
compulsory licensee since consumers recognised the combination as a brand rather than a generic
indication of the type of the tranquilliser: Hoffmann - La Roche v. DDSA Pharmaceuticals [1972]
RJC 1. Courts do not hesitate to intervene in cases involving search goods when there is some
evidence of confusion: see for example Reckitt & Colman v. Borden [1990] RPC 340.
' See "Shoot Out at the Check Out", The Economist, June 5, 1993, where the own label threat is
attributed to the consumers perception of product parity, and, for the US case, to the complicated
economic relations of producers and supermarket owners. For Europe see G. de JONQUIERES,
"New Challenge for Big Brands", Financial Times, June 15, 1993, arguing that private-label business
is a means for the supermarkets to increase their margins. This view of UK retailers is shared by their
continental counterparts since the US practice is rapidly expanding in Europe. See also B. SIMON's,
unhappily titled, "The Man with No Name", Financial Times, August 5, 1993, on the success of
generic products, especially in Canada.
' P. OSTER, "The Eurosion of Brand Loyalty", Business Week, July 19, 1993, 32, at 32. It has been
estimated by Nielsen that discounters in 1992 were sharing 19% of food shares by value in Belgium,
with 6.6% increase over 1991. In other European countries the levels were: France 2% (100,9%),
Germany 25% (11.4%), Netherlands 11% (8.9%), Spain 6% (7.8%), Sweden 6% (58.1%), UK 8%
(32.4%): "A Rose by Any Other Name", G. de JONQUIERES, Financial Times, October 6, 1993.
In particular when recession bites, the consumer is constructively utilising her/his learning abilities:
see the survey on Retail Chain Management, Financial Times, June 15, 1993. At 31, N. BUCKLEY,
in "Customers Call the Tune", claims that the now price-sensitive consumer is accordingly more
sophisticated; combined with the rapid growth of discount retailers this is "bad news for the
retailers".
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is still trusting a name, that of a trader and/or selector,'° and the naming of own label
products as generic is misleading.' 4 ' Furthermore private labels often create to the
customer such a feeling of security that they allow to their owners to sell them at a
premium over branded lines.' 42 From the point of marketers brand loyalty is a method of
measuring of their customers attachment to a brand and
"... it reflects how likely a customer will be to switch to another brand,
especially when that brand makes a change, either in price or in product
features".'43
At the bottom level of brand loyalty we find the switcher or price buyer who is
indifferent to the brand and will switch from one brand to another according to price and
other characteristics. Persons who check prices of competing products and retailers, buy
goods according to strictly set budgets etc., belong in this category.
C.M. WADLOW in The Law of Passing-Off (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1990), at 74 is putting
forward the example of"... a well-known English merchant [who] instructs a foreign manufacturer to
make goods to its specification and mark them with its name", and suggests that the proper plaintiff
is the importer or retailer whose name appears on the goods. Direct judicial support for this can be
drawn from Imperial Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. v. Bonnan [1924] AC 755, at 760. For a review of
cases see WADLOW, at 76-86.
'' A "generic term" is the name of some product or service. It is totally lacking in distinctive character.
Then the "own brand products" are not generic but products that carry a trader's than a
manufacturer's mark. Once a mark, any mark, is affixed the product ceases to be generic. Marks &
Spencer are not trading in generic products, but in products that they either manufacture or choose;
consumers trust the Marks & Spencer name for manufacturing or choosing. This may be shifting
competition from the supermarkets' racks to high street retailers but is not creating generic products.
Three of the six principles of the business philosophy of Marks & Spencer, as propounded by Simon
Marks and Israel Sieff, in A. BRAGGS, Marks & Spencer 1884 - 1984 (London, Octopus, 1984), at
11, are: "1. To offer customers, under the company's own brand name St Michael, a selective range
of high-quality, well designed and attractive merchandise at reasonable prices. 2. To encourage
suppliers to use the most modern and efficient techniques of production provided by the latest
discoveries in science and technology. 3. With the cooperation of these suppliers, to enforce the
highest standards of quality control." However, it must be noted that in many jurisdictions retailers
cannot obtain trade mark protection for retail services as such. They have tried to obtain protection
on the basis, for example, of the advice they provide to prospective customers. However there is
some scepticism as to the distinctness of the service, partly because it is very difficult to identify the
price charged for it - although one way would be to compare the prices charged by retailers and out
of town "generic" stockists. The difference would be the premium charged by retailers. See J.
OLSEN, "Cinderella Spurned: a Retailer's Lament" [1987] EIPR 266, and FIRTH (1995) at 7-8. For
a review of services that could fall under "retail" see Dee Corp's Applications [1989] FSR 266; in
Hong Kong protection against passing off has been granted in order to protect the reputation as a
buyer, see Penney v. Penneys [1979] FSR 29.
142 This is the case especially in Britain; see G. de JONQUIERES & N. TAIl, "A Trolley Full of
Troubles", Financial Times, May 6, 93.
AAKER (1991), at 39.
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At the second level we have the habitual satisfied buyer who will not sacrifice any
particular effort in order to look out for new brands. An example is the customer who
may consider to try the new highly advertised and strikingly different product, but will
not bother to switch and try other products that are already in the market.
The satisfied buyer with switching costs is at the third level. A typist for example who
has no particular complaint from WordPerfect and, having spent some time to learn it,
will probably stick with its upgraded versions. A customer of a bank will not easily
close an account with one bank and open another with a competitor, even when mildly
dissatisfied; in a way, and because of the time and inconvenience involved and the
similar level of services provided in an overcrowded market, the customer is almost held
to ransom from her/his bank.
At the next level is the customer who considers the brand a friend and will act more on a
psychological and less on a cognitive level; a favourite restaurant may change chefs,
become out of fashion, move up-market and raise prices but this will not change some
customers loyalty, unless changes are dramatic. People can resist fashion changes and
buy for decades the same perfume or frequent the same store.
Finally the ideal loyal buyer is the committed buyer. Like the car enthusiast that will go
to any length to find spare parts for the outdated model that has become part of her/his
life, or the Macintosh devotee who keeps on asking if everything is Mac compatible and
can spend time to persuade her/his fellow personal computer users to join the club of
Mac customers.'44
The different levels of loyalty combined with the individual need patterns of
consumption create the most fertile field for the intervention of advertising and targeting
of particular types of consumers. Thus, the economical rationality of brand loyalty will
be examined later combined with the discussion on advertising, but brand loyalty as
such illustrates in many cases that consumers do not care any more for the concrete
The idea for the layers of the loyalty pyramid belongs to AAKER (1991), at 39-41.
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origin of the product, which in reality they cannot even trace. 145 But the existence of a
particular mark, or even of any mark as long as a mark exists,' 46 is enough to shape their
behaviour. The influence of the mark arises first from the belief that the same mark
connotes consistent quality and second from the "aura" of trade marks and their
advertising function.
4.3.4. Trade marks as guarantees of quality
We have seen that trade marks often lead the consumer to think that, s/he does not need
to investigate the attributes of the brand s/he is about to purchase because the trade mark
is a shorthand way of communicating that these attributes are the same with those
enjoyed at an earlier stage.' 47 Therefore most of the commentators agree on an extended
definition of trade marks' functions that embodies, if not a guarantee, at least a quality
assurance role.' 48 Accordingly the perceived quality of the branded product adds value
' J. McCARThY, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (Rochester, Lawyers Co-operative Pub. Co.
1984) at 3.3 acknowledges that consumers are unable to differentiate between products based on
trade marks function as indicators of origin, therefore consumers suppose that the imposition of the
same trade mark indicates at least "... a single albeit anonymous source". See also Mc Dowel! 's
Applcn [1926] RJ'C 313, at 337, where commenting on the possibility of deception Lord J.
Warrington states that it is not crucial "... whether the public do, or do not, know what that source is".
Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co. 250 Fed. 960 (2d Cir. 1918) reaches the same
conclusion, that consumers do not care about the real identity of the manufacturer.
146 Because in the consumer's mind the existence alone of the mark will indicate that someone is putting
the product under her/his aegis.
'' J. COVERDALE, "Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test", 51 University
of Chicago Law Review 868 (1984).
' E.W. HANAK III, "The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks", 65 TMR 318 (1975). Even in
the earlier articles on the subject the issue of quality assurance has been discussed. For example H.W.
WERTHEIMER, in "The Principle of Territoriality in the Trade Mark Law of the Common Market
Countries", 16 International Comparative Law Quarterly 630 (1967), at 649 states that the guarantee
function "... of the trademark is not independent of the origin function. It is nothing else but its
reflex". F. BROWN in "The Economic Role of Industrial Property", [1979] EIPR 265, at 270 accepts
the indication of quality, but only as "purely associative". J.R. LUNSFORD, in "Conswner and
Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Market Place", 64 TMR 75 (1974), at 95 describes a
quality function as the primary function of trade marks. S.P. LADAS is less enthusiastic, in
"Trademark Licensing and the Antitrust Law", 63 TMR 245 (1973), but provides a defmition that
accommodates both, and is used in this thesis as the ideal trade mark definition. D. SHANAHAN in
"The Trademark Right: Consumer Protection or Monopoly", 72 TMR 233 (1982) acknowledges that
trade mark law is often the only efficient way of consumer protection. V. MANGINI in "Competition
and Monopoly in Trademark Law: An EEC Perspective", 11 IIC 591 (1980), at 610-612 accepts the
dual character and pinpoints the patchy attitude of the ECJ, which in early 1980 cases was indirectly
addressing the question. CORNISH (1989) accepts that there is almost always a quality function and
claims, at 50, that "... modern trademark systems have rarely done much to ensure that the mark must
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to the product at least in five interacting ways: it may become the pivotal reason for
buying a product, it allows the marketer and consumer to differentiate between products,
it allows the charging of price premiums, it facilitates distribution, and it facilitates the
exploitation of new markets by introducing brand extensions.' 49 Again, perceived
quality can be a double edged weapon; its loss can turn out to be irreversible. A telling
example is the US beer wars where Schlitz lost much of its market shares in parallel
with a growing image problem; the process was initiated by a simple change of the
methods of transport and proved irreversible despite the later "correction" of the
product. It was in the context of this marketing war that the president of rival Anheuser-
Busch said that:
"[o]ur competition has changed their ingredients and processes in a quest for
higher profits and a greater return on investment. But when it comes to quality
you can only fool the consumer for a short time. Consequently, we chose to let
guarantee a standard of quality". But there are also extreme cases such as F.K. BEIER & U.
KRJEGER in "Wirtschaftliche Bedeutung, Functionen und Zweck der Marke", 3 GRUR mt. 125
(1976), where, at 127, they disapprove the focusing on quality, on the basis of a potential
transformation of a true trade mark to a certification mark, something that does not necessarily follow
from their argumentation. Earlier F.K. BEIER, in "Territoriality of Trademark Law and International
Trade", 1 IIC 45 (1970) at 66 has accepted that the quality function of a mark guarantees only "... a
constant source of origin". In a more recent comment A.R. MARTINO & W. ULLAH, "The Role of
the Trademark", 134 Solicitors Journal 646 (1990) at 647 and "The Quality Guarantee Function of
Trade Marks: An Economic Viewpoint", [1989] EIPR 267, at 268, reject as "rubbish" what has been
written in support of the distinction between origin and quality function, and they focus on trade
marks as conveyors of information; nevertheless they ignore the fact that trade marks can be
persuasive in our consuming decisions and overlook the assymetries in information to get back to
square one of trade marks as indicators of origin. The author is sympathetic to their view on the
informative value, but would characterise their obsession with origin as anachronistic, at least.
Finally it is submitted that the most pragmatic opinion was expressed by A.C. EVANS in "Trade
Marks and Consumer Interests in EEC Law", 32 International Comparative Law Quarterly 241
(1983), at 241 where it is admitted that the justification of trade marks legislation seems to be the
avoidance of consumers confusion, "... however, . . . [highly advertised] marks are treated as the
property of individual undertakings, and existing law is designed to enable the owner to safeguard
the reputation which he seeks to develop for his mark through investment in advertising and other
efforts on his part". As to the judicial UK approach contrast three passing off cases. In Revlon v.
Cripps & Lee [1980] FSR 85, the two products were genuine and, importantly, similar as to quality,
so they were allowed to coexist in the market. The court concentrated in the absence of confusion. in
Spalding v. Gamage [1915] RPC 273 (H.L.), the court distinguished between genuine but inferior in
quality goods which were expressly withdrawn by the manufacturer and genuine goods of the usual
quality. In Colgate Palmolive Ltd v. Markwell Finance Ltd [1988] RPC 283, Falconer J. was
reluctant to lift the corporate veil when the products were genuine, on the basis of Revlon, but of
different quality. Ironically a new marketing product and technique allows Colgate to move away
from fluoride and silica abrasives - the distinguishing quality factors of the case - to the more
traditional ingredient of baking soda; could chalk be the next trendy abrasive? See N. TAIT & K.
ZAGOR, "Brushing up Tradition", Financial Times, May 13, 1993.
See AAKER (1991) at 87-88.
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our earnings decline rather than lessen our quality. After all, we are in the
business for the long term".'5°
In this "naïve" 5 ' psychological approach towards consumer behaviour, consumers
regard trade marks as qualities' predictors; they instinctively turn to the names that have
satisfied them in the past and avoid to buy products that failed to do so.' 52 This pattern
would be easy to understand as long as satisfaction is directly related to personal taste or
objective quality criteria. The choice of coffee, for example, can be based on the
blended varieties of its composition, and this is a matter of taste even when taste is
capricious or based on fashion On the other hand the nature and quantity of
ingredients, including features or services provided with the product, and conformance
to specifications could be objective quality criteria if they could be verified without
undue costs and efforts.IM Complications arise with quality assertions that incorporate
factors like search costs and risk aversion.
Quality is only one of a bundle of product characteristics and is directly linked to the
price that each consumer is willing to pay for her/his "total" optimum of characteristics.
Quality expectations will vary according to ability to pay and willingness to take quality
risks' 55 ; different levels of quality have to exist in a market that caters for more than one
150 For the full story see AAKER ibid at 78-84. Beer lovers, though, must keep in mind that it was
Anheuser-Busch that tried to keep off the markets the, superior in quality and original in name,
Czech Budweiser beer, for the case in England see Anheuser-Bush v. Budejovicky Budwar [1984]
FSR 413. Thus the, ever since much used, phrase of August Busch on consumer deception must
always be read, especially by beer lovers, with some mistrust, if not, disbelief.
'' This incorporates the obvious meaning but also that given by F. HEIDER in The Psychology of
Interpersonal Relations (New York, Wiley, 1958), presented by MONACO & KAISER in HARRIS
(ed.) (1983) at 266, as "... the knowledge of behaviour that has accumulated over the past two
thousand or more years and has been recorded, informally, in our literature".
152 Consumers regard past experience as a predictor for their current choices: P. NELSON, "The
Economic Consequences of Advertising", 48 Journal of Business 213 (1975) at 213.
153 We can borrow the expressive title of G.J. STIGLER & G.S. BECKER, "De Gustibus Non Est
Disputandum", 67 American Economic Review 76 (1977); they claim that tastes are more stable than
we think, since they simply disguise other more rational influences on our behaviour.
' See AAKER (1991), at 85 where he distinguishes between: perceived quality, as a perception by
customers; actual or objective quality, as the extent to which the product or service delivers superior
service; product-based quality, as the nature and quantity of ingredients, features or services
included; and fmally manufacturing quality, as conformance to specification, the "zero defect" goal.
See ECONOMIDES (1988) and K. LANCASTER, "Socially Optimal Product Differentiation", 65
American Economic Review 567 (1975) at 567-568.
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levels of income and needs' patterns. Competition and universal product standards are
incompatible; the setting of a central authority which would detennine the socially
desirable variations of qualities and prices and the optimal allocations of consumers'
goods is much too utopian to develop.' 56 This, of course, does not mean that there will
be no minimum standards of merchantability. An individual may be willing to take the
risk of buying a cheap and defective car but the cost of defectiveness will spread to
others, so the state provided for a certificate of road-worthiness and a car can only be
put in the public roads together with the certificate.
So marketers inevitably market products with diverse characteristics, quality levels and
prices and the consumer will have no fear to lose under the condition that s/he is
adequately informed.' 57 Evidence of acceptance of the quality assurance function on
behalf of marketers is the pressure exercised for the expansion of passing off or the
introduction of an anti-dilution rationale in trade mark protection that will override the
need to prove confusion. 158 An interesting historical note, though, illustrates the strained
156 D.D. FRIEDMAN, in The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism (LaSalle, Open
Court, 1989), is making at 44 a nice contrast between government monopoly and consumer
protection. He is claiming that consumers whose "... relationship to the industry is a very small part
of their lives, will never know what prices they would have been paying if there were no regulation".
Well none would be willing to pay the price of her/his liberty for total regulation apart from those
who would control it, but the argument that regulation is often defective is not an argument against
regulation itself. See the reply to this extreme "Chicago school" view, by S. BROBECK, "Economic
Deregulation and the Least Affluent: Consumer Protection Strategies", 47 Journal of Social Issues
169 (1991): at 186 it is concluded that "... in [banking, telephone, and natural gas] industries,
deregulation markedly reallocated costs to low-income households, significantly increasing related
expenditures as a proportion of their incomes". These groups were not able to avoid rising prices or
benefit from the lowering prices from some of the services provided.
R. DORFMAN & P.O. STEINER, "Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality", 44 American
Economic Review 826 (1954), at 830-83 1.
' For the original introduction of trade mark dilution see SCHECHTER (1929); for a comparative
survey of dilution theories see F.W. MOSTERT, "Trademark Dilution and Confusion of Sponsorship
in US, German and English Law", 16 IIC 80 (1986). For two opposing views see M.W. HANDLER,
"Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible With the National Protection of Trademarks?", 75
TMR 269 (1985), arguing for the disastrous potential of an antidilution statute, and B.W.
PATTISHALL, "Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark - Trade Identity
Protection", 74 TMR 289 (1984), arguing for the need to protect distinctive trade marks from being
used on non-competing products, because of their fame and quality connotations. For the median
view, see J.E. MOSKIN, "Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection", 83
TMR 122 (1993), where both opposing theories for the rationale for protection are presented but it is
submitted that the widening of what constitutes an infringing act already covers the essential basis of
a dilution theory. T. MARTINO in Trademark Dilution (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) argues at
82-85 that the danger of dilution theory is not that it calls for too wide protection - "a zone of
exclusivity" - but that it would accord too much protection for too many marks. At 84 he suggests
that "it would be more efficient simply to classify marks by distinctiveness and to make classification
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balances between conflicting interests and proves the unpredictability of the direction of
legislators' next moves on the question. In October 1987, in the US Senate the dropping
of anti-dilution doctrine was offered as a trade-off for dropping a "consumer rights"
provision which would amend s.43(a) of the Lanham Act, to allow individual
consumers to file federal court actions based on false and deceptive advertising.
Although they essentially form two sides of the same coin, "consumer rights" have been
characterised as the Armageddon of dilution, at the time.' 59 Dilution came back in 1995
and this time became part of the Lanham Act. The owner of a famous mark will be
entitled to protection against use of her/his mark if such use begins after the mark has
become famous and "causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark".° The
consumer however is again a passive participant in the action.
In a neutral environment the consumer can be perceived as an active utility maximiser,
engaged in production and investment activities. Perfectly informed, exchanges in the
market the commodities s/he produces, with her/his skill, training, capital, etc., with the
commodities s/he desires to consume.' 61 There is no imbalance between seller and buyer
(more or less) determinative of the availability of dilution relief'. He classifies marks as coined and
arbitrary, suggestive, and descriptive. It is noted here that this lolc is becoming increasingly
popular; Neil Wilkoff has suggested in a talk he gave at Queen Mary and Westfield College in 1995
that trade mark protection should primarily be accorded to newly created marks. Both use a Lockeian
justification to support their similar positions. See N. WILKOF, "The Decline of Likelihood of
Confusion: Of Broomheads and March Madness" [1998] Ent. L. R. 34 for a case comment expanding
on the balance between likelihood of confusion and property rights as the bases for trade mark
protection.
159 See J. GILSON, "A Federal Dilution Statute: Is it Time?", 83 TMR 108 (1993), at 115. At 115-116 it
has been successfully predicted that the momentum for dilution was surging again.
° According to the new subsection (c)(1) of section (43) of the Lanham Act. Of course there are
qualifications: distinctiveness and fame is related to the degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness, the duration and extent of use, the channels of trade, parallel coexisting use of the
same or similar marks by third parties and so on; comparative advertising, non commercial use, and
use in news reporting is not deemed to be infringing. For a critical approach, due to the confusing use
of terms (distinctiveness and fame for example), see M.S. SOMMERS, "The New US Trademark
Dilution Act: Problems Lurking?", Trademark World, February 1996, 16. The final, prior to the
introduction of the doctrine, discussion was made by J.A. GARCIA, "Trademark Dilution:
Eliminating Confusion", 85 TMR 489 (1995) and K.L. PORT, "The "Unnatural" Expansion of
Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?" 85 TMR 525 (1995). The adoption of
the dilution rationale is evidence of moving away from an "information" justification towards an
"asset" justification of a trade mark protection system.
161 For a formal development of this trade-theory version of a consumer choice theory see STIGLER &
BECKER (1977), at 77.
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since everyone is equally involved in the quest for the best sale or buy.' 62 The message
conveyed, by the trade mark, from the marketer will be of a product of A quality at Al
price and the reply will indicate the willingness or not of the consumer to pay the Al
price. The value of this communication system for the marketer should, in theory,
suffice as an incentive to persist on her/his initial level of quality, if not to improve it.'63
By definition markets are not yet neutral or in conditions of perfect competition, and in
the case of trade marks we apprehend this, without having to refer to the ethics of the
markets,' 64 by underlining the possibility of failures and non neutrality in three aspects.
First it can be empirically shown that the imbalances on information controlled and
conveyed by the trade mark owner are immense when compared with the information
that can be digested even by the most sophisticated consumer. Nobody can understand
and, most importantly, test the qualities of credence products, because we lack the
knowledge, the facilities and the time to do so. Therefore since we do not, yet, live in
economies where transaction costs are infinitesimal, we cannot but trust the information
conveyed to us by the producer and hope that states' regulations are enforced.'65
162 
"A market is an arrangement by which buyers and sellers of a commodity interact to determine its
price and quantity": P.A. SAMUELSON & W.D. NORDHAUS, Economics (New York, McGraw-
Hill, 1989), at 39.
163 w• LANDES & R. POSNER, "Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective", 30 Journal of Law &
Economics 265 (1987), at 275-280 and C. SHAPIRO, "Premiums for High Quality Products as
Returns to Reputations", 98 Quarterly Journal of Economics 659 (1983). For the legislator's similar
argument see the White Paper: Reform of Trade Marks Law, (London, HMSO, 1990), at 25-26, and
for a judicial illustration, Anti-Monopoly Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group 204 USPQ 978 (9th Cir.
1979), at 982. "... used as a means of identifying the trademark owner's products, a trademark makes
effective competition possible in a complex, impersonal market-place by providing a means through
which the consumer can identify products which please him and reward the producer with continued
patronage".
F.!. SCHECHTER's views on the fairness of trade are given through a reference to a dialogue
between R. Stevenson and a royal trader of the south seas. The trader classified the people he had
done business with under three headings: "He cheat a litty" - "He cheat a plenty" - and "I think he
cheat too much". He could easily tolerate the first two categories: "Trade Morals and Regulation", 6
Fordham Law. Review 190 (1937), at 210. For a contemporary comment see S. BRITTAN, "How
Economics is Linked to Ethics", Financial Times, September 2, 1993, there it is put forward that,
despite the cries and attempts to establish "a social responsibility of business", it would be utopian to
expect "socially responsible companies" to carry the load of public policy. See also A.
KAMPERMAN SANDERS, Unfair Competition and Ethics, in L. BENTLY & S.M. MANIATIS
(eds), Perspectives on Intellectual Property (Volume 4), Intellectual Property and Ethics (London,
Sweet & Maxwell, 1998).
165 See A. ETZIONI, The Moral Dimension. Toward a New Economics (New York, Free Press, 1988).
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Second trade mark law and passing off or unfair competition are part of the weaponry
that the competing marketers use in their battle to expand their market positions. Behind
vigorous campaigns of trade mark enforcement often the motive is an
"... insidious and anti-competitive attempt to browbeat retailers into dealing only
with [their] company",'
and although we will come back to trade marks as "barriers of entry" it is noted here
that often consumer's behaviour is used as a testing field in a game where s/he cannot
directly participate. Product differentiation, for example, means for the consumer the
ability to choose and for the marketer the possibility to compete or prevent competition.
In all cases there are results on competition but the relative stances and interests are
different.
And finally, we must not overlook the advertising function of trade marks, the other side
of the guarantee role, which affects the learning process and the context of the
transaction.
In an early article on advertising it was put that, due to the laws' hermetical partitions,
by the imposition of a trade mark the marketer,
"... probably guarantees by it nothing more than his hope that the buyer will
come back for more, the term smacks strongly of the ad-man's desire to create
the illusion of a guarantee without in fact making more than the minimum
warranty of merchantable quality. This tendency is reflected in advertising of the
"Lucky Strike means fine tobacco" type. In trade name law, Lucky Strike means
a brand of cigarettes produced by the American Tobacco Co. and it may mean
cigarettes like those the smoker bought yesterday, but it is not a grade
designation or a certification mark".'67
R. COOTER & T. ULEN, in Law and Economics (Glenview, Scott, Foresman, 1988) refer to the
Coca-Cola Co.; see also J. THARP, "Raising Rivals' Costs: Of Bottlenecks, Bottled Wine, and
Bottled Soda", 84 Northwestern University Law Review 321 (1989), for the cut-throat competition in
the cola wars.
167 BROWN (1948) at 1186. Surprisingly T. MARTINO & D. LUTKIN in their paper "You Say
Confusion and I Say Dilution: Let's Call the Whole Thing Off - The Modem Functions of Trade
Marks" (London, Gamlens - W.H. Beck, 1988), at 27, use the same quotation as their main argument
to support that, "... the ascription of a guarantee function goes too far and is unsound". It may be a
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After five decades, acknowledging the ability of the consumers to learn by their
mistakes and with the benefit of hindsight, it was submitted that, modem trade mark
systems have not done much to ensure that the mark guarantees a standard or quality,
however much the consumer's expectations are aroused by previous purchases of goods
bearing the mark;' 68 in addition, consumer's expectations may be aroused even more by
the advertising associations of trade marks.
4.4. Trade marks: advertising symbols
"Start work in an agency and the first thing they teach you is the difference
between a product and a brand. This is because it is advertising's job to change
one into the other. Brands are products with something extra. All brands are
products, but not all products are brands, and the difference is advertising. That
extra is called added value."69
"[Advertising's] field of competence is so diversified and branching, that it
forms a social network which enervates media, economics, cultures, political and
civil society, international relations. Networks of networks, these systems of
connection regulate the relations between individuals and groups. The so-called
communications society chases the so-called consumer society. We must
therefore examine this essential change which provokes a whole cascade of
mutations and redefinitions in the practice of democracy."7°
4.4.1. Trade marks and advertising
The first, obvious, thing that has to be said about the role of trade marks in advertising is
that they make advertising possible. A trader could put in the market unmarked goods
but s/he could not advertise them without referring to a common point of understanding,
because in order to advertise, the marketer is addressing the human mind as a "symbol
legal nicety but why do we expect any sane person to stand by his claims and promises and at the
same time so easily recognise to the ad-man the right to create illusions?
168 CORNISH & PHILIPS (1982), at 50.
169 M.P. DAVIDSON, The Consumerist Manifesto - Advertising in Postmodern Times (London,
Routledge, 1992), at 23.
170 A. MATTELART, Advertising International: The Privatisation of Public Space (London, Routledge,
1991), at ix-x.
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manipulator". The consumer hearing or seeing ads is doing nothing more than to
process information, organising and interpreting pictorial and verbal messages,' 7 ' and
trade marks are probably the most important of the symbols that are to be interpreted.
A second fundamental way that trade mark protection transforms advertising is by
allowing advertising to perform the transfer of one and only message, and accordingly
making advertising more effective. If a second additional theme is introduced the effect
of advertising will be greatly reduced and advertising will simply contribute "noise" to
the communications system and
"... for this reason ... as long as advertising had the task of linking a Mark to its
maker in the mind of the public, it could never have developed as it did.
Consumers today will know the "selling propositions" or the "images" of
countless products, but they will not know who makes them. The difference is
due to Trade Mark registration, which transforms the function of advertising".'72
Therefore some advertising campaigns may seem complicated and abstract but they aim
first to build brand awareness along defined lines and only then introduce particular
products, especially in markets characterised by over-capacity and increased
Competition.'73
Advertising messages are broadly classified under two categories. They coincide with a
general positive or negative stance towards advertising, but this has more to do with our
ideological biases than concrete economic or social research. In the first we include the
informative messages on the characteristics, prices, etc. of a product. A necessary
precondition is that the message conveyed is true, otherwise we are dealing with
171 HARRIS (1983), at 5 of his introduction. See also R. GOLDMAN, "Reading Ads Socially" (London,
Routledge, 1992), at 5-8. At 5, it is suggested that "... when we recognize an advertisement as such,
we recognize a framework or a context within which meanings are rearranged so that exchanges of
meaning can take place". Thus, trade marks provide the fundamental framework of advertising.
Finally see, T. VESTERGAARD & K. SCHRODER., The Language of Advertising (Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, 1985), at 13-49, on the verbal and visual message of advertising.
172 W. KINGSTON, The Political Economy of Innovation (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), at 68,
and for his full discussion of the matter see the chapter on the legal roots of innovation, at 77-120.
173 This is the tactic adopted by Allied Dunbar for an advertising campaign in the retail financial services
sector a market abundant of participants and suffering from negative publicity.
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misinformation, persuasion and unfair competition.' 74 The second comprises the
persuasive messages of advertising that transform the product by adding to it an external
appeal. They target the psychology of the consumer and although they are not
necessarily untrue they do not contain information that is relevant to the consumer's
cognitive behaviour.'75
Down-playing advertising's social role and effectiveness is the familiar mantra of the
industry that insists that
"... the fact of the matter is that we are successful in selling good products and
unsuccessful in selling poor ones. In the end consumer satisfaction - or lack of it
- is more powerful than all our tools and ingenuity put together. The economics
of the marketplace insist that an advertiser must satisfy the consumer - that is,
get repeat purchases - or fail".'76
As always, the truth is somewhere in the middle ground: advertising is part information,
part persuasion, and sometimes partly irrelevant.' 77 Its purpose is, not to inform buyers
in a "... purely cognitive, unbiased sense", but to sell goods by influencing buyers, 178 and
this view accords with the popular understanding that often advertising persuades
people to buy things that, rationally, they should not buy.'79
' 
"Since the dawn of advertising, claims were supposed to be truthful": S. LIEBERMAN, "The New
World of Claim Substantiation and Claim Substantiation Research" (New York, American Marketing
Ass., 1979), at 1, as cited by A. GARFINGEL, A Pragmatic Approach to Truth in Advertising, in
HARRIS (ed.) (1983) at 175. See also P. NELSON, "Advertising as Information", 82 Journal of
Political Economy 729 (1974).
'" For a strong opposition to the professional persuaders see PACKARD (1957).
176 A. SEEMAN, testif'ing before the US Federal Trade Commission in 1971, as quoted by WILLIAM,
KLINE &. JHALLY (1990), at 35. At 33-42 they offer a good review of positions defending
advertising.
' Illustrating the point people may buy a product, influenced by an advertisement, although they do not
necessarily believe the entirety of what is advertised because: "... [a] The disputed claims are
irrelevant to the consumer's wants. [b] A less exaggerated form of the claim - enough to stimulate
purchase is believed. [c] The purchase involves little risk or potential regret and the consumer
believes he or she should give the product a try": O'SAUGHNESSY (1987) at 20.
' GREER (1980), at 72.
179 In a research conducted by R.A. BAUIER & S.A. GREYSER in, Advertising in America: The
Consumer View (Boston, Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), at 175-183, 73% of the respondents reached
this conclusion: cited by GREER (1980) at 72. Interestingly the views of supporters and opponents of
advertising coincide as to the relevance of such surveys. See PACKARD (1957) and BORK (1978)
underlining the fact that it is always other consumers and never oneself that are dazzled, etc. See also
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Advertisers and marketers tend to view
"... advertising as a potential generator of sales and profits",
whereas the interest of economists, consumer groups and policy makers falls in
"... broader and perhaps longer-term impacts of advertising and its economic and
social implications".'80
Tobacco advertising and its regulation in Britain is a good example. On the one hand
officials argue that a statutory ban of advertising would not have a dramatic effect on
reducing smoking, especially in comparison with the impact of measures such as high
taxes on tobacco or parental influence. But health campaigners point to experience in
Canada and Norway that showed a drop of 4% to 9%, following a total ban on
advertising. 18 ' For the moment advertisers are the only gainers, since they keep the
tobacco market and also share a part in anti-smoking campaigns.
The role of trade marks in advertising is contained in the definition of a branded product
as a product that provides functional benefits, on the one hand, and some added values,
that the consumers value enough to buy, on the other. The added values stem from
experience of the brand, from the sorts of people that use the brand, from the belief that
the brand is effective and finally from the appearance of the brand.' 82 Functional
benefits and previous experiences of the brand fall predominantly within the informative
an interview with an advertising executive in LEISS, KLINE & JHALLY (1990), at 37 who states
that "... the task of most advertising is to keep the product on the market or increase its share from
someone else. This is share - oriented advertising, pushing brands. Most, even for tobacco, is brand
oriented - it doesn't make people smoke". However there is contradicting research assessing that
advertising can at least restructure the markets: consumers for example turned from cigar and pipe to
cigarettes and among them a larger proportion is women, since advertising broke down traditional
taboos. For more references on tobacco advertising see KAMPERMAN SANDERS & MANIATIS
(1997).
180 The balanced view belongs to M.S. ALBION & P.W. FARRIS, in The Advertising Controversy
(Boston, Auburn House, 1981), at x.
' See D. SUMMERS & K. BROWN, "Tougher Tobacco Advertising Rules Rejected", Financial
Times, February 8, 1994.
182 J.P. JONES, What's in a Name? Advertising and the Concept of Brands (Lexington, Lexington
Books, 1986) at 29.
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role of advertising. Associations with other users are part of the persuasive function and
beliefs on effectiveness and appearance are somewhere in the grey area.'83
Probably, it is fair to say that advertising is always informative and persuasive at the
same time. To be effective advertising messages must leave traceable memories, and to
do that advertisers have to address the psychology of the consumer. So even
predominantly informative messages must be carried through persuasive slogans with
multiple meanings and trade marks are often chosen for their persuasive associations.184
But before we turn to the role of trade marks in each occasion we have to turn to the
symbolic value of goods which is partly the result of advertising, but at the same time
provides some of the associations that advertising needs to become effective. Branded
goods stem from the factory without the symbolic value that they gain in a process in
which advertising makes the product a communicator because humans "... endow
objects with certain meaningful properties".'85
183 Turning back to our product differentiating factors it has been proven that advertising is lowest (0,4%
of sales) for search goods and highest (5% of sales) for long-term experience goods. It seems rational
since the consumer does not expect much information for search goods. In the latter case the message
conveyed by the advertiser is twofold: first of superior quality and second of the marketer's
commitment to keep the highly advertised product for a long period in the market. The research is
inconclusive for the case of goods where experience is of little value. For short-term experience
goods the advertising technique of celebrity endorsing simply means to the consumer that the product
will exist in the market for a long time, otherwise Coca-Cola and Pepsi would not spent millions for
the endorsement of Elton John and Michael Jackson respectively. See the results of a research by E.
DAVIS, J. KAY & J. STAR, "Is Advertising Rational?", [1991] Business Strategy Review (Vol. 2:3)
1. R. Enrico, president of Pepsi-Cola at the time that they enroled the Jacksons support, as reported
by D. SUMMERS in "Dangerous Liaisons", Financial Times, November 18, 1993: "... I've had them
checked out. The reports came back sterling. These people haven't been near alcohol, much less
drugs. They're very religious. Very family - oriented. They're not political. I see very little chance of
embarrassment for us here". The fact that, despite various such relations turned nasty, people from
the industry are willing to pay more and more for a celebrity endorsement might be proof of the
correctness of the views of the above mentioned authors.
184 Advertisers will use ambiguities, repetitions, contrasts etc. In this process trade marks can become
parts of slogans - Canderel, Ca ne change rien, et c'est ca qui change tout! (French advert cited at
136-137, in B. GRUNIG, Les Mots de la Publicité (Paris, CNRS, 1990) - or slogans can become
trade marks and then used as slogans again - I Can't Believe It's Not Butter - a controversial UK
campaign, is such an example.
185 G. McCRACKEN & R. POLLAY, Anthropology and the Study of Advertising (Unpublished Paper
of the University of British Columbia, 1981), at 2, cited by S. JII-IALLY, in The Codes of Advertising
(London, Routledge, 1990), at 11.
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4.4.2. Communication and the symbolic value of branded goods
"The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we
purchase goods by them."86
This judicial definition of trade marks allows us to turn back to the function of symbols.
Only that now the symbols are the marked products themselves, and, to use a celebrated
phrase, we are asked to
"... forget that commodities are good for eating, clothing and shelter; forget their
usefulness and try instead the idea that commodities are good for thinking; treat
them as a non-verbal medium for the human creative faculty".'87
"If the connection between the product and the "objective correlative" person or
thing is made by us and in us, it is also made with us, in that we become one of
the things exchanged (given the status of an object) ... There are two axes along
which the product "means": there is the process of its gaining meaning, in a
transaction we make between signifiers (Catherine Deneuve and scent bottle, car
and cigarettes); and now it appears to have a second replacement value: it
replaces, hence signifies us."88
186 Frankfurter J., in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co. 316 US 203 (1942), at
205, 53 USPQ 323 (1942).
187 M. DOUGLAS & B. ISHERWOOD, The World of Goods (New York, Norton, 1979), at 62. At 57
they assert that all material possessions carry "... social meanings".
188 WILLIAMSON (1978) at 45. Put otherwise "[t]raditional morality only required that the individual
conform to the group; advertising "philosophy" requires that they now conform to themselves": J.
BAUDRILLARD, Selected Writings (Cambridge, Polity, 1988) at 13. See also P. LAAKSONEN,
Consumer Involvement (London, Routledge, 1994); at 169-170, in concluding, he diffrentiates
between a "possession system" and a "usage system". "It is at the level of the possession system that
the cultural meanings of a product are created and maintained with the help of possession and
activities related to it. The culturally or subculturally shared meanings can provide a person with the
possiblity of using products as signs of self and also as contributors of self. They can also be used as
signs and strengthenrs of social relationships and as mediators of cultural principles. The personality,
status creating and expressive role of products are facilitated through their ownership, through the
possession of capabilities related to them and also through undertaking possession-related rituals. The
usage system, on the other hand, produces a more concrete type of interaction. It consists of
elements that are organized in the course of time, namely the benefits and risks associated with a
product, and the physical and social characteristics of the behavioural setting surrounding purchase
and consumption. The functioning of this subsystem creates the usage patterns of a product."
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It is widely recognised that objects of property and consumer goods in particular have a
symbolic value that goes beyond utility, wealth or power.' 89 The ephemeral nature of
consumer goods makes them'9° particularly apt to act simultaneously as satisfiers of
human needs and communicators of messages about social standing, ideas and power.
The messages and the means to convey them keep on changing continuously, in a
society that is radically mobile,' 9 ' but marketing and advertising provide the means to
verbalise and image the meanings of things and facilitate the exchange of these
messages.
A good example of this function, that goes beyond consumer goods, is the importance
of the marks in the education field. Oxford and Cambridge can be seen as marks for
providing educational services and Oxbridge' 93 as a "trade mark" or "sign" that evokes
associations of an upper class but at the same creates a class of its own which may or
may not transcend the socio-economic boundaries.' 94 Returning to a less controversial
case of consumer goods we can refer to the marketing strategy of Cartier, the well
known producers of luxury goods. They applied the same mark to a more affordable line
of products. The status of the mark, the quality expectations and the kudos assigned to
189 s EWEN in Advertising and the Development of Consumer Society, in I.H. ANGUS & S. IHALLY
(eds), Cultural Politics in Contemporary America (London, Routledge, 1989), at 82, attributes to
some products the signification of how people achieve financial, professional or personal power over
others, in other terms, "... the equation for success".
190 For two further challenging views see also M. SAHLINS, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1976), arguing that modem society uses consumer products to substitute
animals and plants in their primitive totemistic function and their associations with humans and J.
BAUDRILLARD, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, in Selected Writings
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988), who links semiology and economy and argues that the use value of
goods is almost irrelevant. The introduction of JHALLY (1990) at 1-24 provides a thorough review
of the literature on people and things.
'' See M. McLUHAN, Understanding Media, The Extensions of Man (London, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1964), developing at 7-21 and 226-233, the idea that the medium is the message.
LEISS, KLINE & IHALLY (1990) at 309.
193 Oxbridge of course to the cognoscenti "... is a term freely used by journalists; those who know
Oxford and Cambridge from the inside are more impressed by the fact that they do most things
differently". M. BELOFF, '"'Oxbridge" Does Not Exist", Book Review, The Times Higher
Education Supplement, June 24, 1994.
194 See the discussion on the promotional university of A. WERNING, in Promotional Culture:
Advertising and Ideology in Late Capitalism (London, Sage, 1991), at 154 onwards. For the
American equivalent of a ruling class that may be "... Yale all the way" and the importance of
University education see P. FUSSELL, Caste Marks (Heinemann, London, 1984) at 128-142. The
book provides further illustrations of what consumer products American classes "must" consume.
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owners of Cartier items made their new line very popular, at the same time their careful
marketing strategy enabled them to hold on to their niche in the market of luxury
goods.'95
Trade marks acquired a commercial magnetism which not only corresponds with but
surpasses the quality expectations, since most of the buyers of luxury goods will dress
up the overwhelmingly attractive power of the famous name with arguments about
quality etc. Whether the law should protect the snob value of a trade mark depends on
the social evaluations of a society at a given time. However it is worth adding here an
American judicial dialogue as composed by McCarthy.'96
Judge Learned Hand stated that,
"... if buyers wish to be snobs, the law will protect them in their snobbery".197
But Judge Jerome Frank expressed doubt that this should be the purpose of the law by
saying:
"[n]on-economic snobbish desires of consumers ... and the satisfaction of their
desires engendered by ignorance have been said to be entitled to judicial
protection, at least in the Federal Trade Commission cases ... It is perhaps not
inappropriate to ask whether snobbism and catering to ignorance are important
social interests deserving governmental assistance."98
These trade marks attract not only consumers but also other traders who want to apply
the same or a similar mark on non competing goods, often of lower quality.'
For every story of success there is a failure and a line of followers. Dior, once an exclusive brand
name, followed a policy of indiscriminate licensing, and exhausted all too easily its name appeal.
Valentino and Armani are expanding to cheaper markets following the practice established
successfully be Cartier; see "The Luxury Goods Trade: Upmarket Philosophy", The Economist,
December 26, 1992.
' McCARTHY (1984), at 95.
197 In Benton Announcements, Inc. v Federal Trade Commission 130 F2d 254 (2d Cir. 1942).
' StandardBrands, Inc. v Smidler 151 F2d 34, 66 USPQ 337 (2d Cir. 1945).
' Then the game for trade mark protection changes and is called dilution or unfair competition.
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At the same time marks may serve as signposts for political or social consumer
statements,20° and may be used to further differentiate products. 20 ' The controversy on
the eco-qualities of Body Shop 202 combined with their advertising campaigns that
concentrate on ecology and fair trade with developing countries became relevant to a
wide class of consumers that are becoming more conscious on environmental and
development issues.203
At the same time, companies are making their own views on current issues known
through advertising, either because companies, in a new social environment, have
become so powerful and extrovert that they are getting explicitly and directly involved
into the political game, setting trends in all aspects of societal life, or simply because
such statements are worthy marketing tools. Benetton, a clothes manufacturer, for
example, is using the company's standing on current political and social issues to
200 Or consumer signifiers; Labour modernisers have identified as their political target, the man with a
"huge BMW in his driveway", as reported by J. KAMPFNER, "Even the BMW Owner is Welcome",
Financial Times, October 3, 1995.
201 See P. KNIGHT, "A Rebel Among the Copycats", Financial Times, November 3, 1993, for examples
of the Japanese initiative to flood the markets with green products. Ecosys, a printer that is slower,
more expensive and with a lower density of print from its competitors is being differentiated on the
basis of its long lasting, and thus environmentally friendly, cartridge, and is a pioneer amongst such
products. Even if this marketing strategy fails Ecosys is putting pressure on other manufacturers to
follow by marketing re-engineered cartridges and take back schemes. In the longer term Kyocera, the
manufacturers of Ecosys, had to adapt their strategy, and iconoclastic approach to the market,
stressing, this time, their lower costs per printed page rather than environmental credentials. A.
CANE, "Putting Price Before Conscience", Financial Times, September 1, 1994.
202 What is "ecologically" correct today and advertised as such may of course be not so tomorrow.
Phosphate detergents were banned and advertising campaigns of phosphate free detergents were built
based on their ecological credits, but as new research shows there is no environmental reason for
such differentiation; see D. GREEN, "Errors in the Name of Ecology", Financial Times, January 26,
1994. Nevertheless the effects of advertising will remain.
203 See B. HARRISON, "Fashions in Green", Financial Times, June 9, 1993, where the attraction
towards eco-clothing is described. Nevertheless, the potential for exploitation remains huge since
only 150 - and from those 150 only a very small number was dealing with foodstuffs and consumer
goods - out of 40,000 multinationals had published environmental reports, ranging, in the absence of
any regulation, from few genuine attempts to inform environmental groups, share holders and
customers, to management feel good exercises aiming to appease rather than inform the public; see P.
KNIGHT, "The Advantages of Coming Clean", Financial Times, January 12, 1994. Note that
according to an NOP poil for Christian Aid, conducted in October 1993, 68% of 1,000 adults
surveyed said they would be willing to pay more for products that guaranteed a fair return to farmers
and workers in the Third World; the average amount that consumers were prepared to pay was 25p
on an item that normally costs lp.: D. HARGREA YES, "The Cost of a Fair Deal", Financial Times,
March 17, 1994.
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advertise the brand name without any direct reference to Benetton products.204
Benetton's entire output is produced in Italy, by manufacturers closely linked with the
parent company and then marketed world wide via a complex global sales and
distribution network. 205 The company needs a strong brand image and therefore perceive
their advertising campaigns as "... a long term intangible investment", 206 the value of
which is multiplied in analogy with the publicity they get.
Accordingly it is argued that:
"[e]xpanded sales and control of market shares are not the only agendas at stake
in corporate advertising. Corporations also seek popular legitimacy by joining
cherished values and social relations to their corporate images. Corporate ads
present the virtues of "consumer freedom" as synonymous with "democracy".
Advertisers seek to bolster corporate legitimacy by linking their images to
institutions that represent the social idea, say the family. When ads reframe and
position our meaningful relations and discourses to accommodate the meaning
of their corporate interests, then, advertising intervenes as a potent political
institution in mediating meanings of freedom, individuality, work and leisure,
community and family life."207
Brands also become the images of wider political and social standings. The
"Britishness" or not of Rover under BMW ownership became a heatedly debated
question on the basis of nationalistic feelings and dispassionate economics: could the
Mini ever become German?208 Note that BMW's chairman has accepted that "... others
204 Birth, race, gender, sickness have all been part in campaigns that used poignant photographs that can
tell a story and a message at the same time. See "More Controversy, Please, We'Re Italian", The
Economist 70, February 1, 1992.
205 See P. DICKEN, Global Shift (London, Paul Chapman, 1992), at 261.
206 Words of a Benetton spokeswoman, on the latest campaign depicting the blooded clothes of a dead
Bosnian student, as reported by A. MITCHELL, "Benetton Blasts Another Taste Frontier", The
Times, February 16, 1994.
207 R. GOLDMAN (1992) at 85, succinctly describes a wider view of the scope of building a corporate
image.
208 It was a mix of lost nationalistic pride that made D. LAWSON, the editor of the Spectator, admit that
thinking in such terms of national champions is an "archaic analysis of the modem industrial
economy", but nevertheless accept that he was irked by the triumphalism of the German press over
the take-over of Rover, in "BMW Runs Over Heseltine's Testament", Financial Times, February 5,
1994.
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can manufacture minicars, but only Rover can manufacture Minis". 209 Since Rover is a
part of Midlands industrial and social history, its future was not only a question of
economic interest but also of emotional concern, despite the fact that its role as a source
of jobs has diminished. 210 BMW, a German company, is not only taking over Rover, but
is already providing technology to Rolls Royce and will also provide it with engines and
gearboxes from the end of the century; by then another, quintessentially, English legend
will be at least 20% directly German. 21 ' The lament has already been written:
"... the globalisation of Rolls ... leaves a curious afterburn in the mouth. Since
BMW, through its newly acquired Rover subsidiary, already makes the bodies
for Rolls Royce, it means in future that a Rolls Royce car, though
quintessentially British, will be essentially German. It was the Rolls engine
which defined the car. Remember all that publicity about the hum of an engine
so quite that the only sound to be heard was the ticking of the clock? Now we
shall have to look elsewhere for the defming characteristic of a Roller, that
ethereal piece of value added which will turn a BMW body with a BMW engine
and components into the uniquely prestigious brand of a Rolls Royce. What's in
a name? That which we call a Rolls by any other name would sell as fair".212
Even the absence of a branded product from a national market can become a symbol of
nationalistic pride: India's Cokelessness, from 1977 to 1994, is an illustration of its
political history. Coke was banned as an "imperialistic" drink, gradually people became
proud of their indigenous refreshments - Thums-Up, Double Seven, and Campa Cola -
209 B. Pischetsrieder, as reported by K. DONE, "BMW Chief Enthusiastic About Future of the Mini",
Financial Times, February 2, 1994.
210 See P. CHEESERIGHT, "Emotion Versus Analysis", Financial Times, February 1, 1994.
211 c BARRJE, "Germans to Be the Power Behind Rolls", The Guardian, December 20, 1994.
212 From "Roll Out the Roller", Comment, The Guardian, December 20, 1994. In the more heartening
analysis of K. EASON, "A Marriage Made in Munich", we learn that Rolls Royce has never been shy
of foreign suitors, and that, as Sir Cohn Chandler, Vickers' chief executive, pointed out: "Henry
Royce said that if something has already been designed and it is good, then take it and put it to good
use. That is what we are doing with BMW. People who buy Rolls Royce cars will still get the style,
quality, luxury and systems engineering which makes the cars unique. That does not change." Fine,
but would not people be tempted to buy the real thing, a BMW? In the latest developments in the
battle between Volkswagen and BMW, Rolls Royce was seen partly as a brand allowing the
competing German car manufacturers to move in the market for exclusive luxury cars and partly as a
company providing expertise in almost custom made cars that they have not developed; the
controversy on ownership of the name on the one hand and the undertakings of both companies to
invest in the existing UK plants on the other are evidence of this interaction. The final result seems to
be that Volkswagen bought the Rolls Royce plant but can only produce Bentleys whereas BMW lost
the plant but acquired the brand and can now market Rolls Royce cars.
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and finally when the time came for Coca Cola to be re-allowed in the market, evidence
of a liberal economic climate, this was heralded as India's return to the world of free
enterprise.213
All these are examples of products which are consumed - or boycotted - partly because
they are indicators of our tendencies, social aspirations, political values, fashion
statements and so on.
Advertising techniques have developed so as to accommodate the symbolic value of the
trade mark. If possession of certain goods on the one hand and the style of their
consumption214 on the other are ascribing social positions then advertisers will exploit
the symbolic value of the marks of these goods to stimulate prospective customers by
transmitting a particular style of consumption and creating the feeling of instant
participation. The purchase of the marked product becomes a natural consequence for a
consumer who, psychologically, already shares or wishes to share the lifestyle attributed
by consumption. As one advertiser put it, people are progressing through life stages and
accumulate, like the layers of an onion, knowledge, responses and behaviour. 215 So
213 C. THOMAS, "Delhi Opens Markets to the Real Thing", and "New Fizz for India", Editorial, both in
The Times, January 13, 1994. And as if a political lesson was learned by all parties, Coke and Pepsi
made sure that they establish strong links with local manufacturers: to some extent India is more
important to Coke than Coke is to India. Equally the presence of a particular brand has similar
symbolic value: younger fashion followers in Israel, partly as a statement of non conformity, are
buying the brand "Nazi" for a "shiny black leather material which is called "Nazi" after the leather
boots worn by the Nazis": see C. WALKER, '"'Nazi" Style Distresses Israelis", The Times, October
30, 1996.
214 J BAUDRILLARD, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (St. Louis, Telos Press,
1981), at 42, is making the point for the style of consumption.
215 B. BARRY, planning director of Ogilvy & Mather, as reported by D. SUMMERS, in "Sex, Humour
and the "Me Within", Financial Times, February 3, 1994. For an advertiser, every woman may have
traces of the wild woman, the wicked woman, the free woman, the woman on top, the funny woman,
the return to childhood, the strong woman, the intelligent woman, the pampered woman and so on.
Indeed a growing proportion of 1980s consumer goods advertising "stressed women's expanding
opportunities for achieving success and parity vis-à-vis men. Ads more and more depicted men and
women in relations of formal equity, but on different footing ... Ideological themes ran the gamut
from valorizing a professional woman image in campaigns for Visa, American Express and E.F.
Hutton, to cosmetics and perfume ads that articulated a mythic superwoman figure. These [Visa and
American Express] ads positioned an accompanying male who is subtly threatened by the woman's
enhanced professional status and economic power. In each story-line the woman recognizes his
perception of threat ... and then moves to dispel his anxiety that her new-found power will upset the
proverbial applecart"; see Goldman (1992) at 107. See also B. STERN & M. HOLBROOK, Gender
and Genre in the Interpretation of Advertising Text, in J. COSTA Gender Issues and Consumer
Behavior (Sage, Thousand Oaks, 1994) on the, based on genre, response to advertising messages; the
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advertising has messages for our aspirations, our current positions, and our "me within"
elements up to the last hidden layer.
At the same time the advantages of economies of scale and the development of
multinational enterprises with huge production capabilities led to the flooding of the
international markets with identical products in slight variations.216
"People in places as diverse as Paris and Hong Kong, Khartoum and Tokyo,
New York and Brasilia wear, drive and drink the same brands."217
It is an hyperbole to argue that a new, universal middle class, defined by branding and
trade marks, is under creation, 218 but it cannot be denied that more and more people, all
over the world, are sharing similar consumption experiences of the same branded goods,
in almost all product fields, ranging from Gucci loafers to Courts cheap sofas. 219 The
optimistic approach is that consumption of similar goods and globalisation of the
markets make people more alike and the more like one another we become the more
"identity politics"220 and resulting conflicts are weakened. The notion of becoming akin
does not necessarily refer to actual similarity, but rather indicates a common technique
differences between feminine - masculine, male - female, readings of the same advertisement are
very interesting.
216 Variations that cater for taste, cliniatological differences etc. In Greece, for example, as reported by
G. PAPAIOANNOY, "Euro-Marks Conquest Europe" (in Greek), To Vima, June 26, 1993, Maxwell
is putting in the market a stronger instant coffee, similarly the ingredients of most detergents are
suited for cotton and linen clothing, and the components of cosmetics are differentiated in line with
the warmer climate.
217 J McDERMOTT, Corporate Society (Boulder, Westview Press, 1991), at 141. Units of consumption
of products deriving from a defmite number of sources are potentially indefmite and dispersed all
over the world.
218 For a challenge to globalisation in general see M. FERGUSON, "The Mythology about
Globalisation", 7 European Journal of Communication 69 (1992). Her argument, at 80, that "...
neither "Global Cultural Homogeneity" nor its national or regional variants, fit the emerging conflict
models of the nation state, or the exclusionary imperatives of ethnic or regional entities", is forceful
and topical. See also MILLER, in MILLER (ed.) (1995), at 2 1-23.
219 See "Totally Tropical Taste", The Economist, January 8, 1994, at 61, where the case of Courts is
reported as an example of successful international retailing of cheaper products next to classy
branded stores.
220 Identity politics is defmed as the form of cultural conservatism built on nationalistic criteria that
blends faith to market economics with religious, moralistic or, at its worse, nationalistic fanaticism.
For the contrast of identity politics with the liberal ideology of the global market see V. CABLE, The
World's New Fissures: Identities in Crisis (London, Demos, 1994).
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of consumption. Today, in a post modernist way of looking at things, consumers are
allowed to
"play with, deconstruct, reconstruct, and signif' the signifiers (items and
practices of consumption) and become active participants in cultural
construction".221
Advertising people quickly grasped the new phenomenon and started developing
advertising campaigns built on the "brotherhood" feeling. 222 IBM in their latest
advertising campaign are using different cultural images - Christian nuns and Buddhist
monks for example - conveying the same message, in the same lingo, albeit in a
different language.223
Trade marks have moved one step further and are now capable of potentially creating
themselves classes and class-lines.
221 A. FUAT FIRAT, Gender and Consumption: Transcending the Feminine, in COSTA (1994) at 225.
FIRAT considers consumption as a potentially "self(-image)-construction process" rendering the
consumer to a product in the production of which he or she truly participates as a producer, breaking
down the traditional borders between production and consumption; she goes one step further from
those claiming that today production is based entirely on consumers' desires and attempts to re-
define production and consumption defying their traditional conceptualisation as distinct notions and
actions. Of course commercial interests expand immediately to cater for those who "play" with
consumption; Tower Records swiftly created Tower Alternative as its outlet for The Lab an anti-mall
built as an alternative to the culture of homogenisation; see V. GRIFFITH, "Generation X Goes to the
Anti-Mall", Financial Times, November 17, 1994. This is an exercise of homogenising the anti-
homogenisers.
222 This may be part of what has been described as cultural imperialism: "Cultural imperialism today
develops in a world system within which there is a single market, and the terms and character of
production are determined in the core of that market and radiate outward", H. SCuLLER,
Communications and Cultural Domination (New York, mt. Arts & Sciences Press, 1976), at 5. See
the results of the case-study of advertising in Mexico, in J. S[NCLAIR, Images Incorporated:
Advertising as Industry and Ideology (London, Croom Helm, 1987), at 169-173: at 170 it is revealed
that 70% of the commercials were for transnational brands.
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4.4.3. Advertising, information, persuasion, and trade marks
Early advertising strategies, before the invasion of art and psychology, concentrated
mainly on information.224 Classified ads brought together marketers and consumers
interested in a common product. The traditional approach is that such advertising is
what we call rational advertising and relates to the rational consumer who requires more
information. 225 However, many commentators believe that rational and emotional
advertising are not mutually exclusive. 226 Empirical evidence shows that today most
advertising messages are mixed. Accordingly for a meaningful description of messages
we can classify them along two dimensions: a systematic-heuristic dimension and an
emotional or experiential benefits dimension; this would cover the whole range from
primarily systematic to primarily heuristic. Systematic theories assume that each
consumer is an active processor of information who obtains, evaluates, weighs, and
integrates all available information. On the other hand heuristic processing of
information supposes that people respond to advertising cues which attempt to persuade
without logical justification. A typical example is the endorsement of a product by a
celebrity. The contrast is between consumers who buy because "the expert said it was
the best" and because "I have thought about it, weighed the alternatives, and it is the
best".227
223 
"I'm dying to surf the net" says the nun, or "my hard drive is maxed" says the French pensioner.
Note that this was the first result of the reorganisation of IBM's advertising strategy: P. TAYLOR,
"What's the Big Idea", Financial Times, March 2, 1995.
224 See 73-77 of LEISS, KLINE & JHALLY (1990) for illustrations of such advertising. As history of
advertising unfolds text loses its primal role and gradually becomes a guide that interprets visual
images and connects them with the product until the present day of "shocking" visualisations that are
often irrelevant to the actual product and its uses.
225 It was put forward that a consumer buys as a response to rational or emotional stimuli; the pioneer in
such line of research was M.T. COPELAND, with Principles of Merchandising (New York, A.W.
Shew Co., 1924).
226 D.W. STEWART & D.H. FURSE, Effective Television Advertising: A Study of 1,000 Commercials
(Lexington, Lexington Books, 1986).
227 See C. PECHMAN & D.W. STEWART, The Multidimensionality of Persuasive Communications:
Theoretical and Empirical Foundations, in P. CAFFERATA & A. TYBOUT (eds), Cognitive and
Affective Responses to Advertising ((Lexington, Lexington Books, 1989) and the references therein;
at 36-37 they offer a table of advertising theories.
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Note too that the emergence of a prosperous middle class is what captivates the
producers of consumer products; in the markets of the former Soviet Union the newly
found prosperity of the middle classes and its appetite for "western" brands and
products lured a number of foreign companies like Philip Morris, Unilever, Wella, BAT
and so on, who brought with them massive advertising of all sorts. However the
importation of western consumerist images had to adapt to local cultures and
mentalities, and it has been argued that the lack of market infrastructure in Russia
contradicts with the increasingly discerning taste and behaviour of the consumer. 228 Here
it must be stressed that advertising was not unknown in socialist economies. Advertising
expenditure was lower than in market economies, however commercial advertising was
treated as a necessary technique in order to raise material consumption levels, which
was considered in itself desirable.229
Finally an advertising strategy method that highlights the persuasive character of trade
mark is a recent Persil advertising campaign: first you create the highest levels of
awareness and interest by massive advertising, and then you attempt to convert them
into brand trial by sampling, the possibility for the consumer to "free try" the product
and check, to the extent that s/he is able to do so, the validity of the advertising
claims.230 In this way the brand is marketed before the actual product, and then the new
product is offered and consumed before it can be bought.
228 It has been reported that on September 29, 1990, six hours of British TV programmes complete with
commercials dubbed into Russian were shown on the main national Russian television channel; the
estimated audience was 150 to 200 million; see J. LANNON, Advertising to the New Europeans, (J.
Walter Thompson agency memo, July 1990) as quoted by DAVIDSON (1992) at 47. Later on
Russians laughed at the advertisements for "Wash and Go" shampoo, since the transliteration of
"Vosh" means head-louse: J. THORNHILL, "To Russia with Baked Beans", Financial Times,
October 7/8 1995.
See P. HANSON, Advertising and Socialism (London, MacMillan, 1974), concluding at 15 1-155.
° D. SUMMERS, "Sample the Soap, Buy the Brand", Financial Times, June 2, 1994.
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4.5. The expansion of trade marks
4.5.1. Trade marks and other rights
Historically it has been thought that it was through the
"... notion that an author should have an exclusive "copyright" in his creation"23'
that creations of intellect moved into the field of property. The author was seen as the
transitional point that - in her/his aesthetic function - transformed the cultural value into
a "thing" with a property value; it was the function of the author that provided the
artificial, and economically necessary, rarity.232 Once, mass audiences gained access to
cultural creations, art moved from the stage where the producer was producing for a
small circle of other producers to that of large-scale production. 233 Progressively art has
entered the market, leading to the creation of a culture industry, 234 and the discourse on
authorship has been changing slowly but fundamentally. 235 Individual authorship is now
conceived as only one of a number of means that will give an end to the constraints of
the "proliferation of meaning".236 Originality and novelty and their relevance in the
231 CORNISH (1989), at 245.
232 See LURY (1993), at 23. See also the relevant parts on the discussion of property in chapter 3 above.
We bypass here the differences in the conception of copyright as an economic right or as a right that
comprises the economic and the moral right.
233 See P. BOURDIEU, The Field of Cultural Production - Essays of Art and Literature (Cambridge,
Polity Press, 1993), at 39. It is interesting to note that the struggle between "bourgeois art" (art that is
economically integrated) and art for art's sake (art with a degree of independence) is depicted as a
struggle for the principle that determines hierarchisation. The most disputed frontier between them is
the one that separates the field of cultural production and the field of power, and in the resulting
duality of governing principles one set has to do with economic rules and the other with symbolic
power; see BOIJRDIEU at 40-44 and 74-112. See also A. BARRON, No Other Law? Author-ity,
Property and Aboriginal Art in BENTLY & MANIATIS (eds) (1998).
As termed by ADORNO & HORKHEIMER in CURRAN et al. (eds) (1977) at 349, where they claim
that "... movies and radio need no longer pretend to be art. The truth that they are just business is
made into an ideology in order to justify the rubbish they deliberately produce".
235 See LURY (1993) describing at 13-39 the process from repetition to replication and at 39-62 the
notions of novelty and reactivation. See also M. WOODMANSEE, On the Author Effect:
Rediscovering Collectivity, 10 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 279 (1992).
236 M. FOUCAULT, What is an Author?, in J. F1ARARI (ed.), Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-
Structuralist Criticism (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1979), at 141.
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times of radical technological change were put under scrutiny, 237 as was the consistency
between legal copyright doctrines and the progressing forms of authorship and relevant
aesthetic criteria. 238 So it is argued that consumers of culture are setting the standards of
standardised cultural products. Distributive intermediaries are sensing the standards and
accordingly pass the message of demand to the writers, composers etc.9
An example in the field of literature lies in the creation of series of detective stories built
on variations of the same theme of reappearing connotations on the characteristics of a
particular hero-detective, the immediate entourage, and society of the period. 240 Another
example is the interplay of multi-media products between literary characters, television
series, movies, series of movies, video-games, interactive videos, music themes and
promotional character merchandising in any possible chronological order. 24 ' Mario
Bros. was a video game that turned to a cartoon series and a movie. Dennis the menace
was a cartoon turned to a movie and a video game. Jurassic Park, Batman, Superman,
etc. owned their profitability partly to their success as films, but mainly to the
merchandising products created from their characters.
It is impossible to express a qualitative assertion on the new type of intellectual
productions, but it is emphasised that the process of change cannot but be dynamic and
237 As early as in 1967 B. KAPLAN - as cited by P. JASZI, in "On the Author Effect: Contemporary
Copyright and Collective Creativity", 10 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 293 (1992) at
293-294), in An Unhurried View of Copyright, was stating at 2 that "... if man has any "natural"
rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his fellows, and thus to reap where he has not sown.
Education, after all, proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and "progress", if it is not entirely an illusion,
depends on generous indulgence of copying".
238 See P. JASZI, "Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship", [1991] Duke
Law Journal 455.
239 See LURY (1993) at 40-51.
240 U. ECO, in "Innovation and Repetition: Between Modem and Postmodern Aesthetics", 4 Daedalus
114 (1985) at 162-163 claims that, "... the reading of a traditional detective story presumes the
enjoyment of a scheme. The scheme is so important that the most famous authors have founded their
fortune on its very immutability". In this article Eco elaborates on a theme expressed in The Theory
of the Reader (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979).
241 Interactive multimedia is an amorphous term, but it can be said that "... multimedia works combine
text, images (still and moving), sound (in the form of music and speech), computer software, and
associated computer hardware to create something new". See M.D. SCOT!' & J.L. TALBOTT,
"Interactive Multimedia: What is it, Why is it Important and What does one Need to Know about
it?", [1993] EIPR 284; at 285-286, they are dealing with the rights of the "persona".
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even in the most pessimistic scenario of an audience that is targeted by the media,
influenced so as to choose only from a limited variety of options, and then sold to the
advertisers as an audience of consumers of their limited variety of products,242 the
relations between media, advertisers and audience will never be static. In this procedure
there will always be signs that the audience has not lost all its analytical powers; it has
not totally succumbed to the repercussions of technology.243
What is relevant to this thesis is the belief of some sociologists that these multi-media
products led to the organisation of the culture industry,
"... in terms of a regime of rights characterised by branding, in which the
manipulation of innovation as novelty is subsumed within the more general
phenomenon of the simulation of innovation".244
What has been described as the pervasive use of the "... strategies of seriality, iteration
and standardisation"245 in culture can be assimilated with the notion of the goodwill, as
part of the trade mark protection rationale.
The obvious example is the case of the artist or technician who has developed a
reputable persona similar to the goodwill built by a trader. The participants in the film
industry, based on their talents and chances and supported by the work of their
colleagues246 are building their own goodwill. This is accumulated in the history of their
performances and gradually becomes professional reputation and a distinct industry
242 D. SMYTHE, Dependency Road: Communications, Capitalism, Consciousness and Canada (New
Jersey, Ablex, 1982), as interpreted by LURY (1993) at 50. Incidentally audiences can be literally
sold as mailing lists. For this alternative use of names see E. NOVEK, N. SINHA & 0. GANDY,
"The Value of Your Name", 12 Media, Culture and Society 525 (1990).
243 See for example the results of the research of P. WILLIS, in Common Culture (Milton Keynes, Open
University Press, 1990) and in Moving Culture (London, Galouste Gulbekian, 1990), extensively
analysed by J. McGUIGAN in Cultural Populism (London, Routledge, 1992), at 113-123. See also
M. GANE (ed.), Baudrillard Live (London, Routledge, 1993), at 150, where, commenting on The
Work of Art in Electronic Age, it is submitted that somehow economic power relations are
themselves mediated.
244 C. WRY, N. ABERCROMBIE et al., Branding, Trademark and the Virtual Audience, in LURY
(1993), at 62.
245 LURY (1993) at 51.
246 A support that is being expressly recognised by modern copyright laws.
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identity; the person "... slowly becomes a personage, a valuable commodity to
buyers".247 This process is strengthened by the emergence of flat "image" characters
which indeed can be protected with a trade mark or brand right. Character
merchandising and the "persona" cases can further exemplify this.
Character merchandising is the practice of associating a real or fictitious famous image
or character with goods or services in order to enhance their retail potential, and
probably offers the "flattest" way of exploiting already "flat" characters. 248 It provides a
significant parallel income to the cultural industry, the creations often aim exclusively in
fulfilling merchandising roles. The UK law for a considerable time was reluctant to
come in line with civil and other common law jurisdictions; 249 the situation has been
described as "embryonic". 25° Interestingly, the case 25 ' that moved the law forward
indirectly established a link between copyright and trade mark law. The judge made a
specific reference to the fact that the licensee in the UK was the copyright holder in the
drawings. He distinguished the present drawings-case from previous name-cases - where
there was no chance of a copyright in a name - by stating that there,
"... the plaintiff clearly has copyright in the drawings and is in the business on a
large scale in this country in licensing the use of the copyright in those
drawings".252
247 See R.R. FAULKNER & A.B. ANDERSON, "Short-Term Projects and Emergent Careers: Evidence
from Hollywood", 92 American Journal of Sociology 879 (1987), at 889. Modern copyright laws
provide either for separate rights for each of the attributors which are then presumed to be transferred
to the producer or the director - as, for example, is the case in Greece, see S.M. MANIATIS & G.A.
ZANNOS, "The New Greek Copyright Law", [1993] EIPR 296 at 298 - or more directly attribute the
right to the producer - as is the case in the UK, see CORNISH (1989), at 270-27 1, claiming that these
rights are in essence fundamentally neighbouring rights.
248 Many recent films are a retrospective comment on other films and the world of films. See N.
ANDREWS, "Hell is Other Movies", Financial Times, August 5, 1993. In that sense the allegory of
the merchandising lawyer in Jurassic Park, who was the first to be devoured by the dinosaurs, is a bit
worrying. For a more sympathetic view see J. PHILIPS, "Jurassic Park and Beyond", Managing
Intellectual Property 2, September 1993, at 2, claiming that "... the effective management and
exploitation of IP rights in Jurassic Park has enabled countless millions to be thrilled, scared, amused
and fully entertained. In this sad decade, to spread a little pleasure is no crime".
249 For a review of cases see S. CHONG & S.M. MANIATIS, "The Teenage Mutant Hero Turtles Case:
"Zapping" English Law on Character Merchandising Past the "Embryonic" Stage", [19911 EIPR 253.
250 Per Pincus J. in Hogan v. Koala Dundee Ply Ltd(1988) 12 IPR 508.
251 Mirage Studios v. Counter-Feat Clothing & Co. Ltd [19911 FSR 145.
252 Ibid, at 159, per Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V.C.
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Although this was not a prima facie material reason for deciding the case, at the
interlocutory level, the existence of underlying copyright was clearly a subsisting factor.
The significance lies in the evidence of judicial willingness to comprehend commercial
practice and transcend legal barriers. In legal terms the branding of cultural products
may mean that copyright law can be used in combination with passing off and trade
mark law, at least in the case of the UK, where the absence of a tort of unfair
competition is mediated by the enforcement of a low threshold copyright, the
subsistence and infringement of which are easily demonstrated. Copyright could prove
to be of great strength to the plaintiff's claim253 despite the fact that a name - trade mark
as such cannot attract copyright protection.254
At a different level trade marks, moving away from their function as source indicators,
are viewed as ways of protecting new product varieties. Some advocate a policy shift
towards protecting trade marks as assets rather than information as to origin. 255 If the
253 CHONG & MANIATIS (1991), at 256-257.
254 Exxon v. Exxon Insurance [1982] RPC 69, set that a trade mark owner cannot seek copyright
protection when the mark is used in a completely different line of trade. The decision was consistent
with several cases holding that titles of books, plays, films and the like are "insufficiently substantial"
to attract copyright, see CORNISH (1989), at 269.
255 See for example D.J. GIFFORD, "The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and Trade Dress", 75
Minnesota Law Review 769 (1991); at 774-776 he attacks the appeal decision in Anti-Monopoly, Inc.
v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. 204 USPQ 978 (9th. Cir. 1979), where it was ruled that the term
Monopoly was generic and that the primary significance of the mark must be the source rather than
the product. In Anti-Monopoly [1978] BIE 39, a Benelux case, the court decided that Anti-Monopoly
was a term which would infringe Monopoly. Sir R. JACOB, in "Industrial Property - Industry's
Enemy?", 1996 S. Stewart memorial lecture, comments on the Trade Marks Directive and asserts that
"... there are many who seem to think that it has ... taken trade mark law well beyond anything
conventionally recognised as such". He suggests that "the extended view of trade mark protection
favoured by some theorists requires justification as a practical matter. The extension of monopoly
rights by assertion of damage without proof will not do. Purely theoretical or abstract arguments have
no place in forming the rules of intellectual property". On the other hand A. KAMPERMAN
SANDERS, in "Back to the Dark Ages", [1996] EIPR 3, at 3, proposes that according to modern
understanding "... the trade mark itself embodies value as a conveyor of goodwill and quality,
publicity or life-style". A strong case against is made by L.B. BURGUNDER, "Trademark and
Copyright: How Intimate Should the Close Association Become", 29 Santa Clara Law Review 89
(1989). He argues that the backbone of the US market economy is competition; this means that it is
welcomed if one makes improvements on products already placed in the market. Patent rights are an
exception but they aim to encourage development and disclosure of useful and fimctional product
ideas. Similarly copyright exceptions are based on the need to ensure human investment. The trade
mark system however is "primarily designed to increase the distributional efficiency of the
marketplace". The incentive behind the right is to protect the goodwill of the innovator not
innovation itself; accordingly it is improper to apply copyright doctrines to trade mark law when
confronted with trade dress cases. So, "[t]he exclusion of functional designs from the subject matter
of trade mark law is intended to insure effective competition, not just by the defendant, but also by
other existing and potential competitors" (Third Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition, par.
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shift materialises then functional elements of a product would become protectable as
trade marks. For example, Chanel could, potentially, protect as a trade mark for a
perfume not only the name Chanel No 5, but also the scent of the product.
4.5.2. Trade marks as assets
Having completed the brief examination of trade marks' functions we will fmally look
at them from the perspective of assets mirroring their own economic strength and that of
their owners. Their evaluation does not only incorporate other intellectual property
rights but also expresses these rights and supplements them in real market life. In 1993
the league table of brand valuations found Marlboro at the top with a value of $39
billions and Coca-Cola second, worth $33.4 billions. Surprisingly at the third place was
a newcomer, Intel, at a valuation of $17.8 billions. 256 This underlines the mobility of the
brand system and the speed that it corresponds to changes of values in the market. It
17). See also North American Philips Corp. 217 USPQ 926 (T.T.A.B. 1983) where it is stressed that
any evidence of secondary meaning cannot transform a utilitarian shape into a registrable or
protectable trade mark. In Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc. 58 F3d 27, 35 USPQ2d
1284 (2d Cir. 1995) there is a more direct copyright analogy: an idea, a concept or a generalized type
of appearance is "generic" and not capable of trade dress protection, even if it has acquired secondary
meaning. The unprotectable idea or concept was greeting cards consisting of colour photographs of
animals, plants or people cut to the shape of the image in the photograph. Overextension of trade
dress protection can undermine restrictions in copyright and patent law that are designed to avoid
monopolization of products and ideas. Consequently, courts should proceed with caution in assessing
claims to unregistered trade dress protection so as not to undermine the objective of these other laws.
In Re Morton Norwich Products Inc. 671 F2d 1332, 213 USPQ 9 (C.C.P.A. 1982) it is codified that
in determining functionality, first it is essential to look at the availability of alternatives for the design
of a product. Second that in determining whether a design is functional and thus unprotectable the
court will have to look at four factors. The existence of a utility patent which discloses the utilitarian
advantage of the design. Whether the originator of the design promotes the utilitarian advantages of
the product through advertising. Whether there are alternative designs available. And whether the
design is more economical than an alternative design. Finally, in Fabrication Enters v Hygenic Corp.
64 F3d 53, 35 USPQ2d 1753 (2d Cir. 1995) it is stressed that if a manufacturer wishes to retain
Lanham Act protection for a product feature, it bears the burden of insuring that consumers view the
feature in predominantly source-identifying terms; in Jockey International Inc. 192 USPQ 579
(T.T.A.B. 1976) use of the slogan "Look for this mark on the garment" was successfully used as
evidence in establishing that the design of the garment (Y-fronts) functioned as a trade mark. For the
UK see Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products [1998] RPC 283 where Jacob J.,
succinctly describes the question at issue: "... the principal issue, world wide, is whether Philips, by
trade mark registration, or like right dependant on the appearance of working parts, can obtain a
permanent monopoly of a desirable form of manufacture, namely three headed rotary shavers in
which the three heads are arranged in an equilateral triangle. The answer was obviously negative,
despite the fact that Jacob . in a way dismissed the US approach of looking at the totality of potential
protection.
256 As compiled by Financial World, and reported by M. WHEATLEY, in "Coke and Chips - of the
Silicon Kind", Financial Times, September 2, 1993, at 14.
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shows that in the complex and rapidly changing computer market, consumers are aware
of brands' and products' differentiations, a positive development, even if it follows a
huge "Intel Inside"257 advertising campaign. Second, it reveals the methodology of
accountants in order to calculate the value of the brands and illustrates that trade marks
enwrap the rest of intellectual property rights.
It is not long ago that the practice of evaluating brands has become distinguishable from
the evaluation of the goodwill258 and more widely accepted,259 despite the inherent
deficiencies, encountered in all accounting treatments of goodwill and its components
from a valuation perspective. 260 The debate on accounting for brand names that has
started in the UK261 is significant for accounting, marketing and intellectual property,262
at an international level, since other markets are bound to follow. Goodwill consists of
three identifiable components which are defined as,
1. the fair value of separately identifiable intangible assets;
257 Illustrating one of the advertising advantages, Intel's campaign made consumers partiy compelled to
buy PCs powered by Intel chips and partly aware of how PCs are assembled and the alternatives to
Intel. Microsoft's advertising campaign to protect the Windows, operating system, trade mark from
becoming generic is making the point on awareness stronger.
258 Which, for accountants, is "... the difference between the value of a business as a whole and the fair
value of the separable net assets", as defined in the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice
Number 22 (London, Accounting Standards Committee, 1989).
259 See "A Price on Fame: Company Brands are Worth Something, but Only What They Add to Profits",
The Economist, December 10 1988, at 10, and "The Year of the Brand", The Economist, December
24, 1988, at 95, for the initial reactions, and "Gloves Will Soon Come Off", Financial Times, August
3, 1989.
260 See J. ARNOLD, D. EEGINGTON, L. KIRKHAM, R. MACYE & K. PEASNELL, Goodwill and
Other Intangibles: Theoretical Considerations and Policy Issues (London, The Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales, 1992). at 63. For taxation of trade marks issues see chapter 4 of
R. GALLAFENT, N. EASTAWAY, V. DAUPPE & M. SAUNDERS, Intellectual Property: Law and
Taxation (London, Longman, 1992). For a recent comment see J. HICKEY, "Taxation of
Technology and Intellectual Property: Policy and the Law" [1997] Intellectual Property Quarterly
319.
261 For a full discussion see ARNOLD et al. ibid.
262 We expand what M. POWER states, in "The Politics of Brand Accounting in the United Kingdom",
[1992] The European Accounting Review 41, at 41; that brand accounting represents a "... unique
intersection between marketing and accounting discourse two bodies of practical knowledge which
have for many conducted themselves in isolation from each other", because it will be focusing on
brands as particular intangible assets. On the separability of accounting of objects of intellectual
property see J. HALL, "The Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets", [1990]
(Australian) Intellectual Property Journal 11. Power's article provides a good review of the
arguments pro and against brand accounting with an up to date bibliography.
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2. the present value of benefits arising (not reflected in (1)) from jointness of
activities and market imperfections such as monopoly position and barriers to
entry;
3. over- or under-payment.263
The criteria determining whether an intangible component of goodwill can be separately
identifiable are whether such a component constitutes:
an enforceable property right; or
• a reasonably certain expectation of future cash flows having a discounted
present value greater than the written- down balance sheet value of the
intangible; or
a market value.2
Without going into detailed examination of the methods of brand accounting, 265 it must
be mentioned that they are based on the deduction of the calculated profits of a generic
producer from the profits of the producer of the branded product. On the balance, that
represents the brand's premium, and then a brand strength multiple is applied; on the
multiple are reflected amongst others the brand's leadership and its legal protection. As
the Intel case exemplifies, these two factors, in turn, incorporate the innovative character
of the product, trade secrets and know how, patents, copyrights, monopoly power and
anti-trust questions, etc. as such, and as they are recognised and protected by law.
Therefore although the separate significance of each ingredient is not diminished, it is
the brand value, as calculated in the balance sheets, that becomes their icon, giving to
the company's customers, shareholders, competitors, and public in general, a map of
company strategies and a company health certificate.266
263 ARNOLD et at. (1992), at vii.
264 Ibid, at 85-86.
265 On which see M. BIRKIN, A Methodology for Valuing Brands, in M. POWER (ed.), Brand and
Goodwill Accounting Strategies (Cambridge, Woodhead - Faulkner, 1990).
266 T. JACKSON, "In a Grey Area", Financial Times, December 6, 1996, interviews W. Ansen, a
valuation specialist, head of Trademark & Licensing International, who exemplifies trade mark
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Another telling example can be found in the Report of the UK Patent Office for 1992.267
The number of requests, for a grant of a patent or the registration of a design, from UK
residents has been falling for three consecutive years. 268 At the same time the rate of
applications for trade mark registrations was slower, from that of the booming late
eighties, but it was still moving upwards. 269 Even more significant is the fact that
demand for patent searches fell and requests for substantive examination dropped.27°
The above numbers made trade marks an indicator of economic activities and a sign of
recovery.27'
Another intriguing use of statistics is an attempt to determine the effects of trade mark
related litigation on the stock price of the firm and use it as evidence of the importance
that stockholders seem to place on the protection of trade marks. There is some
empirical evidence which shows that when a firm reaches a favourable resolution within
evaluation practice in a more general way by referring to the brand value of the Financial Times.
There are three relevant elements. First comes the core value, the masthead, quantified by royalty
rates charged by comparable publications around the world, capitalised on a discounted basis over a
twenty year period. Then come the incremental elements of value: like the distribution efficiencies
for a paper of that size, the marketing efficiencies of across other publications in the FT's stable, and
advertising and promotional savings. Finally, comes the value of FT's web site, since FT. unlike
other organisations who had to buy back their name in the Internet, has been prudent enough to
register the name as a web site.
267 The Patent Office, Annual Reports and Accounts, 1992-1993 (HMSO, London, 1993); note that the
figures coincide with the recession that hit the industry.
268 Ibid, at 5 and 11-14 for patents, where the overall numbers moved slightly upwards due to European
and other international applications. Requests of UK residents for grant under art. 75(1)(b) of the
European Patent Convention fell from 2,658, in 1988, to 1,667, in 1992, ibid, at 67. For the designs
see 26-27 where it is shown that the sharper decline of 12% was matched by an increase of fillings
from abroad.
269 Ibid, at 5 and 28-30. Applications for trade marks fell sharply from a peak of 32,925, in 1989, to
28,639, in 1991, but rose again to 29,850, in 1992, ibid, at 78.
270 From 16,536, in 1988, to 13,612 in 1992 for the first case and from 12,766 to 9,632 for the second.
Ibid, at 67.
271 D.M. HIGGINS & T.J. JAMES, in The Economic Importance of Trade Marks in the UK (1973-
1992) - A Preliminary Investigation (London, IPI, 1996) attempt to examine trade mark intensities in
the UK (through trade mark registrations, and by examining the total number of registrations per
class divided by the gross value added for that class per year) and reach three main conclusions, at
22-23: (i) that there has been a general rise in the level of trade marking activity in the UK economy
over the period 1972-1992; (ii) that there are obvious and sometimes extremely wide differences in
the level of trade mark intensity for different trade mark classes; and (iii) the level of trade mark
intensity generally and for the majority of trade mark classes has risen but there are a significant
number of cases where trade mark intensity has fallen over the period. Finally, and despite the
preliminary character of the study the writers point to "the rise in the level of trade marking activity
and its somewhat cyclical relationship".
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the context of a trade mark dispute, either through litigation or through settlement, and
regardless whether the firm is the plaintiff or defendant, then the value of the stock
increases in a statistically significant manner.272
4.6. Conclusion - A perfect trade mark tale
It was repeated many times in this chapter that trade marks have connotations to generic
products, origin, quality, fashion, political statements, and everything else imaginable.
A good illustration is an example of trade marked alcoholic success: Absolut Vodka.
The producers of Absolut were during the 1970's desperate to expand to new
international markets. Thus they identified a demand in the US for white imported
liquors (reference to generic products and fashion), preferably not of Russian origin,
because of the cold war and the invasion of Afghanistan (reference to political
symbolism). Luckily the producers were Swedish and according to a survey the word
purity was strongly associated with Sweden273 (further reference to symbolic values).
They have been producing for years vodka that was distilled in a special way making it
more pure, marketing it under "Absolut Renat Branvin", meaning "Absolute Pure
Vodka" (reference to a generic product and particular levels of quality). Now how can
one blend all these notions into a trade mark? They had to reject marks such as Royal
Court Vodka, Swedish Blond Vodka, Nature Vodka, Damn Swede and Original Black
Vodka, and also product variations such as a black coloured vodka. They chose to use a
variation of the original name enabling them to benefit fully from a marketing and a
272 See G. FILBECK, R.F. GORMAN & D.J. HERRON, "Stock Price Reaction to Trademark Related
Lawsuits", 85 TMR 191 (1995). In assessing the results of their research at 195-197 they conclude
that the result of this scenario was expected; however there was no evidence of an analogous result,
of a price fall, when the firm is announced as defendant of trade mark related litigation. Similarly
there are no statistically significant change in stock price upon announcement of an intent to litigate
and an unfavourable resolution of a trade mark dispute. Other similar research shows that a
significant price reaction must be expected upon announcement of indictments for price fixing
arrangements: see J.L. STRACHAN, D.B. SMITH, & W.L. BEEDLES, "The Price Reaction to
(Alleged) Corporate Crime", 2 Financial Review 18 (May 1983).
273 Another such example is IKEA, now owned by a private charitable foundation in Holland, that
advertises its Swedish links in order to stress purity and simplicity that epitoinise the IKEA style; see
J. MYERSON, "Ikea's Pet Pelikan", Design, February 1993, at 26.
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legal protection view: they thus dropped the "e" from "absolute", retaining the original
Swedish word, and substituted "pure" with "Country of Sweden". They chose a
distinctively but naturally shaped transparent bottle, added a medallion to make it more
distinctive and thus more easily protectable, and printed the label directly on the glass of
the bottle, rather than add a paper label. They chose to ignore the disheartening results
of a first market survey and launched the product, which proved to be one of the biggest
marketing successes.274 Absolut constitutes, together with Campbell, one of the most
famous brands that turned to art, or of art that turned to brands and then to art again. 275
But at the end according to one of the people producing Absolut:
"[i]f I were to choose from the different factors contributing to the success of
Absolut Vodka, I would put the word "Absolut" first. Absolut is a positive,
onomatapoetic (sound imitating), titillating word. It is easy to understand
independent of language, in spite of the Swedish spelling. Hearing people in
their own native language pronounce the word "absolut" has made me
understand what an enormous amount of dynamism, excitement and joy that
comes with the word. There is magic involved."276
274 See J. LINDQ VlSI, "Absolut Vodka - The Birth of a Brand", in Trademark World, October 1993, at
20-22.
275 For a similar example from the world of advertising see the advertising campaign of Hanson, which
borrows heavily from the 1941 Orson Welles movie Citizen Cane. The artistic value of the advert
may be questionable but the contrast between the hypothetical speculator of the advert - King instead
of Cane - and the conglomerate's solidity is carried effectively to the viewer. See D. SUMMERS,
"Hanson Mini - Epic Returns", Financial Times, January 27, 1994.
276 LINDQVIST (1993) at 22.
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CHAPTER FIVE
COMPETITION AND THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE MARKS'
5.1. Preface
"One should hardly have to tell academicians that information is a valuable
resource: knowledge is power."2
"A politician who can regulate an industry gets much more by helping the
industry, whose members know and care about the effects of the regulation, than
by helping the mass of consumers, who do not know they are being hurt and
who would not know if they were being protected. An astute politician can - as
many have - both help the industry and get credit for protecting the consumers.
The consumers, whose relationship to the industry is a very small part of their
lives, will never know what prices they would have been paying if there were no
regulation."3
"... [O]rthodox economics has been isolated from other disciplines so that the
scope for interdisciplinary progress has been precluded ... It is found that the
division between production and consumption has been artificially maintained,
with greater emphasis either on the supply side ... or on the role of consumption
considered independently of how it is provided for other than through
purchase."4
An earlier version of this chapter has been published in A. STERLING (ed.), Perspectives on
Intellectual Property - Intellectual Property and Market Freedom (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997).
2 G. STIGLER, "The Economics of Information", 69 Journal of Political Economy 213 (1974), at 213.
D.D. FRIEDMAN, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, (La Salle, Open
Court Publishing Company, 1989), at 44.
B. FINE, From Political Economy to Consumption, in D. MILLER (ed.), Acknowledging
Consumption (London, Routledge, 1995), at 127.
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5.2. Introduction
We live in a world of limited resources and potentially unlimited needs; therefore the way
that we match needs with resources is significant for the organisation of society and the
economy. The interaction between needs and resources is concluded in what we call open
competitive markets, the institutional arrangements that govern the process of exchange.5
The political arguments for a competitive market regime are described as the need to limit
the power of governments and/or individuals and to ensure that all have some, yet limited,
economic freedom. Unlimited power leads to monopolies, which, according to A. Smith,
have
"... the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by
keeping the market constantly understocked ... sell their commodities much
above the natural price"6.
Equally, within the context of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) definition of market
dominance, the result of monopolistic situations is:
a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it
to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by
giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers".7
Whereas, on the other hand,
"... competitive pressure ... provides a constant stimulus to firms to innovate and
to reduce their costs in order to avoid losing their place on the market. They have
As defined by R. COASE in his Nobel Memorial lecture in Stockholm, 1991.
6 A. SMITH (E. CANNAN, ed.), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(New York, The Modern Library, 1937), at 61. Marx conceives monopolies as part of a dynamic
process which involves competition. The synthesis of the two is a movement: monopolies produce
competition and competition produces monopolies; monopolies can only maintain themselves by
entering into the struggle of competition; see K. MARX, The Poverty of Philosophy (New York,
International Publishers, 1967), at 135. Paradoxically there is an analogy between this conclusion and
the views of radical free marketers who consider monopolies as a phase in an overall game of
competition rather than undermining competitive markets is interesting.
United Brands Company v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, at 277.
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to compete both in terms of quality and in terms of prices and the product ranges
they offer".8
The aim of this essay is not to provide a theoretical discussion on the significance of the
"market". We accept the inevitability of a market system and concentrate on trade marks
and competition. In this context, trade marks will be looked at as parts of creative and
innovative strategies, tools for integration, and determinants of firm behaviour and market
entry.
5.3. Laying the ground for trade marks and competition
5.3.1. The game players
Competition must not be conceived as a monolithic notion linked exclusively to the
competing interests of particular groups - predominantly sectors of marketers. 9 This is
even more so since it has been widely accepted that personal freedom is perceived as
almost synonymous with economic freedom. Accordingly the role of competition laws has
expanded so as to protect both individual and economic freedom.'°
As competition players, marketers on the one hand promote the status quo, the equilibrium
in the market, by guessing the actions of their competitors and acting themselves in an ex
ante neutralising manner. On the other hand, they strive to change the status quo and set a
new equilibrium through innovation, by following new methods of manufacture and
putting in the market new products. They do all this for a profit, employing all the
information available to them, and taking risks.'1
XXI Report on Competition Policy (Brussels, CEC, 1992), at 50.
In a different context Denison J. stated that there is no "fetish" in the word "competition", in Vogue
Co. v. Thompson - Hudson Co. 300 F 509, at 512 (6th Cir. 1924).
M. FREEDMAN, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1962), at 138-144.
J. TOOBY & L. COSMIDES in The Psychological Foundations of Culture in J. BARKOW, L.
COSMIDES & J. TOOBY (eds) The Adapted Mind (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992)
provide at 91-92 an explanation of entrepreneurship.
182
Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks
Consumers, too, have a competing role in the market. First, they compete with each other
for the best buy. Equally they compete with other classes of market players because they
want products that suit their needs, but at prices they can afford. Further they seek public
health protection, information and protection on other matters than health, and finally the
introduction of trading standards and effective public controls that will ensure fair trading.
In short, consumers want choice and information, in the case of competitive markets, and
regulation covering prices, quality, penalties, and compensation, in the case of markets
where competition is absent.' 2 These interests have only lately been "... consciously and
purposefully recognised",' 3 mainly within the notions of unfair trading or unfair
competition. 14
The role of consumers and marketers must be comprehensively viewed. They are
individual competitive players and at the same time team players in a number of different
squads in interactive competition games.
5.3.2. The market interaction
In market economies, businesses exist to cover the supply section for a profit rather than
personal gratification or charity. Consumers, on the other create demand that interacts with
supply and gives life to the economy. The place where the interaction takes place is the
self - regulating market,
"... the fount and matrix of [the modern economic and political] system... It was
this innovation which gave rise to a specific civilization. The gold standard was
merely an attempt to extend the domestic market system to the international
NATIONAL CONSUMER COUNCIL, In the Absence of Competition (London, HMSO, 1989), at 4-
6.
" G. SCHRICKER, "Unfair Competition and Consumer Protection - New Developments", 3 IIC 185
(1977), at 186.
J. BLOW succinctly observes in Consumers and International Trade - A Handbook (Brussels, BEUC,
1986) at 2 that: "[i]nternational trade is a world of its own. Understanding its language and its
mechanics is vital if consumers are to make their voices heard, along with the many other interests
involved - industrial, trade, business, trade union, bureaucratic, developed world, under-developed
world - in an area where the balancing of separate and sometimes conflicting viewpoints, both
national and sectoral, is central to the negotiations. Horsetrading there is bound to be; what is
important is that representatives of the consumer interest are participating in the bargaining".
183
Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks
field; the balance-of-power system was a superstructure erected upon and, partly,
worked through the gold standard; the institutional system of the nineteenth
century [as well as our own] lay in the laws governing market economy")5
Trade marks, in turn, are the signs in and the signifiers of this market. The fact that
marketers and consumers are complementing halves of the market relationship confers on
them a combined competence to defme the notion of trade marks as property and/or
channels of communication, in the same way that the two of them determine the perform-
ance of the economy, as recorded by levels of production and allocative efficiency,
progress, and levels of employment and equity. The existence of trade marks signifies
choice and interaction and serves as evidence of a market economy, a place where the
"... objective orchestration of supply and demand is the reason of why the most
varied tastes find the conditions for their realization in the universe of possibles
which each of the fields of production offers them, while the latter find the
conditions for their constitution and functioning in the different tastes which
provide a (short- or long-term) market for their different products")6
K. POLANYI, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston,
Beacon Press, 1957), at 3. However, it is submitted that the central role of the market is not only that
of an arena where participants co-ordinate their decisions by attending price lists; markets primarily
offer the field "... in which market participants, by entrepreneurial exploitation of the profit
opportunities offered by disequilibrium prices, can nudge prices in the direction of equilibrium": see
I. KIRZNER, Discovery and the Capitalist Process (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985) at
128. P. BOURDIEU, in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (London, Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1984) at 230 views the cultural market - and probably any other market - as a place of
matching of supply and demand, but the matching is "... neither the simple effect of production
imposing itself on consumption nor the effect of a conscious endeavour to serve the consumers'
needs, but the result of the objective orchestration of two relatively independent logics, that of the
fields of production and that of the field of consumption".
16 BOURDIEU, ibid. The matter of taste is worth another reference at this point. Of course G.
STIGLER & G. BECKER in "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum" 67 American Economic Review
76 (1977), argue that tastes neither change capriciously nor differ importantly between people; the
alternative explanations they have offered with respect to addiction, habitual behaviour, advertising
and fashion support their hypothesis that we "... should apply standard economic logic as extensively
as possible" - at 89. However, J. BAXTER, in Behavioural Foundation of Economics (New York, St.
Martin's Press, 1993) acknowledges, at 104, that a problem "... with consumer behaviour models is
that some of the boxes shown in complex flow charts are really more in the nature of "black boxes",
since knowledge about them and the parts they play in decision-making is very limited. Knowledge
about the nature of the links between many of the boxes is often even scantier, and the links not
therefore adequately specified". And they add that a further difficulty with such models is that they
still seem to imply an ability on the part of each individual to process large volumes of information
even if not on the comprehensive scale of the expected utility model". According to Baxter,
discussing individual decision making process, our individual needs create wants, which are strongly
influenced by our social environment. Satisfaction of these needs will rarely or even never be on a
one to one basis since the matching product will include more or less "satisfiers". Since there are
constraints in real world - namely money, time, and competition with other consumers, most
individuals are unable to satisf' all their wants, some basic necessities are ranked highly in any order
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5.3.3. The basics of market rational behaviour
The law of demand proposes that people will buy more of a commodity if its price falls
and less if it rises. In parallel they will tend to buy more as their income rises and less as it
falls.'7
The supply behaviour of businesses is determined mainly by costs of production,
assuming that firms tend to choose the most efficient combination of inputs so as to
minimise the total cost of production, which is defined as
"... the minimum attainable total cost, given a particular level of technology and
set of input prices".'8
Supply behaviour is also inf'uenced by prices of production substitutes, market organis-
ation, and idiosyncratic factors such as government intervention, human disposition,
fashion and natural phenomena which determine consumers' buying decisions.'9
Where supply meets demand we fmd a product, put in the market, at the right moment, at
a total cost, for a profit, and at a price consumers are willing to pay.2°
of spending priorities. In simple decision making purchases many of them will be repeat purchases,
and thus habit and routine come into play. Baxter points out that economic theory has little to say
about unsatisfied wants and suggests that it is reasonable to assume that the greater the extent of
unsatisfied wants, the greater the motivation to try and do something about it by exercising one or
more of the available options, some of which would lead to changes in employment.
17 G. BECKER, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago, Chicago University Press,
1976), at 6.
18 P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, Economics (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1989) at 969.
'	 Ibidat6l-62.
20 K. LANCASTER, in his seminal article "Socially Optimal Product Differentiation", 65 American
Economic Review 567 (1975) posits that for a given level of resources the level of welfare that can
be attained by various consumers will depend on: "1. The production conditions that determine how
much of each characteristic can be supplied from given resources when embodied in a good with
specific characteristics proportions. 2. The preferences of the consumers which determine the relative
welfare levels associated with various bundles of characteristics. 3. The consumption process, which
determines what characteristics combinations the consumer can actually obtain from different
collections of goods. 4. The number and types of goods that determine the transfer link between
production and consumption." Since the desirability of an efficient system of transfer is self-evident
he concludes by answering a set of five rhetoric questions which must be answered by a policy
maker; albeit the answers to some questions are too apodictic: Q.1: Is there a socially optimal degree
of product differentiation? Al: Yes, and divergence from this degree would increase the resources
185
Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks
5.4. The relation of basics with trade marks
Trade marks affect directly costs of production since the cost of branding is incorporated
into the total cost of the product. But trade marks are the operators of trade, infonnation,
and advertising channels. By defmition trade marks are used to identify the existence of
products that can be readily substituted. Trade marks also interact with a plethora of
idiosyncratic factors, from fashion to politics.
5.4.1. Trade marks and the organisation of the markets
Trade marks also affect the organisation of the markets; paradoxically, they may function
as tools for market entry and/or barriers to market entry. Furthermore, they provide
businesses with a chance to mitigate the costs of an investment: firstly, by giving them the
means to test-market products and learn more about the likely fate of any project;
secondly, by intervening "correctively" in the markets, before and after putting a product
in the market, through advertising and marketing strategies; and fmally by allowing them
to diversify to other markets by transferring their goodwill from one national market to
another and/or from one field of activity to another. 2 ' A trade mark's character is split
between monopoly and competition, territoriality and globalisation.
needed to enable consumers to attain specific levels of welfare. Q2: Can the optimum be easily
recognised? A2: No; and certainly not with respect to the actual number of goods, since there are no
easily recognisable conditions which would determine this degree. Q3: Would perfect competition
throughout the economy result in attainment of the optimum? A3: No, since the problem of optimal
differentiation is most important under increasing returns to scale. Perfect competition, under these
circumstances, could not take advantage of the scale economies and would not generate the optimum,
which would require marginal cost pricing and single firm output for each good. Q4: Will market
imperfections tend to give a non-optimal degree of product differentiation? A4: Under constant
returns to scale, no. Under increasing returns to scale, yes. Q5: Does market imperfection give a
consistent bias in the degree of product differentiation always too little or always too much? A5:
Under increasing returns to scale, when imperfect competition tends to give non-optimal
differentiation, the direction of bias depends on the exact market structure. Monopolistic competition
will lead to too much differentiation, monopolisation of a market sector to too little. More complex,
and thus more realistic, market structures may be expected to show effects of both kinds, leaving the
direction of bias uncertain.
21 See for example the "stretchability" brand assessments in R. OLLINS, "Elastic Brands", The Sunday
Times, November 3, 1996: marketers are willing to take the risk to sub-brand in order to "leverage
brand equity". Marks & Spencer are top of the list of potentially expandable brands together with
Virgin (and its David v. Goliath personality) with Barclays and Mars at the other end.
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5.4.2. The economics of information
It is submitted that trade marks function as information carriers 22 and that the basic
economics of infonnation are the same for both consumers and marketers. So parallels can
be drawn with each one of the subject groups of the economics of information and
knowledge as listed by Machiup.
Machiup concentrated on the production and distribution of knowledge, which, indeed, is
the main point of disparity between marketers and consumers. In particular he stressed the
importance of;
• ignorance, chance, risk, and uncertainty as factors of explaining economic behaviour;
• uncertainty, risk aversion, venture spirit, innovativeness, and alertness as factors
explaining entrepreneurship and profit;
• new knowledge - inventions and discoveries - and the application of new knowledge
- seen as innovation and imitation - as factors of economic growth;
• the transfer of technology and know-how; economic forecasting; the cost and value,
private or social, of information and alternative information systems;
• decision theory and game theory; in decision-making by consumers with incomplete
and uncertain knowledge, decision-making by workers and job-seekers with
incomplete and uncertain knowledge; and decision-making by private firms, in
various market positions, with incomplete and uncertain knowledge;
• policy making by governments and public agencies with incomplete and uncertain
knowledge;
• the formation and revision of expectations and their role in economic dynamics;
• the role of information, knowledge, expectations, risks, and uncertainty in the
functioning of markets and the formation of prices;
A. KAMPERMAN SANDERS & S.M. MANIATIS, "A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on
Origin and Quality", [1993] EIPR 406.
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• prices as an information system for resource allocation and product distribution;
human capital, and the accumulation of knowledge and skills.23
The fundamental question on the economics of information has been described by Stigler:
in a market of unique goods for a consumer ascertaining market price - one only of the
product characteristics - the chief cost is time. 24 Since new markets are created and buyers
and sellers change identities knowledge becomes obsolete, so there are four rules which
quantify the value of information:
The larger the fraction of the buyer's expenditures on the commodity, the
greater the savings from search and hence the greater the amount of search.
2. The larger the fraction of repetitive (experienced) buyers in the market, the
greater the effective amount of search (with positive correlation of successive
prices).
3. The larger the fraction of repetitive sellers, the higher the correlation between
successive prices, and hence, by condition (2) the larger the amount of
accumulated search. In other words the more often people buy the better able
they become to judge prices.
4. The cost of search will be larger, the larger the geographical size of the
market.25
23 F. MACHLUP, "The Economics of Information: A New Classification", I Intermedia 28 (1983).
24 STIGLER (1961), at 216; the cost of time is not equal for all consumers: differences in taste and
income are parameters of the optimum amount of search.
25 Ibid, at 219. Other parameters could be access to channels of infonnation, reliability, and so on. C.
SHAPIRO in "Optimal pricing of experience goods", 14 Bell Journal of Economics 496 (1983), at
496, develops two scenaria following the introduction in the market of an experience good, a product
for which the most important source of information is actual experience with it. "In the optimistic
case consumers initially overestimate quality, and the optimal way to milk a reputation is via a
declining price path followed by a jump up to a terminal price. There are no long-run effects due to
initial mistaken perceptions. In the pessimistic case, consumers underestimate quality, and the
optimal way to build a reputation is to use a low introductory price followed by a higher regular
price. In this case misperceptions adversely affect welfare in both the short and the long run." In his
model quality and reputation were exogenously given, but in order to expand his model Shapiro
suggests that advertising may increase consumer willingness to try a product, altering the value of
reputation. See also C. SHAPIRO, "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation",
13 Bell Journal of Economics 20 (1982). The conceptual distinction between search and experience
goods has been introduced by P. NELSON, in "Information and Consumer Behavior", 78 Journal of
Political Economy 311(1970). The important attributes of search goods can be ascertained prior to
purchase, whereas the important attributes of experience goods can only be learned after purchase
and use.
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In principle there are two potential sources of information on brand quality, both of
which are costly to the consumer. Firms may supply consumers with quality signals,
directly or indirectly, through advertisements;26 and/or consumers can supply
themselves with information on quality through search. Both strategies interact with the
value of quality expectations for the consumer and the degree of relevant risks.
Consumers vary according to their individual degree of risk aversion, and therefore
firms offer a variety of product qualities.27
Accordingly, trade marks and advertising of an informative nature - for example
classified advertising - are the main methods of providing potential buyers with
knowledge of sellers' identities. At the same time trade marks and sensational or
persuasive advertising act as initiatives for the consumer to enter the market.
Here advertising is considered to be informative and persuasive and its social and
economic effects a mix of positive and negative. Some commentators believe that
advertising provides direct information about the characteristics of a brand. 28 The fact
itself that the firm advertises is a signal of quality. Nelson's research supports that
26 The cost of advertising is part of the product price; at the same time advertising could constitute a
barrier to entry and potential further competition. For example the research of R.L. WILLS & W.F.
MUELLER, in Brand Pricing and Advertising (Offrint Copy - Unknown Source) shows that prices
of weakly advertised manufacturer brands, private labels and generic products were substantially
lower than the prices of leading brands and especially highly advertised leading brands. The
comparison was for products which were relatively homogeneous and therefore the result of their
analysis was not due to real quality and cost differences. Their research implies that: (i) price
premiums and higher profits are primarily attributable to market power rather than superior products
or lower costs; (ii) large fums would tend to advertise more heavily and have higher prices and
profits than their smaller competitors; and (iii) for consumer goods advertising created brand market
power may be responsible for much of the observed positive of concentration and advertising
intensity on average prices and profitability.
27 According to evidence provided and analysed by S.N. WIGGINS & W.J. LANE, in "Quality
Uncertainty, Search and Advertising", 73 American Economic Review 881 (1983), when significant
search costs coexist with informational imperfections in the market, then consumers who purchase
few units and are quite risk averse tend to purchase advertised products. In their research they
considered advertising which conveys only that a product is advertised but not direct information
about product quality.
28 See for example P. NELSON in "Advertising as Information", 82 Journal of Political Economy 729
(1974). At 734 he states that "[a]dvertising has the seemingly magical property that those whose
tastes are best served by a given brand are those most likely to see an advertisement for that brand";
at 749 he adds that consumers will be rarely deceived as long as consumers follow the decision rule:
"... believe an advertisement for experience qualities when it tells about the functions of a brand; do
not believe the advertisement when it tells how well a brand performs that function".
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producers of experience goods advertise more than producers of search goods; he claims
that this supports that advertising of experience qualities increases sales through
increasing the reputability of the seller, while advertising of search qualities increase
sales by providing the consumer with "hard information" about the seller's products.
Accordingly most advertising is informative since consumers will be willing to look at
advertisements as long as their marginal revenue of so doing is greater than their
marginal cost. Others argue that advertising is inter-related with repeat purchases
through consumer behaviour which is specified on an ad hoc basis; in some of the
equilibria exhibited by Schmalensee it pays low quality firms to advertise more than
high quality firms; especially if buyers' behaviour indicates confidence that better
brands spend more on advertising.29 Some examine the effects of advertising from a
different perspective. Advertising alone does not only create strong brands but also
functions as a barrier to entry; the two may be interrelated but equally they may be
independent of each other. Glenn Thomas however, argues that the durability of
advertising is very brief and, more importantly, that, given the evidence of heterogeneity
in sales and advertising "... profits ... are not the result of collusion among firms
protected by barriers to entry, as such collusion would benefit all firms in the industry.
Instead recorded accounting profits represent rent to highly successful brands"; she
argues that for each company the discounted stream of income obtained from a handful
of successful brands must be compared with the properly capitalised costs of brand
introduction, where these costs are summed over all attempted introductions, both
29 R. SCHMALENSEE in "A Model of Advertising and Product Quality", 86 Journal of Political
Economy 485 (1978), where he attempts to model formally the market described by Nelson.
Contrasting, and similar to Nelson's conclusions, are reached by R.E. KIHLSTROM & M.H.
RIORDAN, "Advertising as a Signal", 92 Journal of Political Economy 427 (1984) and P.
MILGROM & J. ROBERTS, "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality", 94 Journal of
Political Economy 796 (1986). From a different angle N. KALDOR in "The Economic Aspects of
Advertising", 18 Review of Economic Studies 1 (1950) links advertising with market power and
imperfect competition, whereas L. TELSER, "Advertising and Competition" 72 Journal of Political
Economy 537 (1964) argues that advertising enhances competition. R. J. GARY-GOBO & P.
MICHEL, "Informative Advertising and Competition: A Noncooperative Approach" 32 International
Economic Review 321 (1991) argue that in approximately competitive markets advertising
disappears, and thus that perfect competition and informative advertising are incompatible, at least
within a framework of homogeneous goods; they go even further, at 337-338 where they combine
the reading of their model with the research of R.J. GARY-GOBO & J.P. LESNE, Advertising
Strategies and Competition in a Chamberlinian Market (Université Catholique de Louvain,
Discussion Paper, 1988) as indicating that even in non homogeneous products' markets one "... must
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successful and unsuccessful. Finally, she supports that in order to assess the competitive
position of suppliers of major established brands one must look simultaneously at (i) the
magnitude of price differences between major and minor brands, and the extent to which
these price differences may be attributable to quality or cost differences rather than the
exercise of market power by suppliers of major brands, (ii) the cost of launching a new
brand relative to market value, (iii) the extent to which small and new firms face a cost
disadvantage because they have to spend a higher proportion of their sales revenue on
advertising to promote their products effectively, and (iv) the extent to which new or
minor brands (including own label products) have successfully gained market share
from major established brands. 3° But there is also evidence that repetitive advertising is
effective simply because repetition is persuasive: in an experiment conducted by two
economists a consumer group that was aware of the frequency of a group of
advertisements but was not directly subjected to the advertisements did not assume that
frequency was related with quality; another group that was subjected to this frequency
of advertising did associate frequency with quality even though the advertisements were
for unfamiliar brands and in languages that the group could not understand. 3 ' All the
above are random examples of contradicting, albeit plausible, results of evidence and
theorisation; accordingly the truth as to the value and effects of advertising should be
somewhere in the middle.
But information presents one more idiosyncracy:
"[un the case of information or knowledge as a public good, how can you
exclude from using it persons who want to benefit from the knowledge, but did
introduce unusual assumptions in order to find positive equilibrium advertising expenditures in the
noncooperative model of a large market".
° L. GLENN THOMAS in "Advertising in Consumer Goods Industries: Durability, Economies of
Scale and Heterogeneity", 32 Journal of Law & Economics 163 (1989) at 188-189.
See "The Money in the Message" The Economist February 14, 1998, 100, presenting S. MOORTHY
& S. HAWKINS, "Advertising Repetition and Quality Perceptions", Working Paper, February 1998;
for the first group, that could look at repetition detached the actual effect that repetition would have
on them, repetition meant nothing significant as to quality; given this reaction it becomes more
difficult to interpret whether the perception of the second group of a relation between repetition and
quality was based on a sophisticated understanding of how advertising works and in what ways it
pays to advertise or it meant simply that when consumers see lots of advertisements for the same
product they want to buy it.
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not initially share in the cost of producing it? Automatically, users of such
knowledge become "free riders" in the case of public goods".32
In this sense information undermines the established perspectives of viewing markets.
The free ride is accepted because it is essential to the dissemination. As a result, a
market cannot be seen exclusively within a framework of property as reward and
contract as facilitator of exchange. This would not comprehensively accommodate the
production of information and its transmission between competitive firms.33
5.4.3. Trade marks and the orthodoxy of competition
The aspect of trade marks as company assets and indicators of corporate strength enables
us to take a step back into the orthodoxy of competition between marketers, defmed by the
European Commission as the force that
"... enables enterprises continuously to improve their efficiency, which is the
sine qua non for a steady improvement in living standards and employment
prospects within the countries of the Community. From this point of view,
32 M. JUSSAWALA, The Economics of Intellectual Property in a World without Frontiers (Westport,
Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992), at 22. From a different perspective, and in respect of trade
marks and advertising, A.G. PAPANDREOU in "The Economic Effect of Trademarks", 44
California Law Review 503 (1956), at 507 notes that "... in our [free market] kind of economic
organization information concerning some product is distributed by the seller to all comers, both
buyers and non buyers of the product in question, but is paid for by the buyers of the product. This is
tantamount to saying that there is no independent market for information. It follows that it is rather
difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate the extent to which the utilization of resources in the
advertising of information industry is efficient or not". Now this seems to be a dual free ride: a
marketer's free ride on customers who pay for the marketer's wider dissemination of information and
the non purchasing consumer's free ride on purchasing consumers in respect of information.
See E.W. KITCH, "The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information", 9 Journal of Legal
Studies 683 (1980); see also E.W. KITCH, "The Nature and Function of the Patent System", 20
Journal of Law & Economics 197 (1980). E.C. HETTINGER, in "Justifying Intellectual Property",
18 Philosophy & Public Affairs 31(1989), makes the point that the inadequacies of the traditional
justification become more severe when applied to intellectual property, because the nonexclusive
nature of intellectual objects and a presumption against allowing restrictions on the free flow of
ideas. A.S. WEINRIB, in "Information and Property" 38 University of Toronto Law Journal 117
(1988), where he discusses the nature of confidential information, stresses at 149-150 that property is
not a self-explanatory term but rather the representation of a web of legal relations whose form is
dictated by the context in which the term is used and by the ends we are seeking to achieve.
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competition policy is an essential means for satisfying to a great extent the
individual and collective needs of our society".34
5.4.4. An inherent weakness of economics
At this point it must be reiterated that economics have a critical role to play in
understanding the place of trade marks in market economies. Nevertheless they are neither
a scientifically neutral way of defming and measuring nor are they totally distinct from
ideology. Even positivist economics, based on general assumptions about the desirability
or not of possible outcomes, while pretending to be non - normative economics,
"... must ... be understood as a belief system that is not only inherently
ideological - that is enmeshed in the political and social values of its own order -
but imbued as well with beliefs as to "human nature" for which there is usually
no basis for explanation".35
Even if economics could be used as a neutral tool we cannot escape from the fact that
trade marks, advertising, and competition are not devoid of social significance, and should
not be explained, predicted, or used, exclusively according to mathematical equations.
Economic theories attempting to explain and predict technological and economic change
fail to incorporate the affecting social, political and economic variables considering them
either neutral or exogenous. For the new classical economics, economic agents behave as
if they know the correct model and as if markets normally clear after each historical period
without surpluses or shortages. Much of the critique concentrates on these propositions but
as a moderate economist put it:
This is one of the earliest EC attempts to defme competition. It is presented as the prerequisite for the
functioning of the common market as a genuine market, ensuring the continuous adjustment of the
supply and demand structure in correlation with technological developments. See the 1st Report on
Competition Policy (Brussels, CEC, 1971), at 11.
See R. HEILBRONER, Economics as Ideology, in W.J. SAMUELS (ed.), Economics as Discourse
(Boston, Kluwer Academic, 1989), at 115.
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"[w]hat has gone wrong with economics is not that mysterious. It has been the
over - emphasis on economic as opposed to underlying ideas".36
For the Chicago purists neutrality of economics is exactly what validates their perspective
on the legal phenomenon, albeit according to their own favoured economic theory.
According to Posner:
"... eclectic forays into sociology and psychology, descriptive statistics, and
verification of plausibility took the place of the careful definitions and
parsimonious logical structure of economic theory. The result was that industrial
organization regularly advanced propositions that contradicted economic
theory".
This lawyer is guilty of all the above. Economics do not exist in a scientific social
laboratory. They are part of a general picture. In the same way that law on its own is
irrelevant to the picture as a whole, economic theories are irrelevant outside the context of
the picture. Lawyers and economists should recognise this and welcome interaction rather
than doctrinal isolation. So as part of the picture it is submitted that people do care about
opportunities, relative rewards, interpersonal fairness, and mutual respect.38
36 S. BRITFAN, "What's Wrong With Economics", Financial Times, March 10, 1994, reviewing P.
ORMEROD, The Death of Economics (London, Faber, 1994) and T. MAYER, Truth Versus
Precision in Economics (London, Edward Elfar, 1993).
r R.A. POSNER, "The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis", 127 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 925 (1979), at 929; contrast with P. HEYN, The Economic Way of Thinking (New York,
Macmillan, 1991) attempting to incorporate into his principles for economic thinking notions which
are neutral. F. MACHOVEC, in Perfect Competition and the Transformation of Economics (London,
Routledge, 1995) at 311 recaps succinctly some of HEYNES' points. MACHOVEC advocates "... a
continuous thorough integration of process currents; in fact instruction should regularly be framed
with questions like, "How does the firm know that it should do this?"; and, "Does the consumer
always know what he or she wants?"; and "Should the law mandate that both parties to a transaction
must reveal to each other all they know about the commodities to be exchanged?"; and most
importantly, "What condition is required before pure profit can be driven to zero? Can this condition
ever be satisfied?".
M. DEUTSH, Distributive Justice: A Social - Psychological Perspective (New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1985) at 38-58; see also E. FOX, "The Modernization of Antitrust: A New
Equilibrium", 66 Cornell Law Review 1140 (1981), looking at the fairness and access aspects of
antitrust legislation. The other side of the argument is expressed by F.H. EASTERBROOK, in
Ignorance and Antitrust, in T.M. JORDE & D.J. TEECE (eds) Antitrust, Innovation, and
Competitiveness, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), at 119: "[ejiforts to improve markets
through law aim at a moving target, with a paradox: if an economic institution survives long enough
to be studied by scholars and stamped out by law, it probably should be left alone, and if an
economic institution ought to be stamped out, it is apt to vanish by the time the enforcers get there".
For a review of the tortuous relationship between law and economics see G. STIGLER, "Law or
Economics?", 35 Journal of Law & Economics 455 (1992). For Stigler, economics has two diverse
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5.4.5. The regulation of competition
Whether or not to intervene in the workings of the market has been a continuing - and still
unresolved - dilemma for policy makers and economic theorists. 39 In parallel to the current
trend towards deregulation there is a growing supplementing conviction that deregulation
must be accompanied by a strong competition policy, acting as a counterbalance. This is
viewed as a necessary precaution since there is apparently no clear case that deregulation
is actually lifting or indeed posing barriers to entry. 4° But then "deregulation" becomes a
radical dressing exercise for re-regulation, according to new criteria set by different needs
and values, rather than the literal application of the term.
So the underlying theme as to the desirability or not of state intervention in the workings
of markets is that despite the fact that a strong and regulatory state that promotes economic
activity may be a condition for development, though not a sufficient one:
"... a strong and interventionist state does not guarantee economic development;
indeed, it might retard it. The sufficient condition for economic development is
an efficient economic organization of agriculture and industry, and in most cases
this is achieved through the operation of the market".4'
Nevertheless, as put42 by A. Smith regulation, of some sort, is necessary, since to
roles: one to provide expertise on points requested by lawyers, the other to study legal institutions
and doctrines. The answers to these questions are neither exclusively legal nor exclusively economic,
rather they are predominantly political. See also G. CALABRESI & A. D. MELAMED, "Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One view of the Cathedral", 85 Harvard Law Review 1089
(1972).
The regulation of competition has a long history; the Roman Emperor Zeno issued an edict in AD
483 prohibiting monopolies, collusion and price maintenance agreements. See F. MACHLUP, The
Political Economy of Monopoly (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1952) at 152-157 for a
historical note on the regulation of competition.
See K. BUTFON & D. SWANN, in Regulatory Reform: The Way Forward, in K. BUTtON and D.
SWANN (eds) The Age of Regulatory Reform (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989) at 326, where they
point out that such examples as the US airline industry show there is a fear that in some spheres
regulatory reform leads to greater market concentration.
' R. GILPIN, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1987), at 49, criticising nationalist perspectives of political economy.
42 T. BURKE, A. GENN-BASH, B. HAINES, Competition in Theory and Practice (London, Routlegde,
1991), point at 33, that this is a part that is not often quoted.
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"... expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in
Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect Oceana or Utopia should ever be
established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is more
unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it.
Were the officers of the army to oppose with the same zeal and unanimity any
reduction in the number of forces, with which master manufacturers set
themselves against every law that is likely to increase the number of rivals in the
home market; were the former to animate their soldiers, in the same manner as
the latter enflame their workmen, to attack with violence and outrage the
proposers of such regulation; to attempt to reduce the army would be as
dangerous as it has now become to attempt to diminish in any respect the
monopoly which our manufacturers have obtained against us.
This monopoly has so much increased the number of some particular tribes of
them, that, like an overgrown standing army, they have become formidable to
the government and on many occasions intimidate the legislature."43
5.4.6. Forms of regulation and parallels with trade marks
Regulation can be broken down into three main categories: the regulation of anti-trust, the
scope of which is the support of competition; economic regulation, when free competition
is not deemed to be the appropriate norm; and social regulation, dealing with such
externalities as pollution, consumer information, work safety and so on.
It is obvious that trade marks regulation interacts with each one of the three categories.
Trade marks affect competition and often trade mark territorial rights are the building
blocks of anti-competitive arrangements. There are also spheres where public interest
supersedes the desire for free markets, as in the cases of deceptive or immoral marks.
A. SMITH (R.H. CAMPBELL & A.S. SKINNER, eds), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976) at IV, ii, 43, 471. Therefore administrations "...
design bureaucracies with incentive structures to facilitate control. Political principals also monitor
bureaucratic activities to offset information imbalances. When bureaucratic activities stray from the
desired result, policymakers apply sanctions or rewards to bring them back in line. Thus the theory is
dynamic, positing well-informed central decision makers who systematically mould the preferences
of bureaucratic agents": D.B. WOOD & R.W. WATERMAN, "The Dynamics of Political Control of
the Bureaucracy", 85 American Political Science Review 801(1991) at 803; perhaps, an optimistic
view of bureaucracies agility in reacting.
See SWANN, in BUTFON & SWANN (1989), at 4-6.
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Finally, trade marks are the medium of communication and the highway for consumer
information.
It is noted here that the regulation of trade marks can also have direct economic effects.
Nestle for example, having acquired Rowntree, reorganised its trade mark portfolio by
"expatriating" brands such as Kit Kat and Quality Street to Switzerland, and then licensing
their use to its subsidiaries worldwide, including the UK. The reasoning for such a move
was purely fmancial: Switzerland is a low tax area, and accordingly royalties accrued by
licensing are subjected to a lower rate of tax than in the UK; in addition Switzerland
provided for tax depreciation on such assets, something that was not available in the UK."
5.4.7. Interventionism and trade marks
Intervention can be classified as regulatory and supportive. The effects of regulatory
intervention are realised through the legislative and taxation roles of the state, control of
monopolies, health and safety requirements and the regulation of fmancial markets and
company behaviour. 46 It is again easy to draw parallels between the functions and
interventionist regulation of trade marks: taxation of intangibles, regulation of licensing,
labelling requirements, control of advertising, are amongst them.
Supportive intervention is exercised even in the most non - interventionist political
environments through the educational system and the encouragement of particular
research activities in response to specific social needs. Education of consumers and the
emancipation of their associations are relevant trade mark examples.
D. HAIGH, Brands Take Tax Break Abroad, The Times, June 9, 1994, where he argues that, in a
development similar to the flags of convenience, brands of convenience will dominate the markets
from their offshore havens.
B. BLACKWELL & S. EILON, The Global Challenge of Innovation (Oxford, Butterworth -
Heinemann, 1991) at 110.
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5.4.8. Shifting the borders of regulation
The balance between the various aspects of intervention shifts continuously, as does the
extent of such intervention. This is, firstly, because of the complexity of international
economic and political relationships in an unpredictably nationalistic world arena,
where trade and trade sanctions become tools for foreign policy and distortion of trade
flows and competition.47 Secondly it is due to the ability of multinational enterprises to
transfer packages of capital goods, management techniques, marketing strategies and
technological know how from one country to another. 48 Often though, liberalisation,
deregulation and the general rolling back of the frontiers of the state are disguising
exercises where one form of state involvement is replaced by another, at a national or
international level.
Businesses are growing in size and sophistication; global interconnections are today the
norm leading to an increasing regionalisation and globalisation of economic activities. The
European Internal Market, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Andean Pact,
the World Trade Organisation Agreement, are examples of this trend.49
Having to address all these balances and contradictions, any form of regulation should,
ideally, be exercised only when the market fails to correct itself, but prior to the point that
this failure becomes a breakage. We must always keep re-checking the regulatory status
quo, examining the nature and the size of market failures, the time it would take the
See GILPIN (1987), at 56-58. Trade marks symbolic power is again evident: "Motorola" became the
American flag in trade skirmishes between the US and Japan.
Multinational enterprises are considered to be existing in an enviromnent of "global localisation", as
termed by Akio Morita the founder of Sony; an environment which allows them on the one hand to
exploit global economies of scale and on the other to maximise their responsiveness to local markets
and sources of expertise; others challenge the "myth" by stressing that the majority of technological
activity of US multinationals is still conducted at home, or that the rate of technology activity abroad
may be increasing for European multinationals but at a very slow rate whilst in other cases the rate
decreases rather than increases. See the very interesting note of C. LORENZ, "Global Web" Still
Not Free of Tangles", Financial Times, July 15, 1994.
See P. DICKEN, The Global Shift (London, Paul Chapman, 1992), who states at 4 that since the
1950s "... national boundaries no longer act as "watertight" containers of the production process.
Rather, they are more like sieves through which extensive leakage occurs". At 103-110 the
revolution of space and transport, the "space-shrinking" technologies, is discussed; they may not be
the cause of international production but in any case they made it feasible.
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market to remedy them, the government's efficiency record in drawing and implementing
such policies, the costs of regulation and the costs of interventions that missed their
target. 5° In some cases regulation may itself prevent entry, and it may ultimately serve the
exclusive interests of the regulated firms.5'
5.4. Creativity, innovation and competition
5.5.1. Defining creativity and innovation
Before looking at the relation of creativity and innovation, it is essential to defme these
two notions; therefore for our purposes creativity will mean
"... the thinking process that helps us to generate ideas",52
and innovation
".... the practical application of such ideas towards meeting the organisation' s
objectives in a more effective way".53
5.5.2. What is an innovative product?
We may apprehend the outcome of these processes as a product that can be described as
"... new, better, faster, cheaper, and more aesthetic". 54 Turning ideas into real products
° See F.H. EASTERBROOK, "Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law", 75 California Law Review
983 (1987), and F.M. SCHERER & D. ROSS, Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance (Dallas, Houghton Muffin, 1990), at 7-9.
C.J. STIGLER, "The Economic Theory of Regulation", 2 Bell Journal of Economics (1971). For
some practical examples of businesses owing their existence to regulation see "Regulate Us, Please",
The Economist, January 8, 1994, at 67, ranging from the industry that deals with pollution to
companies that make small cars and so on.
52 s MAJARO, The Creative Gap (London, Longman, 1988), at 6.
" Ibid. Another defmition can be found in C. CARTER, "Innovation and Industry", 17 Policy Studies
32 (1987), at 32, as an activity that "... relates to the act of introducing a novelty, or of altering what
is established by the introduction of new elements"; he goes on stressing, at 33, that it has to be
examined separately from research and development, which can generally occur in a large firm, since
innovation may be "... thoroughly well integrated with the production and selling activities of the
firm [and] innovation of this kind can take place right down to the smallest firms".
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marks the difference between intellectual property and creativity on the one hand and
innovation property and entrepreneurship on the other. According to Marshall one of the
entrepreneurial functions of marketers is to fmd out what formerly unsatisfied wants can
now be provided for. of the entrepreneur. 55 Similarly Maithus asserts that a new product
"... "is thrown into the market" because the entrepreneur has "precisely
calculated" its promise as "an increase in value owing to better adaptation ... to
the tastes, wants and consumption of the society",56
and incorporates inventiveness and marketing into the concept of innovation property.
5.5.3. A trade mark for innovation?
Some commentators have proposed the introduction of a an "innovation trade mark", as an
alternative or supplement to the patent system, based on the principles of protecting
commercial and practical realities, innovations and investment. According to Kronz, the
architect of this proposition, it is worth honouring thinking and thinkers, but it is vital to
protect action and those who act. The whole system has a number of analogies with trade
mark protection: there are for example use provisions. Most importantly it provides for the
introduction of an "innovation quality mark" which would identify protected objects.57
Interestingly trade marks in real commerce often function as signifiers of innovative
products or firms.
MAJARO (1988) at 7. In our case the result will be a new, better, faster, cheaper and more aesthetic
product.
A. MARSHALL, Principles of Economics (New York, Macmillan, 1920) at 280-28 1.
56 T. MALTHUS, Principles of Political Economy (New York, Augustus Kelly, 1968) at 318, as quoted
and adapted by MACHO VEC (1995) at 126. Note that the original publication dates back to 1820.
See W. KINGSTON (ed.), Direct Protection of Innovation (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), at
35-59.
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5.5.4. Some prerequisites for innovation
The existence and the extent of innovation may be connected with investment 58 and size of
research facilities. The existence of the "matchless ingenuity of the small man" was
characterised as "pleasant fiction". 59 But of similar importance are governmental support,
general educational background and national characteristics, as a brief comparison
between the British and US computer industry shows.6°
In contrast, it might be the intellect of a lone genius or, even, simple good fortune that
triggers innovation. 6 ' Some advances are inevitable in the course of development of a
science, and in such cases luck may decide who reaches first a scientific signpost.62
As examples of the US creative obsession with innovation, legal battles such as the one on
the fatherhood of NetWare between Novell, the renowned software firm, and Dr. Billing,
hitherto little known in this field, illustrate the fascination that inventiveness holds for the
American. Often the balance in cases that reach the courts lies in favour of the small
inventor; in particular in jury cases where the small inventor may capture the sympathies
of the jury.63 In the UK on the other hand, statistical evidence shows that 23% of the total
for patent applications derive from private applicants, 70% of which went no further than
filing an application and only 4% kept a patent in force for nine years or more.M
Some distinguish between innovators and fmance houses others between marketing and research
departments. CARTER (1987) at 39, stresses that "... it is often thought that innovators are frustrated
by the unwillingness of fmance houses to help them: but it is perhaps even more true that fmance
houses are frustrated by the inability of innovators to put up a properly argued case".
J.K. GALBRAITH in American Capitalism (Boston, Houghton Muffin, 1952) at 9 1-92.
60 See J. HENDRY, Innovating for Failure: Government Policy and the Early British Computer
Industry (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1990), at 162-163.
61 See I. AMATO, "Chemistry: Laurels for a Late - Night Brainstorm", 262 Science, October 22, 1993,
at 506-507.
62 According to R.K. MERTON, The Sociology of Science (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1973), as quoted by MI. KAMIEN & N.L. SCHWARTZ in Market Structure and Innovation
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982) at 34.
63 On this case see, "The Strange Case of Dr. Billings", The Economist, October 16, 1993.
64 See DI. TRAPP, "What Chance the Private Applicant", Future and The Inventor, January 1994, at 1.
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It is not wise, therefore, to adhere to any dogma as to the pre-conditions for innovation
because
"... economic innovation requires simultaneously, both markets and interference
with markets. It therefore requires economic freedom, which is the precondition
for markets to exist, yet if there are no limitations to that freedom, there will be
very definite limitations to innovation".65
This standpoint on innovation liberates our discussion on monopolies and intellectual
property from much of the extremist postures of the opposing sides on the question of the
regulation of monopolies since it acknowledges that,
"... monopoly and competition are very generally regarded, not simply as
antithetical, but as mutually exclusive. ... Indeed, to many the very phrase
"monopolistic competition" will seem self contradictory - a juggling of words.
This conception is most unfortunate. Neither force excludes the other, and more
often than not both are requisite to an intelligible account of prices".
5.6. Describing the stages of competition
It will help the analysis of the monopolistic trade mark's characteristics if we start from
the point that the inventor with his actions added to the existing sea of knowledge just
enough to come up with a new product that is yet unbranded. A firm, has reacted either
to a technology push or to a demand pull, and created a product that fits with a specific
consumers demand. "Technology push" is a term describing the situation where the
results of research work are the initiators of innovation and a technical success from the
research department finds a commercial application through the intervention of the
marketing personel. The "demand - pull" hypothesis involves the other end of the link
between marketer - product - consumer; the marketing personel sense a consumer need,
65 W. KINGSTON, The Political Economy of Innovation (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), at 1-2.
After defming economic innovation as "... getting new things done when the innovator needs to
mobilize resources other than his own", Kingston develops a model where property is the cornerstone
of markets and its legal recognition is both its Jegitimisation and its prerequisite for efficiency.
E.H. CHAMBERLIN The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1962), at 57.
202
Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks
identify it, describe it, and demand a solution from the research department. 67 In some
cases consumers themselves apprehend the innovative character of a product and create
its demand directly.68
5.6.1. The monopolistic advantage of the market leader
We accept that any innovative product will, almost always, enjoy a grace period of
monopolistic market dominance. This grace period will not last for ever since any
profitable activity is bound to attract competitors and imitators, but
"... the practical questions are: how long and how soon? For, meanwhile,
consumers and competitors may be badly hurt".69
Thomas Edison admitted that
"... everybody steals in commerce and industry ... I've stolen a lot myself. But I
knew how to steal. They [some of his competitors] don't know how to steal -
that's all that's the matter with them."7°
5.6.2. A shorter grace period
Today competition for innovative products is almost cannibalistic; competitors in their
urge to out-spend, out-innovate and out-perform their rivals often sacrifice some of their
own success stories. One of the effects of such behaviour is that it partly denies the
likelihood of monopolies. The presence of a multitude of competitors trying to be the first
to enter a market erodes from the outset some of the advantages of the first to succeed. We
67 KAMIEN & SCHWARTZ (1982) offer in 22-48 a comprehensible analysis of such Schumpeterian
hypotheses in the context of Schumpeter's theories and other relevant research.
Tea bags, for example, "... came into being at the beginning of the centuly when a New York
merchant used small silk bags to send samples of tea to his customers. It was the merchant's
customers who immediately saw and demanded the convenience of porous bags for making a single
cup of tea". See J. O'SAUGHNESSY, Why People Buy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987), at
29.
69 As succinctly put by Judge R. JOLIET, at v of his foreword in V. KORAH, An Introductory Guide to
EEC Competition Law and Practice (Oxford, ESC Publishing, 1994).
° R.W. CLARK, Edison The Man Who Made the Future (London, Macdonald and Jane's, 1977), at 54.
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will, briefly, look here to two such examples, one at the highest end of technology and
another at the lowest.
Intel provides the first example. The cost of a chip is proportional to the size of the area
that it covers on a silicone sheet; 486 chips need less space than Pentium chips and
accordingly are more cost effective. It was calculated that the same sheet (wafer) of
silicone would offer an income of $32,340 if it was cut to 486 pieces and $5,418 if it was
cut to Pentium pieces. In theory Intel could wait until 486s were exploited to their fullest
and then present Pentium as a new product replacing 486 chips. However, Intel could not
afford to keep Pentium in their drawers; competition of other 486 chip makers and the fear
that someone else would come up with the equivalent of Pentium, obliged them to out -
perform themselves, sacrifice some of the 486s' profits and introduce Pentiums in the mar-
ket.7 ' And even before Pentium was established in the personal computer market, Intel
intended to put in the market P6, already tested for more than three years, before the end
of 1996 and before AMI) and Cyrix put in the market their own clones of Pentium.72
At the other end, a company that manufactures household goods, like plastic buckets,
sandwich boxes and washing up brushes, has for more than a decade been among the most
innovative US companies. Rubbermaid is constantly updating its products, following the
latest consumer trend, whether fashion-led, sociological, demographic or global. The
company actually demands that 33% of its revenues come from products introduced in the
last five years; as fast as new products come on to the market, old ones, or new but not so
successful ones, are dropped. A result is that, because of the rate of replacement, maturing
products tend to become extinct long before customer demand has dried up.73
71 
"Pent - up Demand", The Economist, November 13, 1993, at 132. A strategy that rewarded Intel
since for the first half of 1994 revenues were $5.43bn, up 31% from the first half in 1993: L.
KEHOE, "Pentium Chip Lifts Intel to Eighth Consecutive Record", Financial Times, July 19, 1994.
72 L. KEHOE, "Intel Steps Up Pace of New Products With P6 Microchip", Financial Times, February
17, 1995.
' See R. TOMKINS, "Low Tech, High Yield", Financial Times, March 11, 1994. Competition
problems would arise when in parallel with the product replacement supply of spare parts of dries up.
This could constitute unethical behaviour but it is a question of trading standards and competition
law to what extent it constitutes punishable behaviour.
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Firms seek constant improvement in their operations, and designers can no longer afford
to wait until a product emerges from a factory before they find out how well it works;
"... engineers and product managers must telescope product specification,
functional design, design for manufacture, factory layout, and product testing
into heavily overlapped schedules".74
5.6.3. Intellectual property: prolonging the grace period
In this frenetic competitive race, trade marks and other intellectual property rights have a
dual role: firstly, they legally prolong either the "first to enter the market" monopoly itself
or at least the enjoyment of some of its advantages for single firms; secondly, in a multi-
firm and competitive environment they may become the tools of competitive or anti-
competitive behaviour, according to their use in licensing agreements, pooling arrangem-
ents and so on.
Patents are a particularly apt example of an almost Faustian bargain that enterprises strike
in order to enjoy the fruits of monopoly protection: on the one hand the enterprise obtains
a limited monopoly for a given period of time and on the other it gives away to the public,
in general, the details of the object of the monopoly, although this may be done in an
obscure way. Bayer, for example has filed patents in the US under 150 different names
and variations, creating almost insuperable difficulties for anyone who wants to cross-
check and oppose patent applications.75
The other side of the Faustian deal is the way the State balances the conflict between
patent rights and antitrust policy. It is argued that the patent system only grants a limited
monopoly, in order to promote efficiency in technological advance, whilst antitrust
See A. PENZIAS, Ideas and Information (New York, W.W. Norton, 1989), at 185-186, describing
his own experience with AT&T.
See "Hidden Agenda", The Economist, November 20, 1993, at 134.
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promotes an efficient production and allocation of resources: both are aiming at the
improvement of market perfonnance.76
A. Grove, Intel's chief, expresses the aphorism regarding some of their rivals that
"... if [copying] is what you choose ... the least you can do is be meticulous in
honouring the trade secrets and patents of the party you are going to rip off'.77
This underlines the importance of the legal monopolies that subsidise Intel's bold market
strategies; even more so when at the other end of Intel's licensing agreements we fmd
companies like AIvID whose very existence in the microprocessor market relies on the
interpretation of its licensing agreements with Intel. US courts construed a 1976 licensing
agreement between the two companies so as to grant AMD the right to use Intel's
copyright programs, including their microcode. According to W.J. Sanders Ill, AMD's
chairman,
"... for nearly a decade, AMD's growth, profitability and indeed very existence
have been threatened by Intel's unwillingness to live up to its agreements with
AMD, preferring to compete in the courtroom instead of the marketplace".78
In short, production cost cuttings and product modifications are not enough to secure
marketing successes. What is required is further technical innovation in parallel with
marketing strategies developed on the basis of the benefits looked for by the targeted
customers, the economics of the firms supply system, and, fmally, the consideration of the
potential and actual reaction of competitors.79
76 See W.S. BOWMAN, Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1977), at 1.
" See A. CANE, "Chips With Everything", Financial Times, November 15, 1993, interviewing Intel's
top trio.
See L. KEHOE, "AMD Wins Round in Intel Fight", Financial times, March 11, 1994.
See A. JOFINE & P. SNELSON, Successful Product Development (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990),
at 10 and 22 for a comprehensive description of the series of strategic choices for product
development.
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5.6.4. Distinguishing diverse stages and forms of competition
The ideal state of the markets, according to classical economists, would be one of perfect
competition which comprises the following essentials:
• firstly, there must be numerous buyers and sellers so that no participant's actions will
have any significant impact on the product's price;
• secondly, market transactions at known prices are the mirror of consumer's
preferences;
• thirdly, all the participants are perfectly informed or that products offered by sellers are
all homogeneous or indistinguishable;
. and fourthly, there are no artificial barriers to entry.8°
The result of such markets where firms are willing to sell at the level that price equals
marginal cost, 81 would be a world of "price-takers", where firms produce and sell their
products at given market prices, in the same way that households buy, accepting the prices
charged by marketers.82
However, real markets are never perfectly competitive;
"... the ... requirements for pure competition suggest at once the two ways in
which monopolistic and competitive elements may be blended.... there may be
one, few, or many selling the identical product in the identical market... [and]
sellers may be offering identical slightly different, or very different products".83
80 See F. BATOR, "The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization", 47 American Economic Review
22 (1957).
Marginal cost denotes the additional cost of producing one more unit of output.
82 SAMIJELSON & NORDHAUS (1989) at 541.
83 CHAMBERLIN (1962), at 8.
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Machovec argues, that partly as a result of Robinson's and Chamberlin's use, the
"classical" model of perfect competition has become
"... a straw man against which their model was favourably compared, and partly
as a result in Knight and Stigler the economic profession, has, by and large come
to accept the erroneous idea that the perfectly competitive model (in various
degrees of formal developments) has been an implicit pillar of economic
analysis since Adam Smith".84
He adds that indeed if every participant were perfectly informed then a dictatorial power
would be required to break the resulting gridlock
".. by directing the consummation of that subset of outcomes which otherwise
would be precluded by the intractability introduced by the omniscience of
transactors".85
Although one may disagree with the perspective from which Machovec views
competition, markets and society, his "bottom line" is probably correct, and supports
our views on neutrality, the definition of property and the relation between law and
economics. The exclusion of socio-political factors from the field of economics was
intended to make allocational analysis ideologically neutral; however this exclusion was
proved to be unworkable.
5.6.5. Branded goods, vertical and horizontal channels
In the different stages of the production process vertical competition will mean
competition between firms engaging in two or more stages of this process and horizontal
the competition between firms that operate at the same stage of production.86
MACHOVEC (1995) at 11. For the references see CHAMBERLIN ibid, J. ROBINSON, The
Economics of Imperfect Competition (London, McMillan, 1932), F. KNIGHT, Risk, Opportunity
and Profit (New York, Augustus Kelly, 1964 - originally published in 1921) and G. STIGLER,
Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, in Essays in the History of Economics (Chicago,
Chicago University Press, 1965).
MACHO VEC (1995) at 50.
86 See the definitions of vertical and horizontal integration, at 975 of SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS
(1989).
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It is difficult though to draw clear lines in defming real life competitors who may be
vertical and/or horizontal. Manufacturers of consumer goods, for example, may reach the
consumer through their own retailing channels; alternatively they may employ exclusive
franchisees, or contract with independent retailers and so on. First in the US, and more
recently in Europe, manufacturers of famous brands, such as Nike, Calvin Klein, and
Laura Ashley, are selling surplus stock at prices up to 50% below conventional retail, but,
as reported, still at a profit, from factory premises or purpose-built malls. Often, and in
order to avoid competition with their own retailers, they situate the malls at out-of-town
shopping centres.87
Horizontal variety
As to the multiplicity of trade channels, and accordingly alternative situations of
competition, a good example is that of Jourdan, the shoe manufacturer.88 It was reported
that the top and medium quality shoes made by Jourdan were sold in France in four differ-
ent ways: first, in twenty shops owned and managed by the Jourdan group, displaying the
Jourdan or Xavier Danaud signs outside their outlets; second, through thirty franchised
shops, under an exclusive distribution agreement, displaying the same signs; third, through
three franchise-corner retailers, selling the brands in separate parts within their shops,
displaying the signs in the particular parts; and fmally through a very large number of
independent retailers. It was this diversity that led the Commission to exempt from the
competition rules the allocation of exclusive territories to the franchisees.
87 See, N. BUCKLEY, "Branded Bargains", Financial Times, January 6, 1994. Again there is a mirror
image here: part of the services offered by reputable retailers is ascertaining intrinsic qualities of
particular brands. So choosing a brand to stand amongst the other well chosen marks acts as a sign to
the consumer. However, the price cautious consumer will then go and shop the branded product in
"no-frills" discounting retailers. This is a free ride for the discounting retailer on the back of the
reputed retailer; but as our case shows it can also be a free ride for the reputed manufacturer.
Relationships between marketers can be unexpectedly antagonistic or synthetic. See D.W. BOYD,
"The Resale Price Maintenance Struggle: A Comment", [1993] American Journal of Economics and
Sociology 449.
88 Charles Jourdan [1988] 4 CMLR 81. See V. KORAH, Franchising and the EEC Competition Rules -
Regulation 4087/88 (Oxford, ESC Publishing, 1989), at 26 and 30.
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Own label and branded goods
A retailer may put in the market her/his own brands that may compete with those of other
manufacturers. Until now retailers and manufacturers were managing to keep a delicate
balance in a relationship characterised as one of "... resentful dependency at the best of
times".89 Often manufacturers that came second in the market were choosing to
concentrate on becoming suppliers for the own labels, 9° or diversify and market their own
brand and manufacture for the "own label" segment as well. On the other hand, retailers
like Marks & Spencer were dealing only in "own label" products, and then used their mark
to jump from one product market to another. Marks & Spencer have become the UK's
most profitable retailer, by carefully selecting the consumer products traded by them. They
moved from clothes to food and are now using their goodwill for carefully selecting
suppliers in order to enter the market for life and pension fmancial products.91
Similarly trade marks are used by manufacturers who want to maintain their exclusivity as
means of strengthening their brand image. Kelloggs, for example, launched a campaign
based on the statement that "We don't make cereals for anyone else", in order to clarify
that their customers would not fmd cheaper Kelloggs under another get-up. The message
89 See S. GILCHRIST, The Undeclared War Waged on Supermarket Shelves, The Times, February 18,
1994.
° See the Heinz - Campbell example below.
' This is a market of products which should be tailor made to fit the needs of individual customers;
however there was public concern about the mis-selling of such products by advisers who earned a
commission from the suppliers of standardised products. In contrast M&S is stressing that its advisers
are salaried, and offer the "standard" M&S product only when it fits the customer's needs. M&S is
apparently attempting to transfer its reputation to a comparatively new field. The only fmancial service
offered by M&S until then was customer's credit. See A. SMITH, "M&S Enters Pensions Market",
Financial Times, February 2, 1994. But M&S is not the only example: General Motors and Ford
entered the lucrative market of credit card issuers offering at the same time discounts on car
purchases to their holders; S. WOTHINGTON, "Card Game With Much to Play For", Financial
Times, May 5, 1994. Similarly other retailers are moving in the financial sector in order to capitalise
further their reputation for customer service: for the case of Safeway see P. HOLLINGER & G.
GRAHAM, "Supermarkets Banking on their Brand Names", Financial Times, December 3, 1996.
Note that in a Financial Times/Price Waterhouse survey of top managers naming their most respected
competitors, M & S was voted as Europe's most respected company; in the Customer Focus section of
the reasons for selecting companies the most important quality was considered to be the enjoyment of
high customer loyalty: P. TAYLOR, "Benchmark is Set by Clear Winners in Product Groups",
Financial Times, June 27, 1994.
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however had to be conveyed in a subtle way because even Kelloggs could not afford
irritating supermarket chains.
In short the markets for branded and own label goods in the UK were considered separate
markets that coexisted and used the same trade channels. It was the introduction of the
Trade Marks Bill and the opportunity for protection against imitation of the overall
appearance of a brand rather than against imitation of distinctive signs that revived once
more the discussion on the interrelation of a trade marks statute, unfair competition and
passing off doctrines, and anti-trust rationales that persuaded brand owners to challenge
supermarkets' awesome power. But as M. Shearer, of the British Retail Consortium put it,
"... brand companies are trying to use trademark legislation to seek infringement
proceedings against something that is not a trademark. That is totally illogical. It
is also a restriction on competition".93
To the counter argument that continental jurisdictions offer more coherent protection to
their brand owners via a combination of intellectual property statutes and unfair
competition doctrines, retailers reply that there is a similar opportunity in the UK by the
appropriate use of consumer protection legislation and the Copyright Designs and Patents
Act 1988.
The reader should note that in most of the discussion the consumer is used as a yardstick
to prove confusion but is refused the right to participate independently. The Consumers
Association seems to back the retailers' claims since, in their surveys, shoppers showed a
preference for many own - label products in blind tastings. There is a fear, therefore, that
tighter restrictions on own label products could lead to narrowing the choices for
consumers.94
5.6.6. The difficulties of regulation
By forming the British Producers and Brands Owners Group, as reported by S. GILCHRIST, in
"Brand Names Take on Stores", The Times, February 23, 1994.
Ibid.
N. BUCKLEY, "On the Prowl for Copycats", Financial Times March 3, 1994.
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Interrelations between trade channels - and accordingly associations of trade marks -
became more and more complicated. Indeed associations of products and names often are
indicative of market concentrations.
Tesco first uses its buying power, and then sells cheap petrol next to groceries; Esso takes
advantage of its thousands of outlets and sells groceries next to petrol; now Texaco will
build outlets to sell groceries and McDonalds burgers, but not petrol. Indeed if McDonalds
can find brand synergy with Texaco, then why not Shell with Tesco?95 In general one can
argue that they are simply sharing ever-increasing costs, relevant expertise and oppor-
tunities for sales expansion; on the other hand the prospect of such linkings is a threat to
their competitors and carries with it enormous market and economic power.
The regulator of competition faces the difficult task of examining such combinations of
production, distribution and retailing, whereas one of the competitors may be controlling
the sites, another the know how, another one of the products using the same channel and
so on. The regulator then has to defme the relevant market, look at the merits of the
agreement and decide whether each combination is efficient, cost cutting and also
beneficial to the consumer, or detect anti-competitive colluding practices.
5.6.7. Competition as a universal policy; externalities and conflicting interests
Finally it has to be added that competition is not necessarily a universal economic policy.
Some markets cannot sustain it - as for example in the cases of natural monopolies where
production at minimum costs is only possible on such scales where a few or only one firm
could satisfy the demand at a profit - or because costs and/or benefits that are external to
manufacturers and/or buyers are distorting the way markets behave.
See A. MITCELL, "Fill the Car With Five-Star Food, Please", The Times, January 26, 1994.
Even for such cases of natural monopolies there are widely differing theories. See, for example, H.
DEMSETZ, "Why Regulate Utilities", 11 Journal of Law & Economics 55 (1968) and contrast with
0. WILLIAMSON, "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies", 7 Bell Journal of Economics
(1976) 73, arguing that the market would support an infmite number of bidders for becoming the sole
distributors of electricity.
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Pollution is the classic example of an externality. The isolated consumer might not be
concerned if he/she could buy a cheaper product from a polluting industry; similarly an
industry might not be concerned if it could lower the costs of production by defying the
nuisance that pollution creates for its neighbours. The citizen though, regardless of status
as a shareholder, employee or consumer, may be concerned by the pollution, at least of
neighbouring industries. It is evident that a compromise has to be reached and standards to
be set.
In addition the interests of some social groups may distort competition: In less developed
economies, for example, with weak industry, having to face massive urban unemployment
created from the influx from the countryside, the easy reaction was to expand state
employment; however such policies distorted the markets and subsequently influenced the
views of many commentators on competition.97
5.6.8. Non price competition
It is necessary to reiterate that firms compete with one another in many aspects beside
prices, such as product quality and after sales service. The ECJ recognised the existence of
non-price competition and it was accepted that in some product markets, as in markets for
high quality and high technology products, a reduction of price competition in favour of
competition relating to factors other than price may be justified. Nevertheless, the
reduction in price competition should never result in limitation of outlets on the basis of
quantitative criteria, resale price maintenance, and/or export bans. 98 Quality and product
See N.P. MOUZELIS, Politics in the Semi-Periphery (New York, St. Martins Press, 1986), at 10-13,
for the results on the political organisation of such economies.
See for example Société Technique Miniére v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] CMLR 357 where it
was held that to determine whether an agreement is anti-competitive one must take into account the
nature and quantity of the products covered by the agreement, the position and importance of the
grantor and the concessionaire on the concerned product market, the isolated nature of the agreement
or its position in a series of agreements, the severity of restricting clauses, and the possibilities
allowed to competitors; see also AEG Telefun/en v. Commission [1984] 3 CMLR 413. Trade mark
wise it is interesting to notice that as consumers in the Union become more affluent inter brand
competition is considered equally important with intra brand competition; accordingly in cases like
Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora B V [1998] RPC 166 (for the Advocate General's opinion) and
Loendersloot Internationale Expeditie v. George Ballantine & Son Ltd [1998] FSR 544 there is
evidence that the ECJ is willing to look at the balance between the interests of brand owners and the
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diversification, on the other hand, adds new dimensions to competition; since such
diversification is difficult to monitor, it is often impossible to detect and distinguish
switching from one field of competition to another both at national and international
levelsY9 In the US case of the airline industry, during the period of fixed air-fares imposed
by the State, airlines began to defy the imposed cartel by providing more value for money
through sophisticated in flight services. When in turn labour laws forced them to stop sex
and age discrimination, competition switched to non-stop schedules, seat width, and leg
room. ' °°
So textbook competition, as long as it fails to incorporate non - price competition, is
almost irrelevant to our case, either because
"... [under] the capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is
not that kind of competition which counts but the competition from the new
commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of
organization (the largest - scale unit of control for instance) - competition which
commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the
margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their
foundations and their very lives",'01
and this capitalist reality is creating new forms of competition.'° 2 On the other hand price
might be something too dangerous to compete in, and accordingly firms rivalry is
channelled to other forms of competition.
need to allow free further commercialisation of a product within the borders of the European
Economic Area.
After a number of contradictory decisions at the Commission and the EJC level the Commission
seems now to take a more relaxed attitude: to determine the effect of an agreement one must look at
the market context and the barriers to entry and take into account changes in marketing and
distribution techniques, so they now welcome contributions in re-establishing a formal policy; see
"The Commission as Repentant Sinner", Business Europe February 12, 1997, 1. For a critical review
of cases see KORAH (1994) at 49-55 and Chapter 14.
'°° See A. DIXIT & B. NALEBLJFF, Thinking Strategically (New York, Norton & Co. 1991), at 96.
'° A. J. SCHUMPETER, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London, Allen & Unwin, 1976), at 84.
102 See T. LEVITT, "Marketing Success Through Differentiation - Of Anything", 58 Harvard Business
Review 83 (1980).
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5.6.9. Monopolies and soft targets
We must also remember, in the urge for (or aversion from) regulation, that monopolies
target the buying power of all consumers, sophisticated or not. The computer games
market targeting younger consumers provides such an example. Despite their involvement
and expertise with computer games, children are not, yet, the economists' dream of
consumers: rational and informed customers capable to exercise their choices. In the UK,
Sega and Nintendo, cashing in on such successful brand names as Sonic - the Hedgehog
and Super Mario Brothers, and relying on patents, trade mark and software protection,
have cornered 90% of a 9 billion pounds-a-year market. The Monopolies Commission is
facing the competition question "par excellence". It is dealing with a highly sensitive
market and is faced with three options; first, to impose price controls, but this might
prevent any competition developing at all; second, to attack restrictive licensing agree-
ments that extended their dominance from hardware to software, but this would have a
minimal overall effect in a market where licensing agreements are on a global scale; and
finally to do nothing but wait for other giants to come in the markets, attracted by their
high margins. Challenging further the rules of the game, Sega announced their linkage
with Microsoft, which already enjoys 90% of the world market in business computers'
operating systems. The new co-operation can lead to the setting of a new industry standard
for home entertainment software. All new software would then have to be compatible with
Microsoft's operating software, as every business software must be compatible with MS-
Dos and/or Windows. Microsoft have realised the controversy of such a marriage and
accordingly are playing down its strategic significance by stressing that they will continue
to focus on their traditional activities.'03
103 See "A Trojan Hedgehog", The Economist, January 22, 1994, and "Games Duopoly", Editorial,
Financial Times, January 17, 1994, M. NAKAMOTO & A. CANE, "Sega Plans Link-Up With
Microsoft for New Video Game", Financial Times, January 18, 1994 and L. KEHOE & M.
NAKAMOTO, "Microsoft Plays Down Sega Video Game Role", Financial Times, March 10, 1994.
Note, too, that Microsoft apparently intends to become the leading supplier of educational and other
programmes published on CD-Rom, what is sometimes known as "edutainment": A. CANE, "Magic
Market for Microsoft", Financial Times, October 3, 1994. Since then Microsoft had to struggle, in
most cases successfully, with numerous questions on competition posed mainly in the us in respect
of the bundling together of Windows Explorer, its Internet browsing software, with Windows 95 and
Windows 98, its operating systems.
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5.6.10. The complexities of detecting market competitiveness
The common theme of all these disparate examples is that competition and, resultingly,
collusion are moving into new and unexplored territories where the limits between
genuine concern for competition and social issues on the one hand and disguised
protectionism on the other are ill defined, and the grey area between them is vast and
uncharted. 104 Identifying possibilities for competition, cases of tacit collusion and
manipulation of the market game has become quite complicated, and trade marks'
functions are opening a whole range of new issues.'°5
Currently the regulation of competition is a game where everyone plays for everything to
win, not only on the international level of national or supranational competing regulatory
bodies, but also on the level of market competitors.
5.6.11. Competition as a two stage game
In order to highlight the competition dilemmas that the firms face before entering a market
and lay the ground for examining the role of trade marks, we will adopt a model that
envisages competition as a two - stage game.'°6
104 In most cases the fact remains "... though you might not see it clearly, ... collusion still hurts you",
DIXIT & NALEBUFF (1991) at 97. Opaque competition, as they baptised the result of the shift of
competition focusing on less observable dimensions, led to the imposition of US quotas on Japanese
car imports. This resulted to a rise in prices of all models, Japanese and US alike, and the
disappearance of the low-end Japanese models from the market. Similarly, under a complicated
system of import quotas imposed by the EEC on Japanese car imports, Toyota Japan has allocated a
number of cars to Toyota Hellas for the Greek market; since Toyota Hellas outperformed its targets
and was pressing Toyota Japan to reallocate to Greece some of the cars destined for other European
markets: in every case the market is distorted and some consumers are left unable to satisfy their first
choice. See S. KTENAS, "The Car Market Is Seeking a Way Out" (in Greek), To Vima, January 9,
1994.
105 The ECJ had to look at this question in Loendersloot Internationale Expeditie v. George Ballantine &
Son Ltd [1998] FSR 544.
106 See J. SUTTON, Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising, and the
Evolution of Concentration (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991), at 7-12, where he sets the grounds for his
analysis.
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The life of a firm as a production unit passes through a series of stages, characterised by
the occurrence of particular costs. The interaction of these costs, in turn, determines the
equilibrium pattern of industrial structure.
The First Stage
At the beginning of life for a firm the initial costs are described as fixed costs and they
represent the total expense to be paid out, even when no output is produced; these are
unaffected by any variation in the quantity of output.'° 7 Such costs are for example the
expenses for acquiring a single plant of minimum efficient scale - setup costs - and
developing and establishing the product line - initial advertising and research and
development costs. These costs carry with them a degree of irreversibility of behaviour,
and for that reason they are also referred to as sunk costs, determining the first stage of the
competitive game and setting the ground for price competition at the second level of the
game.
The Subcases and their Relevance to the Second Stage
(i) Exogenous Sunk Costs
In the first case the only sunk costs involved are the exogenously'°8 given setup costs. So
at a level where firms produce homogeneous products and the only occurring costs are the
exogenously given setup costs, then as the population of the consumers, and resultingly
the size of the market, increases then the number of the firms entering the markets
increases and concentration declines indefinitely. This is the sensible outcome of the
thought that, at the second competitive level, new entrants will keep on coming into the
market as long as the profits of the last entrant cover the sunk costs that occurred at the
107 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS (1989), at 514.
Endogenous are the costs which are part of the choices that a firm must determine within its own self.
Exogenous are the costs determined outside the competence of a firm. The level of advertising for
example must be decided endogenously, whilst the cost of setting up a plant is a cost which is
exogenously determined and is a cost that all market participants must bear.
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initial stage and profits will, as it is argued in most of the literature, rise indefinitely in
relation to the rate of consumption.
In reality though both hypotheses have limits. Firstly, we have seen that products are not
homogeneous, and that
"... a general class of product is differentiated if any significant basis exists for
distinguishing the goods or services of one seller from those of another. Such a
basis may be real or fancied, so long as it is of any importance whatever to
buyers, and leads to a preference for one variety of the product over another.
Where such differentiation exists, even though it slight, buyers will be paired
with sellers, not by chance and at random (as under pure competition), but
according to their preference".'°9
And secondly, during a flat population trend, retailers in many sectors can grow only by
eroding the market shares of others. As a result, cut - throat competition will be evidenced
at all levels." 0 Under these conditions the grace monopoly period of any innovative
product, is getting shorter and increasingly insignificant.
At the same time, and because
"... the only solution fully consistent with the central hypothesis that each seller
seeks his maximum profit is one in which he does take into account the effect of
his policy upon his rivals (and hence upon himself again)",'11
it is rational to expect that prices and profit margins will fall together with the level of
concentration, at the latter stage of price competition." 2 Sutton incorporates this assertion
into his theory by creating a "function" that links market concentration to product price
'° See CHAMBERLIN (1962), at 56.
l0 See J. SCHUMPETER, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London, Allen & Unwin, 1943), who
at 83 states that "... the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes
from new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the
new forces of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates". This impulse will keep on re-
balancing market status quos. As KINGSTON (1984) puts it, at 5, "... if necessity is the mother of
invention, therefore, market power is the mother of innovation, and market power in this context is
strictly a man-made thing".
I" C}IAMBERLIN(1962),at3l.
112 The Bain hypothesis on conduct.
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and by creating subcases for the second stage of the competitive game, that of price
competition. The function is mainly affected first by the physical nature of the product,
coming back to the distinction of homogeneous versus differentiated products; and second
by the climate of competition policy, distinguishing between strict and acquiescent
approaches to firms' coordination on price. He supposes that product differentiation and
strong competition policies make competitive regimes tougher and the anticipation of such
regimes makes entry less attractive and raises equilibrium concentration levels. His theory
is made more attractive because its variations are based on the formulation of a two stage
competitive game and they incorporate subcases. The inclusion of dynamic features allows
a clearer view of the competitive web.
Put another way the result in such markets is that,
"... where sunk costs are exogenous, and where firms offer a homogeneous
product, the equilibrium level of concentration declines with the ratio of market
size to setup cost and rises with the toughness of price competition"."3
(ii) Exogenous sunk costs and product differentiation
In the second subcase are included firms that offer differentiated products but their sunk
costs are still exogenously determined. The archetypal example of such a market is one of
an homogeneous product but where consumers are spread over a region and incur costs in
buying from distant suppliers, consumers thereafter
"... make their purchases from the lowest-cost supplier, where the cost to the
consumer consists of the price paid to the firm plus a transport cost that
increases with his distance from the supplier"."4
His research shows that in such models multiple equilibria are endemic. Any predictions
depend upon market features that vary from one industry to another. Therefore Chamberl-
in's view that
w SUTTON(1991).
" SUTTON (1991), at 10.
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"... curves of demand and supply tell nothing , either by themselves or by their
intersection, as to what price will be established, until other conditions are
known"
seems to hold, despite its age.
A general conclusion for markets with exogenous costs would be that an increase in the
size of the market relative to setup costs may lead to an indefmite lowering of the level of
concentration."6
(iii) Endogenous Sunk Costs
The most obvious examples of endogenous sunk costs are advertising and research and
development (R&D) outlays. Having examined a wide range of oligopoly models, Sutton
arrives to a different conclusion from that reached for firms with exogenous sunk costs
only. By incurring greater exogenous costs at the first stage of the game, finns will create
a lower limit to the equilibrium level of concentration in the industry, irrespective of how
large the market becomes. Therefore,
"... increases in market size cannot lead to a fragmented market structure as the
size of the market increases. Rather a competitive escalation in outlays at stage 1
of the game raises the equilibrium level of sunk costs incurred by incumbent
firms in step with increases in the size of the market - thus offsetting the
tendency toward fragmentation"."7
This conclusion, coupled with the observation that
"... slight elements of monopoly have a way of playing unexpected logical tricks,
with results quite out of proportion to their seeming importance","8
delineates the economic importance of trade marks, which are not only connected with
R&D, as parts of a more general intellectual and industrial property regime, and
' CHAMBERLIN (1962), at 15.
116 SUTTON (1991), at 11.
SUT1'ON (1991), at 11-12.
I'S CHAMBERLIN (1962), at 1.
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advertising, as the enabling factor and a tool, but are also the only way for differentiating
between incumbents and newcomers in the markets.
5.7. The marketplace for international competition
5.7.1. International aspects of competition
The global equivalent to "perfect competition" is a world where trade flows freely and
mankind enjoys a competitive distribution of labour attained by
"... each country producing those commodities for which by its situation, its
climate, and its other natural or artificial advantages, it is adapted, and by their
exchanging them for the commodities of other countries, as they should be
augmented by a rise in profits. Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each
country naturally devotes its capital and labour to such employments as are most
beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected
with the universal good of the whole. By stimulating industry, rewarding
ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed by
nature, it distributes labour most effectively: while, by increasing the general
mass of productions, it diffuses general benefit, and binds together by one
common tie of interest and intercourse the universal society of nations
throughout the civilized world".119
But even Ricardo could diagnose the elusiveness of such a model by referring to artificial
barriers that countries would impose in order to increase their profits from international
trade.
Interdependence, by nature, could never be symmetrical and the Marxist antidote of
national economic self-sufficiency has proved, in practice, utopic; its performance ranged
from inefficiency to inhumanity according to the critics' political and consumerist
"9 D. RICARDO, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (3rd ed., 1821, Royal Economic
Society, CUP edition), at 132. Ricardo's message is topical. Despite the struggle of administrations to
adapt to a changing environment and compete in every aspect, multilateral agreements aim to expand
the markets world-wide and provide opportunities for all. OECD's defmition of a country's
competitiveness as the degree to which a country can, under free and fair market conditions, produce
goods and services which meet the test of international markets, while simultaneously maintaining
and expanding the real incomes of its people over the long term, shows a similar perspective.
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standards. Accordingly, the order of the world market is usually dominated by the
economically strongest competing nations or associations, currently the US, the EU and
Japan. The EU emerged as an important actor in world affairs during the 1970's, having
undermined the world economic hegemony of the US.' 2° Uneven growth among national
economies in a liberal world results in an increasing economic and political differentiation
of states and creates an international hierarchy of wealth, power and dependency
relations.' 2 ' The rigidity of this hierarchy, though, is challenged by the need of the
powerful to trade with the weaker. Examples can be drawn from the (now commonplace)
message that the markets of the formerly eastern bloc are crucially important for the
companies of the European Union, or from the fact that a Malaysian "don't buy British"
unofficial campaign was interpreted as an embargo, with potentially significant negative
results for the British economy.
5.7.2. Tariffs and dumping: distorting the international marketplace
The most obvious tool for states to redraw the balances according to their national
interests was to impose import tariffs or support exporting industries and press for freer
trade when it was within their national interests. The power of such tools often
corresponds to their economic and military power. So many commentators argued that, in
short
"... the greater power of the developed nations imposed upon the reluctant
partners the opportunities of international trade and division of labor",'22
but only to the extent that international trade and division of labour were beneficial to their
interests, and despite the fact that free trade is the most essential precondition of
120 See S. GEORGE, Politics and Policy in the European Community (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1991), at 62-64.
121 See GILPIN (1987), at 96.
122 5 KUZNETS, Modem Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1966), at 335 and GILPIN (1987), at 52, referring also to C. LIPSON, Standing Guard:
Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1985) who advocates that great powers, in pursuit of their own interests, created
international law to protect the property rights of private traders and investors.
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capitalism. On the other hand, less developed countries will benefit from almost any
technological progress that comes together with free trade, so the balance that they attempt
to strike is a delicate one.' 23 Nevertheless, in all cases the condition and regulation of
international competition is critical because if unequal development is connected with the
freedom of trade then it could be attributed to
"... aspects of market power that go beyond monopolistic competition in trade,
i.e. collusion and entry deterrence at the international level".'24
5.7.3. Alternatives for distortion
Since tariff rates have decreased following the efforts of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and agreements for free trading areas like the European Internal Market under the
Single European Act, the European Economic Area, the North American Free Trade
Agreement, and so on, national authorities often succumb to national pressure groups and
switch to elaborate and less visible forms of discrimination, such as voluntary restraint
agreements, customs valuation procedures, administrative practices, and complex quotas.
It is difficult to define, if not to distinguish, all these non-tariff barriers; the limits between
what constitutes a barrier and what is a legitimate concern are often obscure.
France, for example, in order to stop the rapid growth in the importation of videos, ruled
that all such imports would have to pass through customs in Poitiers, incidentally a very
small customs post. The measure was an effective barrier, until withdrawn.125
123 Contrast C.F. DIAZ - ALEJANDRO, Delinking North and South: Unshackled or Unhinged, in A.
FISHLOW (ed.), Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy (New York, McGraw - Hill, 1978),
at 94-104, with A. DIXIT, Growth and Terms of Trade Under Imperfect Competition, in H.
KIERZKOWSKI (ed.), Monopolistic Competition and International Trade (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1984), at 109-123.
124 DIXIT, ibid, at 121.
125 See Commission v. French Republic [1983] ECR 1013. The ECJ has dealt with numerous similar
attempts by member states. See D. WYATF & A. DASHWOOD, European Community Law
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), at 218. Even campaigns for the protection of cultural and linguistic
heritage are often precariously close to camouflaged protectionism. Again in France, in order to save the
French nature of their culture, a scheme has been developed under which all the broadcasters in the FM
band, and irrespectively of the rules of their original licence, will have to broadcast a minimum of 40%
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Another often used mechanism is to demand the international adoption and enforcement
of laws that conform to stricter environmental, labour, trading, and safety, standards. Such
examples are the French prime minister's call for the European Union to push for
protection against "... unfair foreign competition which is based on lower wages, currency
rates, etc. ..."; the UK's passionate support of the British plug;' 26 Austria's environmental
bargaining, during its EU accession negotiations, over lorry transit quotas.'27
And fmally the most powerful of discriminatory mediums: the strict enforcement of
territorial industrial property laws (as a long series of European and American cases
shows),' 28 and the introduction of minimum international standards for the protection of
intellectual and industrial property, under the WTO arrangements for Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs).129
5.7.4. International pressure for upgrading intellectual property protection
In exemplifying the use of trade marks as tools for partitioning and compartinentalising
the markets, we will briefly consider the less developed economies and the pressure
exercised for upgrading their intellectual property laws.
of French contemporary songs. Note that, as reported, there are no references to type or quality of
music, only to language, quantity and chronology of production. This comes after having successfully
negotiated television programme quotas in the context of WTO and strengthened laws that make the use
of French language obligatory: D. BUCHAN, "French Sing a Song of Francophilia", Financial Times,
January 31, 1994 and D. BUCHAN, "Balladur Declares War on Franglais", Financial Times, March
9, 1994. Of course the attachment of the French people to Franglais may prove irresistible. Note that
some opinion makers in France supported that the "associations defending the french language" should
have the right to take directly to court those who infringe their obligations to label products and
advertise jobs in French.
126 R. WATERHOUSE, in "The Implementation of European Legislation in the Area of Consumer
Protection", European Access, February 1990, 13, at 15, stresses that in the absence of common
European high standards the result will be that the pressure on manufacturers will be to conform with
the lower than the higher EU standards, especially as up to date EU standards simply do not exist for
many products.
127 D. GARDNER, "Pressure Builds in EU Entry Talks", Financial Times, February 28, 1994.
' See for example the controversy that cases such as Magill (RTP & fTC v E. C. Commission [1995] 4
CMLR 718 and Hag (Van Zuylen Fréres v Hag A. G. [1974] 2 CMLR 127 and CNL-Sucal v Hag
[1990] 1 ECR 3711) had triggered.
129 On this issue in general see T. STEWART, The GATT Uruguay Round: a Negotiating History
(Dewenter, Kluwer, 1993) and M. BLAKENEY, "The Impact of the TRIPs Agreement in the Asia
Pacific Region", [1996] EIPR 544.
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It has been argued' 3° that model laws proposed to developing countries are based on the
now confounded assumptions that protection of inventions would reduce the time needed
for their economies to reach the technology levels of developed countries and also that
such laws would advance the inward flow of investment; in reality, though, there seems to
be an incompatibility between protection of innovation and the realities faced by
developing economies. In Pakistan, for example, where patents were granted for
pharmaceuticals, prices were up to ten times higher than the prices for the equivalent
products in India, where patent protection was minimal.'3'
In a more general context the argument is that the Anglo-American model of capitalism
exported to less developed countries is putting states further in debt, since it does not
acknowledge their particular features, but rather caters for the interests of investing
enterprises.' 32 It is accepted, that
"... by far the most important reason for taking out patents in developing
countries is tc import to these countries and be protected from imitator's
imports",'33
or to protect their indigenous markets from pirate or grey imports.' 34 What is disputed is if
the net benefits of less developed countries by far overcome the costs for adequate intel-
lectual property protection,' 35 or if intellectual property rights should be granted only and
130 W. KINGSTON (ed.), Direct Protection of Innovation (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), at 23-24.
' "Intellectual Property ... Is Theft", The Economist, January 22, 1994, 64, at 65.
132 J• HILLS in Economics as Ideology, The World Bank and Privatisation, (unpublished paper) argues
that the state often takes over the debts of public utilities in order to make them attractive for
privatisation.
H.E. GRUNDMANN, "Foreign Patent Monopolies in Developing Countries: An Empirical
Analysis", 12 Journal of Development Studies 186 (1976), at 186.
134 R. McQUISTON, "Developing Countries are Undermining Corporate America's Capacity to Market
its Creativity, a Call for a Reasoned Solution by the United States Government in Light of the
Continuing Deterioration of the International Trademark System", 14 Syracuses Journal of
International Law & Commerce 237 (1987), for a complete review of such arguments within the
trade mark field.
' See R. RAPP & R. ROZEK, "Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing
Countries", 24 Journal of World Trade 75 (1990). See also R.M. MATHAROO, Intellectual Property
and Corporate Culture in India - Comparative and Legal Aspects in STERLING (1997) concluding at
194 that "... it is conceded that India must allow foreign investment and expose indigenous industry
to international competition" but at the same time must "... aim to protect Indian owners of
intellectual property rights outside", this necessitates full membership of the International
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when their proprietor actually uses them within the territory of the granting jurisdiction.'36
It is difficult, without an exhaustive economic analysis, to accede to any of the contrasting
theories. This is even more the case, since there is evidence that the transformation of any
economy to a market economy causes the increase of disputes over intellectual property
rights brought before the courts. In China, for example, Shanghai courts have dealt with
around 1,200 intellectual property cases since 1983. The rise intensified in recent years, in
parallel with China's move towards a market economy, and led to the establishment of
specialist courts.' 37 It is apparent that intellectual property developed its own indigenous
dynamic; specialised lawyers, judges, and users of intellectual property demand new legal
tools, similar to those adopted in the West. This of course will satisfy foreign companies
who until now could rely only on administrative rather than judicial means and faced
considerable enforcement problems. 138 In short, piracy becomes rampant as people get
more entrepreneurial and, accordingly, more intellectual property disputes arise; this, in
turn, causes the concern of international players on the one hand and of a new local
establishment on the other.
The incentives for a closer and frank collaboration between developed and developing
economies should be overwhelming,' 39 since it is argued that
Conventions. She describes succinctly the links between trade and intellectual property protection
that often make redundant reservations on the justification of the exercise of intellectual property
rights in developing economies. For some ethical considerations on the multi-directional links
between international trade, intellectual property rights, alternative ways of protecting intellectual
property and oppressive regimes see R. BURRELL, A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism: The
Imposition of Copyright on China by the West in L. BENTLY & S.M. MANIATIS (eds),
Perspectives on Intellectual Property - Intellectual Property and Ethics (London, Sweet & Maxwell,
1998).
136 As argued, for example, by H. JEWRY, Criticism of the International and National Intellectual
Property Systems in Zimbabwe and Developing Counties, a mimeo of the University of Zimbabwe
(14 March 1988); quoted by U. KUMAR, in "Benefits of the Industrial Property System and the
African Developing Countries", 16 World Competition 71 at 71 (fh.7).
137 See "China Plans Intellectual Property Courts", Financial Times, March 4, 1994.
138 It is claimed that in 1992 the record industry pirates shared 83% and 44% of the compact disk and
cassette sales, respectively: see 1. WALKER, "US Seeks to Dog Chinese Copycats", Financial Times,
February 16, 1994. For a more general discussion see B. SODIPO, Piracy and Counterfeiting: GATI',
TRIPs and Developing Countries (London, Kluwer, 1997).
139 See A. OXLEY, The Challenge of Free Trade (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), in particular
at 100-111, after an exhaustive "historical" overview.
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"... unilateral actions designed to force LDCs to reform their intellectual property
systems may backfire....".'4°
New methods of dispute resolution in intellectual property which may make protection a
matter of public as well as private international law will mean that
"... international standards and processes will reach far into the domestic law
formation of the contracting parties •••141
Inevitably, at an initial stage of increased enforcement of intellectual property rights,
developing countries will be in a weaker position, but it remains to be seen what will be
the reaction of developed economies when developing economies start invoking public
international measures for the protection of their own intellectual property.
A balanced development is needed if we want the intellectual property system to work
efficiently and equitably. The best way to achieve this is for owners of international trade
marks to take advantage of the newly introduced legal regimes and support them by
obtaining registrations rather than
"... to sit back and await unauthorised imports, which can be attacked with the
big stick of the ITC. At present the level of US and European registration of
trade marks in developing countries is very low. If these registrations are not
forthcoming, it may take more than threats, promises and diplomacy to get those
countries to raise their IP standards higher in the future".142
There are two further symptoms of the international economic instability. First, the
struggle of national and supranational or intergovernmental authorities to regulate
enterprises that operate at transnational levels and have developed intricate corporate
structures, in a period where
140 See A. P. BRAGGA, "The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATF: A View from
the South", 22 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 243 (1989), concluding at 264, after a
"southerner's" dispassionate presentation of pros and cons.
' See C.J. ARUP, "The Prospective GAIT Agreement for Intellectual Property Protection", 4
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 181 (1993), arguing at 182, drawing from a more general
theory, expressed by Y. DEZALAY, in "The Big Bang and the Law: The Internationalization and
Restructuration of the Legal Field", 7 Theory, Culture and Society 279 (1990).
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"[n]ational anti-trust regulation, national import quotas and national corporate
taxation become increasingly ineffective and meaningless when enterprise on a
global scale is the issue, when the miscegenation of its origin confuses the
nationality of a motor car and when a true and verifiable breakdown of the
profits of a transnational company, territory by territory, can become a minefield
of political disagreement".'43
On the other hand, though, the supremacy of global corporate giants is being challenged
by market forces. Not long ago
"... corporate giants walked tall and proud, bestriding the globe, champions of
this century's miraculous growth",'44
then came the demise of trade barriers, the deregulation of the markets that bypassed many
political decision centres, the explosion of information technologies,' 45 and the introduc-
tion of ever more efficient production techniques. The resulting market and technological
changes, combined with the process of internationalisation of an increasingly sophisticated
consuming public, brought with them a chance for smaller but aggressive and innovative
firms who are reaping the benefits from satisfying niche markets for specialised goods and
services, despite the fact that they face the lack of a supportive specific industrial policy.'46
142 J. PHILIPS, "Trade Marks 1992", in Trade Marks Creation, Protection and Valuation (published
together with April/May edition of Managing Intellectual Property), at 2.
143 B. BLACKWELL & S. EILON, The Global Challenge of Innovation (Oxford, Butterworth -
Heinemann, 1991), at ix. The transcending of national boundaries is called "transnationalism", when
it relates to private interests, and "transgovemmentalism", in relation to the introduction of transnat-
ional co-operation of state authorities. See R.O. KEOHANE & iS. NYE Jr., Realism and Complex
Interdependence, at 129-130, in M. SMITH, R. LITTLE & M. SHACKLETON (eds), Perspectives
on World Politics (London, Croom Helm, 1981).
From "The Fall of Big Business", Editorial, The Economist, April 17, 1993, at 13.
See also G. LOCKSLEY, Europe and the Electronics Industry: Conflicting Strategies in Positive
Restructuring, in D. MARSH (ed.) Capital and Politics in Western Europe (London, Frank Case &
Co., 1983), who argues at 128-129 that behind the new communication technologies viewed by many
as the panacea to a long and deep recession, the majority of the industrialised countries is witnessing
a great shift in economic and political power.
See "Objectives and Priorities for DG XIII, Interview with Dr Martin Bangemann, the New
Commissioner for DG X III", 10 X III Magazine (May/1993) 3, at 5, "... small and medium - sized
enterprises should succeed in becoming more effective, for they have major potential for innovation
in Europe, more so than elsewhere. This, of course, in no way means to say that EC research
programmes are primarily intended to promote small and medium - sized enterprises". See however
the doubts expressed by J.ADAMS in respect of the developments in a particular relevant area in
"The E.C.'s Green Paper on Vertical Restraints: Franchising" [1998] EIPR 1.
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5.8. Competition in Europe
5.8.1. The European perception of competition
There are two prevailing characteristics in the European context that affect our conception
of competition. The first has to do with the scope of the Union that has to include diverse
if not conflicting interests: the approximation of competing economies and at the same
time the creation of a European economy that will compete internationally. The uneven
growth of the Member States' economies, but also of the economies of international
trading blocs, makes the inherent stability of the system problematic and the results of the
regulation of competition critical. 147 The Commission acknowledges that competition
policy
"... endeavours to cut monopoly profits, to ensure that the economy remains
adaptable to circumstances and to stimulate innovation".'48
The Commission has also declared that
"... restrictions on competition and practices which jeopardise the unity of the
Common Market are proceeded against with special vigour".'49
In order to promote the structural unity of the market, the EU does not hesitate to grant
sectoral and regional aid, something that in itself may be anti-competitive, or to allow the
Commission to proclaim that cooperation between small and medium size enterprises will
be tolerated because it is the only means for them to compete with larger enterprises.'50
Secondly, European political tradition, even during deregulative times, is not as hostile to
the role of the government as regulator and never did enthusiastically adhere to the faith
that managers of privately owned large corporations are the best actors to serve the public
See GILPIN (1987), at 64, for a similar thought at the international level.
' lind Report on Competition 1972, at 9.
" Ibid. at 15.
150 Ibid, at 16, and Council Decision 91/3 19/EEC, OJ L 175/32, July 4, 1991.
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interest. The ideal situation for Monnet would not be a common market but rather an
integrated European economy. Accordingly, competition law had less to do with the
application of corporate efficiency and more with building a competition policy, the
principal target of which is trade integration and the approximation of the economies of
the member states.' 5 ' It has therefore been accepted that
"[e]ven though the operation of market forces is an irreplaceable factor for
progress and the most appropriate means of ensuring the best possible dis-
tribution of production factors, situations can nevertheless arise when this in
itself is not enough to obtain the required results without too much delay and
intolerable social tension. When the decisions of the enterprises themselves do
not make it possible for the necessary changes to be made at an acceptable cost
in social terms, then recourse to relatively short-term and limited intervention is
necessary in order to direct such decisions towards an optimal economic and
social result".'52
It must be stressed from the outset that regulatory policies at the European level have
been expanding rapidly and disproportionately to other policies mentioned in the
Treaties such as transport, energy, research and development, education and, notably,
social policy.'53
The guide for what is competitive or not can be found in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome. The differences between the US and the EU in perceiving competition are
obvious even afier the first reading. Art. 85(3), which provides that anti-competitive
behaviour - as described in Art. 85(1) - may be exempted if it is limited in scope and
contribute
'' See E.M. FOX, Abuse of a Dominant Position Under the Treaty of Rome - A Comparison With US
Law, in B. HAWK (ed.) Fordham Corporate Law Institute - Antitrust and Trade Policies of the
European Economic Community - 1983 (New York, Matthew Bender, 1984), at 371, and 369-373,
for noting some fundamental differences between the US and EEC targets of competition policies.
See also P.E. NOEL, "Efficiency Considerations in the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under
European and U.S. Antitrust Law", [1997] ECLR 508 and V. KORAH, "Tetra Pak II: Lack of
Reasoning in Court's Judgment", [1997] ECLR 98.
152 1972,atll.
153 See G. MAJONE, The European Commission as Regulator, in G. MAJONE, Regulating Europe
(London, Routledge, 1996) at 63-64.
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"... to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question."
It is clear that the EU's competition policy not only serves the narrow scope of
maximising allocative efficiency but also aims to spearhead progress, support small and
medium size enterprises, break down barriers and create benefits for the consumer.
However, the basic questions on competition are the same in all jurisdictions: what is
competition, what do we want to protect with a competition policy, and what may fall
within such a policy?
5.8.2. European variations on competition
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has managed, from early on, to grasp the importance
of such complications. In Consten and Grundig' 54 the court clarified first that:
"... competition may be distorted within the meaning of Article 85(1) not only by
agreements which limit it as between the parties, but also by agreements which
prevent or restrict the competition which might take place between one of them
and related parties",155
and then declared that competition rules are to be applied both to "inter-brand
competition", meaning the competition between different brands and to "intra-brand
competition", referring to competition between distributors of the same brand.' 56 In
' Consten and Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR. 299.
'" Ibid,at339.
'	 Ibid,at 343.
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another cas& 57 the court, grasping the need for flexibility in its approach, introduced the
notion of "workable competition": the degree of competition necessary to ensure the
observance of basic principles, the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, and, in
particular, the creation of a single market achieving conditions similar to those of a
domestic market. Accordingly, variations as to the concept, extent, and intensity of
competition may be tolerated. The ECJ, in its interpretation of Art. 86 EEC, stated clearly
that dominance, per se, is not to be condemned: a dominant position,
"... is not itself a recrimination but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons
for which it has such a dominant position, the undertaking concerned has a
special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted
competition on the common market. ... Art. 86 covers practices which are likely
to affect the structure of a market where, as a direct result of the presence of the
undertaking in question, competition has already been weakened and which,
through recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition
in products or services based on traders' performance, have the effect of
hindering the maintenance or development of the level of competition still
existing on the market".'58
Such is the breadth of the defmitions that almost every form of economic competitive
activity could fall within the area covered by the EU's competition rules,' 59 even if we
accept that Art. 86 was originally drafted with a limited scope: namely the exploitation of
dominance by charging high prices, restricting production, discriminating to the
disadvantage of some suppliers or customers, and tying with desirable products a product
that customers did not want.16°
What makes the position more interesting is that the current economic environment in
which trade marks operate poses a unique chance for the consumer to gain a stronger
'" Metro v. Commission [1978] 2 CMLR 1.
158 Michelin v. Commission [1983] ECR 3461.
Such flexibility of interpretation is evident in all regulatory statutes; their actual impact in particular
cases is very much in the hands of the regulatory agency and the competent courts. Therefore de
facto regulation may change even though the regulatory statute - the de jure element - is not
modified. See D. SWANN, The Regulatory Scene: An Overview, in BU1'TON & SWANN (eds)
(1989), at 7. This explains why to business people procedural matters are of equal importance to the
substance of regulations, see R. RICE, "A Burden on Business", Financial Times, February 1, 1994.
'° See V. KORAH, A Comment on Professor Fox's Paper on Article 86, in B. HAWK (ed.) (1984), at
430.
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footing in a competitive game characterised by instability and frequent changes, especially
in Europe where "commodisation" undennines the position of incumbent players,' 6 ' and
the characteristics of the market change continuously due to negative and positive
integration. 162 As noted in the preamble of the Community Trade Mark Regulation, in
order to create a single market which offers conditions similar to those obtaining in a
national market
"... not only must barriers to free movement of goods and services be removed
and arrangements be instituted which ensure that competition is not distorted,
but, in addition, legal conditions must be created which enable undertakings to
adapt their activities to the scale of the Community, whether in manufacturing
and distributing goods or in providing services 	 163
5.8.3. A European approach for encouraging competition
The EU, in particular, has embarked on several interventionist supportive initiatives in the
fields of information technology and telecommunications. It has also attempted to create a
coherent policy on, and provide funds for, Research and Technological Development
despite the fact that a truly coherent industrial policy is an unresolved question under the
Treaty of Maastricht. Finally it has sought to impress upon European industry the need to
invest on R&11) and has formulated a "framework programme". 1M But also part of the
recent developments - an adherence to subsidiarily and a confession of partial failure - is
the declaration of the Commission's view that
16! A term coined "... to represent the downgrading of premium products into mere standard items, the
price of which is set by increasingly fearsome competition between efficient factories", see B.
RILEY, "Victims of the Glut", Financial Times, October 30-3 1, 1993.
162 Negative integration means the removal of all forms of barriers, and positive integration the intervention
of supranational institutions. Again, it is difficult to distinguish between negative and positive
integration, since the integration process as a whole is dynamically linked with both notions: J.
P11'1DER, The Single Market: The Step Towards European Union, in J. LODGE (ed.), The European
Community and the Challenge of the Future (London, Pinter, 1989), at 108.
163 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993, Official Journal of the European
Communities, L 11, January 14, 1994, at 1.
A programme which evolved around enabling new technologies, industrial and materials technologies,
management of natural resources, environment, life sciences and technologies, energy and fmally
management of intellectual resources. See BLACKWELL & EILON (1991) at 131-144, and CEC
(1 989a) The First Report on the State of Science and Technology in Europe.
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"... representing less than 4% of total government research funding in the 12
Member States, the Community's own research effort will only be able to
respond to society's needs and help make businesses more competitive if it is
developed in conjunction with the Member States' research efforts".'65
5.8.4. European integration and competition
The message that "... [w]e must build a kind of United States of Europe", 166 was
proclaimed as the only political way out from the post - war crisis. At the same time Euro-
pean nation states consented that their independent resources alone were not enough in
order to reconstruct their bases of production, and that it was necessary to transcend the
national framework to some form of interdependency.' 67 Having realised the benefits of
this interdependency, pro-Europeans were proclaiming, in 1987, that,
"... today, the more one is nationalist, the more one is European. In tomorrow's
world, there is no chance of being a major power ("grand"), free and respected
without working through
Currently the future of the Union is characterised by unpredictability: nationalistic
polarisation, the breakdown of the bi-polarity between East and West, worries over the
criteria and the implementation of monetary union, and the global interconnections which
became evident with the breakdown of the European Rates Mechanism, after speculation
in the money markets originating largely outside the Community, are some of the factors
that can make the Union move closer to or away from a federal future.' 69 Defining what is
165 
"European Commission Guidelines for the Fourth Research and Technological Development
Framework Programme (1994-1998)", 10 X III Magazine (January 1993), at 3.
' From a speech of Winston Churchill at Zurich, September 19, 1946, in D. WEIGALL & P. STIRK
(eds), The Origins & Development of the European Community (Leicester, Leicester, University
Press) at 40. Despite Churchill's ambivalence in Britain's role in the United States of Europe the
phrase has become a true classic.
167 See J. MONNET, "A Ferment of Change", 1 Journal of Common Market Studies, 203 (1962).
16$ B. BOSSON, in L' Express, February, 27, 1987, as quoted by M. WISE & R. GIBB, Single Market
to Social Europe (Harlow, Longman, 1993) at 36.
169 See for a similar thought J. TRANHOLM-MIKKELSEN, "Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or
Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC", 20 Millenium: Journal of
International Studies 1(1991), at 17-18.
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considered "high politics", and accordingly sensitive to national sovereignty, and what is
simple "running" decisions is therefore getting more difficult, if at all possible.'7°
This unpredictability is casting doubts over the controversial belief that
"... international institutions are capable of becoming the focus of loyalties at the
expense of the state".'7'
What is more easily accepted, at least as an explanatory, if not predictive, tool,' 72 is the
fact that "spillover" effects facilitated integration in the past and may keep on functioning
in the same way in the future.
The core of a functionalist theory is that integration in one sector will bring pressure for
integration in another, and so on, thus moving inevitably towards further co-operation and
integration until the completion of a federal state. Or as Monnet, one of the founding
fathers put it, from the then situation of deadlock,
"... there is only one way of escape: concrete action on a limited but decisive
point, bringing about on this point a fundamental change and gradually modify-
ing the very terms of all the problems".'73
170 Monetary matters were not included in the sensitivity area but turned out to be the most important
banner for national sovereignty. See L. TSOUKALIS, The Politics and Economics of European
Monetary Integration (London, Allen & Unwin, 1977).
171 See P. TAYLOR, Functionalism: The Approach of D. Mitrany, in A.J.R. GROOM & P. TAYLOR
(eds), Frameworks for International Co-operation (London, Pinter, 1990), at 133. The polarisation
amongst trade mark practitioners and commentators on the meaning of "association" in relation to
trade mark infringement is indicative of how legal issues are indirectly but defmitely charged
politically. See for example A. KAMPERMAN SANDERS, "The Wagamama Decision: Back to the
Dark Ages of Trade Mark Law" [1996] EIPR 3, P. PRESCOTT, "Think Before You Waga Finger"
[1996] EIPR 317, and A. KAMPERMAN SANDERS, "The Return to Wagamama" [1996] EIPR
521; see also the comments of S.M. MANIATIS, "Confusion, Association and the Puma Case" in
Trade Marks, Trade Names and Unfair Competition World Law and Practice Bulletin - July 1997,
and G. LEA, "Trying to Square the Circle - The Impact of Sabel v Puma on Assessment of
Likelihood of Confusion" in Trade Marks, Trade Names and Unfair Competition World Law and
Practice Bulletin - March 1998. Interestingly, as noted by A. BUTT PHILIP & C. BARON, in United
Kingdom, in Making European Policies Work - II National Reports (London, Sage, 1988) at 663 it is
amazing "... how much difference the attitude of one individual can make to the whole UK stance on
a regime or policy area: some saw the EC as impotent and thought that a good thing, some saw it as
impotent and much regretted that".
172 On neofunctionalism, predictive, and post-neofunctionalist, explanatory theories, under a historical
perspective, see GEORGE (1991), at 19-34 and for the defmitive overview of integrationist theories
see M. HOLLAND, European Community Integration (London, Pinter, 1993).
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Nevertheless,
"... the idea is clear: political Europe will be created by human effort, when the
time comes, on the basis of reality... For me there has been only one path: only
its length remains unknown. The unification of Europe, like all peaceful
revolutions takes time".'74
Some theorists, like Taylor' 75 using empirical evidence, criticise the pure functionalist
approach of Mitrany, who advocated that mass attitude was bound to change after
experiencing the benefits of co-operation and under the educational role of the state and
the media; this change in attitude would lead to a gradual integration of overlapping
systems of cooperation and welfare promotion.' 76 Currently the unease over the future of
the Union, and the polarisation between adherents to widening and believers in deepening
the structure of the Union are strengthening positions similar to Taylor's. Indeed, the
democratisation of the community could make functionalistic attitudes less significantly
operational in practice.
The Danish dual referendum amply illustrates the validity of both theories. With the first
referendum Danes threatened to block the implementation of the Maastricht agreement,
giving a real blow to the belief that "encrenage" - a French term used by Monnet and
Schuman meaning literally an enmeshing of gear wheels - was the appropriate way to
describe a process where a united Europe would be built up progressively, with one cog
'' From a memorandum of J. Monnet to R. Schuman and G. Biodault, in R. MAYNE & R. VAUGHAN
(eds), Postwar Integration in Europe (London, E. Arnold, 1976), at 53.
'7 J. MONNET (R. MAYNE trans.), Memoirs (New York, Doubleday, 1978), at 43 1-432. An
interesting contrasting view is attributed to the historian Paul Kennedy who, commenting on global
economic integration, concludes that we cannot presume that ever growing economic ties across
Europe will inevitably and naturally produce improved political unity; radical changes in today's
economic environment are likened to the dangers of the early 1930s where industrialisation was
bringing the states economically closer, however it also unleashed social pressures which increased
nationalism and caused a "series of jolts and jars and smashes in the life of humanity". See the report
of F. KEMPE, "Global Economic Integration Holds Perils As Well as Opportunities, Historian Says",
The Wall Street Journal Europe, July 1-2, 1994.
'7 See TAYLOR in GROOM & TAYLOR (eds) (1990).
176 See D. MITRANY, The Functional Approach to World Organization, in C.A. COSGROVE & K.J.
TWITCHETT, The New International Actors: the UN and the EEC (London, Macmillan, 1970); for
the original see E. HAAS, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces 1950-1957
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964).
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driving another in an increasingly complicated and interlocking system.' 77 But the second
referendum had a positive result which was the outcome of a barrage of support from the
political and economic elite and the media, bringing functionalism and the "pedagogic"
role of the state and the media back into play.
5.8.5. The spillover effects of trade marks
One might question what trade marks have to do with integration. The first answer is
given by Holland, who, presenting a neofunctionalist argumentation, states that
"... spillover is also reflected in the typical Community bargaining process wher-
eby agreements across disparate areas are tied together: decision making does
not take place in sectoral isolation, but rather concessions or agreements in one
policy area will have implications and often direct consequences for other policy
areas. Thus the logic of neofunctionalism was relevant, it was suggested, to both
the general integration across functional sectors and to the functional and
political aspects of Community decision - making".'78
Accordingly trade marks cannot exist as compartmentalised and isolated elements within
the Union's legal order.
Firstly, they are a necessary tool for those who want to market their goods community
wide and thus require either a community trade mark or harmonised national protection
for their marks. In that sense the approximation of national laws and the creation of the
Community trade mark fall within the realm of positive integration because
"... trade marks enabling the products and services of undertakings to be
distinguished by identical means throughout the entire Community, regardless of
frontiers, should feature amongst the legal instruments which undertakings have
at their disposal
WISE & GIBB (1993), at 34.
See also HOLLAND (1991) presenting, at 17, neofunctionalists' arguments.
'' Community Trade Mark Regulation, at 1. Council Regulation No 40 94 and the Trade Marks
Harmonisation Directive 89/104 have a dual target: first to harmonise national trade mark laws and
second to create a parallel unitary system of community wide protection through the introduction of
the Community Trade Mark. However, it is submitted that by choosing to compromise between
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Secondly, the development of legal reasonings, for intellectual property rights in general,
such as the principle of exhaustion of rights, undermined the potentially exclusionary and
discriminatory role of trade marks. In respect of intra community trade the Union's aim
was the breaking down of disguised trade and "guild" barriers at the European level.
In Germany, for example, consumer groups have faced the positive challenge of the
deregulation of advertising and the liberalisation of competition laws as a chance for re-
establishing regulation on new grounds. In Germany other European finns wanting to
enter the market, especially in the field of services, have to compete with dominating
national monopolies and at the same time deal with a complex and, often excessive,
restrictive panoply of regulatory control.' 8° In the case of Yves Rocher, a French cosmetics
manufacturer was allowed to sell its products at marked-down prices by mail, and
advertise the practice by comparing prices.' 8 ' In Clinique it was held that German
consumers would not be misled as to the properties of cosmetics sold under the same
name, after a German business association claimed that the name would lead consumers
into thinking the products had a therapeutic effect.' 82 This should be contrasted, for
example, with the "Oftel" case in the UK where the telecommunications regulatory
agency, created in 1984, arguably in order to protect BT's shareholders from a future
Labour government, gradually became the ongoing regulator of the sector.'83
diverging systems of protection they failed to provide clear solutions on what we want to protect in a
trade mark. This of course is a question that needs to be treated in a thesis rather than a footnote; see
however footnote 173 above as an indication of the problems created by the compromise.
° See G. de JONQUTERES, "Animal Spirits on Too Tight a Leash", Financial Times, March 1, 1994.
181 
"Swaddled - Consumer Protection", The Economist, July 24, 1993, at 71 and "German Advertising
Ban Overruled by Court", Financial Times June 6, 1993. See Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der
Wirtschafl v. Yves Rocher GmbH [1993] ECR 1-236 1.
182 See Verbrand Sozialer Wettbewerb v Estee Lauder Cosmetics GmbH [1994] ECR 1-317, and
"Clinique" Name Can Be Used", Financial Times, February 8, 1994.
183 My thanks for this example of an actor turning "pro-competitive" and consumer orientated go to
Maria Michalis. In many cases Oftel is referred to as the consumers watchdog rather than the sector's
regulator. Interestingly Oftel itself is attempting to move one step ahead and become the anti trust
regulator of the sector with wider responsibilities.
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Other examples of "protectionist" attitudes are the beer cases in Germany and Greece, 184
where the ECJ ruled against the prohibition of marketing of beer containing additives,
produced in a different way from that provided for in archaic national legislation. The
Court held that consumer preferences change, and when labelling can be used to inform
the public about product differentiating factors then prohibitions on importation and sale
or sale under particular descriptions is an excessive measure. As was ruled in Cassis de
DUon,'85 every product that was legally manufactured and/or marketed in one member
state should be allowed to circulate freely in the rest of the Community.
It has become clear by now that EU law will preclude national laws that hinder free
movement of goods unless they are necessary to protect a legitimate public interest, such
as consumer protection, and br the prevention of unfair competition and in any case
conform to the principle of proportionality to the objective pursued. Nevertheless, in 1988
technical regulations and standards represented 80% of all remaining barriers to intra EU
trade, 186 and as the controversy on the introduction of the "continental" plug in the UK
shows that standards depict and cause political controversies.
Thirdly, we have to contrast the situation in Germany, which shares an ideology similar to
the Japanese capitalist social market ideology, where a company has an obligation to its
workforce, to the public interest, in short to all "stakeholders", with the neo-liberal Anglo-
American approach, where the principle obligation of the company is towards its share
holders' 87 and the financial markets.'88
' Commission v. Germany [19871 ECR 1013, and Commission v. Greece [1987] ECR 1193. The fact
that the first king of Greece was a Bavarian had a role to play in the quest for beer purity.
185 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649.
186 A. MATTERA, Marche Unique Europeen: Ses Regles, Son Fonctionnement (Paris, Jupiter, 1988) at
270.
See for a similar comment the report Tomorrow's Company (London, RSA, 1994), and the criticism
of the report in "Worthy Waffle", The Economist, February 12, 1994, at 27-28.
Turning again to the Rover saga, it has been argued that British Aerospace sold the company only
because the "working capital" required for its operation was appearing as borrowing, in BAe's
balances. So BAe, succumbing to short-term financial considerations, preferred to sell the company
at a low price, rather than wait for two more years for Rover to acquire a safer pedigree and,
following Honda's advice, then spin it off in the stock market as an independent company. So Rover
was arguably undersold and this was due to an exercise of making book balancing more attractive to
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This approach is arguably evident even in the firms' marketing strategies: as an empirical
research shows UK and US companies are excessively focusing on short - run fmancial
gains, and thus are less committed to the UK market than their Japanese rivals whose
"... approach reflects a managerial philosophy more oriented to long - term
market position than short - term profit performance, and to exploiting new
opportunities created by changing technologies and new market segments
Japanese subsidiaries ... were confident about their marketing ability but they
were marketing - oriented not in terms of spending more on marketing activities
or deploying more aggressive pricing and marketing tactics, but rather by way of
offering good quality products, specifically targeted at well defined segments in
the market, backed by strong customer sales and service support".'89
Compromises are always achieved, not only at the level of member states - where the rift
between "entrepreneurial" UK and more socially minded continental nations may be
legendary but has never reached a breaking point - but also at the lowest level of bureau-
crats and judges who themselves have to create and enforce common policies. Sometimes
of course even single words with ambiguous meanings can be used by the linguists among
fmancial organisations. See A. KALETSKY, "Rover Was Really Sold to the City", The Times,
February 22, 1994.
189 See, V. WONG, J. SAUNDERS & P. DOYLE, "The Quality of British Marketing: A Comparison
With US and Japanese Multinationals in the UK Market", 2 Journal of Marketing Management 107
(1988), at 127. Albeit, in Germany for example social policies have to take into account that unit wage
costs are already 40% higher than in the US. 189 In the UK, for a contrast, which was the first state to
jump on the bandwagon of "euro - sclerosis" in order to deregulate the labour market, a recent study has
shown that the unregulated labour market is returning in the way it was in the nineteenth century, before
trade unionism. It is argued that the recent growth in inequality in wages and earnings, between
managers and workers, which has been greater in Britain than in almost all other developed economies,
is being matched by a widening in the inequalities of influence and access to key decisions about work
and employment. See R. TAYLOR, "Workers "Losing Access to Decisions", Financial Times,
February 15, 1994, reporting a study of 1,500 establishments: N. MILWARD, The New Industrial
Relations? (London, Policy Studies Institute, 1994). Looking at the same question from a different
angle L. HANCHER & M. RUETE, in Legal Culture, Product Licensing, and the Drug Industry, in S.
WILKS & M. WRIGHT (eds), Comparative Government - Industry Relations: Western Europe, the
United States, and Japan (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987), conclude at 174-175 that in the two
countries although "there has been little real change ... the processes by which stability has been
maintained have differed" and argue that the legal culture has contributed significantly to those
processes. The contrast in the way in which problems have been articulated in the two national
systems "can at least partly be explained by the emphasis on bargaining within a given legal
framework in the German system, as opposed to the processes of negotiation which occur outside the
formal framework of law in the UK". They stress that "legal controversy is often merely a surrogate
for wider forms of societal conflicts, the resolution of which may be distorted by the imposition of a
formal framework".
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the jurists in order to remove provisions already negotiated and agreed.' 9° It would be
unwise though to generalise:' 9 ' arguments against this multi-cultural environment and
cries for the establishment of an inspiring "one main idea" are to be confronted as excuses
or as attempts to hijack the economic or the social character of the community. After all,
the strengthening of social policies was part of the compromise between smaller and larger
member states in order to agree on the objective of a single market; in return smaller states
offered to the single market a geographical territory that was vital to the expansion of the
economies of larger states.'92
5.8.6. The social aspect of competition policies
"... [C]ompetition policy endeavors to maintain or create effective conditions of
competition by means of rules applying to enterprises ... Such a policy encou-
rages the best possible use of productive resources for the greatest possible
benefit of the economy as a whole and for the benefit, in particular, of the
consumer."
In the same way that the Single European Act provided both for the creation of a Single
European Market and a Social Charter on the fundamental rights of workers, or the
privatisation of public utilities had to be accompanied by several new regulations and
'° See T. JACKSON, "The Lobbyists Learn to Aim Fast and Low at Legislation", The Independent,
September 1, 1992, where the way that initiatives are targeted at any level is described; from the
lowest eurocrat to Jacques Delors, then president of the Commission. "Association" is a good
example of a word the true meaning of which will have great significance in trade mark matters.
191 See for such a generalisation and a dismissive reply the exchange between P. Demaret and P.
Pescatore in Competition Cases Before the EC Court of Justice - Panel Discussion, in B. FIAWK
(ed.), United States and Common Market Antitrust Policies (New York, Matthew Bender, 1987), at
471.
For similar questions as to whether we are moving towards a Union see WISE & GIBB (1993), at 2-
4. According to J. Pins, head of the European Council's legal service as reported by L. BARBER, in
"Call to Open Up European Maze", Financial Times, February 14, 1994, consecutive compromises
between those favouring deeper integration and those looser inter-governmental co-operation, has
created a labyrinth of regulation and decision making which is too complex for ordinary citizens to
understand, a fact widely accepted by the Commission. Proposals for reforms concern a single, shorter,
readable text consolidating the texts of the Treaties, clearer demarcation of areas of responsibility for all
players, modifications in the decision making processes and the creation of a common facet for the
Community acting abroad. However, such measures target the periphery rather than the centre of the
labyrinth.
1972,atl2.
241
Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks
regulators to ensure consumer protection, strengthening of competition and so on,
liberalisation of the markets is followed by new structures, checks and balances. Indeed
"... [t]he SEA provided not only for the completion of the SEM but also for the
development of EC competences in the monetary, technological, environmental,
social regional and external policy fields, as well as for some reforms of the EC
institutions. It was not, it will be argued, by chance that these measures accom-
panied the single market programme: if the SEM is to become and remain
complete and to bring its full benefits to EC citizens, the EC will have to
develop along such lines so as to become a European Union".'94
Especially, since
"... a more liberal market environment has meant that the power of these groups
[labour unions, consumer associations] has been diminished,"95
and social policies and the creation of a Union - wide social space are "... heavy on
symbolism ... and light on substance",' 96 covering a wide area with, perhaps, deliberately
undefined boundaries. "Euro - sclerosis", referring to the rigidities of labour markets and
the excesses of the welfare state and the pursuit of economic efficiency on the one hand,
with concern for equity and industrial democracy on the other, became the arena of
competition between left and right, supranationalists and intergovernmentahsts.'97
5.8.7. Trade marks as symbols of the social space
"Ideology is closely related to symbols; and symbols have been very important
in the debate of the social space. The latter is meant to symbolize a certain
European economic and social model; the modern version of Europe's mixed
194 See J. PINDER, The Single Market: A Step Towards European Union, in LODGE (ed.) (1989), at
105, advocating that the SEM is a step towards a European federation.
195 BUTTON & SWANN in BUTTON & SWANN (1989) (eds) at 330.
L. TSOUKALIS, The New European Economy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), at 157 and
164.
'97 
"Supranational" and thus more federalist is often juxtaposed with co-operational "intergovernmental"
in a war of semantics; see H. WALLACE, W. WALLACE & C. WEBB (eds) in Policy Making in the
European Community (London, Wiley, 1983). See also R.J. HARRISON, Neo-functionalism, in
GROOM & TAYLOR (eds) (1990), at 147, who highlights the "... differences between domestic and
international politics, between sovereign government and international organization".
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economy which had proved so successful in the 1 950s and 1 960s. This may in
turn suggest that, despite the apparent ideological shift of the 1980's, the battle
continues, or alternatively that symbols are now offered as a substitute for
policies which are in the process of being diluted. On the other hand, the social
space could help to bring about another reshuffling of cards between national
and European institutions. Thus, once again, federalist ambitions are difficult to
separate from the intrinsic merits of the proposed policy."98
But the other aspect of the citizen as an economic actor is the citizen as a consumer, a
prerequisite too for the creation of a European social space. According to the Commission,
"... the single market and competition policy work together to allow consumers
to choose between the goods and services offered by firms throughout the
Community."99
It is the trade of consumer goods, the retailing services, that are giving the marketplace
face of the European Union. The internationalisation of retailing, for example, generates
not only growth but also brings closer the varying national trading patterns and creates a
mass market for services. The sector had some significant successes: Aldi, a German
discount grocery retailer, obtains more than 40% of its turnover outside Germany, as does
Promodes, a French food retailer, and to a lesser degree Carrefour; and Ikea, the Swedish
controlled furniture retailer, derives 75% of its turnover outside Sweden.20°
The fact that the character of intra-community human flows has been gradually changing
is adding further importance to the "signs" of the social space. Mass labour movements
northwards are history; now we witness student exchanges, movements of professionals,
changes of residence of people who are retiring, and the proliferation of tourism. 20 ' These
migratory movements are multi-directional, less permanent and relatively small in size.
TSOIJKALIS (1993), at 162. At 164-165, he observes that the discussion about the creation of a
European social space has often taken place without reference to its actual contents. He concentrates on
the aspects of social policy concerning labour standards, education, training, housing and health.
Tsoukalis chapter on social policies and labour markets at 148-174, is an authoritative updated guide.
XXHnd Report on Competition Policy (CEC, Brussels, 1993), at 50.
200 
"Source: European Commission and Service Industries", Financial Times, March 1, 1994.
201 See F. ROMERO, Cross-Border Population Movements, in W. WALLACE (ed.), The Dynamics of
European Integration (London, Pinter, 1990).
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Labour markets remain in essence national, 202 whereas consumption is rapidly becoming
European. The Commission and the member states often overlooked this factor; according
to Sir Leon BI-ittan,
"... we have to bring Europe back to its people ... and what is needed is
investment; investment in ideas, in the superstructure, in humans".203
5.8.8. Some wide gaps
Finally it has to be stressed that, because of size, geographical, economic and social
conditions consumer awareness in some of the EU countries (namely Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain), is still low, compared with that of the rest of their partners: it
suffices to say that the Luxembourg Consumer's Union had, in 1989, more members than
the Italian and Portuguese organisations combined. 204 If we really want to have equal
opportunities for the citizens of the EU this is a problem that has to be addressed, because
the liberalisation of the markets will require stronger state and social institutions. 205 This is
202 See TSOUKALIS (1993), at 173-174.
203 L. BRI1TAN, "Three Crucial Challenges for the European Union", To Vima, February 20, 1994 (in
Greek). This is a partial confession of failure, since Commission President Delors proclaimed in 1985
that the launching of the SEA was "... a splendid opportunity for the Community to emerge from what
it is at present - a free trade area, plus budgetary transfers ... cohesion is a new idea, the idea that
convergence of economic and social policies - and not mere budgetary transfers - will in ten years'
time enable every Member State, including the poorest, to say that all in all Community life has been
of benefit": Bull. EC 11, 1985 at 17. See also K. FEATHERSTONE, The Mediterranean Challenge:
Cohesion and External Preferences, in J. LODGE (ed.) (1989), The European Community and the
Challenge of the Future (London, Pinter, 1989), at 197-198, arguing that "cohesion" is facilitating a
"pay - off' for the expansion of the market to the south.
204 See E. LAWLOR, Individual Choice and Higher Growth: The Aim of Consumer Policy in the Single
Market (Luxembourg, CEC, 1989), at 53-54.
205 The fact that consumers' associations have at least identified the need to use similar means with any
other competitor is heartening. It was reported that in 1989 in Brussels, the lobbyists' town, around
3,000 EC watchers were working for business interests, whereas no more than 30 people worked full
time on public interest causes. The Euro Citizen Action Service (ECAS) was created financed
initially by a quixotic property developer, but private initiative cannot replace the obligations of
Member States and the Commission to its citizens. See J. ERLICHMAN, "Lobby Service for
Pressure Groups Opens in Brussels", Guardian, June 29, 1989. V. KENDALL in EC Consumer Law
(London, Wiley Chancery, 1994) at 6-12 provides a comprehensive review of the origin of consumer
protection at the EU level from the development of representative groups at the national level in the
1 950s, to the setting up of European consumer organisations in the early 1960's, the consumer
programmes adopted in 1975, 1981, and 1986, with specific targets each time and finally the
adoption of action plans in the 1990's. At 19, she acknowledges that representation of consumer
interests has been difficult even at the national level and attributes the difficulties to "the sheer
diversity of concerns which they need to cover coupled with inadequacy of resources".
244
Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks
even more so because the real reason for this particular north - south gap in awareness
seems to lie simply in the difference in the degree of capacity to set up such organisations
rather than individual awareness. 206 It has been suggested that the principle of subsidiarity
in consumer affairs can be extended even further:
"... the ultimate aim is to delegate responsibility to the most effective agents in
the process: the consumers themselves",207
provided that their proper role in the economy is recognised in order to enable them exert
their rights at a maximum effect.208
Free flow of valid information between producers and consumers is one of the ways
ensuring that each fully understands the needs and the motives of the other. But it was also
made clear that this is not enough as long as the consumer is not supplied with a basic
legal recognition combined with the central and integrating influence of competition laws
on consumer protection.209
5.8.9. Two catalysts for harmonisation
At the European level proportionality will inevitably serve as the first catalyst in all the
conflicts described above. The principle of proportionality was defmed by the ECJ as
follows:
"[un order to establish whether a provision of Community law is consonant with
the principle of proportionality it is necessary to establish, in the first place,
whether the means it employs to achieve the aim correspond to the importance
of the aim and, in the second place, whether they are necessary for its
achievement."210
206 See for more details: BEUC (European Bureau of Consumers' Unions), Consumer Awareness in the
South (Brussels, BEUC/101 87, 1987).
207 LAWLOR (1989), at 12. Lawlor acknowledges that "... the unif'ing agent in an economic
community is the economic benefits it confers on its members".
208 Ibid.
209 SCHRICKER (1977), at 188.
210 Fromancais [1983] ECR 395, at 404.
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The second catalyst will be the possibility of fmding a state authority directly liable to pay
damages for failing to implement EU rules as a method for the EU to enforce its measures
on member states. In general there are two ways of ensuring the implementation of
Community Legislation. Under Art. 169 and, to a lesser degree, Art. 170 the Treaties
provide for a centralised form of control. Direct applicability of Community legislation
also gives to individuals the right to require from their national courts the application of
such legislation, creating a decentralised form of control. 211 Because of the diverse
traditions and the ever changing attitudes of the member states and the balances that the
institutions are trying to maintain, it has been suggested that
"... instead of concentrating only on the functioning of centralized control, the
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council should focus ... more
attention on strengthening decentralized control of the implementation of
Community law".212
Cases such as Francovich will reaffirm and widen earlier principles,213 and may give real
teeth to community law for community citizens by establishing these three conditions:
"The first was that the result laid down by the Directive involved rights
conferred on individuals. The second was that the content of the rights might be
identified on the basis of the provisions of the Directive. And the third was the
existence of a causal link between the failure by the Member State to fulfil its
obligations and the damage suffered by the person affected."214
5.8.10. A change of priorities
"The increasing specialization of the Community substance of the directives has
diluted their relationship to a European policy superior to them".215
211 Cases C-6 90 and C-9 90, Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic [1993] 2 CMLR 66.
212 C.D. EHLERMAN, Opening Speech at IVth Erenstein Colloquium, in H. SIEDENTOPF & J.
ZILLER (eds), Making European Policies Work - I Comparative Syntheses (London, Sage, 1988), at
148.
213 Factorfame [1990] ECR 1-2433.
214 As described by WYATT & DASH WOOD (1993), at 85.
215 See H. SIEDENTOPF, The Implementation of Directives in the Member States, in SIEDENTOPF &
ZILLER (eds) (1989) at 169 onwards; especially at 179.
246
Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks
At the same time the national institutions for coordinating European affairs have lost
much of their importance. In many fields European policy has become a domestic policy
in specialised European matters. The Community process of regulation and legislation is
therefore subject to the same centrifugal forces as the national processes and it is only
recently that new doors have opened up under the mottos of deregulation and of
"subsidiarity." Indeed it is a common complaint of the industry in Europe that member
states are failing to implement many of the important legislative initiatives adopted by
themselves. Consumer groups, trade associations and small businesses claimed that the
single market worked mainly for those with the determination and money to fight for
their rights and for those citizens living near borders, multinationals, and international
travellers already used to dealing with European borders.216
So proportionality and direct enforceability will probably be the catalysts that will allow
the re-discovery of existing common grounds between jurisdictions and redraw the rules
and balances of competition's game, because
"... individuals, who by and large resort to court proceedings infrequently and
only when all other avenues of redress are closed (one shotters), are perceived to
be at a considerable disadvantage vis-â-vis those (companies, traders, suppliers,
etc.) who make more or less constant use of the judicial process (repeat players):
the consumer - trader relationship is often taken as the paradigm for such an
unequal situation where one party has a "structurally irreconcilable advantage"
over the other".217
216 A business representative is quoted proposing that "... in policy terms [the Commission] should set the
overall goals and objectives and then let the governments themselves get on with it. But then I think
what they have to do is to be much more ruthless with enforcement". R. Brooke, European marketing
director of Price Waterhouse, the accountancy firm, by A. HILL, "Balloon Struggles to Get
Airborne", Financial Times, January 5, 1994. Surprisingly, this comment, comes very close to the
classical defmition of a Federal Cabinet as a Cabinet with limited functions but real powers: see H.
BRUGMANS, criticising the Thatcherite Bruge's view of Europe, in Britain and Europe: A Survey
(Hull, Benedicta Press, 1991), at 66-67.
217 European Consumer Law Group (ECLG), Report on Group Actions (Brussels, ECLG/8 82, 1982), as
quoted by LAWLOR (1989), at 54.
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5.9. Trade marks and competition
5.9.1. Law and economics and trade marks
The current predominant ideology behind trademarks is neoliberal market economics, in
particular of the Chicago School type. This is reinforced by the fact that the large majority
of the bibliography on the matter is Anglo-American and the continental writers who
touch upon the subject are either unfamiliar with or heavily influenced by such views,
which are then taken for granted. Lawyers who welcomed enthusiastically this new
approach to the law are reluctant to consider the view of economists who challenge the
general validity of Chicago School theory as an economic theory. As one economist
claims:
"[a]round 1975, the Chicago consensus had largely won. There wasn't any
market power in the economy because cartels always broke down and because
barriers to entry, predation and such, could not be equilibrium phenomena. We
now know this argument cannot be established by theory."218
Scherer proposes that the key for the theory's success lies in the fervor of its advocates:
"... as in other areas, the "Chicago School" has through superior organization,
fervor and timing, if not superior access to revealed truth, sent the rest of the
world reeling".219
Chicago draws much of its arguments from the model of perfect competition, and then
concedes that monopoly is possible, but will always be temporary. 22° Trade marks, anti-
trust and unfair competition are examined as if they operate in a market the constituents of
which are working as they should, and manufacturers, traders and consumers are all
218 See T.F. BRESNAHAN, "Comment, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity", Microeconomics,
226 (1991), at 227.
219 See SCHERER& ROSS (1990), at 541.
220 See M.W. REDER, "Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change", 20 Journal of Economic
Literature 1 (1982) and S. MARTIN, Industrial Economics - Economic Analysis and Public Policy
(New York, Macmillan, 1994), at 9-11,
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rational and perfectly infonned. A comment of Bork on product differentiation is a guide
for such a theoiy:
"[e]ntry into the field of differentiation would tend to return the profitability of
that activity to the competitive level ... If product differentiation succeeds, it is
because consumers like and respond to it."22'
Ultimately no single-firm or cartel monopoly can survive the power of competition that is
inherent in the markets. Even the possibility of competition, according to some
economists, and the threat of new entrants in a market will make the dominant firm think
before abusing its dominance and to avoid the accumulation of supranormal profits that
will attract new entrants and competition. Such behaviour is to be found in contestable
markets, defined as markets where the participants always choose an optimal behaviour;
this, when there is a chance for potential competition, obliges them to equal prices with
marginal costs, as is the case in perfect competition. 222 Nevertheless a precondition of the
theory, that there must be freedom of entry and exit with no sunk costs, makes it very
difficult to bring it in touch with real markets. 223 In short,
"... real world entry is a risky business, and entrants do not generally threaten
incumbents until they have gotten through a trial period which ends, for most, in
withdrawal from the market".224
221 R.H. BORK, "The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division", 75
Yale Law Journal 373 (1966), at 421-422. C. SHAPIRO, in "Premiums for High Quality Products as
Returns to Reputations", 98 Quarterly Journal of Economics 659 (1983), makes the point that the
ideas of reputation makes sense only in a world of imperfect competition: if product attributes were
perfectly observable prior to purchase then previous production of high quality items would not be
part of consumers' evaluations. But consumers have to look back to the past as an indicator of
present or future quality. He rules out guarantees as quality assuring mechanisms: guarantees are
imperfect tools of conveying information because the minimum quality that is legally enforceable
may be interpreted as the maximum quality.
222 See W. BAUMOL, "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theoiy of Industry Structure", 72
American Economic Review 1(1982).
223 This is the main point of W. SHEPERD's criticism in "Contestability Vs Competition", 74 American
Economic Review 572 (1984), which concentrates on the failure of Baumol to distinguish various
degrees of entry and sunk costs.
MARTIN (1994), at 86. At 11, Martin observes that: "Industrial economics was long a dialogue
between groups of researchers with very different methodologies and very different world-views.
The structure-conduct-performance school believed that elementary price theory was inadequate to
explain real-world events and that observation should guide the development of models sophisticated
enough to explain the real world. The Chicago school believed that contradictions between the
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The relevance of the above regarding trade marks lies in their inclusion in the list of
deterrents to potential entrants, a list that also includes product differentiation, economies
of scale, cost advantages, patents, crucial inputs, strategic pricing, research and
development, vertical integration and better access to sales' networks.
5.9.2. Trade marks and other intellectual property rights
The first thing that has to be said is that all industrial and intellectual property rights
function in a similar way in influencing competition. However, some commentators argue
that trade marks are in a league of their own, being predominantly pro-competitive, and
distinguish them from patents and copyrights. Rogers for example argues that patents and
copyrights are monopolies created by law whereas a trade-mark is quite a different thing
because there is no element of monopoly involved; trade marks preclude the idea of a
monopoly because they are the means of distinguishing one product from another. From
this follows that there are more than one products to choose from. If on the other hand
there is a monopoly then there is no need for distinguishing and then there is no need for
trade marks.225
Young submits that trade marks offer a quasi - monopoly and the opportunity to a firm to
lift itself a little above the "dead level" of competition, but
"... because [its] power to control the price of [its] product is in general much
more limited than that of the true monopolist, and because competition limits
and conditions [its] activities in other ways, [its] business is more properly called
competitive than monopolistic".226
However, Chamberlin rightly submits that in such views, and especially in those of
Rogers, there are explicit traces of the dialectic that monopoly and competition must be
predictions of elementary price theory and observations of the real world should be explained by
assuming that the observations were in error."
225 ROGERS E.S., "Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks", 14 Law and Contemporary
Problems 173 (1949)
226 YOUNG, in R.T. ELY, Monopolies and Trusts (New York, Arno Press, 1973), at 562-563.
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regarded only as alternatives.227 Answering Young, he points out that patents, for example,
do not confer a complete monopoly since single patents do not ordinarily "... give
exclusive control of one sort of business". 228 In addition to this argument it must be
stressed that it is true that the law confers a limited monopoly on the trade mark owner,
but this is only a necessary consequence imposed by the public interest "... in excluding
rival traders from the field in question".229
Rogers, concedes that consumers have assumed preferences and brand habits; these
preferences and habits are worth something to the producer of the goods since they
eliminate competition. There is nothing just as good as the branded product.23°
Nevertheless it has to be added that often trade marks are used
"... in furtherance of a monopoly scheme ... [as] an instrument only, not an
incarnation, of the monopoly. We should, therefore, be on guard that "the
tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic" (Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process, [1922], at 51), does not leave us with a theorem
of trademarks as vehicles of monopoly power which has no foundation in the
concepts of our modem law, no matter how closely trademarks may have been
linked in their early history to the then existing, differently constituted
monopolies",23'
but the distinction between monopolistic tools and a monopoly as such does not in any
way eliminate the suitability of trade marks for establishing a monopoly.
So there are two conclusions to be drawn, first that there are monopolies, created by signs
of distinction, and second that those monopolies interact with other intellectual property
rights.
CHAMBERLIN (1962), at 61.
228 Ibid, at 60-6 1.
229 D. SHANAHAN, The Trademark Right: Consumer Protection or Monopoly?, 72 TMR 233 (1982),
at 234-235.
230 ROGERS (1949).
231 P.H. BEHRENDT, Trademarks and Monopolies - Historical and Conceptual Foundations, 51
Trademark Reporter 853 (1961), at 862.
251
Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks
5.9.3. Some more comments on product differentiation and monopolistic
competition
An excellent example of product differentiation is the amount and quality of services
offered together with the actual product, since a product can be offered to different
markets characterised by the degree of support needed in each of them. Some will need
total support, others will need less and some none at all. Accordingly pricing and
marketing can vary ad infinitum.232
A UK example of such tactics is the offer of extended warranties by retailers, commonly
for electrical goods, after the expiration of one year guarantees. The sales' value of such
warranties accounts for less than 10% of the main retailers' sales, but analysts believe that
they account for a large part of the group's operating profits. Market inquiries by the
Office of Fair Trading have revealed a wide range of prices for extended warranties on the
same goods coupled with a lack of information about the choice of cover available to
consumers, and concluded that greater transparency was needed in the market.233
5.9.4. Trade marks role in competitive stages
In order to examine to appreciate the competitive significance of trade marks we will
follow Suttons stages' analysis and then look at the alternatives.
(1) Exogenous Sunk Costs
This is the case where the only sunk costs involved are the exogenously given setup costs
and the market consists of various firms producing an homogeneous product. Here it can
be said that the equilibrium structure of such markets reflects a tension between the size of
232 ss MATHUR., How Firms Compete: A New Classification of Generic Strategies, 14 Journal of
General Management 30 (1988).
233 N. BUCKLEY, "OFT To Investigate Warranties", Financial Times, March 1, 1994, and B.
HUTTON, "Warranties Under Fire", Financial Times, March 5 6, 1994.
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the setup costs necessary for entering the market and which must be recovered to justify
entry ex-post, and the intensity of price competition after entering the market. In short
"... more entrants mean lower prices, but the lower the prices (for any given
number of entrants), the less attractive will entry be".234
Here the role of trade marks is limited; since products are identical there is no incentive for
the consumer to make any particular choice. Accordingly, trade marks can only be used as
an indication of origin. They denote ownership of the marketed goods and facilitate first
allocation of payments and then firms' calculations over entry. The choice available to
firms is either not to enter the market or enter and set output in correlation with the
number of firms that have already entered the market. In more complicated markets
though there is also a third choice and a related hidden cost: wait for a better moment.235
It is stressed that all the different interpretations of the model have a common precondition
of some - however small - sunk costs. 236 Actually the existence of sunk costs brings
Sutton's model closer to real markets than Baumol's contestable markets.
Another point that is worth mentioning is that increases in the size of the market are
accompanied by a less than proportionate increase in the number of firms in the market
and accordingly an increase in the level of output per firm.237
Albeit, very few products are homogeneous in nature. Technically, product differentiation
can be horizontal and/or vertical.
234 SUTTON (1991), at 29.
235 This results from the fact that a decision for a product to be put in the market carries a degree of
irreversibility. Accordingly the choice of an investment carries within it at least the cost of waiting for
better information and a more appropriate point in time for acting. hvestments become a now-or-never
option only when they are realised. A theory developed by A. DIXIT & R. PINDYCK, in Investment
Under Uncertainty (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994) as presented in "Optional
Investing", The Economist, January 8, 1994.
236 See SUTTON (1991), at 36 and fitil.
237 Ibidat36-37.
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(2) Horizontal Product Differentiation
Horizontal models are those that conceive the possibility of alternative varieties at the
same cost, and allow consumers to rank the attraction of these The simplest
example is of alternative identical products produced at several geographical points of a
market. Consumers, dispersed within the marketplace, will maximise the utility obtained
from buying a product by choosing the source that is nearer to them.239
What all forms and models of horizontal product differentiation have in common is that,
"... for any vector of distinct products on offer, if all prices are equal (to
marginal cost, say), then all products enjoy a strictly positive market share".24°
(2)a Horizontal DLfferentiation and Single Product Firms
When producers, in such cases, market single products then the situation will be analogous
to that of homogeneous markets, only with the introduction of a geographical function.24'
Trade marks in this case function as signposts of actual origin; they could easily be the
station signs in a railroad connecting the points where the product may be obtained. Their
function is to allow consumers to express their rationality by choosing the most
convenient location and marketers to weigh the potential of their markets. The location of
producers on different points on the map may give rise to products that are spatially
differentiated. In particular when transportation costs are significant in relation to total
product value, as in steel, cement etc., pricing practices may entail significant elements of
discrimination. It is critical, for example, if the price is uniform for all customers,
238 See SUTTON (1991) at 38-39, and J.C. PANZAR & R.D. WILLIG, "Economies of Scope", 71
American Economic Review 262 (1981).
239 For the original example of the "transcontinental railroad" see H. HOTELLJNG, "Stability in
Competition", 39 Economic Journal 41(1929).
240 SUTTON (1991), at 39.
241 For the full analysis see A. SHAKED & J. SUTTON, "Product Differentiation and Industrial
Structure", 36 Journal of Industrial Economics 131(1987).
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regardless of the distance for delivery, or if the price is an F.O.B. price, with customers
covering outbound freight expenses, and so on.242
It must be added that advertising levels for homogeneous products are normally minimal
and usually occur when consumption of an homogeneous product is falling; then,
advertising messages concentrate at the product as a generic, and not as a branded one. An
interesting example that has to do with the geographic location of sale points is the UK
milk market. In 1980, 90% of households had milk delivered. Ten years later and, mainly,
after the super-markets price war, the percentage dropped to 69%, and the National Daiiy
Council estimated that, loosing one million customers a year, there would be nothing left
of the market within twelve years. The successful advertising campaign conveyed the
convenience of having milk delivered, rather than canying it home. It targeted the location
of the sale - point and the hidden inconvenience consumer costs that had to be added to the
supermarkets price.243
(2)b Horizontal Differentiation and Multi Product Firms
Since firms in this model are producing more than one products, the number of possible
situations in the market varies according to the criteria included in each particular model.
Some of them are cost - side characteristics. For example economies of scope are achieved
when several products share the same sunk costs: producing a product at a larger plant,
that produces other products as well, may be more cost effective than producing it in a
smaller exclusive unit. The impact of the particular product's output volume and the
242 See SCHERER & ROSS (1990), at 502-505, referring, for further analysis to M.L. GREENHUT, G.
NORMAN & C. HUNG, The Economics of Imperfect Competition: A Spatial Approach (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1987).
243 See for the advertising campaign, D. SUMMERS, "Gambling on a Gut - Feeling", Financial Times,
February 24, 1994. Other real examples of markets of homogeneous products with large, relative to
market size, set-up costs, low advertising and high concentration levels, are the markets for sugar and
salt: see the research of SUTTON (1991), at 132-161. The low concentration level of the market for
sugar in Japan is a result of the vigorous regulation of competition, a trip to a supermarket and a com-
parison of their number of brands with that of washing powders is evidence that we can all obtain.
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production plant's size on the product's total cost is pictured into the term "economies of
scope".2
Considering, on the other hand, the demand - side characteristics, it is suggested that we
have to examine two effects: the market expansion effect and the competition effect.
Market expansion is measured by the expansion of total industry sales caused by the
introduction of new products at given prices. The monopolist will offer new products in
order to attract new clients and the newcomer in order to cut the size of the monopolist's
market slice. It is expected that a stronger expansion effect will cause more concentrated
equilibria, but "... delicately dependent on the exact structure of the model specified"245
and the nature of the product. The competition effect measures the price change that
results from passing from the situation of a monopolist owning all products to one of each
product owned by a different firm, considering the list of avallable products is fixed. The
results in this case will be similar to the case of homogeneous products: stronger post
entry competition will favour markets with fewer participants.246
In both cases, though, the role of trade marks is neutral. Distinguishing criteria between
the same line of product are objective for all products and consumers. Of course all the
discourse on the symbolic value of goods remains valid for particular generic products -
fast cars as opposed to estate cars for example - but neutral for particular makes of
products - all fast cars would be the same.
(2)c Horizontal Djfferentiation and Leader - Firms
It is logical to expect that the innovative firm that came up with a new product and
launched it first in the market will enjoy an initial period of monopolistic dominance, at
least until imitating competitors will put in the market identical or similar products.
244 For economies of scale in general see Chapter 4.1 of SCHERER & ROSS (Dallas, Houghton Muffin,
1990) and for economies of scope see Ch. 4 of W.J. BAUMOL, J.C. PANZAR & R.D. WILLIG,
Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1982).
245 SUTFON (1991), at 41.
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Yet, and as Bain had put it,
"... the advantage to established sellers accruing from buyer preferences for their
products as opposed to potential entrant products is on average larger and more
frequent in occurrence at large values than any other barrier to entry".247
Bain's conclusions challenged the view that advertising was necessarily the main or most
important factor at work for such preferences, but he avoided describing explicitly any
mechanism which creates product differentiation advantages. 248 Assuming that consumers
are risk neutral, have infinite horizons and behave rationally, then a model described by
Schmalensee seems valid. At a first stage the pioneering brand is alone in the market, and
its product works the same for all the consumers willing to pay its price. At a second stage
even the objectively identical brand that enters the market will have to face consumers'
risk aversion and only when its pricing is significantly lower than that of the established
brand will it be able to erode the market segment of the second.249
Nevertheless, according to other commentators, the quantity and quality of the firm's
advertising may enhance the profits from innovation; this in turn may strengthen
investment in product R&D, aiming at a timely market introduction. 250 Advertising at this
level may be modest and informative, but it can also be at a higher scale than in strategic
symmetry, providing in some such cases a considerable advantage over an equally
efficient late entrant, because
246 A. SHAKED & J. SUTTON, "Multiproduct Firms and Market Structure", 21 Rand Journal of
Economics 45 (1990).
247 Js BAThI, Barriers to New Competition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press), at 216.
248 See R. SCHMALENSEE, "Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands", 72 American
Economic Review 349 (1982), at 349. Schmalensee himself referring mainly to Chapter 4 of Bain's
work and to marketing research of the 70's claims that marketing successes of pioneering brands have
to do with the consumer's preoccupation with quality. His assertion though that "me too brands",
claiming to sell identical to established brands' products at lower prices, have little success, is
challenged by the surge of generic products. At 360 he refers to Bain's observation that infrequency
of purchase contributes to strong product differentiation, which in part explains the success of
generic products at the low end of the market.
249 Ibid.
250 See F.M. SCHERER, "Research and Development Resource Allocation under Rivalry", 81 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 368 and 388 (1967).
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"... it may be unprofitable for the late entrant to attempt to achieve parity with
the leading firm at the top end of the market, and its advertising efforts may be
correspondingly muted".25'
Note that in 1993 the average cost for maintaining a top ten brand, incorporating
advertising and "below the line" expenditure figures for direct marketing, sales promotion,
trade promotion, and public relations, was calculated to be in the UK around the UKEl5m
mark, about 7% of sales.252
In such cases, advertising concentrates on strengthening the brand name of the first mover.
Then the name becomes associated with the generic product as such, price and/or quality
and any other product characteristic. For the association of a brand with the product as
such there are many examples: some are based on words, signs, etc. descriptive of the
product or of its qualities, but employed as brands. Similar examples are brands that grew
so strong and well established in the minds of the public that they became a synonym for
the generic product.253
251 SUTTON (1991), at 206.
252 A. MITHCELL, "A Costly Presence", Financial Times, September 1, 1994. Accordingly brands
which want to break in into the top ten must either establish a critical mass of sales, or face a very
high ratio of advertising and promotion to sales. Marks which are already there can strengthen their
position by shifting from brand to corporate name advertising, as is the case of Heinz, and getting rid
of their weaker and "costly to sustain" brands. We must keep in mind that advertising, to an extent,
lowers real prices, since it reduces consumers' transaction costs, namely the value of time and other
resources expended in selecting a brand of a particular type of product rather than selecting the
desired generic product: see R. POSNER, "The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis", 127
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 925 (1979). On the other hand D. NEEDHAM in "Entry
Barriers and Non-Price Aspects of Firms Behavior", 25 Journal of Industrial Economics 29 (1976)
claims that the general assumption that advertising outlays per unit of sales will be higher for entrants
than for established firms does not necessarily follow, even when established firms' advertising is
more effective then that of entrants. At 37 he claims that a "conclusion reached consistently in
empirical studies of factors underlying firm and industry profitability is that a positive and
statistically significant relationship between profit rates and advertising intensity in firms and
industries remains after eliminating the effects of other explanatory variables which underlie
profitability". Needham claims that even where advertising intensity and profit rates were found to be
positively associated a second major issue would be whether the positive relationship is attributable
to the effect of advertising on entry barriers and the resulting behaviour of potential entrants, or
whether it can instead be explained wholly in terns of the effect of advertising on the behaviour of
established firms. His theory undermines what is considered to be the consensus in this issue but does
not promote a new aspect.
253 This was the case with "Durex," used as a generic name for contraceptives which was considered a
deterrent to the entry of competing manufacturers; see MMC, Contraceptive Sheaths, Cmnd 8689,
November 1982, at 2.16, and N. PARR & M. HUGHES, "Consumer Brands and Advertising in
Competition Inquiries", 14 European Competition Law Review 157 (1993), at 160.
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5.9.5. The US and UK war of soups
An example of successfully associating brand name and price and of the resulting market
concentration is the juxtaposition of the US and UK markets for canned soups. In the US
Campbell was the first to enter the market and establish itself as the low cost producer,
after a heavy magazine advertising campaign combined with a low price policy. Heinz, the
challenger, has been a weak second ever since. Heinz mainly supplies retailers with
"retailers' own - label" products, having failed to establish its own position relying on
heavy advertising, promotional deals and a sophisticated sales network. It is an indicative
detail that in the early years of the century, Heinz's total selling costs exceeded one third
of its revenues. In the late eighties and early nineties, Campbell captured 80% of the
market. To strengthen further Sutton's theory, Lipton, who was the first to enter the
market for dried soups, and was eventually the first to advertise heavily, had, in 1986, a
32% of the market, and Campbell a mere 4%. Note that in that year Campbell had
outspent Lipton in overall advertising ($42,4 million compared to $ 16,9 million), but only
$5 million was spent for its dried soup product, whereas the total of Lipton's advertising
investment went to dried soup products.254
In the UK Heinz was the first to establish itself in the same market, and accordingly it
became identified as the low - cost producer whose pricing policy effectively shapes the
pattern of market shares. The interesting detail here is the slight differentiation of the type
of the product. Initially, since the 1930s Heinz had been selling, and relatively heavily
advertising, ready-to-serve canned soups. It was in the late 1950s that Campbell launched
in the UK its own range of condensed soups - which required heating and the addition of
an equal volume of water. Heinz and another market incumbent launched their own
condensed ranges. Advertising costs rose for all three main competitors who then captured
a combined 30% of the market. But Heinz apparently realised that it was playing
Campbell's game: persuading customers to switch from their established ready-to-serve
line to the condensed line, and offer itself to competition with Campbell, in a market
254 See SUTTON (1991), at 207-209.
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where they were all newcomers. It then dramatically altered its pricing strategy, offering
the condensed product at half the price of the ready-to-serve. This not only undermined
Campbell's position, but more importantly undermined the image of the condensed
product, portraying it as one of inferior quality. Consequently, the market for condensed
soups collapsed and has never since recovered; later Heinz withdrew completely from that
market, but retained roughly 60% of the ready-to-serve product, spending a similar
percentage of the total advertising. Campbell has about 12%, despite the periodical
disproportionate picking of its advertising expenditure.
So "Beanz meanz Heinz" was for decades not only an advertising slogan but also an
attempt to concentrate on Heinz's historical position and links with particular products.
The success of their current break with advertising tradition remains to be seen.255
5.9.6. The Greek yoghurt war
An analogous development supporting Sutton's position is provided by the Greek yoghurt
market which has been stable for the last decade. Fage was the dominating firm; it has
introduced to the Greek market a series of yoghurt based products and it was the only
overall significant player, with 65% of the market. Delta concentrated in the market for
milk having a 48% of the fresh milk market. Agno, enjoying the results of economies of
scope in northern Greece256 and a spin off success of its dominance in the market for fresh
milk, had a substantial segment of the market for both products. Delta and Fage were the
main advertisers but each concentrated on its own main products.
Lately these almost monopolistic situations broke down after a series of cross attacks and
huge marketing campaigns. In 1993 Fage introduced milk products and managed to gain a
255 See "Heinz Slogan a Has-Been", The Times, February 5, 1997 reporting in their new campaign
Heinz have dropped the slogan.
256 Namely Macedonia, another symbolic name, the origin of which is currently disputed between the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece. The author would welcome a solution based
on established principles of passing off, like concurrent use and confusion, the addition of some
disclaimers and additional distinguishing elements. It is interesting, though, that Greek reactions were
partially triggered by a decision of a German court which refused to Greeks originating from
Macedonia and now living in Germany to register the name of their "Macedonian Club".
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stake of almost 20%, partly due to a small erosion of Delta's slice, partly to the erosion of
the slice of smaller firms, and partly to the overall expansion of the market. Very similar
are the results of Delta's retaliation, a year after, and its attack on the market for yoghurt.
What is very interesting is that in their advertising wars both concentrated on which firm
introduced first each particular product in the Greek market, believing that this is what
counts in the consumer's mind. This, in turn, results in the introduction of all conceivable
product variations. But despite the amounts spent in advertising the positions remain
unchanged, although the market responded by growing significantly, at least in the short
term. It is characteristic that in 1993 the whole (milk and yoghurt) industry spent Dr.877m
on advertising, whereas during the first month of 1994 the two competitors spent for
yoghurt only Dr.150m. Many smaller players are quite happy with the advertising blitz,
expecting that even if their share becomes smaller it will be a share in a much larger
market.257
5.9.7. The world war of Colas
At the end of 1993, in the southern Chiapas region of Mexico, Coca Cola's advertising
message that "Coke is a revolution" was a prophesy rather than an advertising campaign:
the nick-name of the regional representative of the ruling PRI party was "El Pepsi" since
he was the owner of the plant manufacturing Pepsi Cola in the region. It is indeed the
unprecedented symbolic meaning and power of a brand name that made people declare
that they left the ruling party and drink Coke, or the local magistrates' courts enforce
"Cola justice", often making the defendant buy a Pepsi for the plaintiff as an alternative
way for disputes settlement. 258 It remains to be seen if the Zapatistas uprising will also
257 See (all in Greek), C. KORFIATIS & D. HARODAKIS, The Battle for the Food of Gods, To Vima,
February 20, 1994, An Interview with Agno's Managing Director, To Vima, February 27, 1994, C.
KORFIATIS & D. HARODAKIS, First Week of War, To Vima, February 27, 1994, V. NIKOLIKA-
KIS, Fage's Sales Rise by 66% in 1993, Nafteboriki, February 13, 1994, and V. NIKOLIKAKIS,
Delta Enters the Markets of France and Italy, Nafteboriki, December 21, 1993.
258 T. PADGETT, The War of Colas and the Zapatistas, To Vima (Newsweek), February 27, 1994 (in
Greek).
261
Competition and the Economics of Trade Marks
result in the erosion of the local Pepsi domination. But this is a small part of the relentless
Cola war world wide, 259 and a change to the image of Coke's supremacy.
Indeed the challenge that Coca Cola is creating against Snapple -the big name in the world
of New Age natural drinks - may further strengthen Sutton's theory. Coca Cola launched
Fruitopia, backing it by a $30m marketing campaign, planning to raise its 8% stake in the
market to 15% initially and 30% within three years. Snapple seems unconcerned by the
move, claiming that extra advertising will accelerate the market's growth.26°
5.9.8. Price competition: the norm for aggression
Prices, of course, remain the norm for aggressive competition being relatively easy for
regulators to monitor and colluders in cartels to observe; however price competition is
usually the last resort.
When for example a brand name is unknown, and the relevant market abundant of
divergent levels of qualities and prices, then the only way to gain entrance is by disrupting
the market by undercutting competitors' prices. Market research for Kia, an unknown
South Korean car maker in the US, showed that the public was "tired" of automotive
advertising in general and was not receptive to the introduction of another manufacturer,
so the only strategy available was to underprice its rivals, while offering competitive
quality and superior levels of standard equipment and creating an impact for its name.26'
259 For another implication of politico-economic decisions and strategies in the Cola wars reference can
be made to the fact that in Saudi Arabia Coca Cola is known as the red Pepsi; this is the result of the
exclusion of Coca Cola from the local market for a period of twenty five years, due to the Arab
boycott against the company resulting from its presence in Israel; see A Red Line in the Sand, The
Economist, October 1, 1994.
260 R. TOMKINS, Coca - Cola Looks to the Grape Beyond, Financial Times, March 2, 1994. Note that
Coca Cola is now using aboriginal emblems and names such as "Mind Over Mango" to capture our
imagination.
261 See, K. DONE, Monster Challenge for Cut-Price Kia, Financial Times, January 20, 1994.
HOTELLING (1929) builds his hypothesis on the fact that price and real product variety are two
things with which firms do not play; consumers are not accustomed to radical change and thus what
is offered to them is variations on the same product. However consumerism is becoming more radical
in itself, so the borders of acceptable change are shifting.
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This example gives further credit to Shcmalensee's model; nevertheless it refers to an over
populated market rather than one of pioneers.
5.10. Conclusion
Marketers and consumers interact in the marketplace. The result of this interaction is a
competitive market with an infinite number of possible variations. The number is
infrnite because of the multitude of product variations and the complexities of human
behaviour. In this marketplace, trade marks serve a dual purpose. Firstly, they convey
information between the market participants. Secondly, they function themselves as
information. In this way trade marks have acquired a degree of independence from the
product they mark. At the same time trade marks are part of a wider picture. They are
part of a web of intellectual property rights. And also, although their aura knows no
limits, the exercise of the right is territorial.
The result of their complicated nature is that their relation with competition is a
paradox. They are essential for competition to exist. Plainly, a market without trade
marks cannot function as a market. But trade marks can also be raised as barriers to
market entry: those who have first entered a market, those who take advantage of
advertising, and those who exploit the fact that trade marks are territorial can arguably
use trade marks in undermining a competitive equilibrium in the marketplace.
Trade marks do influence the state of the market and their close link with competition
cannot be ignored. Therefore in relation to competition trade marks cannot be left on
their own. Some regulation seems inevitable. However the crucial question is the scope
of such regulation.
However, in regulating trade marks we must not overlook their nature as information.
Often we concentrate on their value as property. This value is the direct result of their
nature. Accordingly, protection must target trade marks as information. No protection
and overprotection may destroy their information perspective. The extent of protection
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can only be decided on the basis of economic analysis and more importantly by
answering the fundamental question: what do we want to protect in a trade mark?
264
Conclusion
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
6.1. The communicative aspects of trade marks - The common
threads
6.1.1. A historical review
In chapter two of this work trade marks were viewed from a historical perspective
following their transformation from demarcations of ownership - stating that the marked
object belongs to the marker - to indications of origin, product quality, craftsmanship,
and creativity - evidencing the origin of good wine, product safety, or the pride of the
creator of the work. We have also seen that from the very beginning trade marks were
often seen as the tools for enforcing monopolies or discriminating against imported
products.
Although this development involved different apparent functions, in practice differences
from today's perceptions of trade marks should be based on a better theoretical
understanding of trade marks and fuller appreciation. It is not necessary to posit radical
changes in the role of trade marks on the marketplace. Marks and, later, trade marks
were created and used because humans had the need to communicate with each other
effectively.
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6.1.2. Property and trade marks
Given this early indication of the communicative nature of trade marks it was appealing
to ignore what was characterised in chapter three as a deontological argumentation
based on property theories and concentrate on the economic-exchange functions of trade
marks. However, such an analysis would be incomplete because it would bypass the fact
that in law trade marks are explicitly recognised as objects of property and would also
ignore the current trend of looking at trade marks as assets deserving protection because
of their value rather than their function.
At the end, property theories proved appealing because paradoxically they introduced a
very strong theoretical basis of bringing the consumer into the trade mark field as an
active player rather than a passive viewer or indicator. Trade marks as information in a
one way system would not deserve protection if no one was first perceiving and then
acknowledging the information. And, even more importantly, trade marks as a multi-
directional system of communicating information again would not deserve protection
unless all parties were actively participating.
In other words, claims conveyed by trade marks would be irrelevant if they were not
acknowledged and used as the basis for action on the marketplace. And since it takes
more than one to communicate, then all parties participating in the system of
communication should have recognised and protectable property rights in the relevant
parts of the system.
6.1.3. An overview of trade mark functions
The theoretical deontological arguments were strengthened by the empirical evidence
used in describing the "modern" functions of trade marks. In chapter four the focus was
on the consumer's understanding of trade marks, the importance of consumption in
economic and social terms, and the working of this multi-directional system of
information that was already tentatively described in chapter three.
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Indeed there is ample evidence that trade marks have so many and such varied functions
that in many cases the system devised for their protection is perplexed and uncertain, for
example as to whether enforcement ought to be private or public, take into account the
snob value of trade marks or not, concentrate on trade marks as indications of origin or
accept as protectable other functions already recognised in general but still too nebulous
to describe in detail. The problem is exaggerated first by the fact that trade marks are
perceived by many as the easy way to obtain protection for elements of a product and
also by the claim that trade marks are eroding the territory traditionally covered by other
intellectual property rights.
Finally, by looking in chapter four at how trade marks actually work it has been
confirmed that trade marks are at the same time information and also a complex system
of conveying information. Without trade marks, markets as we know them would not
exist.
6.1.4. The economics of trade marks
The fmal part of this thesis was an exercise in testing this emerging view of trade marks
in terms of economics. It is obvious that trade marks are the absolute prerequisite for
competition: if one is unable to distinguish one product from the other then there is no
mechanism for choice nor incentive for marketers to compete.
But at the same time, as evidenced from the historical review and confirmed in the
analysis of functions, trade marks are used as barriers against new entrants in product
markets and as tools to compartmentalise national markets. Do these negative aspects
outweigh the advantages of a competitive market evidenced and enabled by the presence
of distinctive signs?
By looking at a number of different market situations it has been reconfirmed that trade
marks are an extremely valuable, and at most times rational, system of exchanging
information. And although it is very difficult to agree on objective terms on what
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constitutes a malfunction of the system, it is misuse of the system that causes the
malfunctions rather than weaknesses inherent in trade marks themselves.
6.2. Concluding remarks
As mentioned in the introduction the purpose of this thesis' was not to provide a
detailed analysis of all the conflicts arising within trade mark law itself and between
trade mark law and other areas of legal or other regulation. An attempt to provide in a
single thesis definitive answers to a long list of complicated issues in an ever changing
environment would be unhelpful if not misleading.
Instead, the aim was to explore and underline the fundamental elements of the nature
and the functioning of trade marks, viewed from diverse but inextricably linked
perspectives: the history of trade marks, trade marks as property, the functions of trade
marks, and the economics of trade marks.
The hypothesis was that trade marks not only consisted of information but also
constituted a system for conveying a variety of messages between the users of this
system, including marketers and consumers.
Accordingly, throughout this work it has been argued, hopefully convincingly, that trade
marks ought to be protected, not only as legitimate objects of property, but also should
be protected as a result of their function in society and the marketplace. The essence of
trade marks is their communicative nature providing the rational basis for accepting that
trade mark rights are property rights but also the limitations on trade mark protection.
A good example is the controversy surrounding trade marks for tobacco products. The
proprietors of such trade marks must be free to exercise their property rights and use
their trade marks on tobacco products. The exercise of their rights, including use in
advertising, may however be limited on the basis of their societal effects. Their
'Chapter 1, at 13.
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economic value as brands for tobacco products may also determine whether their use in
relation to non tobacco products constitutes genuine or advertising use. Dilution theories
offering wider protection for well known marks on the one hand and used as fences
against predatory competitive practices on the other ensure that, irrespective of
limitations imposed on the use of trade marks for tobacco products, their proprietors are
adequately protected. So, in any possible scenario involving such a trade mark we
cannot avoid an analysis on the limitations imposed on property rights taking into
account the functions and economics of trade marks.
It has been shown, that even in less controversial areas, the actual information that trade
marks convey changes according to economic and social considerations; what today is
innovative and exclusive tomorrow may become outdated and common. Accordingly,
an attempt to exclusively protect specific messages conveyed by trade marks would not
only be futile and static but also anti-productive in terms of efficiency since trade marks
would be protected exclusively as means to sustain the status quo of the marketplace.
On the other hand it has also been shown that the existence of trade marks triggers and
dominates a complex system of multi-directional information exchanges. Failures in the
functioning of such a system could have negative deontological and consequentialist
results. Goodwill, for example, would be unprotected and this would, in turn, cause
market inefficiencies. The marketer would remain un-rewarded and the consumer under-
supplied. This would damage their position as partners in the system of information and
also their level of well being. So, the continuity and integrity of the system must be
protected. This means that a rational system of trade mark protection must ensure that
information flows freely in all directions. Too much protection will distort the flow by
blocking it: competitors do not know where their rights stop and the rights of others
start and consumers are deprived from information that would be otherwise available.
Too little protection will distort the flow by draining it: not trusting the system,
marketers and consumers alike will gradually refuse to participate.
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This is the only rational basis for trade mark protection: protect the integrity and
functioning of the medium rather than exclusively what we perceive each time to be the
current value of the message.
Legislators and, perhaps even more importantly, judges, aware of the complex nature of
trade marks, must always consider why and to what extent a trade mark must be
protected. Trade mark rights are property rights but in each specific case their extent
must be delineated on the basis of the function of the trade mark in society and the
marketplace.
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